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SUMMARY 
Much of the study of the British Conservative Party has been concerned
with the power of the Party Leader. Two conflicting interpretations
have been presented: the monolithic view that power lies essentially
in the hands of the Leader, and the pluralist view that power is
widely dispersed within the party.
	 This dissertation examines the
validity of these interpretations with regard to the question of
Britain's attitude to European integration from 1945 to 1975, an
issue which has traditionally been seen to support the monolithic
view.	 The primary method of investigation in this study has been
the examination of primary sources in the archives of the Conservative
Party and other relevant bodies, supported by interviews with
participants.
The Introduction presents the two interpretations and
demonstrates that the monolithic view has been widely presented as
the correct one to explain the party's position on European integration.
Chapter One reviews the literature on the distribution of power within
the Conservative Party.	 Within the framework of the various elements
that make up the party, the issue is examined chronologically.
Chapter Two examines 1945 to 1951; Chapter Three, 1951 to 1960;
Chapter Four, 1961 to 1963; Chapter Five, 1963 to 1970; Chapter 6,
1970 to 1972; and Chapter Seven, 1973-1975.
	 The final chapter argues
that the electoral orientation of the Conservative Party leads to a
pluralist distribution of power, and that the study of the European
issue supports that interpretation. 	 This thesis substantially
undermines an important source of support for the monolithic
interpretation and provides additional support for the pluralist view
of the distribution of power within the Conservative Party.
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Introduction 
Discussions of the Conservative Party have traditionally
emphasised the powers of the Leader. McKenzie, in his seminal work
on British Political Parties, stated, "The most striking feature of
the Conservative party organisation is the enormous powers which
appear to be concentrated in the hands of the Leader". (1)	 "It
would be difficult to envisage a more tight-knit system of oligarchic
control of the affairs of a political party". (2) Samuel Beer, in
his classic study of Modern British Politics, stressed that "The Tory
conception of the wide and independent authority of Government and
parliamentary leaders implies that they will have a very free hand
(3)to do what they think best". Official party documents tend to
confirm this view.	 The Maxwell Fyfe Report described the Leader as
(4)
"the main fountain and interpreter of policy".	 Hoffman stated
that "the party constitution accords what appears to be close to
dictatorial powers to the Leader of the party in the matter of
policy-making". (5) This view has been described as a monarchical
or a Hobbesian model of the distribution of power within the
(5)Conservative Party.
McKenzie saw the power of the Leader as arising from three
factors: his security of tenure, the wide range of appointments
within his control, and his exclusive right to determine party policy.
Beer found the source of his power as arising from the ideology of
the party which stresses hierarchy, authority and leadership.	 Nigel
Fisher emphasised the security of tenure, that "a Prime Minister who
is in good health and enjoys the support of his Cabinet colleagues
is virtually immovable", (7) while Gamble stressed the ability of the
Leader to manipulate the party to support his policies. (8)
An alternative, and more pluralistic, view of the Conservative
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party has been presented. Pinto-Duchinsky argued that in practice
"informal manoeuvres and compromise between leaders, M.P.s and local
associations are essential to the maintenance of party unity and to
the formation of policy". (9) Behrens believed that the huge
formal authority of the Leader was circumscribed within defined
limits and involved a high degree of consultation with other elements
of the party, which.he described as "the traditional form of
conversation". (10) Norton and Aughey found the Hobbesian model
less useful than "a traditional family" model, which emphasised the
responsibilities as well as the rights of the various elements of the
(11)party •
	 The monolithic and pluralist models are competing
descriptions of the Conservative Party.
The monolithic view of the Conservative Party has been supported
by studies of Britain's attitude to European integration.
	 These
studies have placed heavy emphasis on the role of the Party Leader in
creating Conservative support for Britain's involvement with European
unity.	 The story of the Conservative attitude to Europe has been
written in the names of three men: Winston Churchill, Harold
Macmillan and Edward Heath.
Most studies of Britain and her post-war relations with the rest
of Europe start with Churchill's speech in Zurich in 1946 and his
(12)
call for a United States of Europe.
	 Duncan Sandys stated that
(13)
"it was Churchill's voice which first called upon Europe to unite".
Most Conservative publications on Europe referred to Churchill's role
as an inspiration of the European Movement in the immediate post-war
period.	 Churchill was seen as the chief spokesman for the European
idea in Britain at this time.
The role of Harold Macmillan in the first application for British
membership of the European Community in 1961 has received considerable
3
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emphasis in most discussions of this event.
	 Lindsay and Harrington,
in their history of the Conservative Party, believed that "The
conversion of the Conservative party to the Common Market was one of
the more remarkable of Macmillan's political achievements, for the
whole enterprise stood in flat contradiction to all the traditional
instincts of the party, which were for national sovereignty at any
price". (14) Ronald Butt shared this view that "the decision taken
by the Macmillan government flew in the face of most of the instincts
of the Conservative Party, and most of the traditional interests •
supporting it... .The Prime Minister himself was the decisive
factor". (15) Drew Middleton wrote that "without Macmillan the
Tories would never have approached Europe and that if Britain does
enter Europe it will be because of his leadership.
	 The role of
Harold Macmillan in this great decision has been stressed
intentionally... .The decision to seek union with Europe was Macmillan's...
in the sense that the will of the Prime Minister dominated the
(16)Cabinet".
	 Greenwood and Wilson attribute the lack of intra-party
opposition to Macmillan. (17)
A similar attribution of power in this issue was given to Edward
Heath.	 Kitzinger felt "It was this personal commitment to Europe on
the part of the Party Leader which prevented the Conservatives from
giving up in the course of the sixties, prevented them from opposing
Harold Wilson's attempt to enter the Community, and then committed the
Conservative Party to pursue that application when on all the evidence
the majority of local associations and a very large section of the
(18)parliamentary party were distinctly cool or hostile".
	 "He knew
what he wanted; British entry to the Common Market.
	 Britain joined".
(Rose) (19) Burch argued that his interest in EEC not only explains
British entry, but also Conservative policies on taxation and
agriculture. (20)
	 4
The thesis of this study is that the role of the Conservative
Party and the European issue supports the pluralist view of the nature
of the party, and not the monolithic view of most of the literature
on Britain and Europe. This thesis will argue that the view that
European policy was decided personally.by
 the leader and against the
wishes of the rest of the Party is mistaken.
	 The success in getting
the Party to support British involvement with Europe has been
attributed to the tremendous power of the Leader. Whilst not
rejecting the importance of the Leader, this thesis emphasises the
role played by the other elements of the Party in determining
European policy.
A leader can successfully lead the Party in new directions only
when there is already widespread support for movement in that
direction.	 Macmillan was able to lead his Party into applying for
EEC membership because many of the elements in the Party and
associated with it were already pro-European.
	 Such groups included
the early 'Europeans' in the Cabinet, a group of vocal young M.P.s
' in the Parliamentary Party, some parts of the voluntary side
especially amongst the youth sections, the advisers in Central Office,
most of the intellectuals in the Party, much of industry and
agriculture, the Tory press and the target voter.
	 Those groups
believed to be opposed to entry, the Commonwealth lobby, the right
and agriculture were by no means united in their opposition. Under
Heath nearly all parts of the Party favoured membership, even though
there was considerable criticism of the way in which Heath attempted
to carry out the policy.	 Outright opposition was confined to a
distinct, if vocal, minority.	 By the time of the referendum in 1975
most Conservatives actively participated in the campaign, through
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Party or non-Party structures, without the necessity of a strong lead
from above. Support for British participation in Europe was not
confined to the Leaders.
This study will attempt to demonstrate this thesis by examining
the part played by the various elements of the Party during the
stages of development of Britain's relations with Europe.
	 Chapter
One provides an understanding of the structur6s, both formal and
informal, of the Conservative Party.
	 Later chapters will use this
presentation of the different elements as a framework to study
activity during the various periods of development from 1945 to 1975.
Chapter Two presents the beginning of the positive Conservative
attitude to Europe in the immediate post-war period of 1945 to 1951
when they were in opposition to the Labour Government.
	 Chapter Three
examines the position of the Conservative Party in government from
1951 to 1960.
	 The first application for membership of the European
Economic Community, considered in Chapter Four, was made in 1961,
discussed through 1962 but vetoed by General De Gaulle in early 1963.
The response to the veto and the later restatement of a Conservative
commitment to seek membership during the period 1963 to 1970, mainly
spent in opposition, is covered in Chapter Five.
	 The Conservative
Government elected in 1970 vigorously pursued British entry until
membership was achieved on 1st January 1973, discussed in Chapter Six.
The Conservative response to membership and the referendum campaign
of 1975 is examined in Chapter Seven. This study therefore examines
a 30 year period from 1945, when the idea of European unity first
arrived on the political agenda in Britain, to 1975 when the British
people endorsed British membership of the European Community in a
referendum.
The Conservative Party and European integration is assessed
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through a re-examination of secondary texts, the study of the records
of the Conservative Party deposited at Nuffield College, Oxford, and
through a series of interviews.
	 Secondary texts on Britain and
Europe and on the Conservative Party were examined for evidence
concerning the Party's participation in this issue. Records of the
Conservative Party, primarily of Conservative Central Office and the
Research Department, were deposited at Nuffield College, Oxford.
They are, however, covered by the 30 year rule as with Cabinet records
whichwouldhave effectively excluded most of the period of this
study. Fortunately special dispensation was obtained from Lord
Thorneycroft, then Party Chairman, to examine records up to 1975.
The papers were not well kept by the originators so were freqUently
incomplete, and the archivists had not yet been able to properly
organise and record the material.
	 Despite the incompleteness, they
provided considerable new evidence as to the activities of Central
Office and their assessment of Party opinion.
	 These records were
supported by the archives of groups such as the Conservative Group
for Europe and the Anti-Common Market League.
	 The third source was
a series of interviews with participants in the events described
here, both pro and anti-marketeers.
	 Regrettably many of them
preferred to remain anonymous, partly from a desire not to re-open
old wounds. It was, therefore, decided not to use new information
that could not be directly attributed, but to use the interviews to
confirm or deny statements of fact and to assist in a more accurate
Judgement of events.
The thesis presented here is that an examination of the
Conservative Party and European unity supports a pluralist conception
of the distribution of power within the Conservative Party.
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CHAPTER ONE:	 THE NATURE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY 
An assessment of the role of the Conservative Party in the issue
of European integration requires an understanding of the organisational
structures of the Party and the debate about the role of the Leader
within them.
This chapter will examine the role of the Leader, the Cabinet or
Shadow Cabinet, the Parliamentary Party, the National Union, Central
Office, the informal associates of the Party and the Conservative
electorate.
	 In the rest of this dissertation the role played by the
various elements of the Conservative Party in the development of the
Party's approach to Europe will be examined.
The Leader 
The power of the Conservative Party Leader is said to rest on
four factors: (i) the security of tenure of the leader; (ii) the
large number of appointments available to the Leader, of the Cabinet,
front bench spokesmen, honours, and Central Office; (iii) the leader's
role as the policy-maker; and (iv) the acceptance of the authority of
the Leader.
	 McKenzie emphasised the first three and Beer the final
factor.
Until 1975 the Leader, once chosen, had unlimited security of
tenure with no formal means of removal available.
	 The process of
selection changed considerably during the peribd of this study.
	 For
20 of the years covered, and for the previoua years in the Party's
history, the Leader had emerged through a period of consultation among
leading figures of the Party.
	 This was the process for the selection
of Churchill, Eden, Macmillan and Home.
	 The advantage of this method
was the avoidance of Party disunity.
	 As one M.P. expressed it at the
10
election of Bonar Law in 1911,
"Great leaders are not elected, they are evolved....
The leader is there, and we all know it when he is
there... .If one voice of doubt is raised now it will
be seized upon and will be magnified into party
disunion at a most critical time.
	 That I sincerely
hope we may avoid". (1)
Controversy failed to be avoided in 1957 with the Queen's involvement
in the choice of Macmillan, and in 1963 when the selection of Home
caused great public disunity and the refusal of lain Macleod and
Enoch Powell to sit in the Cabinet.
	 Macleod wrote a strong attack
on selection by "the magic circle". (2)
In response to the failure to perform the function of avoiding
disunity, Home introduced a new system of election by the votes of
the Parliamentary Party. Designed to achieve a leader with broad
based support, a candidate needed an overall majority plus 15% of the
votes cast on the first ballot.
	 A second ballot was then held, and
if no candidate received the requisite weighted majority, a third
ballot was taken on the alternative vote system which favours the
least unacceptable candidate.
	 As an official party publication
noted, "The new procedure makes no provision for periodic re-election
and the Leader of the Party remains in office until he resigns". (3)
With the private expression of dissatisfaction with his leadership,
Home resigned in 1965 and Heath was elected under the new procedure.
The lack of a formal procedure to remove the Leader was raised
during a period of intense dissatisfaction with Heath after the two
electoral defeats of 1974.
	 The rules were amended to require an
absolute majority and 15% of all eligible voters, and provision for
regular election at the start of a new Parliament and each Parliamentary
session.	 Mrs. Thatcher then challenged Heath and to general surprise
defeated him on the first ballot, and was elected on the second
ballot.
	 Thus the formal security of tenure has ended.
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It is not clear, however, that these formal changes have made a
substantial difference to the position of the Leader.
	 As McKenzie
stated, "When appointed the leader leads and the party follows, except
when the party decides not to follow - then the Leader ceases to be
(4)
Leader".
	 Fisher quoted Churchill that "The loyalties which
centre upon number one are enormous.
	 If he trips he must be sustained.
If he makes mistakes they must be covered.
	 If he sleeps he must not
(5)be wantonly disturbed.
	 If he is no good, he must be pole-axed".
The leadership has been far more insecure in reality than in theory,
when party pressure can be identified as an element in the change of
every leader in the post-war period.
	 The more significant question is
whether the mere holding of the position brings with it considerable
power, when a formal position may be held with little opportunity to
make the decisions.	 The powers of the Leader must be examined.
The second source of power has been identified as the power of
appointment.	 As Prime Minister, he appoints all the ministers, not
only the Cabinet of around 20 people, but also the 60-70 ministerial
appointments.	 As Leader of the Opposition, he appoints the Leader's
Consultative Committee, commonly known as the Shadow Cabinet, and
other front bench spokesmen.
	 The Chief Whip is appointed to manage
the parliamentary party, and the Leader has numerous honours, such as
Knighthoods and Peerages, to reward loyal backbenchers.
	 On the party
organisation he appoints the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Party
organisation to run Central Office, the Chairmen of the Research
Department, the Party Treasurers and the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen
of the Advisory Committee on Policy.
	 The importance of these
appointments will be examined later in this chapter.
	
The third factor is the power of the Leader to make policy.
	 The
Leader has the sole responsibility for the making of policy.
	
Party
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policy is what the Leader says it is. The election manifesto and
other policy documents are the responsibility of the Leader. The
Maxwell Fyfe Report described him as "the main fountain and interpreter
of policy....Endorsements and pronouncements on Party policy are the
(6)prerogatives and responsibility of the Leader".	 As Conservative
principles are viewed as highly flexible and "electoral perspectives
are the ideology of the leadership", (7) the Leader is believed to
have a very wide range of choice in the selection of policy.
In practice the Leader must conduct a wide range of consultation
before deciding policy.	 The Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet, the
Parliamentary Party, Central Office, the Advisory Committee on Policy
and the National Union will all participate in the discussion of
policy.	 What is practical, what is acceptable within the party and
what is electorally acceptable are all major considerations apart
from the personal wishes of the Leader. 	 It is accepted that the
final decision rests with the Leader, but that decision is rarely taken
without extensive consultation throughout the party, and if that advice
is consistently ignored there could be the public expression of
intense dissatisfaction.
The fourth factor is the Tory belief in authority, hierarchy and
deference, which places considerable power in the hands of the Leader.
This power is legitimated by a Tory view of the Constitution which
"trusts men of the governing class to do 'what is necessary' in any
particular set of circumstances.	 As the nature of governing requires
wide discretion for the governors, the capacities of the governing
class justify their independent authority". (8)Layton-Henry
(9)described this as the theory of authoritative leadership. 	 This is
best seen in the emphasis on loyalty to the leadership and a reluctance
to publicly express criticism. 	 Maxwell-Fyfe claimed that "loyalty was
(10)	 3the Tories secret weapon". 	 The acceptance of the right of the1
Leader to make decisions and the duty to support him provides him with
great authority.
However that authority is not unlimited.
	 Authority, by its
very nature, is voluntary and can be withdrawn. Authority implies
responsibility, a responsibility to make considerable efforts through
consultation to ensure that the decisions are correct, and responsibility
to accept the consequences of his decisions.
	
The relationship is more
one of a Lockean contract than a Hobbesian one.
	
In the Hobbesian
model the Leader as Leviathan is given absolute power and total
obedience, which will only be removed in the most extreme of
circumstances.
	
In the Lockean model the Leader is given wide
authority to act within certain limits, that the policies shall be
acceptable within Conservative principles and lead to electoral
success.	 The party may reasonably discuss whether the Leader's
policies fit their two criteria, and therefore consent or loyalty may
be withdrawn.
Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet 
The Cabinet or the Shadow Cabinet, and other front bench positions,
are appointed by the Leader, who decides the allocation of
responsibilities. 	 Unlike Labour, there is no group elected by the
parliamentary party from which the Leader must select his spokesmen.
A Leader, therefore, could in theory select a group of loyal 'Yes-men',
(11)
as Heath was accused of doing in the 1970-74 government. 	 In
practice there are severe limits on choice. 	 Constitutionally they
must be Members of Parliament, proving a considerable restriction
compared to the power of the U.S. President. 	 Leading M.P.s, with
considerable support in the Parliamentary Party, cannot be excluded,
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as with James Prior in the Thatcher government. Political skill and
standing are not always to be found in abundance. A large number of
the Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet will already be automatic choices.
There are real limits to choice. (12)
The theory of collective responsibility is still respected, at
least in Conservative governments, and is usually applied in the
Shadow Cabinets too.	 The sheer range of issues that need to be
considered prevent close supervision by the Leader, and in practice
the initiative for most policy developments rests with the Minister
or Shadow spokesman.	 Chris Patten, secretary to the Shadow Cabinet
for much of the 1974-79 period, wrote, "The Shadow Cabinet is in effect
the collective policy-making body in opposition, and because of the
additional strength which this gives to any policy statement, no
sensible leader would have it otherwise". (13) Punnett, in the most
detailed study of opposition politics, has also noted the importance
of the role played by individual spokesmen. (14) Any Leader requires
substantial information as to what is practical, acceptable to the
party, and electorally rewarding, and uses the Cabinet or Shadow
Cabinet as a significant source of this information.	 No Leader can
successfully impose his policies against the will of "the big beasts
in the jungle", the senior political figures represented in the
Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet.
Parliamentary Party 
The Conservative Parliamentary Party has been viewed as little
more than lobby-fodder in support of the party line.
	
The evidence for
this is found in the high degree of party cohesion in parliamentary
votes.	 If a three-line whip is established, the degree of intra-party
dissent is likely to be small, if any.
	 The Leader is thus presented
as being able to rely on a pliant parliamentary party. 	 The reasons
presented for this cohesion are several: the power of dissolution;
the withdrawal of the whip; career aspirations; the power of the
whips' patronage; appeals to loyalty arising from group identity; and
fear of deselection.
The power of dissolution is supposed to strike fear into the
minds of M.P.s that an election might lead to the loss of their seats.
Butt, however, argued that "Dissolution, in circumstances of a revolt
by an important section of the parliamentary party supporting the
Government is likely to be potentially more dangerous to the party
leaders than to the rank and file.	 The outcome is likely to be loss
of office for all the leaders - whereas only some of the rank and file
are likely to lose their seats". (15) The power to withdraw the Whip
from a member would lose that M.P. some of the organisational
advantages of party membership in the House, and above all threaten
the possibility of re-election to.the House. 	 The Whips, however,
have found it too heavy a form of discipline, ineffective when it has
been applied, and creates an impression of disunity which they wish
to avoid.	 The Whips have allowed the practice to go into disuse,
"as it looks suspiciously like a blunt instrument". (16)
Ministerial office, or the position of spokesman as a preliminary
to such office, is the traditional ambition of backbenchers, and this
lies in the hands of the Leader.	 Dissent, however, is no automatic
handicap to promotion and indeed may be an advantage.	 Rebels may be
appointed in order to co-opt them and reduce their rebelliousness.
Mackintosh claimed "some backbenchers are appointed precisely in order
to reduce the number of vocal opponents of government policy". (17)
Francis Pym, when Chief Whip, believed that "Very often a rebel becomes
appointed because he's a good chap in his own right and he disagreed
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for a perfectly legitimate reason". (18)
The function of the whips is commonly seen as applying strict
coercive discipline, in support of party policy in Parliament, but
their weapons are nothing like as fearsome as their name implies.
"The main functions of the whips", said Norton, "may instead be
identified as those of communication, management and persuasion". (19)
The whips provide a means of two-way communication between the
leadership and the backbenchers, organise the parliamentary timetable
to be confident of a majority, and exercise some informal persuasion.
They have no powers of coercion.
Apart from ministerial office, there is minor patronage in the
form of honours, knighthoods, etc., for a member or his constituency
chairman, selection for parliamentary delegations abroadr or pairing
with opposition M.P.s. 	 Jackson believed that patronage was "a
significant factor in the relationship between Tory leaders and
backbenchers". (20)
	
While these may have a marginal value in
specific circumstances, they are unlikely to make any substantial
difference on any particular issue or to affect any large number of
M.P.s at any particular time.
The sense of group identity or loyalty has been identified, by
Schwartz and Lambert, as a significant factor in Conservative
cohesion. (21) The homogeneity, and prior socialisation, of
Conservative M.P.s leads to a high degree of party identity and desire
to demonstrate group loyalty. 	 The strength of this influence on
party voting will depend on the degree to which M.P.s generally
identify with the leadership and its policies. 	 Informal group
pressures can also operate in the direction of dissent as well as
loyalty, or at least may operate weakly upon potential dissenters.
The final factor leading to party cohesion is pressure upon the
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M.P. by his constituency association of a threat not to readopt him
if he does not follow the party line. 	 Norton, after his exhaustive
study of Conservative dissent in 1970-74, concluded that, "Although
not sufficient to ensure complete cohesion in the parliamentary
Conservative party.. .constituency party pressure (actual or
anticipated, especially the latter) would nevertheless appear to be a
very pertinent factor in helping contain the incidence of intra-party
(22)dissent".	 This issue will be examined later in this chapter.
The emphasis on party cohesion in parliamentary votes has the
weakness of failing to emphasise the numerous opportunities that exist
for backbenchers to influence policy, and the existence of other
sources of revolt other than votes on the floor of the House. 	 Jackson
argued that an "adequate adjustment or accommodation process is
(23)
required to maintain a stable and cohesive party".	 The leader-
ship is able to receive messages from backbenchers as to their
opinions, and this can be reflected in party policy.
The 1922 Committee is the representative body of Conservative
backbenchers. (24)	 In government, Ministers attend by invitation to
explain their policies and to listen to backbench opinion.	 In
opposition, front-benchers may attend. 	 The Chairmen and the Executive
Committee are elected by the backbenchers, and represent their views
towards the Leader.	 The election is considered to have great political
significance, as in the election of du Cann as chairman when Heath as
Leader was known to be hostile.	 The Committee meetings provide an
opportunity for frank and private discussion on party policy.	 There
also exist party specialist committees (currently 20) on a variety of
areas, such as Agriculture, Foreign Affairs and Trade. 	 They provide
a forum of contact and debate between frontbenchers and backbenchers
involved in a particular area, and provide an important source of
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information to party spokesmen on feelings among M.P.s with a direct
interest in an issue. The committee officers are elected by the
backbenchers, and the election is often seen as a reflection of
political temperature. 	 There is an opportunity for dissidents to
demonstrate their degree of support in these elections and the
committees.	 There are also ad hoc committees formed, such as the
policy committees of the Opposition years in 1965-1970, and
Parliamentary representation upon the Advisory Committee on Policy.
Opportunities for expressions of dissent, other than through a
parliamentary vote, exist in numerous forms, through Early Day
Motions, amendments to legislation, speeches, questions and in private
party meetings. (25) None of these have the seriousness of a
negative parliamentary vote and thus provide plenty of opportunity for
the expression of dissent, without any direct consequences for the
party. The power of the Leader to obtain the assent of the
parliamentary party is not unlimited.
National Union 
The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations is
the national organisation of the voluntary side of the party, made up
of the constituency associations.	 The National Union from its
inception has been viewed as a supportive rather than initiatory
organisation.	 At its foundation in 1867, the Chairman declared that
it was "not a meeting for the discussion of Conservative principles
in which we are all agreed, it is only a meeting to consider by what
particular organisation we may make these Conservative principles
(26)
effective among the masses".	 Henry Raikes M.P., one of the
inspirations of the National Union, stated, "The Union has been
organised rather as a...handmaiden to the party, than to usurp the
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(27)functions of party leadership".	 Maxwell Fyfe viewed the role
as "an organisation which is an educative political force and a
machine for winning elections". (28) The National Union thus is given
no policy-making function.
A major activity of the Union is to organise the Annual
Conference, to which 4,500 or more party activists attend. 	 As David
Clarke pointed out, "The members of the Conference are representatives
and not delegates.	 Their associations do not mandate them to vote in
a particular way.	 The resolutions passed are not binding on any part
(29)
of the party".	 The resolutions for debate are chosen by a
sub-committee of the General Purposes Committee, and are usually
expressions of vague, general support for Government or Party policy.
Front-benchers respond to the debate before the vote in order to
indicate to the representatives the position of the platform. 	 Most of
the motions carried are passed with overwhelming majorities or even
unanimously. The primary functions of the Conference are to
demonstrate party unity to the country and to boost the morale of
party workers.	 "As a sounding board of Party opinion and as a
demonstration of the strength and vigour of the Party, it is without
(30)
rival". (David Clarke) 	 Similar remarks apply to the Central
Council, a mini-conference held every spring.
Constituency Associations are expected to be oriented towards
electoral functions, with fund-raising to raise campaign funds and
social activities to raise funds and to keep together workers required
at election time. McKenzie commented on the Model Rules for
associations that "It is clear that the primary purpose of the local
Associations is to conduct propaganda and to raise funds with a view
to securing the election of Conservatives to public bodies. 	 It will
be noted that the list of objects contains no reference whatever to
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the discussion of policy; there is no hint that the constituency
associations are expected to formulate their views on national and
international issues and forward them to the National Union". (31)
A study of virtually any association will confirm that the primary
function is seen as the preparation and organisation for elections,
and not political discussion or policy-making.
One area of constituency activity with significant political
consequences is in the selection of parliamentary candidates. 	 The
role of Central Office in the selection process will be examined later.
The selection is carried out by the Association, usually by a committee
of the Association leaders and formally endorsed by the Association
members, although there have been occasions when a short list has
been drawn up by the committee but with the final decisions taken by
the membership. 	 The two major studies of the selection process, by
Ranney and Rush, found that political considerations were a rare
influence.	 Rush concluded that "Political considerations seldom have
any bearing on the deliberations of the selection committee". (32)
These and other studies suggest that political issues or loyalty are
rarely the cause for the-removal of an M.P. or candidate, but are more
likely due to personal factors or constituency neglect. (33)
The National Union is organised at an Area level, with eleven
Area Councils for England and Wales, and a separate organisation for
Scotland.	 The Areas do organise some activities but primarily their
role is as a channel of communication between the constituency
associations and the national level.
The Central Council is formally the governing body at the national
level, but it is very large (about 1,500) and only meets once a year,
so effectively the National Union is run by the Executive Committee
(NUEC), which elects the officers of the National Union, and appoints
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its representatives to other bodies, such as the Advisory Committee on
Policy. The NUEC, and particularly its Chairman, is the main
spokesman for the views of the National Union to the rest of the
Party.
The National Union also has a number of National Advisory
Committees (NAC) representing special interests within the Party.
The two main committees are the Women and the Young Conservatives, who
usually have ex officio representation on the important committees.
Other Advisory Committees are the Federation of Conservative Students
(FCS), the Conservative Trade Unionists (CTU), the Conservative
Political Centre (CPC), Local Government and Education. 	 The NAC's
organise their own activities, their own conferences and sometimes
their own publications and publicity.
The National Union is primarily concerned with organisational
maintenance rather than policy-making, but possibilities exist for the
expression of political views through resolutions to the Party
Conference, the Central Council or the National Union Executive
Committee, the CPC discussion groups (see below), through the National
Advisory Committees and their conferences, and frequently through
informal channels.
Central Office 
Conservative Central Office (CCO) is the professional side of
the Party.	 It is run by the Chairman of the Party organisation,
sometimes a Deputy Chairman and usually three Vice-Chairmen, all
appointed by the Leader.	 The Chairman is usually a major political
figure in his own right, and probably a Minister when in government.
The vice-chairmen are usually responsible for the list of approved
parliamentary candidates, the Women's organisation and the youth
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sections.
The main policy oriented section of CCO is the Conservative
Research Department (CRD), run by a Chairman and a Director appointed
by the Leader, with 20-30 researchers. 	 The CRD has three main
functions.
	 The first is to provide briefs for the specialist
backbench committees, and when in opposition, the front-bench
spokesmen.	 Secondly, it is to help the formulation of long term
policy through the provision of proposals to the Shadow Cabinet, as
secretaries of policy groups, and in the preparation of general
policy statements, such as the election manifesto.	 Thirdly, it
provides information, either in response to specific requests from
M.P.s, or as a general assistance to Party speakers and workers.
It provides a Campaign Guide during elections and pamphlets of facts and
(34)figures called Notes on Current Politics. 	 It has a semi-
autonomous existence from the rest of Central Office and, until
recently, was located in a separate building.
The Organisation Department is concerned with the degree of
electoral organisation of the Party throughout the country. It
provides aid to local associations, mainly operating through the Area
(35)Offices, which have their own Area Agents and Deputy Area Agents.
As well as a Speakers' Section, the Department provides the staff for
the National Union and its Advisory Committees, although for a time
some of these activities were carried out in a Department of Community
Affairs.	 A major function is regular contact with the paid
professional agents in the constituencies.
Political education work is the responsibility of the Conservative
Political Centre, which publishes pamphlets and organises Conferences
and courses.	 A major activity is the CPC Two-Way Movement of Ideas
where Party members locally are encouraged to discuss a political
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Issue and transmit their views to the Party, including the Minister
or Shadow Minister.	 This plays an important function in the
transmission of policy down from the leadership, and the opinions of
(34)
the party members up to the leadership. 	 The role of Swinton
Conservative College should also be mentioned as a national residential
education centre, which organised conferences and courses, and for a
time published the Swinton Journal, until the College was closed in
1975.
Other sections of Central Office are the Publicity Department
(now Communications), the International Office, the Board of Finance,
and the Standing Advisory Committee on Candidates (SAAC).	 SAAC
establishes a list of approved candidates, from which the constituency
associations may select their parliamentary candidate, and is made up
of representatives from the National Union, the Parliamentary Party
and the Party organisation.	 The Advisory Committee on Policy meets
within Central Office to advise the Leader on policy, with
representatives of the backbenchers, the peers, the National Union,
Central Office, the CRD and the CPC. 	 King felt that "the Advisory
Committee does not decide anything; it does not even initiate.	 Its
importance is as a sounding board - as one way of keeping party
(37)
leaders from getting too far out of step with their followers".
The power of Central Office, as an instrument of the Leader, has
been a constant theme in much academic and public discussion.	 McKenzie
argued that "The political secretariat is in effect the personal machine
(38)
of the leader"	 and that "The political bureaucracy, responsible
to the Leader of the Party, is just as fully in control of the affairs
of the Party as it was in the heyday of Captain Middleton 60 years
ago". (39)
The Leader's control of Central Office is said to arise from his
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extensive power of appointment, through the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen,
and the Chairman and Director of the Research Department. These top
appointments are viewed as creating a Central Office personally loyal
to the Leader and his policies. Pinto-Duchinsky has argued that the
loyalty of these professionals is to the Party, rather than the
Leader. (40) Most of the staff are permanent and of long service,
whose professional careers are tied to the Party as an institution.
A good example of this permanence is the career of Michael Fraser
(now Lord Fraser), Director of the CRD 1951-64, Deputy Chairman 1964-1974,
Chairman of the CRD 1970-74 and brought back from retirement to run the
Party's referendum campaign. 	 He thus held a prominent position under
six Leaders, and was described by Ramsden as "the best adjutant the
(41)Party ever had".	 This institutional loyalty meant that in times
of conflict, when the leadership itself was in dispute, as in 1965
over Home and 1975 over Heath, CCO remained neutral.	 Even the Party
Chairman could not be guaranteed to be a personal loyalist, e.g. du
Cann as chairman in 1965-67 had poor relations with Heath.	 The
attractions of the post are not so very great for a leading politician,
especially when in office, and the Leader's preference may not be
acceptable to the rest of the party, as with Jim Prior in 1974. (42)
CCO is not simply the "personal machine" of the Leader.
The second part of this claim is that Central Office has the power
to impose the will of its master upon the voluntary side of the Party.
This power is based on its control of candidates, its ability to
undermine the position of rebel M.P.s and its control of the local
Associations through a variety of means.
	
On candidates, it is widely
held that political conformity is necessary to be placed on the
candidates list and that CCO can place the candidates it desires in
safe seats. (43) This belief was widely held by anti-marketeers during
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Heath's leadership.	 McKenzie believed that S.A.C.C. "in no way
ensures popular or non-professional control over policy with respect
to candidates... (because) final authority lies with an official of
the Central Office who is a direct personal nominee of the Leader"
(i.e. the Vice-Chairman for Candidates). (44) Rush, after his study,
concluded that "there is no evidence that...the vice-chairman...can
(45)
and does over-rule the decisions of the SAAC".
	 He also argued
that their primary concern was with personal qualifications and
qualities rather than policy positions.	 The 'purge' of the List that
occurred under Heath was primarily concerned with these qualities,
although there may have been one or two removals due to concern over
contacts with the National Front and Protestant para-militaries.
On the ability to place candidates, Rush's view that they have
no such power, is supported by Ranney. Lord Kilmuir believed that
associations "are so independent that pressure in favour of a
candidate is an almost certain method of getting someone else adopted". (46)
Two examples would be that of Douglas Hurd, of the CRD and a close
aide to Heath, who several times failed to get selected in the late
sixties, and the failure of Paul Channon to be selected for a
Euro-constituency even though it was widely known that Mrs. Thatcher
wished him to be Leader of the Conservatives in the European Parliament.
Central Office has sometimes been accused of seeking to undermine
rebel M.P.s, a charge made by several anti-market M.P.s Pinto-
Duchinsky claimed that "it normally does not withdraw its services
from a Conservative politician with whom the leader is in disagreement",
continuing to organise speaking engagements and distribute their press
releases. (44) When rebels have been in trouble with their
constituency associations, and when Central Office has intervened, it
has been on the side of the rebels, e.g. over the Suez rebels, on the
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grounds that intra-party fighting damages the Party. (48)
The third source of power is said to be a wide variety of
instruments, such as patronage and through the agents.	 CCO has a
distinct absence of material incentives, such as finance or honours,
and is reliant upon the voluntary co-operation of associations.	 The
constituency agents, while centrally trained, are employed by the
Association, and are expected to show their primary loyalty to them.
An attempt to centralise the employment of agents to ensure their most
effective deployment was preventeci..b-y 'constituency fears of the loss
of control over their agent. (49) Agents are an important source of
information to CCO via the Areas, but are not under central control. (50)
Associations have a high degree of autonomy. (51) Lord Woolton
described his relations as Party Chairman with the constituency
associations.
"I had, on paper, no control over their activities:
they selected their candidates; they selected
their agent, and employed him; they arranged
their meetings, and were at liberty to make direct
approach to any speaker they desired. 	 I depended
on the good will...in the creation of a head-
quarters staff that would be so efficient in
performance and so approachable in manner that
their influence would overcome their lack of
authority". (52)
This discussion is not designed to claim that the Leader has no
Influence nor that Central Office is powerless. The Leader and the
professionals share a common aim of gaining or retaining Conservative
control of government, and the image of a strong leader and a united
party is an important element in that success.	 CRD has some
influence on policy arising from its expertise and close proximity to
decision-makers.
	
CCO can influence the constituencies through its
authority and distribution of political material, and the leadership
by its assessment of constituency opinion.
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The Informal Party 
Much misunderstanding of the Conservative Party has arisen from
a concentration on the formal structure of the Party, to the neglect
of the informal channels of contact, which create political communities
within the Party that are both vertical and horizontal. 	 The informal
Party consists of 'ginger groups', explicitly Conservative and
desiring to influence the Party on policy issues; the traditional
interest groups which try to influence all governments but which may
have a special attachment to the Conservatives; the 'Tory press',
broadly supporting the Conservatives but not uncritically; and finally
the Conservative voter (or potential voter) with no direct contact
with the Party but an ever-present concern for it.
One debate about the Conservative Party has been whether it is a
Party of factions or tendencies. 	 Rose has argued that the
Conservatives are a party of tendencies, a stable set of attitudes but
with politicians varying with the issue, rather than of factions,
groups of organised members united on a broad set of issues over a
(53)period of time.	 This was supported by studies of backbench
behaviour. (54) Seyd has challenged this argument.
that Conservative factions differ from those in the Labour Party, he
argued that factionalism does exist and has been growing. 	 His
discussion on 'factional upsurge' emphasised that "on the issue of
entry into the EEC, the supporters and opponents of the Conservative
government's policy established organisations" and that "the EEC was
the major factor" in the rise of parliamentary rebellion. (55)The
study of the pro and anti-EEC groups may contribute to that debate.
Despite impressions to the contrary, 'ginger groups' are not a new
phenomenon within the Party.	 The Primrose League was founded in 1883,
and the India Defence League was active in the 1930s. 	 There has,
While recognising
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however, been an increasing degree of activity by these groups. 	 The
best known is the Bow Group, formed in 1951, as a forum for the
intelligent discussion of Conservative principles and policies. (56)
It operates through the publication of pamphlets, a quarterly journal
Crossbow, study groups, speaker meetings and conferences. The Group
has no collective policy, but it became "a shorthand phrase for the
Tory left", (57)	 "hardly to be distinguished from radical liberalism,
and sometimes even from socialism", according to T.E. Utley. (58)
Lately the Group has become more associated with the neo-liberal
right. The Group denies that it is a 'pressure group' concerned with
the promotion of a particular ideological line, although it has become
associated with certain policies, such as pro-Europe and selective
welfare benefits.
	
Rose believed that the Group had some influence
exercised through their informal contacts with M.P.s and Leaders.
By contrast, the Monday Club has a clear political line on the
right.	 Formed in 1961 to promote an alternative to the Bow Group for
traditional conservatives, the Club later became a mass organisation
claiming 10,000 members at its height in 1971.
	 The Club was torn
apart by internal strife in the mid-70s, from which it has never fully
recovered.	 Defence, race and Rhodesia were some of the issues of
special concern to the Club, but was strongly divided on Europe.
	 Seyd
concluded that "the influence of the Monday Club on the Conservative
Party leadership.. .would appear to be negligible. (59)
The 'left' or 'progressive' tendency was organised in 1963 as
Pressure for Economic and Social Toryism (PEST). 	 Originally based
on the universities, it later opened its activities to all sympathisers
and created a list of parliamentary supporters. 	 Never a mass
organisation, PEST sought influence through publications, meetings
and conferences.
	
In 1975 it merged with two other smaller groups to
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form the Tory Reform Group. 	 Throughout its existence, it was strongly
pro-European and federalist.
The European issue led to the creation of single-issue groups
within the Party.
	
The Conservative Group for Europe (CGE) was formed
in 1969 (as the European Forum) and acted as a focus for Conservative
'Europeans'. On the anti-market side, a number of organisations
existed, some of them short-lived. 	 The Anti-Common Market League in
1961 was the first, the Conservative Anti-Common Market Information
Service (CACMIS) 1971-72, and Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome
(CATOR).	 There were also non-party organisations within which
Conservatives were active, such as the European Movement and Keep
Britain Out.	 These are all discussed later.
The economic interest groups of the Confederation of British
Industry (CBI) and the National Farmers Union (NFU) are not formally
allied with any party, but they perceive that the Conservatives are
more open to their interests than Labour. (60) The party is aware
of the value of their support in reaching their members, and is
therefore sensitive to their views. 	 The exact relationship is
difficult to establish. 	 Gamble noted that the party has "never been
the mouthpiece for business interests", and Grant argued that the
(61)
relationship has not been well understood.
	 A study of this
European issue should help to illuminate the relationship.
The relationship between the Tory-inclined press and the Party
has received little attention, and is rather ambivalent.
	 On the one
side, while the editors and many of the journalists may be sympathetic
to the Party, they do not wish to lose less partisan readers and they
recognise that news, not Party propaganda, sells newspapers.	 For the
Party, the press is an essential means of communication to their
supporters but the Party's inability to control the interpretation of
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events makes them cautious in their relations.	 The Daily Telegraph 
has been described as the "chief orchestrator of opinion amongst
Conservative Party members and activists". (62)A clearly aligned
newspaper, it provides a forum for the discussion of Conservative
policy, including some by influential Tory journalists, William
Deedes, Peregrine Worsethorne and T.E. Utley.
	 The Times is less
partisan, but is widely read amongst M.P.s and has many informal
contacts with the Party.
	 The former editor, William Rees-Mogg, had
been a Conservative candidate, and Norman Fowler, the current
Secretary of State for the Social Services, was the paper's Home
Affairs correspondent.	 The Financial Times is seen by the Party as
a useful reflection of business and financial opinion. 	 The popular
press (the Express, the Mail and the Sun) is interesting for the Party
for their mass circulation rather than the quality of their commentary.
The weekly press also deserves consideration.	 The Economist is
widely read among businessmen and politicians, and provides news
coverage and commentary in a distinctive style. 	 The self-description
as extreme centrist has meant an anti-Communist foreign policy, market
economics, liberal on social issues, and strongly pro-European.	 With
contributors from all parties, it has usually taken a special interest
in the Conservatives.
	
The Spectator has been more clearly a
Conservative journal of opinion. For most of the post-war period it
has been liberal, with Ian Gilmour as a proprietor and lain Macleod as
an editor, which also included being pro-European. 	 In the early
seventies it took a right-wing, populist tone with journalists like
George Gale and Patrick Cosgrave, strongly anti-market.	 While a small
circulation journal, it is well read in Conservative circles.
The final element in the informal party is the Conservative voter
or potential voter.
	 Always electorally aware, the Conservative Party
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is concerned to both influence and understand their voters. The
institutions of the informal party are both a major channel to reach
the voters with the Party's messages, and an imperfect reflection to
the Party of the state of public opinion. Public opinion polls have
proved to be another useful source, and the Party has conducted some
of its own polls. However, the judgement of public opinion remains
an uncertain business, based more on skill and judgement than
scientific certainty.
Conclusion 
The debate about the relative importance of the Leader and the
other elements of the Party has been explored.	 The role of these
various elements will now be examined during the stages of
development of Party policy from 1945 to 1975 in the following
chapters.	 In chapter 8 the issues discussed in this chapter will be
examined in the light of the information presented to illuminate and
test the pluralist thesis of the distribution of power within the
Conservative Party.
CHAPTER 1 
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Background 
The immediate post-war period saw the establishment of the
foundations of European integration.
	 Continental Europe had been
devastated by war, with the destruction of economic, social and political
life.	 Such conditions led to the great attraction of European unity for
many Continental Europeans, with its promise of an end to intra-European
wars, co-operation towards economic recovery, and strength against the
super-powers, especially the threatening neighbour of the Soviet Union.
There was therefore a tremendous emotional desire for European unity,
particularly on the right.
The situation in Britain, however, was somewhat different.
Britain had emerged as one of the chief victors, and considered itself
an equal partner to the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union.	 Britain as a
nation-state, political leadership, the industrial base, Imperial
Preference, the Commonwealth were not discredited by the war. 	 Thus the
Labour Government, and to a lesser extent, the Conservative opposition,
while not unsympathetic to some aspects of the movement towards European
unity, felt no sense of urgency. 	 Britain saw Europe as only one of
three circles of power, together with the U.S.A. and the Commonwealth
and Empire, of which Britain was the focal point.
	
The different
situations of Britain and the Continent led to contrasting and
conflicting perceptions of the method and direction of European
integration.	 Many European politicians saw the need for supranational
institutions to which national interests, and nationalist military
interests, would be subordinated, and which would provide the political
strength for Europe to behave as an independent actor on the world
stage.	 These people favoured a new supranational institutional
framework.	 The British, however, saw European integration as
37
developing upon the lines of intergovernmental co-operation designed to
restore the nations of Europe to their former position. They favoured
pragmatic, functional and intergovernmental institutional developments.
This contrast in approaches dominated the several attempts at
European integration in the post-war period. 	 It was at the insistence
of the U.S.A. that their development programme for the recovery of
Europe, the Marshall Plan, led to the creation of the 0.E.E.C. (the
Organisation of European Economic Co-operation) in 1948 to administer
the programme through a European Payments Union and the liberalisation
of intra-European trade.	 It was the British Government, however, who
insisted that the 0.E.E.C. should be an intergovernmental body, and not
one with supranational elements as desired by the French. 	 The Treaty
of Brussels between the Benelux countries, France and Britain in 1948
was signed primarily as a common defence instrument against the Soviet
Union but the British Government saw the Treaty as a preliminary to the
involvement of the U.S.A. and Canada as well in a common defence, as
provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (N.A.T.0.) in 1949.
As with the 0.E.E.C., the British Government frustrated attempts to
turn the Council of Europe, created in May 1949, into a supranational
body.	 While a Consultative Assembly was created, power lay firmly in
the hands of the intergovernmental Committee of Ministers.
Frustration with the slowness of integration led to the bold
announcement of the Schuman Plan in 1950, whereby the French Government
offered to merge the coal and steel industries (vital to the ability
to conduct war) with Germany, and any other European nation.	 While
eventually six nations joined the European Coal and Steel Community
(E.C.S.C.) in April 1951, the British Government felt unable to join
because of the creation of the High Authority, a supranational
decision-making body over whom the national governments would have no
veto.	 In October 1950 the French Prime Minister, M. Pleven, launched
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the idea of a European Army, based on similar supranational ideas to
the Schuman Plan. This plan also met with a lack of support from the
British Government.
Throughout this series of attempts at European unity, the Conservative
Opposition had appeared far more positively disposed to these
developments than the Government. 	 The election to power of the
Conservatives in October 1951 was thus seen as opening a new era in
British participation in European integration. 	 Our concern here is
to examine the role and response of the various parts of the
Conservative Party to these developments between 1945 and 1951.
The Leader 
Despite the overwhelming defeat of the 1945 election, Winston
Churchill remained the dominant figure of the Conservative Party,
especially in the field of foreign policy, where he was virtually
given a free hand.	 Disappointed at the way he had been treated by
the British public and perhaps bored with details of domestic policy,
Churchill was highly attracted to the role of international statesman.
His frequent visits abroad met with considerable attention and a
spontaneous welcome.	 During these visits he made two major and
significant speeches.	 The first was at Fulton, Missouri, in March
1946, when he spoke of the iron curtain which had dropped over half of
Europe and this marked the beginning of what became known as the Cold
War. (1) While he emphasised the close relationship of the U.S.A.
and the U.K., he also spoke of a new European unity which would include
the defeated powers.
	 The second was in Zurich, in September 1946,
which gave great impetus to the European movement with his emotional
demand that "we l
	
(2)
ust build a kind of United State of Europe".
	 The
endorsement of the European Movement by an internationally respected
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statesman of the stature of Churchill helped to place these ideas on to
the political agenda. 	 Churchill thus emerged, without any conscious
decision by himself, as a symbol of the European idea. In return he
was flattered by the attention which he thus received, and pleased to
have found an issue to establish him as a statesman of the future as
well as of the past.
Duncan Sandys, Churchill's son-in-law, played a major role in
creating the United Europe Movement in 1947 to campaign for the
European idea in Britain, and persuaded Churchill to become chairman.
The Movement provided Churchill with a major non-partisan platform to
project himself as a major national leader as well as a party leader,
such as at the launch of the Movement at a mass rally in the Albert
Hall in May 1947.
In May 1948, as part of the campaign to inspire European public
opinion, the International European Movement organised the Congress of
Europe in the Hague, to which political, industrial and cultural
leaders from the different European countries were invited.
	 Despite
the presence of many national government ministers, Churchill was one
of the dominant figures of the Congress, gave a tremendously well
received speech to the Congress, and was elected President of the
International European Movement.
	 The Congress passed a resolution
calling for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly to represent
the people of Europe, and this provided the inspiration for the
creation of the Council of Europe.
	 To the disappointment of federalists,
It was an intergovernmental organisation, but it was a European
political organisation with a wide remit of aims and interests, and it
did provide for the creation of a Consultative Assembly to act as a
voice of European public opinion.
	 The Assembly, based in Strasbourg,
was to represent European opinion and not national governments, and so
the British delegation was an all-party one.	 The decision of
Churchill to lead the delegation was seen as further evidence of his
commitment to the European idea. 	 The Conservative delegation, known
as 'the Tory Strasbourgers', was of high quality and played an active
role in the Assembly.
The next attempt at European unity was the Schuman Plan for a
coal and steel community.	 Membership of such a community was firmly
rejected by the Labour Government because of the federalist element of
the High Authority, which would have meant the subordination of the
British coal and steel industry to a supranational authority.
Churchill, while also suspicious of federalism, strongly condemned
the Government for failing to even participate in the discussions on
•the same basis as the Netherlands with the right "to reserve its
freedom to go back on the acceptances of these general principles.. .if
it should prove in the future that these principles raise serious
objections in practice". (3)
While Churchill proposed the creation of a European Army to the
European Assembly on 11th September 1950, shortly before the Pleven
Plan in October, those proposals, developed by Macmillan, were quite
different from the Pleven proposals which quite explicitly tried to
introduce the supranationalist approach of Schuman to the European
Army.
	
The Conservative approach was based on intergovernmental
safeguards, so that the military experts would report to a Committee
of Ministers, vital national rights would be protected, and every
government would have the right of withdrawal after 12 months notice.
Thus the policy of Churchill and the Conservatives was to encourage
European developments while removing their supranationalist elements
to enable British partici pation.	 Ernest Bevin, the Labour Foreign
Secretary, quickly made it clear that he thought the Plan mistaken, and
favoured NATO as the sole military organisation.
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As the general elections in 1950 and 1951 approached, as
partisanship became more intense, and as opportunities for British
leadership in Europe were missed, Churchill became more and more
bitterly critical of the Labour Government, whose attitude to European
questions, he attributed to "personal jealousies and party rancour". (4)
He accused the Labour Government of being forced to make concessions
to a united Europe "in the least possible degree, at the last possible
moment and in a grudging manner". (5) The electoral campaign of
1951 was fought with what was seen as a clear difference of attitude
between the Labour Government and the Conservative Opposition.
The subsequent inaction of Churchill as Prime Minister in the
European field requires some explanation of his attitude in opposition.
The first point to note is that Churchill's commitment to European
unity was at the level of 'the broad stroke'.	 He had an emotional
commitment to the need for European unity as the safeguard of Western
civilisation, but this commitment did not translate into specific
proposals about how this should be achieved.	 Such considerations
were left to others. Thus in his speech to launch the European
Movement at the Albert Hall he saw Europe as "a system of beliefs
and ideas which we call Western Civilisation...and we are here to
proclaim our resolve that the spiritual conception of Europe shall
not die". (6)
	
Later in the speech he stated "We know where we want
to go, but we cannot foresee all the stages of the journey, nor can
we plan our marches as in a military operation". (7)	 In his speech
to the Congress of Europe, he said that the strength of the European
(8)
Movement came "from our sense of common spiritual values",
	 and
argued against rigid structures of constitutions.
	
"That is a later
stage, and it is one in which the leadership must be taken by the
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ruling governments". (9) Macmillan described Churchill's approach
to the European Army as typical. 	 "At that stage, as indeed in many
aspects of his European policy, Churchill had no clear or well-defined
plan....His purpose was to throw out general ideas and give an impetus
towards movements already at work. 	 It was for others to find
detailed solutions". (10) Churchill saw his role, and that of the
European Movement, as the creators of a European public opinion to
which national governments would respond with concrete proposals. 	 It
was not his job to provide the bricks, only the inspiration to build
the house.
This broad commitment to the European idea enabled Churchill to
avoid spelling out the role that Britain would play in a united
Europe.
	
It is clear that he believed in Britain's role as the focal
point of the three circles of the U.S.A., the Commonwealth and Empire,
and Western Europe.
	 He accepted that this would involve Britain as
a participant in a united Europe.
	 "It was clear from his words that
he contemplated a system in Europe in which Britain should play a
leading role, not merely cheer from the side-lines", wrote Macmillan. (11)
Churchill believed that British leadership was a requirement to achieve
unity, "the mother country must be a prime mover". (12) This European
role did not conflict with Britain's role towards the other two circles.
He told a Conservative rally, "The conception of (sic) United Europe
joined together in amity and fact, though not perhaps as yet in form,
in no way conflicts with the fratneral association of the
(13)	
English-
speaking Commonwealth and States". 	 He told the House of Commons
that "this European policy of unity can perfectly well be reconciled
with and adjusted to our obligations to the Commonwealth and Empire of
which we are the heart and centre.	 I cannot believe that those
(14)difficulties will not be settled by patience and care".
	
This is
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a perpetual theme in Churchill's European speeches, althought there
is little evidence to suggest that he considered how those conflicts
could be resolved.
At other times, he was ambiguous about the nature of Britain's
role, presenting Britain as a friend and supporter but not necessarily
as a member.	 In his Zurich speech he spoke of Britain together with
the U.S.A. and hopefully the Soviet Union as "friends and sponsors of
the new Europe". (15)In his first published work on Europe in 1930,
he wrote "We have our own dreams and our own task. We are linked
but not comprised. We are with Europe but not of it". (16) Miriam
Camps wrote, "It should be noted that although he called strongly for
European unity, he did so in lofty but imprecise language and in a
way that made it clear that Britain, although working closely with the
Continent, would not in any real sense become 'integrated' with the
Continent". (17) There exists, therefore, contradictory views over
Churchill's attitude to membership of a United Europe.
However, a discussion of his attitude to federalism supports the
view that he accepted the need for Britain's membership. 	 Churchill
was not opposed to federalism in principle, but felt that institutional
discussion was not the best road to European unity, that federalism
was then unacceptable to the British people, and anyway he probably
found such debates rather tedious. 	 He has normally been depicted as
an anti-federalist.	 Yet there is reason to believe that he saw
• federalism as the possible future development of a United Europe. 	 In
his Zurich speech, he talked of "a kind of United States of Europe", (18)
which has been interpreted as simply an example of his high-flown
rhetoric.	 After the 1945 election defeat Churchill's wife told
their doctor that Winston had told her, "If I were 10 years younger
I might be the first President of the United States of Europe". (19)
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For Churchill to become President, it would require both that Britain
was a member of such a federation, and that the office would have
some power and responsibility.
	 In his Albert Hall speech he said,
"There are several working bodies which are working directly for the
federation of the European States and for the creation of a Federal
Constitution of Europe.	 I hope that may eventually be achieved". (20)
He accepted that a loss of sovereignty would be necessary. He told
the Congress of Europe, "It is said with truth that this involves
some sacrifice or merger of national sovereignty.
	
But it is also
possible and not less agreeable to regard it as the gradual
assumption by all the nations concerned of that larger sovereignty
which can alone protect their diverse and distinctive customs and
characteristics and their national traditions". (21)
	
He told the
House of Commons that "national sovereignty is not inviolable". (22)
He was unwilling to rule out the possibility of a federation in the
long term, but saw it as a political impossibility in the near future.
"To imagine that Europe today is ripe for either a political
federation or a customs union would be wholly unrealistic.
	 But who
can say what may not be possible in the future". (23) Churchill did
not exclude the possibility of a federal Europe or Britain's
membership of it.
This, of course, does not mean that he was a federalist in the
sense used in the post-war debates, such as at the Congress of Europe.
Federalists were those who believed that the best or only way forward
was the creation of a federal Constitution for Europe which national
governments would accept due to the creation of immense pressure from
mobilised European public opinion.	 The federalists concerned
themselves largely with discussing the nature of such a constitution.
Churchill, however, felt that this was premature.
	 The current
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objective was to mobilise public opinion in favour of the idea of a
united Europe, which might be estranged by constitutional debates.
"It is not for us at this stage to attempt to define or prescribe the
structure of constitutions.
	 We ourselves are content, in the first
instance, to present the ideal of (sic) United Europe, in which our
country will play a decisive part, as a moral, cultural and spiritual
conception to which all can rally without being disturbed by
(24)divergencies about structure". 	 At the United Europe Exhibition
in 1948 he said "My advice is not to attempt at this stage to define
too precisely the exact constitutional form which will ultimately
emerge.	 We would do better to concentrate our united efforts on
(25)immediately practicable steps". 	 Churchill was also conscious
that British public opinion and the Conservative Party was not at
that stage willing to accept supranationality.
	 He made clear that
the steps towards European unity that he supported did not imply
federalism, and should be acceptable to the British public.
	 He
urged the Hague Congress, "Let us adopt nothing and say nothing that
If we were ourselves charged with the responsibilities of Cabinet
Ministers, we would not be prepared to ask our Parliaments to do". (26)
He argued, in regard to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe, that "The creation of a deliberative European Assembly
naturally involves no transfer of sovereignty and raises no
,
constitutional problems whatsoever". (27)
Thus it is argued here that Churchill was not opposed to a long
term solution of a federal United States of Europe, but felt that it
was a strategy which might follow the mobilisation of opinion but
should not precede it, and that in the current climate of opinion in
the Conservative party and the British electorate it was not a viable
proposition, and therefore any serious politician would be wasting his
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time championing such a cause. 	 Britain should play a leading role
in European unity, and not simply as a supporter, but no faster than
was acceptable to British opinion.
The final point to make about Churchill's attitude was his intense
desire to make the issue a national and all-Party one, and not a
partisan issue.
	 He told a Conservative rally, "This is not a Party
theme.	 It is one to which all parties in our island should and will
(28)
subscribe".	 There were several considerations that led to the
adoption of this position.
	 Firstly, he felt that the issue was of
such importance that it was 'above Party politics' and continually
stressed the all-Party nature of the United Europe Committee. (29)
"The movements towards European unity cannot be a monopoly of any
party". (30) "Let us try to keep the idea of a United Europe above
the Party divisions which are inevitable, permissible and indeed
tolerable in all
	
(31)free countries".
	 Secondly, he was conscious,
both as a former Prime Minister and a prospective one, of the need
for the European Movement not to impose on the responsibilities of
Governments - that the British Government was speaking on behalf of
the British people, and that function should not be confused by
anything that the European Movement do or say.
	 Rather he saw the
role of the European Movement to create a public opinion which would
enable the Government to act in the desired direction.
	 "Of course,
we understand that until public opinion expresses itself more
definitely, Governments hesitate to take positive action.
	
It is for
us to provide the proof of solid popular support, both here and
abroad, which will give the Governments of Europe confidence to go
(32)forward and give practical effect to their beliefs".
	 He
continually expressed the view that there was no conflict between the
activities of the United European Movement and the Government.
	
"I
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must say a word about our unofficial Committee for a United Europe,
and also about its limitations.	 I am most anxious to re-assure the
Government and the Foreign Secretary on this subject. We do not
aspire to compete with Governments in the executive sphere. What we
seek to do is to build up moral, cultural, sentimental and social
unities and affinities throughout all Europe, or all those parts of
Europe where freedom still reigns.	 Nothing in the activities of
our unofficial movement and committee can hamper the progress of the
(33)
policy of Her Majesty's Government".	 "We are not seeking in
the European Movement.. .to usurp the functions of Government.
have tried to make this plain again and again to the heads of the
Government". (34)
Churchill's recognition of the responsibilities of Government and
the need for a bipartisan foreign policy made him committed to the
all-party nature of the European Movement. This meant that he was
most careful not to present the European idea as Party policy. 	 While
the European issue was frequently referred to in his speeches to Party
supporters(although rarely the main theme), it was always presented as
a view which Conservatives should support rather than as Conservative
Party policy.
	
He told the Primrose League, "I ask my friends in the
Conservative Party, which I have the honour to lead, to give the whole
question their earnest consideration". (35)To a Conservative rally,
"I commend the cause of a United Europe to the Conservative and
Unionist Party in Great Britain. 	 This is not a Party theme", almost
as if he was a non-Party speaker. (36)To the Women's Conservative
Conference, "I have always tried to keep this Movement outside and
(37)
above Party politics, and I shall continue to strive to do so".
While his prestige as Party leader inevitably encouraged Conservative
support for a United Europe, that support was not sought as Party
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leader. There were none of the appeals to Party loyalty, or trust
in the Party leadership that were to be seen later. The issue was
to be judged by Conservatives on their merits as a policy for Britain
not as Party policy.
It was his strong insistence on this approach that made him so
angry with what he perceived as the partisan nature of the Government's
actions. He criticised the proposal to form a European Association
of Socialist Parties and warned the Government, "I hope that the
Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will not commit the great
mistake and failure of duty of trying to divert this move of European
(38)unity into Party channels".
	 He attacked the Government over
its hostility to the Congress of Europe.
	 "One of the least creditable
actions of the Socialist Government and Party was their attempt,
their vain attempt, to sabotage the Congress of Europe at the Hague
three weeks ago... .This is very small -minded behaviour and unworthy
(39)of the gravity of the issues at stake".
	 "The British Government
have gained very little credit in any quarter by their handling of
this large issue, and petty and personal jealousies, arising from the
fact that I revived this idea of a United Europe two years ago in a
(40)
speech at Zurich, have clouded the vision of some of them".
"The attitude of the Socialist Party.. .has hitherto been far from
creditable and below the level of these important world and human
events. Petty personal jealousies and party rancour have marred
their action and falsified their principles". (41)
Churchill was no doubt naive in believing that there could be a
separation in the eyes of the public, the Conservative Party or the
Labour Party, between Churchill as Party leader and Churchill as
international statesman.
	 The United European Movement was seen by
many in the Labour Party (not entirely incorrectly) as an attempt to
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re-establish Churchill's prestige in the world and at home and,
therefore, a threat to their own power in Government. Herbert
Morrison, Labour Deputy Leader, refused a request to speak to the
European Movement in these words. 	 "I think that it was most
unfortunate that both Winston Churchill and Duncan Sandys should have
been placed in positions of responsibility as this was bound to make
the situation difficult for our people....My people have strong
suspicions that the European Movement was working in association with
the British Conservative machine at Strasbourg against the Labour
representatives and this leaves very unpleasant impressions". (42)
Sidney Silverman told the 1948 Labour Conference that Churchill was
"merely trying to pull a United Europe into existence in order to
(43)recapture that platform we took from him in 1945".	 Whatever
Churchill's own attitude, it was inevitable that his position on
Europe should have been seen as an implicit challenge to the conduct
of foreign policy of the Labour Government. The charge of
partisanship was already widespread before his critical comments on
the Labour Government's approach from late 1948 onwards.
The role of Churchill in Conservative attitudes towards Europe
was clearly a major one.
	
As the war-time Prime Minister, his views on
foreign policy were given great respect and he was virtually given a
free hand.	 He inspired that positive attitude towards the idea of a
United Europe which has existed in the Party ever since. 	 However,
his role should not be exaggerated. 	 He himself tried very hard to play
down his role as Party leader when promoting the European idea, he did
not use the full weight of the Party machine behind the European
Movement, and he did not seek to commit the Party totally to his views
on Europe.
	 He was well aware of the existence of fears and concerns
about Europe in the Party leadership, the Parliamentary Party and the
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Party workers, which acted as some constraint on his public utterances.
The Conservative Party was also part of that public opinion he hoped
to win over to the European cause, and he did not treat it as an
obedient and quiet follower.
	 As we shall see, opinions in the
leadership were by no means uniform.
Shadow Cabinet 
Churchill dominated his Shadow Cabinet, because of his personality,
his position as an international statesman, and the absence of many
Conservative leaders due to the 1945 losses.
	 Gradually many of them
returned, but it took some time to develop an effective Shadow Cabinet.
For most of this period, it was rather a loose group which acted as a
discussion forum as much as a decision-making body.
In the Shadow Cabinet there was a consensus in favour of European
unity.	 Differences existed over (i) whether Britain needed to be a
member of a European union, or merely a supporter; (ii) whether
British membership would conflict with her commitment to the Empire and
Commonwealth; and (iii) whether a United Europe inevitably meant some
form of federalism.
	 However, as is common in committees, the concrete
issues facing them rarely presented themselves in these clear-cut
terms.
	 It was not until the Schuman Plan that these differences were
forced to the surface.
	 During this period the Shadow Cabinet was
concerned with presenting a more positive attitude towards the concept
of European unity than the Labour Government, without discussing
details. The Shadow Cabinet was agreed on the need for European
unity, especially as part of a wider Western Union, to act as a
bulwark against the Soviet Union.	 There was little problem in
supporting Churchill's promotion of the European cause, while it remained
in general terms.
	 Indeed a number of the Shadow Cabinet themselves
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played an active role in the European Movement, such as Duncan Sandys,
David Maxwell-Fyfe, Harold Macmillan, Leo Amery and Oliver Stanley.
Duncan Sandys, as Churchill's son-in-law, played a significant
role in influencing him to associate himself so strongly with the
European idea.	 Sandys was the organiser of the United European
Movement in Britain and the Hague Congress, and was the enthusiastic
and energetic driving-force behind the United European Movement.
Sandys believed in the need for European Unity as "the surest means
of turning the tide of Communism and tyranny", (44) in the necessity
of full British participation to achieve that goal, and in the lack
of any fundamental conflict with Britain's Imperial role. 	 At the
1949 Party Conference, Sandys presented an amendment in the foreign
affairs debate, calling for all measures towards European Unity
"consistent with the full maintenance of the unity of the British
(45)Empire and continuing collaboration with the U.S.", 	 in order to
make clear to the Party the leadership's close support for the cause.
Sandys recommended "the functionalist approach. 	 This involves no
federal constitution and no irrevocable transfer of sovereign powers". (46)
"I have never been a keen federalist, or a federalist". (47)He
believed federalism was impractical but feared a split with the
Continental European Movement.	 "It is best that they should learn
this for themselves". (48)He forthrightly rejected claims that
European unity involved a federalist system. 	 "No-one of this side of
the House has seriously recommended that a federal system should be
(49)instituted in Europe or that we should join it". 	 Sandys was a
committed supporter of British participation in European unity on a
functionalist basis, that the way forward was through the creation of
intergovernmental organisations with responsibility for specific and
limited functions.
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Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe was a major figure in the Shadow Cabinet,
author of the Maxwell-Fyfe Report which helped reform the post-war
Conservative Party, and another enthusiastic European. He "accepted
with enthusiasm" (50) Churchill's invitation to join the Executive
Committee of the United European Movement, attended the Hague Congress
and was a member of the Conservative delegation to the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe. He became a leading and much
respected figure in the Assembly, where he played a major role as
Chairman of the Legal and Administrative Committee in the creation of
the European Convention of Human Rights. 	 Like Sandys, he was a
functionalist, giving his unqualified support to those "who believe
that the way to greater union is the common attack on varied problems
and the function of co-operation inherent in their solution". (51)
With the tremendous respect in which he felt Britain was regarded in
the rest of Europe, the exercise of leadership, understanding and
responsibility by Britain would have led to the establishment of
European unity on terms quite acceptable to Britain.
	
It was with a
tone of considerable regret, and almost bitterness, that he noted
that failure in his autobiography.
	 "It seems almost incredible were
it not true that we should so contemptuously have thrown over an
opportunity for leading Europe into an economic, military, moral and
cultural unity without parallel in her long and tortured history.
The Europe of 1950 was avid for British leadership". (52)
Harold Macmillan was a third European enthusiast among the Shadow
Spokesmen. He was active in the European Movement at the Hague
Congress, Chairman of a Commonwealth Conference organised by the
European League for Economic Co-operation (E.L.E.C.), and Chairman of
the Central and East European Committee of the International European
Movement.	 Macmillan's attitude to the situation of the Empire, and
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the federalist/functionalist debate is not so clear. Publicly he
endorsed the pre-eminent role of the Empire. He described the Empire
(53)
as "the centre and pivot of the Grand Design",	 and stated that
if a choice had to be made between Empire and Europe, no M.P. "would
hesitate for a single moment... .1 do not believe that this choice
forces us...an absolutely unreal dilemma.. .our first duty, of course,
(54)lies to the Empire".	 Nigel Forman expressed doubt "whether
(55)he was voicing his own intellectual opinions".
Macmillan's position was that British participation was vital
to the success of European Unity. 	 "I do not think it (the Council
of Europe) can survive yet alone achieve its purpose, without full
British participation.	 Yet if it perishes, the last hope of peace
will perish with it". (56)He was strongly critical of the lack of
support provided by the British Labour Government. 	 However, he also
recognised that there was insufficient support in Britain for any
supranationality.
	
"One thing is certain, and we may as well face it,
our people will not hand over to any supranational authority the
right to close down our pits or our steelworks". (57)
	
He himself
accepted the "merging of sovereignty in practice not principle" (58)
but recognised the political restraints on such a policy.
There were other members of the Shadow Cabinet, such as Leo Amery
and Oliver Stanley, whose support for European unity was clear, but
for whom the price they were willing to pay was smaller. 	 Leo Amery
was a member of the European Council of the United European Movement,
and his importance lay in his strong identification with the cause of
Empire.	 His support for European unity was a strong demonstration in
many people's eyes that there was no incompatibility between Europe
and Empire.
	 Indeed he argued that European unity was desirable in
the interests of the Empire.
	 "European unity is of vital significance
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to the whole Commonwealth, and it is our duty and interest to
share actively in the task of promoting it. We and other members of
(59)the Commonwealth can do so without detriment".
	 At the same time
his opposition to federalism was made absolutely clear: "The real
solution would seem to lie, not in the direction of federalism, but
in that of securing effective co-operation between governments as
governments". (60)He attacked "the misplaced enthusiasm of certain
advocates of European unity who can only think in terms of a federal
constitution" (61) and said it was "essential to make it clear to our
Continental friends that if and when it comes to anything in the nature
of a surrender of sovereignty.. .we must stand outside". (62) 	 The
support of Amery was significant both in demonstrating the breadth of
support for European unity, but the limits beyond which much support
would not go. Another figure who reassured the Empire was Oliver
Stanley who was a well-respected party figure, a former Colonial
Secretary and another member of the European Movement's Executive
Council.
The most difficult role to explain in the 1945-51 period is that
of Anthony Eden. 	 He is generally regarded as one of the main causes
of the failure of greater British involvement in European integration.
Yet it was while he was Shadow Foreign Secretary and a respected
figure in foreign affairs in his own right, that the general
Conservative commitment to Europe was established.
Eden supported European unity. During thb war he saw some form
of federation as a war aim, in 1947 welcomed the Marshall Plan as the
first step to European unity, (63) and was anxious to encourage
Franco-German co-operation, but he viewed Britain's role as an external
supporter.	 His interest was in Western unity, in which a United
Europe would play a significant role together with the U.S.A. and
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Britain and her Empire.	 The Empire was the basis for Britain's
position as a world power, so "For us in this House as a whole, the
welfare of the Commonwealth and Empire must always be first
consideration". (64) From this perspective British participation in
any federation was impossible. He spoke against a Commons motion
on federalist, and stated at Columbia University, "This is something
we know in our bones we cannot do". (65) "We continuously encouraged
close co-operation and unity between the continental powers but we did
so from the reserve position that we would not accept a sovereign
(66)
European authority".	 His "lack of enthusiasm for the movement
for Western European Unity" (67) was certain, but lacks a clear
explanation. Macmillan wrote, "I have never understood whY Antony
Eden stood aloof". (68)
An explanation may be found in the multiple impact of a number of
factors.	 One was Eden's close personal relationship to Bevin, "one
of his few personal friends in politics". (69)	 Foreign policy
debates were often between the two front benches on one side and a
group of dissidents, either on the left or the right, on the other.
Eden believed in a bipartisan foreign policy and was opposed to the
use of foreign policy as a partisan weapon.	 He felt that much
Conservative criticism of the Government on the European issue was
simply an attempt to make party points.
	 "He tended to believe that
it was all a 'party stunt' of Winston's". (70)
A second factor was the strong influence of the Foreign Office,
with whom he had served for a long period of time.
	 The Foreign Office
was opposed to any firm commitment to British participation in
European unity.	 Despite being in opposition, when politicians often
lose touch with officials (and therefore become more open to radical
ideas), Eden's close contact with Bevin included contact with the
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officials, and their influence upon him remained strong.
	 One
biographer wrote that "he did not wish to diverge from the Foreign
Office, who certainly commanded more of his loyalty and affection
(71)than the Conservative Party was ever able to do".	 A third
factor was his lack of involvement with the Continental Europeans,
which consistently led him to underestimate the strength of
Continental feeling. Those involved with the European Movement were
highly conscious of the gap between Continental and British opinion
and sought to bridge their gap, while often being infected by
Continental enthusiasm.	 Eden's attendance at the Hague Congress
however was only as a result of strong pressure from Churchill, and
his lack of enthusiasm was evident. 	 Kilmuir placed great importance
on Eden's absence from the Conservative delegation to the Council of
Europe.
	
"His absence from the meetings of the Council of Europe in
those exciting and very moving months of its existence was a great
misfortune for himself, Europe, and the Conservative Party and the
cause of world peace". (72)
Another factor was his poor relationship with Churchill. 	 There
was a significant difference in assessment of the Soviet Union, with
Eden taking a less hostile position.	 Churchill believed that Eden
was behind several attempts to remove him as leader, while Eden felt
that Churchill was using foreign policy for domestic party advantage.
Their relations were not close. 	 Despite Eden's position as Shadow
Foreign Secretary, he played no effective role in the development or
articulation of European policy.	 He lacked any commitment to a
policy in which he had not participated, and viewed it as Churchill's
policy rather than that of the Conservative Party.
The final factor was that "at root Eden was an Atlanticist with
a view of Great Britain as a world power whose aspirations had
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scarcely altered since the inter-war years". (73)
	
Eden believed
that Britain could remain as one of the major powers together with
the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, with her position as head of the
Empire.
	 It was for this reason that he argued that "the first
consideration of the U.K. must always be the welfare of the
Commonwealth". (74))
	 He perceived this as a most formidable obstacle
to British participation in a united Europe, so he preferred to
encourage unity from outside rather than as a leader within.
Thus the Shadow Foreign Secretary was not committed to the spirit
of much of the Conservative discussion on European policy, but while
there was no need to establish any concrete positions then this
situation, and the presence of other sceptics, did not matter a great
deal.	 However, once decisions had to be made, these differences
clearly emerged.
	 The issue that brought differences to the fore was
the Schuman Plan. In May 1950 Robert Schuman, the French Foreign
Minister, proposed the merger of the coal and steel industries of
the war-time enemies of France and Germany, and opened the proposal
to other nations.
	 The specific nature of the proposal was the
creation of a supranational Higher Authority, over which the national
governments would have no control.
	 The presentation of this concrete
proposal, which required a British response, brought to the surface the
differences within the Shadow Cabinet.
Some urged a positive response.
	 Macmillan tried to arouse
support and "expressed alarm at the somewhat tepid reception given so
far in British official circles to the Schuman proposals... .If the plan
is pursued and implemented, it will be a wonderful step forward.
	 But
if it fails, it will mean a serious deterioration.
	 It will be more
than a set-back. (75)It will be a disaster".
	 He wrote to the
Times as Chairman of E.L.E.C. (76) andsent an urgent minute to
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Churchill urging that a Commons motion be placed in support of the
(77)Plan.
	
The 'Europeans' recognised the problem of the
supranational authority but wanted . the party to understand the attitude
of the Continentals.	 They recognised that a federal solution was
unacceptable in Britain, but feared that no British participation
would destroy the Plan completely, and believed that Britain could
achieve the necessary changes to make the Plan acceptable. 	 Thus
Macmillan's minute read:
There is, of course, no Schuman Plan
in existence... .There is a plan to
have a plan.
4. But this is the very reason why
Britain should be in from the start.
Then we can mould the plan to our
-pattern.
5. If we are not in:
either ( i) the whole thing will
collapse, and with it all
real hope of European
co-operation;
or	 (ii) the Governmentswill, in due
course get complete control". (78)
Maxwell-Fyfe felt the Plan was too ambitious and would fail.
(79)
"My general impression is quite clear, namely that it is unworkable".
He felt that British participation was essential to ensure that
something would be saved from the Plan and in a form acceptable to
Britain.	 Eccles argued that without British participation the Higher
Authority would have considerably more power, while British
participation would ensure a more acceptable solution.
There was, however, considerable opposition within the Shadow
Cabinet by what Maxwell-ryfe described as "many of the most dominant
figures-on the Conservative benches". (80) Eden, Salisbury and
Stanley were opponents.	 Their arguments against were on grounds of
sovereignty, and that the British coal and steel industries would not
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be better off in such an arrangement. (81)
A compromise emerged.
	 In the Commons, the Conservative position
was to attack the Labour Government for their hostile attitude, and
urge British participation on the same basis as the Dutch who had
agreed to participate but without any prior commitment. Eden very
reluctantly endorsed this position, the first time that he did not
follow the Foreign Office position on a. major issue.
	 He accepted the
collective Shadow Cabinet position put through by Churchill under the
strong influence of Macmillan.
The Commons debate was held on 26th and 27th June 1950 on the
Conservative motion
"That this House requests H.M.G., in the
interests of peace and full employment,
to accept the invitation to take part
in the discussions on the Schuman Plan,
subject to the same condition as that
made by the Netherlands Government,
namely, that if the discussions show the
Plan not to be practicable, freedom of
action is reserved".
The basis of the Conservative case was that Government hostility was
based on partisan motives; that the Plan was anti-national planning;
that socialist governments would be in the minority; and that the
trade unions feared the loss of their negotiating power.
	 Eden
presented the motion in a rather half-hearted manner, which contrasted
greatly with Churchill's scornful attack on the Government.
	 Max
Beloff has described the debate as "noteworthy as being the only
occasion in this period when a Parliamentary Opposition attacked the
Government for its unwillingness to proceed faster in the direction of
European integration". (82)
The second part of their policy was to seek to influence
Continental discussion through the Macmillan-Eccles Plan, which was
presented to the Assembly of the Council of Europe on 15th August 1950.
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Macmillan has described the three main differences from Schuman.
"1. The experts who co-ordinate the coal
and steel industries will be
responsible to a Committee of Ministers,
and therefore the link with the
underlying Parliaments is kept.
2. The basic social, economic and strategic
interests of each country are safe-
guarded from encroachment by the experts.
3. Any member can withdraw on giving 12
months notice and any member can be
expelled by the others". (83)
The proposed coal and steel community could exist under the
Council of Europe, as perhaps the first of a series of functional
organisations with which nations could choose to associate, "integration
a la carte" (Sandys).
	 However, as Max Beloff noted, "This was far
removed indeed from the ideas of the supranationalists and the scheme
met with little response in the Assembly where it was allowed to die
(84)in committee". This compromise formula had at least managed
to keep together a united Shadow Cabinet, until the next issue of a
European army.
Churchill recognised that the Soviet threat required all the
resources of the West to combine in defence, and that included German
rearmament and participation.
	 When the issue was raised at the
European Assembly in August 1950, Churchill decided to propose a
motion calling for the immediate creation of a European Army as the
means to enable German rearmament.
	 "We should make a gesture of
practical and constructive guidance by declaring ourselves in favour,
of the immediate creation of a European army under a unified command,
(85)and in which we should bear a worthy and honourable part".
This was presented in the form of a general idea rather than any
considered plan. 	 The motion was endorsed by the Assembly.
On October 24th 1950 the French Government presented the Pleven
Plan for a European army, with German participation, integration at
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unit level, a supranational authority a la Schuman, a European
Minister of Defence, European Budget and a European Parliament for
defence. The Conservative reaction was to reject the Plan as of
little military value but to fear that failure would set back
co-operation.
	 Churchill described the plan as a "sludgy amalgam", (86)
and felt that there was too much mixing of nationalities to create
an effective military force. The Conservative position was to favour
national divisions with a Supreme Commander, the centralisation of
supply, the standardisation of arms, but no elaborate or supranational
authority.
	 Sandys, speaking for the Party in the Commons, supported
a European Army as the only framework for German rearmament but
opposed the Pleven Plan because it would hinder co-operation through
N.A.T.O., proposed a European Minister of Defence, and favoured a
European Parliament instead of democratic control through a joint
committee of national parliaments. (87)
Eden's position was somewhat different. He favoured a European
Army to encourage Franco-German entente.
	 "I had no quarrel with
the conception of a European Defence Community.
	 On the contrary, I
liked the idea, for I have never thought that my country need have
any apprehension on account of a closer union between the nations of
continental Europe".
	 He, however, was opposed to British
participation in a European Army. He also endorsed the Conservative
opposition to Pleven.
	 "I feared that the plan, imaginative as it was,
might fail for just that reason.
	 It seemed to attempt too much, to
ask more of the nations concerned than they could freely give and then
the outcome might be disillusion, leaving Europe in disarray". (88)
Eden's contribution was to urge that a European Army should be
created within an Atlantic Army, leaving the nature of Britain's
(89)position ambiguous.	 The issue of the Army was still unresolved
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when a second election was called and the Conservatives were called to
form the Government, when the different attitudes would re-emerge.
Parliamentary Party 
The Parliamentary Conservative Party was devastated by the 1945
election with the loss of many seats. Gradually it restored itself
in morale, but the 1945 intake included a large number of
inexperienced M.P.s.	 Due to the presence of Churchill and Eden,
foreign affairs was largely left to them.
	 There was a heartfelt
desire to unite again the socialist government, and so to avoid
strong intra-party conflict.
There was in the Commons a small group of European enthusiasts
who made most of the running on this issue.
	 Most M.P.s were willing
to follow the lead from the leadership.
	 While in support of the
general concept of European unity and especially Western union,
they were hostile to federalist experiments.
	 There was also a
group of opponents, however, who never provided a coherent critique
of the European issue, although they often articulated fears which
were felt more widely.
The most prominent backbench speaker for European unity was Bob
Boothby, an articulate, irrascible and independent-minded Tory from
Aberdeenshire East. Boothby spoke frequently inside and outside the
Commons on two necessities for him: the need for Europe to develop
as a 'third force' between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, and the
need for democratic regional economic planning, which would provide
a middle way between laissez-faire capitalism on the one side, and
communism on the other. Together these two concerns led him to
believe that this was the end of the era of the sovereign state.
The concept of sovereignty was obsolete.
	 "The smaller nations
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of Western Europe, of whom we are one, cannot hope to survive
politically or economically in isolation". (90)	 "war is inherent
(91)
and endemic in a world of completely independent sovereign states".
European unity must involve the surrender of sovereignty.
	
"If it is
to be anything more than a meaningless phase, it must involve some
merging or pooling of national authority or sovereignty for defined
purposes". (92)	 Boothby believed in the need for some supranational
authority and supported an Early Day Motion in favour of federalism
in 1948, but was aware that many Conservative backbenchers were
suspicious of such ideas.
His first objective was to avoid the absorption of Europe into
either the U.S. or Soviet blocs.	 "Unless we get together in pursuit
of a common political and economic policy we shall, inevitably,
sooner or later, be absorbed into one or other of the great economic
(93)
or political blocs which surround us".
	
His fear of American
dominance led him to vote against the American loan agreement in
(94)1945.
	 He also feared that the only alternative to voluntary
co-operation was domination by the Soviet Union.
	 He believed that
there was "only one alternative to the regional planning of Europe
by mutual agreement, and that is yet another attempt at unification
(95)
of the European economy by force, or by the threat of force".
He attributed the failure to achieve peace after World War I partly
"to our refusal to abandon the obsolete economic doctrines of
laissez-faire and multi-lateral free trade, and our refusal to accept
the modern economic concept of regional planning and organisation,
both for economic and defence purposes". (96)He felt that Western
Europe could combine the best of the Soviet Union, economic planning
but without the loss of democracy, and the U.S.A., with its democracy
and freedom but without its "free knock-about capitalism". (97)Thus
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Boothby presented a Third Force approach, which was not widely
supported in the Parliamentary Party or shared by his fellow 'Europeans'.
There was a group of enthusiasts, around 60, who took many
opportunities to express their support for European unity.
	 They
•
contributed to many debates and participated actively in the work of
the European Movement. Boothby and Leslie Hore-Belisha were on the
Executive, and Julian Amery was a member of its Central and East
European Commission.
	
Boothby, Walter Elliot, Henry Hopkinson,
Hore-Belisha and Colonel Hutchinson attended the International
European Movement in Paris. 	 23 Conservative M.P.s attended the Hague
Congress, one of the most impressive single delegations. 	 Three
Conservatives (Boothby, Sir Peter Macdonald, Peter Roberts) Joined
an all-party ad-hoc drafting committee on an Early Day Motion which
called for a long term policy of Britain's membership of a federal
Europe, which achieved support from over 60 Conservative M.P.s (98)
A later Early Day Motion, welcoming the Council of Europe, received
(99)
over 65 Conservativevotes.
	
This group also provided a number
of the Conservative members of the European Assembly, including
Boothby, David Eccles, Lady Tweedsmuir, Henry Hopkinson and Christopher
Hollis.	 None of this is to suggest there was anything like an
organised European faction.	 There did, however, exist a number of
individual minds who were thinking along similar lines, and who
co-operated on an ad hoc basis, such as over a particular Early Day
Motion.
The ideas of this group can be represented by the expressed
views of Anthony Nutting, a young and rising star in the Party, and
Sir Peter Macdonald, a respected spokesman for this viewpoint.
Nutting castigated the Labour Government for their failure to provide
a lead.
	 "How long has the time been ripe to organise Western Europe?
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I should have thought that the time was now over-ripe".
	 He saw the
need to unite against the Soviet Union, Europe was already divided,
and the cold war had begun.
	 He rejected the Third Force idea
proposed by some Labour supporters of Europe and Boothby, saw Western
Europe as part of a wider Western Union, and expressed the opinion
widely shared among Conservative Europeans' that "Surely we in this
country, in Western Europe, are the only people who can give a lead
(100)
to Western Europe today".
Sir Peter Macdonald, a more traditional backbencher, accepted
the need for federation and the loss of sovereignty, and helped draft
the Early Day Motion calling for "a long-term policy...to create a
democratic federation of Europe".
	 He fervently rejected thb view
that there was a conflict between Europe and the Commonwealth.
	 "The
charge made against the promoters of this Motion is that we are
leaving the Commonwealth behind...in the whole of my political life,
(101)I have been devoted to the interests of the Commonwealth".
He mentioned support from Smuts of South Africa, MacKenzie-King of
Canada and Fraser of New Zealand.
In the same debate Boothby rejected such charges.
	 "What nonsense
those people write and talk who say that the idea of the British Empire
and Commonwealth and of a United Europe are contradictory or clashing
ideas.	 On the contrary, they are entirely complementary". (102)
He argued that British participation would help the Commonwealth
because Britain would then be part of a great power, and could provide
access to European markets. (103)
While the group were federalists in the long term, they accepted
that progress should be at a pace widely acceptable.
	 Boothby attacked
one approach, the Interlaken Plan, as "an orgy of
(104)	
constitution-
mongering to no useful purpose",
	 which created a bad image in
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Britain.	 Lady Tweedsmuir accepted that "if political federalism
is not possible, we must achieve things on a functional basis". (105)
Sir Arthur Salter accepted federal union as the ultimate development,
but felt it should be achieved through dealing with immediate
problems.	 "Although it is well that we go step by step.. .we should
have an idea of the direction which we are going". (106)
Thus the 'Europeans', the first of what critics call the
Euro-fanatics, provided pressure on the leadership, helped to create
a positive attitude to Europe among other backbenchers, and while
accepting federalism as a long-term aim, accepted that a slow pace
may be necessary to obtain broad acceptance among Conservatives and
the nation.	 There were few outright opponents to a European policy.
Aidan Crawley, then a Labour M.P., claimed that no clear Conservative
attitude existed, and Conservatives were strongly divided.
	 "There
is a deep division on both sides of this House, between parties and
throughout the country". (107) 	 If so, the determined opponents were
able to find few spokesmen in the Commons.	 Only 3 opponents emerged
in the parliamentary debates - Lord Hinchingbrooke, Sir Herbert
Williams and Harry Legge-Bourke.
Hinchingbrooke was a member of the reformist Tory Reform
Committee and saw the United Nations as the instrument to bring peace.
Western union he saw only as a threat to world peace. 	 "I do not
believe that a Western bloc will serve to increase our security, or
that of the other countries proposed to be included in it... .It will
be resented by the Dominions who will think that our industrial
effort is being diverted from them into Europe; it will be resented
by the U.S. who are, above all, concerned to see that the
potentialities for conflict in Europe are reduced, and not increased.
It will increase apprehension in Russia, and play right into their
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hands by prolonging the game of power politics... .1 believe the
policy of the Western bloc to be a stupid and childish game of tu
(108)quoque".
Sir Herbert Williams, described by Forman as "a typical
(109)backwoodsman",	 strongly opposed the European Movement, the Council
of Europe, the Schuman Plan and a-European Army.
	
"I should not shed
any tears if the Council of-Europe never met again....(The European
Movement) represent nobody but themselves, and they do not bind the
rest of their parties in the faintest degree....I am completely
opposed to our participation in the Schuman Plan. 	 I do not believe
in what is described as a European Army...(the Hague Congress is)
the reverse of what I regarded as some of the fundamental principles
of the Conservative Party". (110)
Legge-Bourke was somewhat more moderate. 	 "I am, before anything
else, a nationalist....I am in favour of the Council of Europe, but
I am in favour of it only on one set of terms, and that it remains
as a council and does not become an international pressure group".
He opposed the Council of Europe having limited function but real
powers; was against a unified army although favoured a combined army,
because "I oppose a political authority"; and opposed the Schuman
Plan as "very dangerous indeed for the British Commonwealth". 
(11 1)
They proposed several Early Day Motions of their own, but they
did not obtain substantial support.	 Two amendments which explicitly
rejected federal union (33/47A) and which required the prior agreement
of the Commonwealth (33A/47) attracted only 15 signatures, compared to
60 for federalism and 65 for the Council of Europe. 	 On the Schuman
Plan they were only able to get 6 Conservative abstainers (Legge-Bourke,
Enoch Powell, Gerald Nabarro, McAdden, A.V. Harvey and Sir John
(112)Mellor)	 despite a claim that "a lot of Tories would not vote.
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They said that they would not go into the Lobby to hand over our coal
and steel industries to Europe". (113)
Why did they fail to generate more support? They clearly
articulated fears that were widespread among Conservative backbenchers,
in particular over the effect of the Commonwealth and the loss of
sovereignty.	 Colonel Hutchinson said, "We wait with interest the
plan...to see how far that integration can be consolidated and made
compatible (with the Commonwealth) with the other aims, that is the
closer integration of Europe with which I also agree". (114)John
Maclay stated, "I am very nervous about the extreme idealist advocates
of the federal idea", warned that it would require many stages to
achieve Western union, that the national governments would have to do
much of the work, and yet even he hoped that "we could bit by bit
gradually hand over sovereignty until we achieved the kind of federal
world which I think most people would like to see achieved". (115)
The majority of backbenchers appeared to have been convinced that
Western unity was a necessity to stop Soviet domination, and that
European unity was an essential part of any Western co-operation.
Concerned about loss of sovereignty and the Commonwealth, they appeared
to have confidence firstly in Churchill's leadership on the issue, and
secondly that British participation would mean British leadership and
therefore a Europe on British terms.
Even when the issue came to a decision point over Schuman,
backbench support remained. 	 A meeting of the M.P.s was held on 19th
June 1950 to discuss Schuman.	 According to Macmillan, over 80 were
present, 23 spoke in favour of Schuman and only 2 or 3 against. 	 "There
was an overwhelming majority that the party should give a lead and
that a motion should be tabled. 	 Some who afterwards spoke in the
debate and were believed to have special knowledge of the industries
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concerned had given their support.
	 The younger elements were anxious
(116)for a clear and positive attitude".
	 In the Commons debate,
influential backbenchers such as David Eccles, Quintin Hogg, Harold
Watkinson and Julian Amery spoke in support.
	 Edward Heath also gave
his maiden speech in favour.	 "There were a few speeches expressing
doubt from the Conservative benches, but a great body rallied to the
lead which Churchill and Eden gave". (117)
The Parliamentary Party only provided a limited restraint upon
the leadership.	 Their fears were already represented in the Shadow
Cabinet, while they generally supported the pro-European position of
the Party.	 Even when the issue was presented in a concrete form,
over the Schuman Plan, the bulk of backbenchers had no problems in
supporting the Shadow Cabinet position.
National Union 
The ordinary party members tended not to discuss political
issues a great deal, unless requested by the leadership.
	 On this
question, the party membership was encouraged to discuss Europe by
the leadership.
	 Churchill frequently mentioned the issue at
Conservative meetings and rallies, even while emphasising its non-
partisan nature.
	 He also sought to calm fears over the Empire.
	 "I
cannot think, and here I come to the issue which I know is much in
your minds, that the policy of a United Europe as we Conservatives
conceive it can be the slightest injury to our British Empire and
Commonwealth". (118) 	 EuropeanReview, information on the Council of
Europe, European Movement literature and speakers were distributed
to local Associations.
	 The Conservative Political Centre, the
political education wing of the Party, published a pamphlet by
Boothby and encouraged discussion groups on the topic, and the Women's
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organisation discussed it at their Central Council in 1948. 	 All
this represented a desire from the centre for Conservative grass-roots
support for the European ideal.
At Party conferences, uncontroversial motions on the Empire
provided the main foreign policy debates until 1949. 	 In 1948 two
speakers emphasised that Imperial Preference must come before trade
with Europe, while two other speakers supported European co-operation.
In 1949 European unity was discussed for the first time at a
Conservative Conference. 	 At an earlier debate on Imperial Preference,
the concept of the three circles was reiterated by Eden. 	 The motion
on European Unity, proposed by Sandys and John Foster M.P., stated:
"That this Conference welcomes the creation
of the Council of Europe and promises its
support for all practical measures to
promote closer European Unity, consistent
with the full maintenance of the unity of
the British Empire and continuing
collaboration with the U.S.". (119)
Unusually an amendment was called for debate, proposed by
Hinchingbrooke, M.P., and Michael Astor, M.P., but it was accepted by
Sandys and carried by a large majority. 	 Sandys'proposing speech
emphasised the necessity of European unity to defeat Communism and
to provide bigger markets, and that the protection of the Empire was
a precondition for British participation in a United Europe. 	 "I
submit to you that where Mr. Amery leads no Empire man need hesitate
to follow".
	
Hinchingbrooke emphasised that he was not against the
main motion, but wished to strengthen the three circles.	 The speech
by Leo Amery was an important one.	 He stated that conference would
not accept unity which impaired the Empire, spoke against federalism
and emphasised that "a free and friendly Europe is an essential
element in our Imperial defence".	 The only opposing speaker noted
that the motion called for unity not co-operation, and that it was
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impossible to serve two masters at the same time. 	 All the other
speakers (Eccles, Boothby, Macmillan, Martin Madden) endorsed the
motion, noting that Imperial Preference had been accepted by the
Council of Europe (Eccles), that a rejection of the motion would be a
rejection of Churchill (Boothby), and that all unity meant was "the
decision to act together on a number of questions where action taken
together can be more effective than taken separately" (Macmillan).
The motion was adopted overwhelmingly with only two dissentients.
The debate emphasised several factors: that the party activists were
broadly pro-European; that there was some concern about the effect on
the Empire but they were satisfied with the reassurances received;
that all the well-known speakers in the debate were on the European
side, and the opponents could not field one prominent spokesman; and
finally that on issues of this kind the party was happy to place its
confidence in the hands of Churchill.
While the 1950 conference did not debate Europe, contributions
favoured the integration of European armies to enable a German
contribution, and noted the lack of conflict with the Commonwealth.
Further support came from the Central Council, an annual mini-conference,
which in 1948 unanimously adopted a motion welcoming the Treaty of
Brussels and looking "forward to a further widening and enlarging of
this pact in the field of defence and economic collaboration with the
approval and support of the countries of the British Commonwealth of
Nations".
Further evidence of European feeling in the constituencies came
from a report on the Two-Way Movement of Ideas by the C.P.C. (120)
In November 1949, a pamphlet by Boothby on European union was
distributed to Associations, together with a list of questions designed
to stimulate discussion and provide an indication to the party
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headquarters of feelings on the issue. 	 The summary of the 485
reports received stated that support for the ideal was "almost without
exception".	 It was seen as anti-Communist, and essential to the peace
and prosperity of Europe and the world.	 However, it involved a number
of decisions "which may appear to conflict with accepted ideas and
long-standing policies".	 On the question on sovereignty,
"reluctantly the majority accept the principle that Britain must be
prepared to surrender some of her sovereignty if she is to play her
part in the creation of a European Union".
	
They were divided on
industrial development, where economic co-operation was favoured but
not planning.	 The majority accepted there would be some conflict
with the Commonwealth, which led some to oppose European unity, but
the majority felt that it was in the long term interests of the Empire
and policies should be adjusted.
	 Most favoured the inclusion of
colonies in the Western Union,.while some favoured a Union of English-
speaking peoples.
	 On a European Parliament, some wanted detailed
plans for a constitution and some wanted direct popular elections.
Most favoured representation on the basis of population (not just by
nation), appointed by national governments, but representatives should
not vote on a national basis. 	 This survey of constituency opinion,
more representative of the political activists than the ordinary
members, suggests a recognition of the problems involved, but that
these were outweighed by the economic and defence advantages. 	 They
were surprisingly willing to accept the loss of some sovereignty.
This suggests both a lack of naivity, and a deeper commitment to the
concept of Europe than might have been expected.
Another source of evidence is resolutions submitted by constituency
associations or area organisations to the National Union Executive
Committee (NU
	
(121)EC) for consideration.	 These resolutions showed
7P
that the Empire remained the primary international interest of
constituency activists.	 In 1948 resolutions began to appear on
Europe, which were all positive.	 On 28th March 1948 Yorkshire Area
passed a resolution, with 572 present and only 10 against, urging a
conference of democratic parties in Europe in the belief that "the
United States of Europe will readily materialise". 	 Sympathetic
motions also came from Home Counties North, West Midlands Women's
Advisory Council, and North West Women (on support for a European
Army).	 The national affiliates also considered the issue in various
ways.
	
The Women's Conference debated Europe on 21st April 1948 and
passed a positive motion. 	 The Young Conservatives were active in
sending representatives to the Hague Congress and attending several
meetings on the Continent. 	 The Federation of University Conservative
Associations debated and passed a motion in 1948, calling upon the
party to submit a definite plan for Western European unity. 	 Thus
all the indications are that support was as strong, if not stronger,
among the affiliated organisations as in the party as a whole.
Taking the temperature of the rank-and-file Conservatives on any
issue is always difficult, but the evidence that exists, despite its
inadequacy, all tends to support the conclusion of broad support.	 The
evidence comes from Conference debates and votes, the C.P.C. survey,
and the activities of affiliates.
	
The cause of this support seems to
have two prime causes: trust in Churchill's judgement, and fear of the
Soviet Union.	 They even seem to be prepared to sacrifice at least
some sovereignty and some of the Imperial relationship in order to
achieve European unity.
Conservative Central Office 
Conservative Central Office did not play a major role in the
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discussion on Europe.	 Apart from the distribution of literature,
only the Research Department, C.P.C. and the Overseas Committee were
involved and even these only to a very limited degree.
This was the period of the great revival of the C.R.D., when it
was led by Rab Butler and desk officers included Macleod, Maudling and
Powell.
	 However, it concerned itself very little with this issue,
partly because the C.R.D. concentrated on broad principles rather than
details, and partly because effort was directed towards domestic
affairs, where both Butler's interests and the most votes lay.
	 A
significant event was the appointment of Ursula Branston in 1946 as
a foreign affairs desk officer. 	 She became Head of the Foreign
Affairs Section in the 1950's, and according to Ramsden, "she certainly
.had a considerable influence on policy, through a close working
(122)
relationship with Anthony Eden". 	 Branston supported a European
approach.
	 She presented a brief on 8th December 1949 to the
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, which argued:
1. Europe must unite with or without Great Britain.
2. United without Great Britain would be politically disastrous.
3. United with Great Britain would mean British leadership.
4. Political change could be achieved through the evolution of
co-operation.
5. "At all costs the idea of a federal power in Europe should be
(123)discouraged at the present time".
She argued for "common action in certain specific matters" and that
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe should be a
European Political Authority, acting as a European body and not simply
inter-governmental, with the possibility of infinite development as
Europeanism grew from strength to strength.
7 5
In August 1950 she wrote a pamphlet on the Schuman proposals
(124)which was distributed widely to M.P.s, candidates and speakers.
The pamphlet described the proposals in factual detail, and presented
the Conservative response as positive and the Socialists as hostile.
Another Foreign Affairs Committee brief, on the European Army,
presented the Sandys compromise plan, explained the Conservative
objections to Pleven, and emphasised that acceptance of Pleven was not
(125)
a precondition to discussion.	 Branston strongly supported
European co-operation, and feared that without British participation
it would develop in unfortunate directions.
	
In a brief in 1953,
while understanding why federalism was unacceptable to Britain, she
argued that if Britain had given leadership, federation could have
(126)been avoided.	 Thus the limited influence that did come from the
C.R.D. supported a positive attitude to Schuman and the European
Army.
The Conservative Political Centre, the new political education
wing of the Party, organised the discussion groups on European union
in 1949 in the Two-Way Movement of Ideas, and published as pamphlets
for discussion About Western Union by Boothby in January 1949,
Conservatives and Peace by Nigel Davies, M.P., and European Union by
T.E. Utley in March, 1951, all pro-European.
The Conservative Overseas Committee, set up in 1949 to deal with
contacts and publications on overseas affairs, had its primary interest
in Commonwealth affairs, but it also considered the question of
contacts with similar continental parties. 	 An instruction from Butler
"ruled out any question of formal alliance with kindred parties
(127)
represented at the Assembly".
	
They showed an interest in the
Nouvelles Equipes Internationales, a loose organisation of Christian
Democrats, and endorsed Young Conservative membership of its youth
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section, as the N.E.I. was described as "a unit of the European
Movement and was therefore working for Western union under Mr.
Churchill's general leadership". (128) Soon, however, the Young
Conservatives withdrew.
	 Anthony Nutting, the Young Conservative
representative, explained that the N.E.I. "was running a policy in
Europe with which the great majority of the Conservative party
fundamentally disagree, i.e. federalism, and for that reason he was
withdrawing from the British Committee. 	 The Committee concurred".
Europe was not a significant issue for Central Office, although
it did contribute to the stimulation of debate on the issue, acting
within the broad outlines of party policy in favour of European unity
but against federalism.
The Informal Party 
In the immediate post-war period, there were none of the
intra-party "ginger groups" that were to emerge later, except for the
Tory Reform Committee, which was exclusively parliamentary and
concerned with domestic issues.	 The European Movement was an all-party
body and included leaders from all three parties, but it was frequently
accused of Conservative bias.
	
It was generally considered "strongly
Conservative in its leanings", (130) partly because of Churchill's
leadership and partly because most of its membership appeared to come
from Conservatives. 	 Attempts to destroy this image, and to encourage
Labour and Liberal participation, led to concern within the Party
that the Conservative interest was being ignored, leaving power in the
hands of Socialists and Federalists. 	 These feelings emerged over the
poor Conservative representation at a European Economic Conference
organised by the European Movement on 20th-25th April 1949, which was
discussed by the Overseas Committee.
	 Henry Hopkinson, from the Research
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Department, felt "very strongly that there is now a danger that a
United Europe and all that that involves, having been largely a
Conservative conception and enjoying considerable support from our
Party, is now tending to fall more and more into Socialist hands".
He was supported by Pat Hornsby-Smith who complained that "In the
general desire to ensure that the Movement is non-political, we have
deliberately weighted the Conference with trade unionists, free traders
(131)and socialists on the British side...".
	 Macmillan was asked to
call a meeting to try to encourage greater British participation.
	
It
was widely believed by both Conservatives and Labour that the bulk of
the European Movement membership and of those who attended the large
number of meetings throughout the country were Conservative, which
reflected a •certain level of sup port on the issue from some
Conservatives.
The sectional interest groups from industry took little interest
in Europe, seeing it as primarily a foreign policy issue.
	 Some parts
of industry were attracted by the removal of trade barriers, promoted
by the European League for Economic Co-operation (E.L.E.C.).
	 Churchill
attracted industrial funds into the European Movement, and Lord McCowan
of I.C.I. held periodic fund-raising lunches.
	 ELEC organised the
Westminster Economic Conference, 20th-25th April 1949, primarily to
attract industrial support for European unity. (132)
The Conservative press adopted a position similar to the Party,
very sympathetic to developments towards European unity while cautious
over the cost to the Empire.
	 An editorial in the Times stated that,
"For us Empire ties must always come first, but, if by ' a Western Union
we can help to create more settled political conditions on the
European continent, that will be a contribution to the peace of the
(133)
world".
	 The Times welcomed the Schuman Plan and urged a
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(134)positive response from the British Government. 	 An exception,
and one that proved to be of substantial duration, was the Express.
Its proprietor, Lord Beaverbrooke, was against British participation
because of the effect on relations with the Empire and the U.S.,
although he was not against Continental unity. (135)He strongly
attacked the European Movement, without ever naming Churchill for whom
(136)he had great respect,	 and in 1949 the Express launched its famous
campaign for Empire Free- Trade.
The Economist adopted from the first a strongly pro-European
position with which it has been identified ever since. 	 In 1947 it
congratulated itself that "The Economist was one of the earliest, and
has been one of the most persistent advocates of a closer association
(137)
of the Western European Nations". 	 It accepted the need for the
surrender of some sovereignty. 	 "The European nations must transfer
and merge some portion of their sovereign rights". (138)	 It
recognised that this would create problems for the Commonwealth (139)
but claimed that "the active pursuit by the British Government of
greater political unity would not weaken Atlantic unity or compromise
Britain's relations with the Commonwealth". (140)	 It severely
criticised the Labour Government for "the record is one of a steady
pouring of cold water", (41) andasked it "to forget the association
(142)
of these ideas with Mr. Churchill and examine them on their merits".
Thus the Economist provided important intellectual support for
Conservative opinion-formers on the European issue.
The Spectator, another journal widely read by Conservatives, was
rather more cautious.	 While it welcomed European co-operation, it
felt that priority should be given to the United Nations. (143)While
it favoured some form of confederation, it firmly rejected federalism.
"It is a complete fallacy to maintain that there cannot be effective
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European union without European federation". 	 The Spectator 
emphasised "how narrow was the real difference between Government and
Opposition", (145)in that both supported European unity but rejected
federalism.	 In an article on 'Schuman and the Conservatives' it was
this anti-supranationalism that was emphasised. (146)
	
Thus, The
Spectator, while quite within the Conservative policy of pro-unity/
anti-federalism, emphasised the latter rather than the dangers of a
failure to create European unity.
The sources of the politicians' perceptions of public opinion
are many, varied and not always reliable. 	 Those that were available
to politicians suggested that the concept of European unity received
a positive response from the electorate.	 One source was the success
of the European Movement, with a large speakers panel of around 130;
great strength in schools and universities (the second largest group
at Oxford); large audiences at their meetings, a few of over 1,000;
and over 3,500 regular subscribers to their newsletter. The European
Movement attracted considerable support, especially among Conservatives
and the young.
Two major polls were conducted on Europe. 	 The first, published
by the Express, showed wide support for European unity. 	 65% favoured
economic integration, 68% military integration and a surprising 58%
political union.	 Whether those polled (or the electorate in general)
had a clear understanding of the implications of these policies may
be doubted, but they did reveal a general sympathy to Europe. 	 The
16% who took a firm anti-integration position gave two reasons, that
Britain should avoid continental entanglement, and that they feared
that this approach would increase the likelihood of war. (147)
A second opinion poll, conducted March-June 1950, confirmed the
positive attitude of the electorate towards European unity, although
also a low saliency.	 54% felt that European unity would be good for
them, and 80% felt that it would make a contribution to world peace.
The second poll may have shown slightly less support because the
sample was less biased towards Conservatives than the first one. (148)
Public opinion was the major target of Churchill's campaign on
Europe.	 However Churchill calculated public opinion, by the time of
the elections in 1950 and 1951 he appears to have concluded that public
opinion had not sufficiently expressed itself.
	 At the Party
Conference in 1950, which he knew must precede an election, Europe
received only a passing reference in his speech.
	 He seems to have
believed that no votes were to be won on the theme of European unity.
It played a less significant role in his speeches as the elections
approached.
	 In the two manifestos the Empire and Commonwealth
received far greater attention.
	 The 1950 manifesto simply said
"Hand in hand with France and other friendly powers we shall pursue
the aim of closer unity in Europe", and in 1951, "We put first the
safety, progress and cohesion of the British Empire and Commonwealth
of Nations.
	 On these foundations, we will labour for a united
Europe". (149)
Conclusion 
During the period of the post-war Labour Government, Churchill
and to a lesser extent the Conservative Party was associated with the
cause of European unity, mainly as a barrier to the Soviet Union but
also to help restore the European economy.
	 There was little dissent
at any level of the Party for a policy in support of European
developments but rejecting federalism.
	 Both federalists and anti-
Europeans were few and active only in Parliament. The Party generally
accepted those broad parameters of party policy and were willing to
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leave to Churchill and the Shadow Cabinet the interpretation of that
position to particular issues. Throughout this period, Conservatives
presented the concept of European unity in a positive light, and thus
created in the Party and amongst their supporters a broadly positive
attitude to European integration.	 Faced with specific decisions, on
the Schuman Plan and the European Army, it was much more difficult to
find a consensus. 	 Two different assessments of continental opinion
played an important role in these different attitudes. 	 The 'Europeans'
recognised how strong-opinion on.the Continent was for some form of
supranationality or federalism, and partly infected by that enthusiasm
and partly because of the fear of a split between Britain and the
rest of Western Europe, they were willing to make some concessions
towards supranationality, while unwilling to accept federalism. 	 The
'Europeans' also felt that a united Europe was only possible with
British participation.	 The alternative to no British involvement was
no European unity, which they felt would leave Europe divided against
the Soviet Union. 	 As they also believed that Britain would be the
leader in any European organisations and be able to move them in the
direction that Britain wanted, they were more willing to make initial
sacrifices to see those institutions created.
	 The sceptics were less
sensitive to Continental opinion and less willing to make gestures in
their direction.	 They were more accurate in their perception that
their Continental allies could unite without Britain. Thus the
sceptics were less willing to pay any sort of price to belong to
European developments.
It is important not to exaggerate the differences among
Conservatives in this period.	 There was general agreement that
European unity was a positive development, but the 'Europeans' felt
that it could only occur with Britain, while the sceptics felt that it
would happen simply with British support. There was agreement that
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Britain remained a major power, but the 'Europeans' felt that power
would be enhanced within a united Europe while the sceptics feared
that it would be restricted to only one of the three circles.
	 All
agreed that the Empire and Commonwealth remained central, but the
'Europeans' believed that the Empire would be strengthened by the
European association while the sceptics felt that it would reduce
attention to imperial affairs. 	 All accepted that federalism was not
a feasible option for Britain, but the 'Europeans' were willing to
make some gestures in that direction while the sceptics were not.
Thus there was a high degree of consensus on the strategy but
considerable differences on tactics.
	
As the Conservatives moved
into power as the Government, these tactical differences were to
emerge into sharp focus.
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Background 
The Conservatives became the Government in October 1951, amidst
considerable expectations on the Continent of a far more vigorous
European policy than had existed under Labour. (1) They were, however,
to be bitterly disappointed, as the Conservatives in power adopted a
cautious approach. 	 Eden announced that Britain would not participate
in the European Army, which Kilmuir described as the single, most
important act in destroying Britain's credibility on the Continent. (2)
The new government also rejected the idea of membership of the ECSC.
The Continentals felt a great sense of betrayal. 	 Paul-Henri Spaak,
President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, resigned in anger
with charges of duplicity, and Paul Reynaud, the French Prime Minister,
spoke contemptuously of how the Conservatives were in favour of
European unity when in opposition but against it when in government. (3)
This opened a period during which Britain was willing to participate
in European co-operation but only on terms which excluded any
supranationalism, and in which the Continent treated Britain with
suspicion as seeking to frustrate their attempts at a more federal
approach to Europe.
This decade, therefore, was filled with numerous initiatives by
Governments and politicians on the Continent to create European
institutions on a supranational bäsis, some of which succeeded and
others failed, while Britain presented alternatives based on
intergovernmental co-operation designed to avoid a divided Europe, a
constant fear of British governments under Churchill, Eden and Macmillan.
The Schuman Plan led to the establishment of the Euro pean Coal and
Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) in August 1952, with six members of France,
West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg.
	 A treaty
to create a European Defence Community was signed on 27th May 1952
following from the Pleven Plan but it was rejected by the French
Assembly in August 1954, partly due to fears that without Britain,
Germany might become dominant.	 M. Paul-Henri Spaak, as President
of the ad hoc Assembly of the ECSC, presented a draft statute for a
European Political Community in March 1953, but the idea was never
taken up by any of the national governments.
	 Concerned with the need
to relaunch the European Idea,	 the Messina Conference was held in
1955, out of which developed the European Economic Community and
Euratom in 1957.
The British Government responded to these developments with a
refusal to participate in these institutions together with their own
set of competing proposals. 	 In 1952 Eden proposed that the ECSC and
any other European institutions that might develop should be brought
within the auspices of the Council of Europe, so that member governments
could decide to affiliate on a case by case basis, but as this was
perceived as an attempt to water down the supranational element in
the various proposals, it received a cold response from the Continent.
In 1954, following the breakdown of the EDC, Eden proposed a revision
of the Treaty of Brussels, in which the Western European Union (W.E.U.)
secured the presence of British troops on the Continent without the
unilateral power of withdrawal, designed to ease French fears of German
domination and thus enable German rearmament.	 In February 1955
Britain formed a Treaty of Association with the ECSC.
	 In 1956 Eden
launched his Grand Design to bring together in one Assembly the various
Western parliaments of the Council of Europe, the Western European
Union and the ECSC, but was o pposed by the Six who saw in this proposal
further evidence of British unwillingness to support a supranational
community.
	 Britain initially participated in the Messina talks but
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withdrew in November 1955, due to fears of supranationalism and to a
failure to take the discussions seriously. (4) As proposals for
an economic community emerged from those discussions, Britain proposed
a Free Trade Area (PTA) which would include free trade in industrial
products but not in agriculture, would have only a limited impact on
Commonwealth trade, and avoided any commitments of future political
development.	 This was far from the intentions on the Continent so
received little support, although negotiations were conducted and
broke down in November 1956.	 Another British initiative was the
European Free Trade Area, creating in 1959 free trade in industrial
products between seven European nations (Britain, Norway, Denmark,
Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal), designed to act as a
bridge-builder towards the EEC, which might eventually be persuaded
to join, but EFTA was perceived as a rival by the Six.
	 Despite the
series of initiatives by British Governments throughout this period,
their objective of a united Europe on intergovernmental lines was not
achieved.
	
In fact, their main fear of a divided Western Europe was
the result, and this contributed to their re-examination of Britain's
attitude towards the Six which eventually led to their formal
application for membership, to be discussed in the next chapter.
The Leader 
Winston Churchill returned ta power closely associated with the
European idea, yet throughout his second premiership he allowed foreign
policy to be conducted in a way widely perceived to be hostile to
European developments.	 He backed Eden's position opposing British
membership of the ECSC and the EDC, no longer participated in the
activities of the Council of Europe, and presented no initiatives of
his own.	 There are three causes for his lack of a strong European
policy.	 Firstly, he still conceived of Britain as a great power, 92
especially as it was the only other power besides the U.S.A. and the
Soviet Union with the atom bomb.	 Eden argued that Churchill had
always envisaged a Grand Alliance of the West, and not an exclusively
European institution, that Churchill like Eden was essentially an
(5)Atlanticist rather than a European. 	 However, the difference
between them was that Eden felt that Atlanticism excluded British
participation in European developments while Churchill saw no
contradiction between the two positions. 	 Churchill's attention was
drawn to more exciting opportunities on the world stage, (6)so
Europe became a low priority.
The second cause was that the Continentals were developihg
supranational ideas that were unacceptable to British opinion. 	 The
European Coal and Steel Community included a Higher Authority with the
power to over-ride national governments and this was unacceptable to
British interests.	 While he had been a proponent of a European army,
he was determinedly opposed to the mixed manning of the Pleven Plan.
"What he himself had in mind for such an Army was, as he put it, a
bunch of faggots bound together, stronger as a bunch than as individual
sticks, but each retaining its individual characteristics in the bunch.
, Pleven's Army, he says, is a bunch of wood pulp". 	 Despite strong
U.S. pressure, the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acherson reported that
"On the EDC, Churchill remained unreconstructed to the last". (7)
Thus, for Churchill, European unity was developing in an unacceptable
direction.	 This may have been inevitable as his commitment to the
broad concept of unity may have been difficult to translate into
agreement with its specific and detailed realisation.
The third factor was the position of Eden as his natural successor.
Kilmuir, who had the experience of seeing Churchill in both Cabinet and
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Shadow Cabinet, believed that "Winston Churchill was determined not to
oppose his successor", so that Eden and the anti-Europeans were always
"supported hesitantly but inevitably by Churchill" in the Cabinet. (8)
An old European Movement friend, Edward Beddington-Behrens, believed
that Eden's influence led Churchill to exclude 'Europeans' such as
Macmillan, Maxwell Fyfe, Sandys, Eccles and Thorneycroft from any
(8)position in the field of foreign affairs. 	 Churchill's age and
illness made Eden's succession simply a matter of time and therefore
made him reluctant to propose policies which would be opposed by his
Foreign Secretary and successor.
	 The initiation and conduct of
European policy was left to Eden and the Foreign Office.
Eden's role as Prime Minister in European developments were
limited primarily because of his shbrt period in that office, from
April 1955 to January 1957, and his preoccupation with Suez during
much of this time.	 As discussed earlier, he viewed Britain's role as
an external supporter of Continental unity, and that any British
involvement should be limited and intergovernmental. 	 Eden's response
to Messina was that there were opportunities for limited co-operation
on communications and energy, but that anything grander was only
utopian.
	
The failure of the EDC and the lack of enthusiasm for
supranationalism by the French and German governments confirmed his
scepticism that major developments were unlikely. 	 The Spaak Committee
was seen as a sop to the Belgian government. 	 Thus he never took
Messina or the Spaak Committee very seriously. 	 In 1956 his Grand
Design to bring together the assemblies of the various European
institutions was part of his attempt to obtain British influence on
developments without any commitments. 	 His first choice as Foreign
Secretary, Harold Macmillan, occupied that post for only 9 months
from April to December 1955.	 Eden wished to retain a high degree of
9 4
control over foreign policy, and this led to conflict with Macmillan's
desire to be an active Foreign Secretary, including in European
(10)
affairs.	 Eden replaced him with the more compliant Selwyn Lloyd.
In the only manifesto produced under his leadership in 1955, the sole
mention of Europe was "the major defence commitment through the
Western European Union".
	 Eden's control of foreign policy continued
whether as Foreign Secretary and Premier, as did his attitude to
European unity.
Macmillan's interest in Europe was well established by the time he
became Prime Minister in January 1957.
	 However, his immediate priority
was to re-establish the dis pirited and divided party after Suez, and
to win the forthcoming general election in 1959 which to the-surprise
of early forecasters he did with the biggest majority since the war.
The manifesto gave no mention of Europe.
	 Macmillan was highly
concerned about a divided Europe, initiated an extensive examination
of Britain's European relations soon after the 1959 election, and was
a strong proponent of a European Free Trade Area, which he hoped would
bridge the gap between the Six and the rest of Western Europe. 	 While
his own conviction that Britain would have to join the EEC probably
became established in late 1960, he accepted earlier on in his
premiership that Britain's relations with the rest of Europe would have
to become much closer and tried to educate opinion, including Party
opinion, of this necessity. 	 How this concern ended in a formal
application of membership is the subject . of the next chapter.
The Cabinet 
The tensions that existed within the Shadow Cabinet, came to the
surface soon after the formation of the new government. The Cabinet
discussed what should be the attitude of the new government towards
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the European Army. Eden dominated this discussion, supported by
Salisbury and Oliver Stanley, against Maxwell Fyfe, and the compromise
that emerged was that British participation could only be achieved on
intergovernmental terms. Maxwell-Fyfe, then Home Secretary, gave a
carefully prepared and agreed statement to the Consultative Assembly
in November 1951:
"I cannot promise full and unconditional
participation, but I can assure you of our
determination that no genuine method shall
fail for lack of thorough examination which
one gives to the needs of trusted friends....
There is no refusal on the part of Britain". (11)
That same night Eden announced at a press conference in Rome the
refusal of Britain to participate in a European Army.
	 According to
Boothby, Maxwell-Fyfe was "on the brink of resignation".
	 The Assembly
was stunned and demoralised by the decisions.
	 The Conservative
delegation sent, on 3rd December, a formal protest to Churchill:
"We venture to appeal to you to take some
action designed to restore British prestige
in the Consultative Assembly, and to show
that H.M. Government mean to play their
part in the military, defence and economic
development of a united Europe". (12)
Churchill did not reply.
Thus at an early stage Eden's dominance was established.
	 Towards
suggestions by Anthony Nutting, Minister of State at the Foreign Office,
and Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Ambassador in Paris, that Britain should leave a
certain number of divisions on the Continent in lieu of participation
in the EDC, Eden reacted "like a kicking mule". (13) Eden successfully
excluded leading Europeans' from the field of foreign affairs, and his
authority was rarely challenged.
	 Supported by the Foreign Office, he
believed that both the ECSC and the EDC were bound to fail.
	 According
to Maxwell-Fyfe, "none of the other members had the knowledge or
experience to question or contradict Eden's policies.
	 I doubt if a
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Foreign Secretary has enjoyed quite so much independence since Lord
(14)
Rosebery".	 Eden's biographer wrote that "his position was
immensely strong.. .Eden's strength was reflected in his standing in
the Cabinet.
	
As the obvious successor to an aged Prime Minister he
(15)
could rely on most of his colleagues not daring to cross him".
Boothby is rather unfair in his. criticism of Maxwell-Fyfe,
(16)Macmillan and Sandys that they "did nothing about it". 	 They
were inevitably much involved in the running of their departments:
Maxwell-Fyfe at the Home Office, Macmillan at Housing where he made
his reputation by reaching the unexpected target of 300,000 houses
completed in one year, Sandys as Minister of Supply and later Housing
and Local Government, and David Eccles as Minister of Education.
These positions provided little opportunity or time to intervene in
European affairs.	 However, Macmillan mentions informal discussions
(17)between them although Eccles and Sandys were not in the Cabinet.
When opportunities did arise they tried to influence policy in a
European direction.
	 Macmillan considered resignation over the lack of
Cabinet support for British association with the EDC on 13th March 1952,
sought British association with the Spaak Committee discussions, and
upon his appointment as Chancellor in January 1956 "injected a sense
of urgency" on the consideration of possible courses of action. (18)
Sandys promoted association with the ECSC and introduced the motion in
the House of Commons ratifying the Association agreement in 1955. (19)
Maxwell-Fyfe suggested to Eden as Prime Minister that a new clear call
(20)for Britain-in-Europe should be issued. 	 David Howell later
congratulated Thorneycroft, Eccles and Macmillan for their continued
support for Europe.
	
"Those who had once expressed hopes for a
united Europe out of office kept up the struggle when in power". (21)
However, this occasional involvement could not match the power of Eden
and the Foreign Office, with the endorsement of Churchill.
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However, with the increasing role of economic policy in European
co-operation, and with the position of Macmillan as Chancellor and
Thorneycroft as President of the Board of Trade, they were able to
press the idea of a FTA.
	 Thorneycroft has emphasised that "the
Conservative Party's trading policies at that time really stemmed
from Imperial Preference.
	 This was the Ark of the Covenant to the
Conservative Party". (22) There was a Cabinet consensus against a
customs union because of the need to protect the Commonwealth, and on
the exclusion of agriculture from any FTA although Thorneycroft
believed that arrangements could have been made over agriculture and
Commonwealth imports, but there was little Cabinet su pport for that
view.	 Macmillan told the House of Commons that:
"I do not believe that this House would ever agree
to our entering arrangements which, as a matter
of principle, would prevent our treating the great
range of imports from the Commonwealth at least as
favourably as those from the European countries.
So this objection, even if there were no other,
would be quite fatal to any proposal that the U.K.
should seek to take part in a European Common
Market by joining a Customs union". (23)
The Cabinet, including Eden and the British negotiator, Payment-General
Reginald Maudling, who were bothotherwise 'sceptics', saw the value of
the FTA.	 The FTA negotiations, however, failed as it further
underlined the differences in aspirations between the British and the
Six.
Soon after the 1959 election, John Profumo, Minister of State in
the Foreign Office, told the W.E.U. that since the election the
Government had been "examining each facet of our relations with the
Governments of the six-power communities to see where they can be.
improved" and that Britain was "determined to draw closer to
Europe". 
(24)
The Government attempted to improve relations through
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extensive bilateral contacts, reform of the OEEC and the creation of
EFTA.	 However, as Camps stated, "Had the British Government reached
the point of seriously considering the Six, the decision to proceed
with the EFTA would presumably never have been taken, for by tying
itself to a group of low tariff countries and to a number of neutral
countries, the U.K. was obviously adding to the problems which would
have to be settled in a future negotiation in these terms". (25)
Profumo even told the Consultative Assembly that Britain was prepared
to reconsider the question of her membership of the ECSC and Euratom
but not the EEC. 
(26)
This presented a consensus within the Cabinet
that 'bridge-building' with the Six to avoid a divided Europe was
essential, but EEC membership was not an option.
The position of the Cabinet in this decade appears to have been
fairly consistent after the initial disagreements.
	 The row over
the European Army was the start of the recognition of Eden's
dominance.	 Little opportunity.existed then for new British
involvement with the Six.	 The 'Europeans' supported Eden's
attempts at promoting European co-operation while favouring something
more radical.
	 However, as developments on the Continent moved away
from perceived British interests, with the establishment of
organisations with a strong supranational element (at least in theory)
and policies such as a customs union and agricultural free trade,
they also accepted that the Six would develop in a different way and
that the best Britain could hope for was 'bridge-building' institutions
such as the FTA and EFTA.
	 There appears to have been no group who
favoured Britain's membership of the EEC nor any group who opposed
the search for European co-operation, even while there may have been
differences over the importance given to a European policy.
	 Serious
differences were not to re-emerge until the issue of British
membership came on to the table. 	 99
The Parliamentary Party
As in the Cabinet, there was general agreement in the Parliamentary
Party that close relations with the West was an important objective but
that membership of any supranational institution was impossible.
	 This
was expressed by Aubrey Jones M.P., when he stated in an article that
"I have never seen how Britain can reconcile the Head of the
Commonwealth with a European federal community", but began with the
view that everyone is agreed that Western Europe must be united. (27)
There was always broad based support for the Government's attempts at
improved co-operation with Europe.	 There were some who actively
promoted the European cause, and a few who were active opponents, but
the bulk of the party was willing to follow the general direction of
the Cabinet.
The appointment into the Government of many of their leaders,
such as Maxwell-Fyfe, Eccles, Macmillan, Thorneycroft and Sandys,
left the Conservative 'Europeans' rather weak.
	 Active in the
European Movement were Boothby, Sir John Hutchinson, Maurice Macmillan,
(28)
Lady Florence Horsburgh and Geoffrey Rippon. 	 Others included
Julian Amery, John Biggs-Davison and Martin Madden. 	 Boothby was as
individual as ever.	 He was re-appointed to the Conservative
delegation at the Council of Europe despite some opposition, and then
(29)
completely absorbed himself in the politics of Strasbourg. 	 He
became estranged from the Conservative Government as it failed to
participate in European developments, and frustrated ideas presented
in Strasbourg.
	 He actively promoted British participation in an
EDC because, as he argued in 1952, "the French will never agree to
(30)this unless and until we are ourselves part of the EDC".
	 "Sooner
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or later we must face the fact that there can be no hope of European
unity, or of European defence, except on the basis of British
(31)
participation".
Boothby's enthusiasm was much stimulated by his membership of
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and membership of
this body influenced many Conservative M.P.s to adopt a more European
position.
	 A large number of Conservative M.P.s had experience in the
Assembly as normally one served for only three years. 	 The group,
known as the Tory Strasbourgers under the leadership of Lady Horsburgh,
acted as individuals and therefore were not committed to the British
Government line.
	 They refused, however, to affiliate to any of the
party groups that existed both in the Council of Europe and the WEU,
following the general position of the Party. 	 Not until 1958 was
there any discussion on forming an independent group together with the
Scandinavians and the Irish.
However, despite their interest, they had little influence on
national policies. (32) One reason must include the rather poor
quality of many of the members. 	 David Howell rather kindly explained
that they were "not second Elevens, they are first Elevens without
strong opening bats". (33) Few of them were to achieve ministerial
office.	 There were exceptions, the most prominent being Peter Kirk.
However, apart from increasing the number of sympathisers on the
Conservative backbenches, the Council of Europe delegation had a very
limited influence.
Another group of 'Europeans' was the Empire men around Leo Amery
who combined commitment to European union, the Commonwealth and Empire,
anti-federalism and hostility to the super-powers.
	 The Amerys were
very influential in the European Movement during the Conservative
(34)
Government.
	 Julian Amery was a strong supporter of European
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unity, but felt that if it developed towards federalism, Britain
could not participate but should associate herself as closely as
possible.	 Thus he believed that the Schuman Plan involved too great
a loss of sovereignty, but Britain should support developments from
outside if necessary, "as a pillar from within or as a buttress from
(35)
without".	 Bernard Braine saw a natural alliance between the
Commonwealth and Europe against the super-powers. (36)John
Biggs-Davison described the U.S.A. as The Uncertain Ally, and blamed
federalism in Europe on the U.S.A.
	 He rejected federalism and
therefore EEC membership but wanted to give Europe the same
preferences as the colonies and an "intergovernmental association of
(37)
sovereign governments".
A third group of younger 'Europeans' included Peter Kirk,
Geoffrey Rippon and Martin Madden, who were active on the backbenches
and frequently participated in European debates, but David Howell
felt that "what has been lacking in the Tory Party is a younger
generation of outspoken European idealists to replace those who moved
into high office.
	 It is the miserable silence from their ranks which
accounts for the failure of Conservative thinking to advance further
after 1958". (38)
There was no active group of anti-Europeans until the early 1960's,
although individual M.P.s voiced their opposition to British
participation in Continental developments without the usual
qualifications of the importance of European co-operation, and they
voiced their feelings that the Empire and Commonwealth was neglected in
the pursuit of European interests.
	 Hinchingbrooke opposed German
rearmament and the E.D.C., and described it as "a pious nightmare" and
(39)
"a military nonsense".
	 Sir Gerald Nabarro was "the only outspoken
opponent", according to the Conservative Research Department, of'the
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(40)
FTA.	 Harry Legge-Bourke was a frequent critic of any federal
relationship with Europe. The Expanding Commonwealth Group was
formed to reverse the neglect of the Commonwealth, publishing
(41)pamphlets in 1956 and 1958.
	 It included some anti-Europeans
such as Hinchingbrooke, Anthony Fell, Robin Turton and Paul Williams,
but also some Empire Europeans, such as Julian Amery and Biggs-Davison.
Therefore it did not take an explicitly anti-European position.
	
The
1956 pamphlet saluted "efforts of Continental Europeans to achieve
closer economic unity" and favoured Europe's association with the
Commonwealth.
In a study of the 1955-59 Parliament, Conservative M.P.s were
identified as 28 European stalwarts, 76 Empire Europeans, 63 Empire
Moderates, 64 Empire stalwarts and 27 uncommitted.	 This division
was seen as a contest of generations. 	 The pre-1950 intake were more
Empire-oriented, the 1951 intake were equally split while the 1955
group included two Europeans for every Empire man.
	 The younger M.P.s
tended to be European, the older Empire.	 The safe seats tended to
have Empire men but this was largely a result of their date of entry
into the House.
	 The study also discovered the fact that Oxford graduates
were more European and Cambridge more Empire, but could provide no
reasonable explanation! (42)
Varying attitudes of M.P.s emerge during the discussion of
concrete proposals.	 On 10th July 1956 Conservatives led by Rippon
presented an Early Day Motion calling for British participation in the
(43)Spaak Committee, which attracted 89 signatures. 	 The motion
called for "an agreement in principle on the establishment by stages
of a Common Market in Western Europe", and urged participation in
negotiations to enable British participation in a Common Market.
Signatures included Robert Matthew, Sir Keith Joseph, Arthur Holt, John
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Rodgers, Harold Steward and Boothby. 	 Another Early Day Motion
calling for a European Conference to further unity attracted 100
(44)
signatures.	 Harry Legge-Bourke responded with two Commonwealth
motions which rejected British participation in any supranational
economic organisation, which attracted 9 signatures between them. (45)
In a debate on 26th November 1956, the conflicts emerged between
Martin Madden and Gerald Nabarro. 	 The Government's position was
presented by Harold Macmillan as Chancellor. 	 "When we see a
significant move in Europe tending to strengthen the old world, we
must, I think, at least try to find a way whereby, without weakening
or moving counter to our other interests we may be associated with
it". (46) Martin Madden wanted British membership, (47) Nabarro
opposed involvement in an economic organisation with the rest of
Europe as high wages, the welfare state and high taxation would put
Britain at a competitive disadvantage. 	 Macmillan felt that a big
market would enable high costs, while Thorneycroft's response was
that Nabarro's argument was a case against high taxation not a Common
Market.
There was very high support for the Grand Design, especially by
those at the Council of Europe, and demands for British leadership were
expressed at a Commons debate on 8th February 1957. (48)Similarly
there was support for the EFTA, although the CRD had to deal with many
inquiries from M.P.s about its effects on particular industries. 	 In
1958 an Agricultural Policy Committee of M.P.s was set up to monitor
(49)
agricultural opinion on EFTA. 	 Generally speaking, EFTA was
supported but with little enthusiasm. 	 When the Commons met to ratify
the EFTA Treaty, attention was concentrated on how it would improve
relations with the Six, and the Chancellor, Heathcoat Amory, failed to
(50)
convince the House that it would.	 Thorneycroft, now a backbencher,
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and others argued that the Government should seek other approaches
such as tariff harmonisation, and should even consider common
institutions.
Thorneycroft pursued this approach of new proposals with two
articles in The Guardian, 4-5th May 1959, which argued for a common
industrial tariff, free entry for food, and a reduction in
Commonwealth preferences in return for greater Commonwealth access
to the markets to the Six. (51)
	
Even he, however, did not propose
British membership of the EEC.
Concern over the inadequacy of EFTA as a response was again
expressed by a Conservative motion calling for "firm proposals" for
the EEC, which was signed by all the officers of the Conservative
(52)Committee on Foreign Affairs on 24th September 1960.
	
On 25th
July 1960 a statement organised by the Common Market Campaign called
for negotiations to obtain British membership of the EEC, and was
(53)
signed by 15 Conservative, 23 Labour and 3 Liberal members.
The Conservative M.P.s included Peter Kirk, David Price, Sir Peter
Agnew, John Foster, Fred Corfield, Martin Madden and Robert Matthew.
This was the first declaration of support by M.P.s for the idea of
EEC membership, and was an early sign of the campaign which led to the
eventual decision to apply for membership by the Government.
The Parliamentary Party during this decade shared the general
position of the Government, that close relations with Western Europe
were essential but membership of any federal structures impossible.
There were some M.P.s who felt that the Government did not give
European relations a sufficiently high priority, and criticised
British initiatives when they did occur as inadequate.	 They provided
a reminder to the Government not to neglect this issue, and a source
of backbench support for their initiatives.
	 On the other hand, these
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initiatives produced only isolated opposition ., although particular
constituency concerns were expressed.	 However, until the question of
the membership of the EEC appeared on the agenda, there was no
substantial body of M.P.s against greater co-operation with Continental
Europe.
National Union 
National Union Conferences, both national and Central Council,
between 1951 and 1957 usually reiterated its support for the three
circles, but rarely debated Europe as such.	 One motion in 1953
(not debated) on the Commonwealth brought forth an amendment by Barney
Hayhoe and Julian Amery to also include to work "for closer economic
co-operation, as proposed in the Strasbourg Plan, with like-minded
European countries" to ensure that the European circle was not
neglected. (54) The only European debate was in 1954, on German
rearmament and the WEU, a motion called for debate even though only
two resolutions had been received from local Associations, so it
reflected a positive decision by the Party leadership that the issue
should be debated rather than a reflection of constituency demand. 	 The
motion welcoming the WEU was proposed by William van Straubenzee, who
welcomed British leadership after the collapse of the EDC, congratulated
the Continentals for trying to build on federalism, noted that Britain
had accepted majority decision-making and to maintainance of a large
Army on the Continent, and said that this would not weaken the
Commonwealth.	 Martin Madden urged the necessity of new political
institutions because common defence requires a common foreign policy,
and to give new authority to Strasbourg and "some real power in a
limited sphere to evolve and debate foreign policy and arrive at a
European foreign policy on a democratic basis".
	 Julian Amery
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reiterated his familiar themes of the need for British leadership,
the unacceptability of federalism, that a united Europe would be based
on intergovernmental co-operation and that European unity would
strengthen the Commonwealth. 	 Harvey emphasised the importance of
Franco-German co-operation, while Henry Hodgkinson gave a passionate
speech that Europe must be united before it is too late. 	 "We must
pledge ourselves as total Europeans". 	 Eden endorsed the motion,
noting Commonwealth support for the WEU, and it was passed.
	
This
debate suggests that Europe was still viewed positively among
Conservative activists, even while not receiving a high priority. (55)
The first major and potentially controversial debate was on
EFTA in 1957.
	
18 constituency resolutions were received on this
issue, and as always the Party leadership examined these resolutions
as an expression of Party opinion. 	 On this occasion David Dear of
the CRD prepared a special report for the Party Chairman, Lord Hailsham,
on political attitudes to EFTA. (56) His report stated that "there
Is a wide measure of support for what the Government is trying to do -
to open up wider opportunities for our export trade and to prevent us
from being virtually excluded from the new Common Market in Europe".
The Conference resolutions confirmed this, with 12 in approval with
the normal reservations, 2 neutral or possibly hostile and 1
specifically concerned with the glove industry.
	 Dear noted that
these reservations (Commonwealth, agriculture) were important as they
were the reason why Britain could not join the Common Market, that not
everyone in the Conservative Party supported the plan, and drew
attention to the Daily Express group, who were saying "that the
• Government is abandoning the Commonwealth and destroying Imperial
Preference", and the "very natural anxieties of some industrialists
who feel that their particular business may be adversely affected".
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Dear could also have noted that many of the motions were highly
positive, references to the advantages of a large market and the
benefits to the Commonwealth, five even without the usual reservations,
and also the complaint by two motions of the lack of information. (57)
The NUEC chose a motion for debate which welcomed EFTA as
providing a large market while excluding agriculture and preserving
the Commonwealth tie.	 In his proposing speech Michael Jopling said
that the advantages were great, that any one enthusiastic to include
agriculture was not in the majority, and that if a choice had to be
made it would be the Commonwealth, but this was not the choice as the
Express had tried to suggest.	 Unusually an amendment was proposed
and accepted for debate, that accepted rather than welcomed-EFTA and
included the "expansion of Commonwealth trade and safeguards for
British industry". The proposers of the amendment showed that they
did not even accept EFTA, were Empire First men, and attacked "Liberal
ministers in Tory governments".
	 The other four speakers divided
equally for and against the amendment, with a claim that it was "a
British scheme for British advantage", Anthony Fell M.P. arguing that
in speaking against EFTA he was not speaking for a faction, and the
fear that British industry could not face European competition, which
was booed.	 David Eccles wound up the debate arguing its political
importance as a bridge-builder, that industry was protected against
unfair competition, agriculture was protected and the Commonwealth was
in support.	 The amendment was defeated by a considerable majority,
and the motion passed with similar support. (58)
The next major debate was in 1960 on European Unity and Trade.
Nine motions were received: 3 for co-operation without reservations;
3 for co-operation with Commonwealth protection; 1 urging EEC
membership; and 1 reiterating the three circles. (59) The motion
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presented urged the necessity of bridge-building between the Six and
the Seven.
	 The spirit of the proposers, if not the words of the motion,
was support for membership of the EEC, as they argued that agriculture
needed.a change in method, that Imperial preference was of declining
value to the U.K., and that we must convince the Europeans that we are
interested.	 John Paul complained that his amendment was not called
and that the Party was thinking too much about Europe and too little
about the Empire.
	 Gordon Pears (a Bow Grouper) spoke against the
motion, because entry into the EEC on those terms would dilute it and
be "immoral", and co-operation would not solve the problem.
	 The
arguments were overwhelming for "entry on acceptable terms".
	 The
final speaker condemned the last two speakers as extreme, mad expressed
the view that a motion to join the EEC would have been rejected.
Heath responded to the debate with the points that a large market
would provide great economic benefits, the dangers of European disunity,
the Government would only join with the agreement of the Commonwealth
and EFTA, the enthusiasm especially of the young for the EEC,
Commonwealth came first and that he "believed in a better system" for
agriculture.	 The motion.was passed by an overwhelming majority. (60)
This • debate helped to influence the Party to recognise the importance
of European unity and trade, and the problems of EEC membership were
recognised but downplayed.
	 Once again the anti-Europeans failed to
obtain substantial support but showed that there was at least some
support for their fears in the Conference.
During the 1950's the affiliated organisations, the YC's, FUCA,
and the Women played an active role in European affairs, and
provided the base for much of the 'European' support at Conference.
In 1952 the Young Conservatives joined the European Youth Campaign
"which is educational in character and seeks to promote no given
109
solution to European problems" and from which they could withdraw "if
anything untoward developed, e.g. insistence upon federalism",
obtained Overseas Committee approval to join a federation of
Conservative and Christian Democrat Youth organisations, urged
Conservative representation at the N.E.I., published an article in
Young European, supported a European Youth Campaign rally, organised
a study visit to Strasbourg, sent a delegation to the European Youth
Assembly in the Hague, and held regular meetings of the External
Relations Committee. (61) This began the trend for a programme of
European activities, including participation in European Youth Campaign
activities, a study weekend with the Belgian and French Christian
Democrats and participation in the 2nd European Youth Parliament in
(62)
Vienna, known as the 'Junior Strasbourg'. 	 These activities led
to a paper from the Secretary of the Overseas Bureau urging greater
emphasis on Commonwealth and colonial affairs. 	 Europe, however,
remained an important area of European Youth Campaign activity, so
that in 1956 Barney Hayhoe was elected Chairman of the British National
Committee of the European Youth Campaign, and the Campaign published
a pamphlet by James Driscoll, Young Conservative Vice-Chairman, later
re-published by the C.P.C. as Our Trade with Europe in 1957.	 The
Young Conservatives increasingly took the initiative in promoting
overseas Party contacts, both bilaterally and multi-laterally, as in
their international conference on European co-operation chaired by
Nick Scott, 7th-9th October, 1960.
The Federation of University Conservative Associations (FUCA)
were also active, in the European Youth Campaign, in bilateral
relations at international conferences, and eventually in 1961 in the
formation of the International Union of Conservative and Christian
Democrat Students (ICCS) together with Continental student organisations.
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	The Women, rather more tentatively, followed a similar path. 	 In
1953 and 1954 they sent observers to conferences of Continental
Christian Democrat Women, but were conscious of the Party position
against formal alliances.	 Rather timidly, in May 1954, they agreed
to Alison Tennant becoming a Vice-President of the Christian Democrat
organisation but only in a personal capacity.
	
In December 1954
Alison Tennant proposed affiliation to the organisation, now called
the European Union of Women (EUW).
	 However, the Overseas Committee
expressed the view that "the idea of direct participation in an
international organisation with a prevailing political complexion was
a new one, and contrary to previous directives and practices and
(63)
therefore the decision would have to be made by the Foreign Secretary".
In February 1955, Eden agreed to membership and the Women joined the
EUW, followed by the creation of a British section of the EUW in
March 1956, thereafter playing a very active role.
	 The Women's
Conference debated EFTA on 21st May 1956 and unanimous support was
expressed after an amendment was accepted on Commonwealth safeguards.
A similar motion was passed at their Conference on 21st May 1958.
European affairs played an ever present role in the Women's
activities, e.g. their Swinton College course on 28th-31st October 1960
had a European Affairs session with Maurice Macmillan, M.P.
Thus throughout the 1950's European activities played an important
role in the Young Conservatives, Student and Women's organisations,
providing a base of support for Europeanism in the Party, and educating
prospective politicians in European Affairs. 	 While pressure from the
Party members did not play an important role in government or Party
policy-making for Europe in the 1950s, the creation of this base was
to prove vital, perhaps decisive, in the debate of the early 1960s.
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Central Office 
The CRD . provided factual information on European developments, and
an analysis of possible future developments, all within the broad
policies of the Government, aimed at Party leaders, M.P.s and
parliamentary candidates.
A major brief was presented by Ursula Branston in August 1953. (64)
This described the positive approach of Conservatives towards European
unity expressed by Churchill and Eden; explained that federalism was a
barrier to British participation, while expressing the view that if
Britain had given a lead in the late 1940s, federalism could have been
avoided; and noted the Government's desire for association with the
ECSC and EDC.	 Branston regretted the tendency to see federalists as
extremists, for they must be seen within the context of Christian
influence upon European unity and the tendency by federalists to
regard the Commonwealth and NATO as British special pleading. 	 In
other words, she attributed much of the difficulties to a lack of
understanding between Britain and the Continent. 	 She ended, "Let us
preserve in things essential, unity; in things not essential, liberty;
in both, charity".
As a primary function of the CRD is to brief the Party on
developments, the next period of activity was over the PTA and EFTA in
1956-59 when a number of briefs were prepared.
	 The first, in
September 1956, explained the Government's position towards the Spaak
Committee. (65) This brief said that "The Government has stated that
it has a completely open mind on the question of a European Community,
and will be guided by its sense of the proper harmony of the interests
of Britain, the Commonwealth, Europe and the free world as a whole".
Edward Boyle, Economic Secretary of the Treasury, is quoted as saying
that in "the finest and fullest sense - this will be a major policy
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decision".	 The author of the brief took a somewhat strong position.
"The 64 dollar (sic) question is can the U.K. afford not to be
associated? She would preserve the great majority of Imperial
Preferences.	 She would not sacrifice her Commonwealth links; and
she would acquire a special relationship with those countries which
take 25% of her trade".	 Three basic facts were noted: the Six was
the most rapidly expanding market in the world; the 9/10th of the
Commonwealth imports that were agricultural or primary, which did not
compete with European goods, would enter duty free or would be
excluded from a Common Market; and the Six were a great power.
	
The
brief ended "The major political decision on British policy is
waited" but the author's position was clearly in favour of a FTA.
Another brief, by James Douglas, confirmed the CRD position in
(66)favour of negotiations for a FTA. 	 The brief repeated the view
that agriculture, and therefore the Commonwealth, would not be greatly
affected. "The area of possible conflict between the European Common
Market idea and our traditional Commonwealth trade is thus much smaller
than might be supposed". 	 The advantages would be a large market and
the accumulation of capital.	 The summary was therefore in favour of
negotiations because they would influence them, without detrimental
effect on Commonwealth agriculture. 	 Further briefs reported evidence
of support for a PTA, from a public statement organised by E.G. Thompson
of 50 prominent Conservative-oriented personalities, EDM's and Commons
debates, the Economist, and the results of an FBI Survey. (67)
Douglas also responded to a number of letters from M.P.s expressing
concern.	 To Lady Davidson, M.P. he wrote of the dangers of exclusion
and that the Government was seeking a third way, "a way of associating
with this new initiative in Europe in such a way as to avoid the
(68)dangers and grasp the opportunities". 	 He assured Harold Gurden
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M.P.that the Economist "presents Britain as rather more committed to
the Spaak proposals than she in fact is". 	 To Soames, Air Minister, he
quoted the position of Macmillan and Thorneycroft, and noted that
(69)
Nabarro was the "only outspoken opponent".	 He described Victor
Morgan M.P. as "a very good and...honest expression of the political
neurosis that I fear is affecting a good many of our supporters - an
inconsistent combination of economic defeatism and national
susceptibilities". (70) There were many similar letters mainly
concerned with the fears of particular industries.
	
Douglas thus
attempted to present the Government's position which changed in
response to events, and to calm the M.P.s concerns.
The campaign by the Daily Express was clearly having an impact
at this time.	 A letter from the Conway Agent raised the Express 
theme of the Government acting without a mandate. (71) Heath asked
the CRD to consider whether the figures presented in the Express 
pamphlet Your Future were correct.
	
The main argument was that
Britain could not stand competition from lower wage levels and a lower
standard of living on the continent, to which Macmillan was quoted in
reply that wages were not the only factor in costs.
	 A speech by the
Economic Secretary was distributed,with his conclusion that "The FTA
is desirable, it is not essential". (72)
A brief sent to Butler emphasised that the Government's proposals
were for an industrial FTA to calm his concerns over his agricultural
constituents. (73) David Dear presented his assessment of opinion
to Hailsham in October 1957 just before the Party Conference, noting
that despite reservations there was wide support in the Conservative
(74)
Party, industry and the Labour Party.
Another brief noted that the agricultural industry was sceptical
despite Government promises, because they regarded easier access to
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the U.K. for agriculture as being the quid pro quo for the reduction
(75)
of European tariffs against British industry. 	 The result was a
strong statement by Maudling to the OEEC that "none of the countries
represented here.. .would propose a system whereby their agriculture
would be exposed in the PTA.	 We all protect our agriculture in one
(76)
way or other, and intend to go on doing so". 	 This statement
and one saying that "there will be no free trade in agricultural and
horticultural products" helped to calm some NFU fears.
In January 1957 special notes for speakers on the FTA were
(77)
produced.	 It noted the British Government had proposed the FTA,
in response to the threat created by a common market of the Six. 	 The
PTA proposed fair competition, economic co-operation and the exclusion
of agriculture, acknowledged in the Treaty of Rome as different.	 FTA
created both dangers and opportunities, but the opportunities far
outweighed the dangers.	 A series of briefs on EFTA were produced in
an attempt to keep up to date, including one for the Conservative
Parliamentary Committees on Trade and Industry, Finance and Agriculture. (78)
By late 1960 the CRD appears to have taken the view that Britain
should consider applying for EEC membership. 	 A widely distributed
pamphlet was a factual presentation of Britain's trade position but
it concluded that "it should not be construed that Britain is
unsympathetic towards the wider aims and ideals of the Six". (79)
Another pamphlet on European unity provided an historical survey of
Conservative European policy noting that federalism was the major
political obstacle. 	 It ended by questioning how far federation was
implied in the EEC, and suggesting that the British-Continental
(80)division was psychological not actual. 	 A brief by Peter Minoprio
at the trade desk suggested that there were only three alternatives:
the EEC would accept a PTA; Britain would join the Treaty of Rome; or
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(81)there would be a negotiated agreement between the EEC and EFTA.
	 The
CRD proposed on 20th December 1960 that the Y.C.s should adopt the
theme, Commonwealth and Common Market, for their discussion groups.
James Douglas gave a speech at a Swinton Conference in December 1960
which said that the problems with the Treaty of Rome were not
insuperable, that the dangers outside the EEC were grave, that political
will could solve the technical problems, and that it was dangerous to
exaggerate the differences between Britain and the Six. (82)The
CRD in the late 1950s, while never exaggerating the Government's
position, tried to pave the way in their briefs to M.P.s for a more
radical position.
	 While it would be an error to believe that a clear
CRD position was taken, evidence from the briefs suggests that there
was an accepted consensus in favour of more radical policies and
eventual British membership of the EEC.
The CPC in the 1950s played a minor role on Europe compared to its
later activities.
	 Its journal, Objective, although edited by a
'European', Richard Bailey, faithfully reflected Conservative Party
(83)policy, both that federalism prevented British participation
	 and
that the opportunities were greater than the risks with the FTA. (84)
The CPC published Our Trade with Europe in February 1957 by James
Driscoll, a strong proponent of British participation in the FTA, but
(85)it also published pamphlets by the Expanding Commonwealth Group.
The Overseas Committee endorsed a paper in July 1951 on their
future role, which stated that "our closest political links are and
should be with the Commonwealth countries generally, and then with
Europe and the U.S.A." and that contacts would only be with individuals
and not organisations.
	 "It is obviously undesirable (to) promote a
Conservative International overseas". (86)	 This was their position
throughout the 50's although events both external and internal (the
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activities of Y.C.s, FUCA and Women) forced them to give more attention
to Europe and to establish some limited inter-Party contacts. 	 They
endorsed Y.C. membership of the European Youth Campaign with the
understanding of withdrawal if it should adopt federalism, and the
Women's membership of the European Union of Women only after Eden's
agreement.	 In October 1952 they organised a visit to Strasbourg and
agreed to urge greater interest in European unity, although there is
little evidence of any activity resulting from this decision. (87)
In response to a call from the Conservative delegation at Strasbourg
for a revival of the European Movement, the Committee considered
that a mass revival was out of the question, but they would continue
"influencing existing organisations in favour of Strasbourg's
efforts". (88)
	
In May 1954 there started a long discussion on
relations with the Christian Democrats, which led to the decision in
December 1955 that the "Party should seek optimum representation at
international NEI functions, on an observer basis". 
(89)By 
1959
"a Continental federation of parties was hoped for, association with
(90)
which, in some form, could in due course be considered".
	 Thus
the Overseas Committee played very little role on Europe in the
1950s, following the initiatives of others rather than leading.
The semi-autonomous Swinton Journal published three articles on
Europe in the 1950's.
	 The first by Aubrey Jones M.P. emphasised the
conflict between the Commonwealth and federalism, but also the need
(91)
to co-operate with the ECSC.
	
J.A. Hendry, a Swinton College
tutor, argued the advantages of a PTA, that the Commonwealth was no
alternative and Britain must be careful not to try European patience
(92)too far.	 William Rees-Mogg, a journalist with the Financial
Times, argued that if the EEC failed there was no problem, but if it
succeeded that would create great problems for Britain's overseas
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trade because the FTA was impossible, EFTA was inadequate, and the
value of Commonwealth preferences was declining. (93) The Swinton
Journal provided another outlet for views that were not outside
Government policy but pointed it in a more radical direction.
The Informal Party 
The Bow Group was formed in 1951. While it does not take
collective positions on policy issues, the Bow Group leadership did
provide a clear pro-European lead, in terms of its pamphlets, and
articles published in their journal, Crossbow, established in October
1957.	 Russell Lewis, a Group chairman and later an employee of the
Community Information Office in London, reported that in 1958 when
they adopted a broad editorial policy for Crossbow, one of the major
themes was "a recognition that our future lay with a united Europe". (94)
In 1956 the Group published their first pamphlet on Europe, The
Challenge from Europe, by Russell Lewis, which argued the case for the
•
FTA but noted the benefits would not be very great. (95)	 He
disagreed with the Express pro-Empire position by noting that Canada
would not join such a policy because of the U.S.A., that the Empire
was not self-sufficient and that the Commonwealth market was growing
only very slowly.	 The main benefit would be the competitive stimulus
to industry.	 Lewis looked to further co-operation with the EEC, for
increasing trade in agriculture and the free movement of capital and
labour.
	 The pamphlet also explained in the appendices Euratom with
which the author, Anthony Morris, argued Britain could associate, and
the EEC.
	 The pamphlet, therefore, argued in favour of the FTA, but
also of further European commitments.
In Crossbow articles appeared arguing for a more adventurous
European policy, and for EEC membership.	 Jock Bruce-Gardyne
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felt that Britain had ignored developments towards European unity
when Britain did not participate in them.	 In a special issue in
Spring 1958 Patrick Jenkin argued the case for membership of the EEC,
Jock Bruce-Gardyne wanted the EEC to be more liberal and outward-
looking, and Sir Robin Williams argued for better European-Commonwealth
relations.	 Henry Gelber believed that political union was more
important than economic, and Britain should join if only it would
accept federalism. 	 David Howell presented his criticism of the lack
(96)
of effective 'European' leadership among the Tories.
There was, therefore, a strong pro-European feeling within the
Bow Group which easily moved into favouring British membership of the
EEC.	 This helped to identify Europe with the younger, intellectually
able and more forward-looking members of the party, and therefore
helped to make Europe an attractive political proposal for the
Conservatives.
As Nigel Forman has discussed, the European Movement (EM) went
into decline after the election of the Conservative Government in
(97)1951.	 The Conservative Party continued to take a benevolent
attitude to the Movement, especially as the Movement itself, under
the influence of the Amerys, was careful not to move far from the
Government's own position.	 In the organisation of an ELEC monetary
conference, Lady Elspeth Rhys-Williams told Sandys "We would, of
course, be working with the full co-operation of the Foreign Office,
and would not put up anything (at the Conference) that was not
acceptable to the Government".	 The Movement's journal, the European
Review, under Lady Rhys-Williams' editorship, even criticised the
Continentals in 1953 for developing in the wrong direction. 	 Its
policy, prepared by Julian Amery, was one based on the co-operation
of nation states working through functional authorities responsible
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to a Committee of Ministers. 	 Faced with financial bankruptcy, Leo
Amery, the Movement Chairman, obtained Churchill's agreement to run
it on a care and maintenance basis only. 	 The European Movement was
thus at a low level of activity, in a generally supportive role
towards the Government.
In 1954 there was an attempt to revive the European Movement, led
by the Conservative delegation in Strasbourg. 	 A rally was held at
the Caxton Hall on 15th January 1955, at which the speakers included
Boothby and Leslie Hore-Belisha, to which the Party encouraged
Conservative representation. 	 In May 1957, it organised a visit to
the High Authority in Luxembourg for prospective parliamentary
candidates, including 12 Conservatives. 	 Lord Poole, Party Chairman,
told the Party in May 1957 to take a positive attitude towards it.
"We could make a good deal of use of this organisation" in furtherance
of Government policy towards Europe.
	
The Overseas Committee welcomed
the appointment of Humphrey Berkeley, the CPC's Political Education
Officer, as Director-General of the Movement in April 1957. 	 A mass
Britain-in-Europe meeting was held in Central Hall, Westminster, on
9th July 1957, which Macmillan, Churchill and Boothby addressed. 	 The
Party feared disturbances by Empire Loyalists so the Organisation
Department distributed 1,000 tickets to local associations to try to
ensure a friendly audience. (98) The U.K. European Movement were
dissatisfied with the attention given to the Common Market by the
International European Movement, and decided to conduct its own campaign
for broader European unity. (99)
With the approval of the Government, the European Movement
organised, on 19th-21st February 1958, a European Industrial Conference
of employers and trade unionists throughout Europe to discuss the
problems of the Common Market and the proposal for its association with
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(100)
a FTA.	 The Conference enhanced the Government's policy, and was
addressed by Derek Heathcoth-Amory, the Chancellor, Reginald Maulding,
the FTA negotiator, and Sir David Eccles, President of the Board of
Trade.	 This was an example of where the close relationship between
the Government and the European Movement was mutually beneficial.
To support the new EFTA, the European Movement organised a
government and industrial conference of the Seven in London in
Autumn 1960, to which the Government gave strong support, with speeches
from Macmillan, Selwyn Lloyd, Maudling and Heath. 	 The role of the
European Movement in the 1950s was supportive of the Government's
position in favour of inter-governmental co-operation in a wide United
Europe, and it was able to provide concrete support through its
international contacts.	 In return the Government and the Party
provided its own form of support for the European Movement.
The British industrial organisations took little interest in
European affairs in the early 1950s, as it was considered as an aspect
of foreign affairs, rather than of economic affairs. 	 With the
movement towards economic aspects of European unity with the Spaak
proposals for a common market, these organisations took a greater
interest in European affairs, although it was primarily in a reactive
rather than initiatory role. 	 This was partly a result of the
fragmented nature of the organisation of British industry, with the
Federation of British Industries (FBI), the National Union of
Manufacturers (NUM), the Institute of Directors, the Association of
British Chambers of Commerce (ABCC) and the City.
The Party took a close interest in the position of these
organisations towards the FTA and EFTA. 	 The CRD reported an FBI
survey of its members' attitudes towards the FTA, which found of the
128 trade associations surveyed 52 were in favour, 15 wanted negotiations,
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(101)
27 were against, 22 don't knows and 12 were divided.	 Of the
member companies, 479 were in favour, 147 against and 38 don't knows.
9 out of the 10 regional councils favoured negotiations. 	 The CRD
urged the need for close consultation with the FBI.
The FBI met with the Board of Trade on 2nd November 1956 and
expressed their broad support for the FTA but insisted on the need
for safeguards against unfair practices and the need for close
consultation with the Government at all stages of the negotiations,
which the Government accepted. 	 On 2nd October 1957 a joint report
was produced by the ABCC, FBI and NUM in support of the FTA but with
three requirements, that Imperial Preference be maintained, food be
excluded and no common external tariff towards the rest of the world,
which were already part of the Government's proposals. 	 This
Information led David Dear, in his report to Hailsham, to conclude
that "the weight of opinion is in favour of negotiations", but it was
not prepared to pay too high a price. (102)
The FTA negotiations had forced the FBI to co-operate with other
industrial federations opposed to a customs union, and they made their
own proposals. (103) They were an early promoter of the idea of a
FTA: among the 'Outer Six', and on 17th December 1958 they issued a
joint statement with the Swedish Employers Federation calling for the
establishment of such an association. 	 According to Camps, pressure
from British industry was an important element in the Government's
decision to support the EFTA rather than negotiations with the Six, but
(104)
after initial zeal the FBI took a more cautious approach.
Thus, apart from close consultation over the details of
negotiations and a short period in the winter of 1958-59 of pressure
for EFTA, the FBI and other industrial organisations played a passive
role in the development of Government policy.	 Blank believed that
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"the FBI was never effective as a pressure group" because the
leadership was never able to take a firm position, and Leiber stated
that "there is no doubt that in the crucial phrase of decision-making
(105)the FBI as an organisation lagged behind the British Government".
Although the Government and the Party were very sensitive to industrial
opinion, it was rarely clearly expressed, so the Government had a
relatively free hand in this area.
The situation with the agricultural organisations was more
clear-cut.	 In none of these negotiations did the Government seriously
consider the abandonment of national agricultural protection.
	 The
exclusion of agriculture was an important element in the Government's
inability to join the Common Market of the Six and the failure of the
PTA negotiations.
	
Lieber described the NFU as "the critical factor.
Had the Union, by some transformation, become a positive advocate of
a common agriculture policy, there would have been little likelihood
of agriculture remaining outside the European arrangement". (108)
The reason for NFU hostility was the disruption that would have
occurred in their relationship with, indeed some might say 'capture' of,
the Ministry of Agriculture.
	 "The NFU would have to seek allies
among other European farm organisations instead of relying on its
close relationship with the British Government.
	 This prospect explains
(107)
the Union's distaste for European integration".
	 The CRD
reported that the National Farmers Union nonetheless remained
sceptical because of their fears that easier Continental access to the
U.K. in agriculture would be the quid pro quo for British industrial
access to the Continent. (108)A statement by Maudling to the OEEC
saying that "there will be no free trade in agriculture and
horticultural products" helped to assuage NFU fears. (109)
The economic interest groups, in industry and agriculture, played
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a very limited role in Government policy-making towards Europe which
was conducted primarily as an aspect of foreign affairs. 	 While the
Government was extremely sensitive to their opinions, their broad
policy was not constructed to respond to pressure from these
organisations.
The opinion of the quality press was also closely monitored by
the CRD.	 The press generally took a view similar to that of the
government, that co-operation with the rest of Europe was important but
that membership of any supranational organisation was impossible.
The Economist continued its support for European unity and in
September 1956 called for "an unequivocal public statement of support
for a FTA" from the Government and warned of the dangers of
hesitation. (110)	 In response to concern expressed by Harold Gurden,
an anti-European M.P., Douglas of the CRD commented that the Economist 
was inclined to assume that its own views were also those of the
Government and "hence presents Britain as rather more committed to the
(111)
Spaak proposals than she in fact is".	 After the collapse of
the FTA negotiations, the Economist carefully considered the question
of membership of the EEC, especially in a series of editorials in
November and December 1958. 	 Finally, on 27th December 1958, it became
the first major journal to advocate full membership, although very much
in the form of testing the water. 	 It was sceptical of the value of
EFTA compared to the EEC, (112) andfinally, in June 1960, came out
unequivocally for membership with "due flourish and after appropriate
consultations with fellow members of EFTA, we believe that Britain
would be wise to make an offer of full-scale participation in the
European common market and community". (113) Similarly the Spectator 
urged a more positive approach to Europe. 	 In a series of articles
and editorials it expressed great scepticism as to the value of EFTA.
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An editorial claimed that EFTA would fail to get Britain closer to the
EEC, and thatthe gains of EFTA membership were probably less than the
losses from not being in the EEC. (114) Selwyn Lloyd was frequently
(115)
criticised for being insufficiently 'European' 	 and Europe was
described as the most important single question facing the Chancellor
of the Exchequer. (116) The Spectator was thus an early supporter of
British membership and highly critical of the Government's position.
The daily press was rather more cautious. 	 The Times reported
that on the FTA, "the obstacles are many, varied and formidable". (117)
It *supported EFTA as a bridge to the EEC, (118) but was firmly hostile
(119)
to any federalist entanglements. 	 The paper finally came out in
favour of entry in September 1960. (120) The other Conservative
(121)
papers tended to take a similar development. 	 They supported EFTA
(122)but favoured an even closer relationship to Europe, 	 and
(123)
eventually came to support British entry.
The Express was the only Conservative oriented paper to take a
strong hostile stance to European links in favour of Empire Free Trade.
It rejected the EEC on a wide range of grounds, including national
sovereignty, an independent foreign policy, the Commonwealth and the
protection of agriculture.	 Its influence caused great concern to the
pro-European elements in the Party. 	 It published in 1957 a pamphlet,
Your Future, which argued that any European arrangements should have
Commonwealth agreement, and that Britain could not face the competition
from lower wage levels and the lower standard of living on the Continent.
Heath was concerned enough to ask the CRD to provide a critique of the
pamphlet. (124) The Express was seen as the major encouragement of
intra-party opposition with their claim that "the Government is
(125)
abandoning the Commonwealth and destroying Imperial Preference".
The Express was also the first to raise the question of a 'mandate'
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for European entanglements, which received a sympathetic response from
some Conservatives. (126) The Express editorialised on a pro-European
inter-departmental report in summer 1960 that the report was a
"blueprint for disaster", and meant "soaring prices for the housewife,...
(127)
ruin for the small farmer" and "betrayal of Empire producers".
While the position of the Express did not prevent the Government from
promoting European negotiations, it was aware and concerned about any
impact that the paper might have in encouraging opposition in the Party
to any agreements which the Government might make.
Electoral opinion on Europe in the 1950's was sympathetic to
European co-operation, suspicious of institutional links but above all
the issue was of low salience. 	 Within those parameters the Government
had a wide scope of action. 	 A poll in November 1952 showed 62% in
favour of European Unity, in January 1957 58% favoured a close British-
European partnership, and in March 1959 54% favoured joining the EEC
for trade reasons.
	
There were, however, limits to that support. 	 In
November 1952 only 19% favoured membership of the European Army, with
65% in favour of the status quo and 16% don't knows.	 The same poll
also showed that only 23% favoured membership of the ECSC, with 47%
against and 30% don't know. 	 A poll in July 1960 revealed 49% favoured
European co-operation with only 13% against, but if there were
"political implications" these figures change to 22% for and 35%
against.
	
A question stating whether membership would be personally
good or bad, asked in summer 1961 before the Government's announcement,
found 28% thought that it would be a good thing, 19% bad and 53% that
it would make no difference. 	 This poll, like the others, found
(128)
Conservatives provided greater support for entry. 	 The
Conservative assessment of the electoral value of Europe as an issue
can be seen in that the only mention in the 1955 manifesto was a
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reference to the WEU, and there was no reference in the 1959
manifesto. (129)
Conclusion 
The disappointment with the record of the Conservative government
in the early 1950s expressed by the Continentals was largely based on a
misunderstanding of the Conservative position, although the
Conservatives and especially Churchill must take much of the blame
for that misunderstanding. 	 The'Europeans'in the U.K. largely
supported the Government's position of European Unity on an inter-
governmental basis.	 The Conservative Governments were consistent
throughout this period in their objectives, and those objectives were
supported almost totally within the Conservative Party. 	 It was
events on the Continent, and the Government's response to them, which
caused some inter-party conflict.
	
It was felt by some in the Cabinet,
in the Parliamentary Party, in the Conservative delegation at Strasbourg,
in the CRD, in the younger elements such as the Y.C.s and the Bow Group, in
parts of the press, that a more positive response to European developments,
even when British participation was not possible, would have led to a
better relationship with the Continent and especially the Six, and
avoid the great fear of both Government and'Europeans'of a divided
Europe.
	
The role played by the Conservative 'Europeans' was to raise
Europe in the list of Government priorities, and to maintain a steady
if not especially great pressure upon the Government to develop
initiatives towards the rest of Europe. 	 The anti-Europeans' were not a
significant influence, largely because their objectives of agricultural
protection, Commonwealth preference and no federalism were shared by
the Government.	 Their fears that any institutional entanglements
with the Continent implied the abandonment of these objectives however
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was not shared by the Government.	 The main influence of the anti-
'Europeans' was to encourage the Government to continually demonstrate
to the public and the Party that their policies were perfectly
consistent with those objectives. 	 They had little effect on those
policies themselves.
	 There was, therefore, in the 1950s, a broad
national and Party consensus which the Government shared. It was
when the dual objectives of a European unity without supranational
institutions appeared to be incompatible that the Government had to
re-examine that consensus.
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Background 
During 1960 Harold Macmillan came to the personal conclusion that
Britain would be best situated within the EEC, but doubted that the
country would accept it.
	 Over the Christmas period of 1960-61,
Macmillan decided that Britain should apply, and directed himself to
gaining broad support for that policy, especially from the Cabinet.
The Cabinet discussed how Britain could join during the spring of 1961
and gradually Cabinet opinion moved in the direction of acceptance of
negotiations.
	 Hints began to emerge that the Cabinet was seriously
interested in membership.
	 The Government began a series of
consultations with the Commonwealth, EFTA and the Six. 	 On 27th July
1961 the Cabinet agreed to apply for membership, and seek acceptable
conditions.	 On 31st July 1961, Macmillan briefly announced it to the
Commons, that these negotiations were to see whether satisfactory
arrangements could be made to meet the interests of Parliament,
Commonwealth and EFTA, and that no agreement would be made without the
approval of the House and consultations with the Commonwealth. (1)
Two days later a full scale debate, lasting 13 hours, was held on a
motion reflecting the cautious approach of the Government.
"That this House supports the decision of H.M.
Government to make formal application under
Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in order to
initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory
arrangements can be made to meet the special
interests of the United Kingdom, of the
Commonwealth and of the EFTA; and further
accepts the undertaking of H.M. Government
that no agreement affecting these special
interests or involving British sovereignty
will be entered into until it has been
approved by this House after full consultation
with other Commonwealth countries, by whatever
procedure they may generally agree". (2)
The motion was passed on August 3rd by 313 votes to 5 (4 Labour, 1
Conservative) with the Labour Party and 25 Conservatives abstaining.
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Long, difficult and detailed negotiations were conducted by
Edward Heath as chief negotiator with the Six and the Commission of
the EEC from September 1961 to January 1963. 	 During the negotiations
debate raged within Britain, with a movement of opinion in the
direction of the anti-marketeers.	 The Government was reluctant to
campaign for the principle of membership while negotiations were still
being conducted. A major event was the Commonwealth Conference in
London, 10-19th September 1962, where Europe was the main topic. The
communique did not oppose the British policy, but considerable
disquiet was expressed, and the Government failed to achieve the
passive acceptance that it had sought. 	 The Party Conference at
Llandudno, October 1962, provided a surprisingly overwhelming
endorsement of Government policy. 	 In November 1962, however, the
Conservatives did badly in six by-elections, in particular losing
. South Dorset to Labour due to the intervention of an independent
Conservative anti-marketeer, Sir Piers Debenham, which rocked the
Party.
	
The Government awaited successful negotiations in order to
launch a major and, they believed, election-winning campaign.
Then President De Gaulle delivered a bomb shell at a press
conference on 14th January 1963. He said the question was whether
"Great Britain can at present place itself with the Continent and like
it, within a tariff that is truly common, give up all preference with
regard to the Commonwealth, cease to claim that its agriculture be
privileged, even more, consider as null and void the commitments it
has made with the countries that are Dart of its free trade area.
That question is the one at issue.	 One cannot say that it has now
been resolved.	 Will it be one day?	 Obviously Britain alone can
answer that". (3) This was virtually a French veto, and the
negotiations soon broke down, on 29th January 1963.
	
At the end,
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Heath made it clear that this did not mean the end of the Government's
European policy.	 "We in Britain are not going to turn our backs on
the mainland of Europe or on the countries of the Community. We are
a part of Europe by geography, tradition, history, culture and
civilisation.	 We shall continue to work with all our friends in
Europe for the true unity and strength of this Continent". (4)
Macmillan also emphasised in a television broadcast on 31st January
1963 that for the sake of Europe and the free world, Britain would
continue to seek further co-operation with Europe. 	 The breakdown
was a serious blow to the Party's election prospects.
This period was marked by two interacting sets of activities.
On the one side were the negotiations, not only with the Six but also
EFTA and the Commonwealth. 	 On the other was the domestic debate on
the wisdom of British membership.	 Most of the work on this period
has concentrated on the negotiations, and the impact of the domestic
debate upon the negotiations, and the claim that the lack of domestic
(5)
enthusiasm seriously weakened Britain in the negotiations. 	 Our
concern is with the debate within the Conservative Party, and in
particular the claim that Conservative support for membership was
primarily a factor of the power of Harold Macmillan as Prime Minister
and Party Leader.
The Leader 
There has been much discussion of the reasons that Macmillan
came to the conclusion that Britain should enter the EEC. 	 Factors
included the strength of the free world, the need for a large market,
the 'cold shower' of competition on British industry, the economic
benefits of the Community and the influence that Britain could have in
the world through the EEC. (6)	 Another factor was Macmillan's need
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to find a new theme for the next election, that the Conservatives
had been in power for 10 years and look a tired and exhausted
administration, and the Conservatives needed to attract the support
of the young and the new upwardly mobile middle class. (7)
	
Europe
provided the mixture of idealism and 'progressiveness' that Macmillan
felt could win the next election. He was also influenced by the
interests which called for membership, such as the Treasury and the
Foreign Office, parts of industry, the City, the U.S.A. and most of
the press.	 Conservative Central Office recommended the application
as an election-winner. 	 Thus while the strategic and economic
interests of Britain were the primary determining factors, the
electoral interests of the Conservative Party were an additional
consideration.
Most commentators have placed considerable emphasis on the role
played by Macmillan, indeed that he was the sine qua non of the
British application.	 Ronald Butt argued that "it was not a decision
arising out of urges from the traditional streams of influence of the
Conservative Party... .In truth, the decision taken by the Macmillan
government flew in the face of most of the instincts supporting it".
"The Prime Minister himself was the decisive factor" and his final
section is headed "Macmillan's achievements". (8)
	
Drew Middleton
said that "without Macmillan the Tories would never have approached
Europe and that if Britain does enter Europe it will be because. of his
leadership.	 The role of Harold Macmillan in this great decision has
been stressed intentionally... .The decision to seek union with Europe
was Macmillan's.. .in the sense that the will of the Prime Minister
dominated the Cabinet". (9) T.E. Lindsay and Michael Harrington in
their history of the Conservative Party claimed that "the conversion
of the Conservative Party to the Common Market was one of the more
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remarkable of Macmillan's political achievements, for the whole
enterprise stood in flat contradiction to all the traditional instincts
of the Party, which were for national sovereignty at any price". (10)
The view that this decision was a major break for the
Conservative Party is endorsed by Macmillan himself. He felt that
there were "many very anxious Conservatives. 	 It is getting terribly
like 1846", (11) thus comparing the issue with the repeal of the Corn.
Laws in 1846 which split the Party and effectively excluded the Party
from office for 28 years (except for a brief period 1867-68). 	 "I
don't see how the Conservative Party can avoid some sort of split on
(12)
this issue".
	
For this reason Macmillan adopted a very cautious
approach, designed to carry along the Cabinet, Parliament, the Party
and the Country.	 Richard Neustadt believed that he did this "by
(13)disguising his strategic choice as a commercial option". 	 He
presented the talks as exploratory, talks about talks, and emphasised
the economic advantages rather than the political consequences. 	 A
good example of his caution was his handling of Sir Robert Menzies,
the Australian Prime Minister, "the only person Harold Macmillan was
really frightened of", because of his popularity with the Conservative
Party.
	 Menzies was "softened up by Macmillan" with "lavish and
skilled hospitality". 
(14)
From such a dramatic . cerspective on the
difficulties of gaining party acceptance of the decision, it is easy
to attribute the success in achieving Party support to Macmillan's
skill.	 As Macmillan himself said, "The opposition of the 'anti-
Marketeers'...had proved a complete, almost ludicrous, failure". (15)
The failure of his opponents to obtain any substantial body of support
within the Party is largely attributed to Macmillan's skilful
handling.
A theme of this chapter is that this view severely exaggerated
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the danger to Party unity and underestimated the already substantial
support that existed within the Cabinet, the Parliamentary Party, the
rank and file activists, Central Office, the ginger groups and associated
interest groups, the Party press and the electorate.
	 This is not to
denigrate the skill that Macmillan did display, only to rebut the
exaggerated influence attributed to that skill and attributed to the
power of the Prime Minister and Conservative Party Leader.
The Cabinet 
On 27th July 1960, Macmillan reshuffled his Cabinet, a consequence
of which was to place 'Europeans' in a number of sensitive positions.
Duncan Sandys went to the Commonwealth Relations Off ice, Christopher
Soames to Agriculture, Lord Home became Foreign Secretary with Edward
Heath as his number two with special responsibility for Europe as Lord
Privy Seal, and Thorneycroft became Minister of Aviation.	 It is
denied by Bruce-Gardyne and Lawson, who had good contacts within the
administration, that the reshuffle was carried out in order to promote
(16)
the Europeans.	 The main factor was to provide the Government
with a new look, which involved the promotion of a new generation more
oriented to Europe.
The Cabinet had a strong group of 'Europeans'. Sandys had long
been identified with Europe, as had Thorneycroft. 	 Soames at
Agriculture was also a strong 'European',, although he had accepted earlier
arguments that membership was a political impossibility. (17)Lord
Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor, and Sir David Eccles, Minister of Education,
had been early Europeans'. rain Macleod, Colonial Secretary but also
Party Chairman, was convinced of the electoral benefits of membership,
that an idealistic approach would attract the young and the new middle
class to the Conservatives.
	 He told his Association in April 1962
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that "as a nation we should thrill to the challenge.	 I believe we
have nothing to fear but much to gain". 	 Fisher noted that Macleod,
like Macmillan, "sensed and expressed the need to look towards new
areas of vitality, political and economic, to a wider sweep of ideas
and events, and to the exciting prospects which seemed to be opening
in Europe". (18) Europe appealed to his romantic nature, while what
appealed to his political nature was the fact that young people,
professionals and white collar workers, the target group for the
elections, were especially in favour of membership, as Macleod told
the Cabinet.
At the Foreign Office, Home and Heath were two convinced but
moderate'Europeans!. Home's primary concern was the power of the
Soviet Union, and therefore with the dangers of a divided Europe. 	 By
1961 he had concluded that "the U.K. could not afford to stay out of the
European Community" because of the declining value of Commonwealth
preferences, the threat from the Soviet Union, and the need to inspire
(19)
the young with the philosophy of freedom.	 One biographer
described his position as one of strong conviction without crusading
enthusiasm. (20) Home was especially important because of the
confidence placed upon him in the Conservative Party. 	 Henry Fairlie
reported that "his value in holding rank and file opinion is more and
(21)
more obvious".
Edward Heath had been an early sympathiser of Europe, giving his
maiden speech in favour of the Conservative motion on the Schuman Plan.
However, as Chief Whip he had acted to restrain 'European M.P.s, and was
reluctant to accept the post in the Foreign Office after only a few
months at the Ministry of Labour.	 The Economist later suggested
several reasons for Heath's choice as chief negotiator: that he was
close to Macmillan, was held in high esteem by the Six, had the
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confidence of the Party "who regard him rightly as a convinced but
not a fanatical European" (Thorneycroft was rejected as too fanatical),
his experience as a chief whip, and his ability to simplify
complicated issues. (22)	 It also stated that if he was a success,
that would make him a candidate for the leadership.
	 A close
political friend and biographer described him as "a convinced
European, believing that Britain's future can best be assured by the
sort of association that he was called upon to negotiate". (23)Thus
there was in the Cabinet a large group of ministers strongly in
favour of British membership, even if some like Sandys or Soames were
more committed than others like Home or Heath.
There was, of course, also a group of people highly sceptical of
the EEC, although this group was smaller, including Butler, Maudling
and Hailsham. (24) The most important sceptic was Butler, although
it has been said that "Butler had doubts about everything". (25)
Butler was particularly concerned about the farmers in his constituency,
especially the tomato-growers, and acted as a spokesman for agricultural
interests within the Cabinet. 	 Soames described him as "the keeper of
quite a number of Conservative consciences, including the conscience
of the countryside".	 Butler himself explained that his doubts were
"actuated by the fact that all my life I'd represented a farming
constituency, and all my life I'd been connected in one way or another
(26)
with the NFU".	 He even complained that European Community
(27)
officials were speaking about agriculture in Britain! 	 Macmillan
handled Butler by appointing him chairman of the negotiations committee,
where his belief in team-work and Party unity led him to work for a
successful negotiation.	 A tour of farmers convinced him that
agricultural opinion was not so hostile as he had thought. 	 "Butler
himself says that he came around with the farmers". 
(23)	
Heput his
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full support behind the policy and indeed at the 1962 Conference
gave a highly successful speech attacking Labour's opposition with
the phrase "For them a thousand years of history books. 	 For us, the
(29)
future".	 Yet clearly Butler acted as a restraining influence
on the speed, though not the direction, of Government thinking, and
was never fully converted to support.
	 In his autobiography
significantly there is no mention of the application. (30)
Maudling was a strong believer in free trade and, in his role as
negotiator towards the FTA and EFTA, was very sceptical of the
economic benefits of the EEC.	 In his autobiography he wrote that
"The economic advantages were difficult to assess", while recognising
(31)
the political case was stronger. 	 "We wanted a special position
which recognised our Commonwealth ties and out world-wide status.	 We
were not altogether unjustified in this point of view". 	 Maudling
probably played an important role in delaying the Cabinet commitment
to membership.	 In May 1961, he told Boreham Wood Young Conservatives
that it was "inaccurate" to say that the Government had decided to
(32)join.	 It was also noted that Maudling was "conspicuously
missing" from the visits to the Commonwealth carried out in June 1961. (33)
Once the decision had been taken, he concentrated on his concerns at
the Colonial Office, and after 13th July 1962 as Chancellor of the
Exchequer.
Lord Hailsham was identified as the third sceptic, and indeed as
the potential leader of the opposition within the Cabinet. (34)This
exaggerated Hailsham's position.
	
He claims that he was an early
supporter of a united Europe in defence of European civilisation,
describing his speech for British participation in the Schuman talks
(35)
as "one of the most significant I ever delivered".
	 During his
period as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1956 he talked of "my already
developed commitmen	
(36)
t to Europe".	 He expressed his concerns
	 143
about some of the conditions of membership, because the EEC had
developed along less favourable lines than if Great Britain had
already been in, but he was not opposed in principle. 	 He accepted
that participation in a United Europe was the "only reasonable
prospect if we are to offer to our countrymen a life under the rule
of law for civilised men". (37)
It has been claimed that speeches by Macleod and Frederick
Erroll, President of the Board of Trade, in late 1962 were the public
appearance of a Cabinet rebellion. (38)On 3rd November 1962
Macleod stated that Britain must not pay too high a price for
membership, and that she must keep her agricultural system until the
end of the transition period. 	 Erroll claimed on 10th December 1962
that it would be unfortunate but not a disaster if Britain failed to
enter.	 However, these speeches should rather be seen as an attempt
to strengthen Heath's bargaining position during a particularly
difficult period of negotiations.
Thus the role of the sceptics should not be exaggerated. 	 They
had their own conditions to be met in the negotiations, and they may
have had their doubts that these conditions could be met, but they
were not opposed to membership in principle. 	 Because of the breakdown
in negotiations, it can bever be known if conditions acceptable to
them could have been found, but the degree to which the prestige of
the Government and the electoral prospects of the Party were tied to
a successful entry, suggests that they would have accepted the terms
that were emerging.	 Heath has strongly emphasised that the application
for membership "was a Cabinet decision. 	 It wasn't just a Prime
Ministerial decision. 	 The great majority of the members of the Cabinet
felt strongly that our future lay with Europe, and many of them
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(including my generation) had made up our minds about this a long
time ago.. .it was a Cabinet decision in which the great majority were
firmly and strongly behind making an application to join the
Community". (39),	 Indeed, there is no evidence that any members of
the Cabinet (or any other member of the Government) considered
resigning over the issue.
The Cabinet agreed to negotiate unanimously on 27th July 1961,
and it was felt even before then that no Minister was likely to resign
over the issue. 
(40)
There was never even a suggestion of a
resignation during the negotiations.	 There was a major reshuffle on
13th July 1962, the Night of the Long Knives, when one-third of the
Cabinet was sacked. 	 This was generally perceived as strengthening
the'Europeans' 
(41)
but this should not be seen as the cause.	 Macmillan
was still concerned to present a new and dynamic image to his
administration, and sought to bring in a number of new faces. 	 The
dismissal of Lord Kilmuir, Sir David Eccles and Selwyn Lloyd certainly
did not strengthen the 'Europeans', or the promotion of Maudling to
Chancellor.	 By the end of 1962 all Ministers were publicly speaking
in favour of the policy, and according to the Economist this squashed
rumours in the constituencies that Macmillan lacked Cabinet support. (42)
Thus without denying Macmillan's skill in handling the Cabinet,
and particularly Butler, the divisions within the Cabinet were never
as great as many commentators have suggested.	 Once acceptable terms
seemed possible, and membership even electorally attractive, the
Cabinet united in support of the negotiations and the search for
membership under acceptable conditions.
Parliamentary Party 
Inevitably with the actual application the initiative on Europe
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lay with the Government, and the 'Europeans' in the House were cautious
not to undermine the Government's negotiating position or domestic
support. This group was primarily the younger members and those who
had participated in the European Assemblies.
	 A few urged the
Government to join the EEC first and negotiate conditions after, and
twelve Conservative M.P.s signed a memorandum circulated by Lord
(43)Gladwyn to that effect in June 1961.
	 However, once
negotiations had begun they acted to strengthen the Government's
negotiating position.
At the Western European Union (WEU) in late May 1961 a motion
urging British membership of the EEC was adopted by 65 to 1, and
supported by all the Conservatives there except Sir John Eden who
voted against in principle, and Ronald Russell who abstained because
of Commonwealth preferences. (44) The others strongly endorsed
membership, but without haste or at any price.
	 Maurice Macmillan
urged joining; Sir John Maitland feared that the treatment of
agriculture was too superficial; Anthony Kershaw felt that the slow
approach was right and this was not "a slow and reluctant conversion"
but the "gradual evolution of a technical problem"; Monty Woodhouse
presented the political arguments for membership; and Kirk urged the
mutual advantages of British membership.
	 "We are not going down on
our knees to beg anyone to take us in since we have a great deal to
offer".
At the next WEU Assembly in December 1961, a report on
agricultural problems brought Conservative supporters to emphasise
the difficulties with Robert Matthew saying that these could be
resolved and Sir John Maitland felt that the problems had been ignored
in the report and so voted against the report, while noting his support
for British membership. .( 45)
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At the Council of Europe Assembly the Conservatives reacted to the
patronising attitude of the Commission and some speakers from the
Six who felt that Britain had to join from necessity. 	 Maurice
Macmillan said that Britain had "no more to gain from success and no
more to lose from failure than other European countries".	 Kirk noted
that the application had been made before the recent balance of
payments crisis.
	 "While devoutly hoping that the negotiations may be
successful, I say frankly that, at the moment, I give them a 50-50
chance, the principle reason being the relationship between the U.K.
and the Commonwealth". (Anthony Kershaw).	 Ronald Russell, an
anti-marketeer, noted Sandys' statement that if a choice had to be
made, the Commonwealth would come first. 	 Maitland argued that the
responsibility for agriculture should not be given to a supranational
Commission, while Kershaw favoured such transfer. 	 "It is necessary
for the Common Market to have some compulsive powers in order to
ensure that countries do what they are told in the ultimate interests
of all". (46)
Heath told the WEU Assembly in June 1962, that the Government's
objective was to find solutions to the problems involved. 	 Sir James
Scott-Hopkins and Robert Matthews urged the need for guaranteed entry
of Commonwealth products into Europe.
	 A number of Conservatives
abstained over a motion on European Political Union because of its
federal implications (Scott-Hopkins, Mayhew, Sir John Rogers, Russell,
(47)
Prior-Palmer).	 The Conservatives also impressed on the Six their
reservations about the protraction of the negotiations and about the
introduction of new EEC regulations during the negotiations. 	 "As a
result public opinion in Britain was hardening" (Maurice Macmillan). (48)
The delegations thus had representatives of all strands among
M.P.s - the anti-marketeer in principle (Sir John Eden), the anti-
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marketeer based on Commonwealth fears (Russell), the pro-marketeer if
agricultural protection (Maitland), confederalist 'Europeans' (Scott-
Hopkins, Mayhew) and even federalists (Kirk, Nicholas Ridley).
	 The
bulk of the delegation favoured British membership but feared that
displays of enthusiasm on their part could weaken the Government's
negotiating position.
	 Therefore, strong contributions like the one
by Peter Smithers were rare. (49) However, its importance was that
they provided a reliable source of backbench_ support for the
Government in parliamentary debates, and their support was solid
despite the ups and downs of the negotiations.
It should also be stressed that support was broadly based in the
Parliamentary Party and not only of the 'progressive' variety.
	 While
the 'left' were predominantly pro-European, a great deal of the
'right' were the same, although less prone to federalism.
	 There were
(50)
comments that the Suez Group provided a base for the anti-marketeers,
but leading Suez Group figures were notable 'Europeans', such as Sandys
and Julian Amery.	 Lord Salisbury, described by the Economist as the
only right-wing Tory of national status, was for membership. (51)
They were staunch Commonwealth men who guaranteed in the eyes of many
M.P.s that Commonwealth interests would be protected.
	 Other right-wing
(52)
enthusiasts were Sir Peter Agnew and David James.
A mention should be made of the role of Sir Tuf ton Beamish the
respected Chairman of the Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee from
the centre of the party, also with well-established Commonwealth
connections.
	 He conducted a visit to the Commonwealth to reassure
them that the Government would protect their interests and on his
return reported that criticisms expressed by Menzies and others did
not represent Commonwealth opinion, which was much more sympathetic to
(53)
Britain's application.
	 An article by Beamish was circulated to
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constituency journals in July 1962.
In October 1962 a Parliamentary Advisory Committee on the Common
Market was set up to advise the Party on opinion within the Parliamentary
(54)
Party and the constituencies.
	 The Chairman was William Deedes,
Minister without Portfolio responsible for the Government's public
relations, and members were mainly European backbenchers - William
Aitken, Beamish, William Gough, Stephen Hastings, Lionel Heald, Marcus
Kimball, Kirk, Gilbert Longden, Maurice Macmillan, Robert Matthew,
Gerald Nabarro, James Prior and William Root.
	 The group met weekly
and at their meeting on 22nd October 1962 emphasised the importance of
the diffusion of information.
	 On 31st October 1962, they discussed
the need to brief backbenchers by providing a reading list of back-up
services provided by CCO.
	 Beamish and Kirk sought to draw up a list
of experienced'European'M.P.s, and questions were directed to Heath's
department in response to queries received by M.P.s from their
constituents.	 Concerns expressed were the effect on Britain's
religious practices especially on Sundays, the fear that it would
increase tension between East and West, the effect on jobs, and on
the standard of living.
	 A continual theme was the need for
more information and the complaint that the Government should have
started its information campaign much earlier.
	 The main issues were
seen as agriculture, .the cost of living, jobs and the demand for a
referendum.	 Surprisingly, the Commonwealth did not appear to most
M.P.s and their constituents as the primary issue that it was for
most of the anti-marketeers.
	 Concern was expressed that displays of
enthusiasm, such as at the Llandudno Conference, would weaken Britain
in . the negotiations.	 Upon the breakdown of negotiations, the Group
hoped that it would not exclude future membership, urged the need for
stronger contacts with the Six, decided to meet fortnightly, and
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urged an information campaign "the essential purpose of which was to
tell people the basic facts of life on which the Foreign Secretary
had to operate with Britain outside the Common Market", designed to
destroy the concept of the Commonwealth and EFTA as a satisfactory
alternative.	 On 9th May 1963, the Group was suspended until Europe
once again became 'active politics'.
The'Europeans'in the Parliamentary Party, therefore, adopted a
low profile after Britain's application, concerned with supporting
the Government's negotiating position, but often expressing privately
the fear that the lack of a strong campaign by the Government left
the field to the anti-marketeers.
The anti-marketeers also covered the broad spectrum of the
Parliamentary Party, from the right, left and centre. 	 The leadership
came from the centre, former ministers Derek Walker-Smith and Robin
Turton. While they used all the normal arguments against membership
(the Commonwealth, agriculture, EFTA and sovereignty), the main
concern of this group was the sovereignty question, reflecting their
careers as lawyers. Walker-Smith was the closest the anti-marketeers
had to a leader.	 He presented "the most eloquent and most elegant
speech against the Government's decision" during the July 1961
(55)debate.
	 A special concern was the different legal and
constitutional historical development between Britain and the Six.
On 5th July 1961 Turton asked the Prime Minister why Britain had
applied for full membership under Article 237 instead of association
under Article 238. (56)
The small group of anti-marketeers from the 'progressive' wing,
essentially Peter Walker, a former Young Conservative Chairman, and
Sir Robin Williams, a former Bow Group Chairman, were concerned with
pushing Britain towards the new Commonwealth.	 While both left and
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right saw the Commonwealth as a reason for not joining the EEC, they
were thinking of rather different Commonwealths, the left of the
developing countries and the right of the Anglo-Saxon Dominions, so
co-operation was not close. 	 There were also differences on tactics.
Walker wanted to organise a research team to investigate the
potential for expansion offered by Commonwealth markets, and present
their proposal to meetings of Commonwealth ministers. (57)This
was a different approach from the public campaigning favoured by the
other anti-marketeers.	 Walker himself went on a Commonwealth tour
to find support for his ideas.	 The importance of Walker was
that he might have attracted support from the left and the Young
Conservatives, normally considered pro-European. 	 However; he failed
to bring substantial support with him.
The most vocal and prominent group of anti-marketeers were from
the right-wing, such as Anthony Fell and John Biggs-Davison, who
were "more of a source of embarrassment than of strength", (58)in
particular because of their personal attacks on Macmillan. 	 Upon
the announcement of talks, Fell asked, "Is the Prime Minister
aware that his quite shocking treatment, full of double talk, has had
the effect on one of his previous supporters, that he now thinks the
Prime Minister a natural disaster?" (59) Fell also wrote to
Macmillan demanding his resignation, 	 publicly attacked him and
(60)
urged Party members to withdraw their support from their M.P.s.
Harry Legge-Bourke made a personal attack on Macmillan which met an
embarrassed public silence and considerable private criticism amongst
Conservative M.P.s. (61) The talk of the Earl of Sandwich, the
former M.P. Viscount Hinchingbrooke and the President of the Anti-
Common Market League, also caused embarrassment with xenophobic
(62)
references to "frogs and huns".
	 John Biggs-Davison was a
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'European' who would not, however, tolerate any supranationalism as a
threat to the Commonwealth. He wrote a short book expressing his
view that Europe and Commonwealth co-operation could be and should be
achieved, but not through British membership of the EEC. 
(63) 
This
was, however, too sophisticated for many of the anti-marketeers.
He also attacked Macmillan as another Robert Peel, that his "betrayal
of British agriculture and Commonwealth preference will destroy the
(64)
Party of Macmillan".
A reference should be made to Sir Anthony Hurd, Chairman of the
Conservative Agricultural Committee, who potentially was a source of
tremendous influence upon the agricultural M.P.s At an early stage
he forcefully expressed the apprehensions of the agricultural lobby
(65)
to Macmillan at a meeting of the 1922 Committee in May 1961.
At the early stages he sought to protect agriculture in the
negotiations but as the EEC developed their Common Agricultural
Policy while the negotiations were conducted, Hurd took a firm anti-
market position.	 On 23rd November 1962 he said that "the British
electorate just would not take sharply increased food prices on our
entry into the Common Market.
	 Nor will the Conservative Party put
back a network of food subsidies as a palliative for high consumer
(66)prices.	 It is well to say this bluntly".
	 He was a significant
signature to an anti-market motion on 31st December 1962 congratulating
the Government on their firm negotiating stance over agriculture.
The anti-marketeers presented a series of motions and amendments
in the House of Commons.	 On 21st June 1961, 7 Conservative M.P.s
signed an amendment warning of the dangers of membership, and on
26th July 1961 Walker-Smith and Turton presented an amendment
expressing concern over the loss of sovereignty, which attracted 49
signatures. (66)On the motion on the application, there was only 1
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Conservative vote against, but 25 Conservative abstentions. 	 On 10th
October 1961, Walker-Smith presented an amendment emphasising
sovereignty, agriculture and the Commonwealth.
	
The CRD prepared a
brief on the amendment which stated that the Government accepted a
limited loss of sovereignty, was pledged to a prosperous agriculture,
and felt that the Commonwealth would benefit from membership. (68)
On 21st March 1962 30 Conservatives signed a motion demanding that the
Government make "Completely clear to the Common Market the assurances
of the Secretary for Commonwealth Relations that if we cannot secure
special arrangements to protect the vital interests in the countries
of our own Commonwealth partnership, Britain would not join the
Common Market".	 Butt argued that its significance was that "it was
signed not merely by prominent campaigners against the Government's
policy, but also by a considerable number of moderates who had
hitherto seemed uncommitted" (69).	 On 31st July 1962, 40 Conservative
anti-market M.P.s tabled a motion designed to attract the widest
possible support urging the Government to "stand firm and to insist
on definite assurances for Commonwealth trade and for our agricultural
and horticultural policies". 
(70)
During the Commons debate on 3rd
August 1962, the Tory anti-market amendments attracted 40 signatures,
which the Economist claimed was only half the sponsors hoped
(71)for.	 On 13th December 1962 47 Conservatives signed a motion
congratulating' Heath on his firmness over agriculture and urged equal
firmness on other issues, even if that should lead to a breakdown in
the negotiations. (72) This was a more significant motion in that it
attracted the signatures of Anthony Hurd, Sir Donald Kaberry, a former
vice-chairman of the Conservative Party organisation, and Sir James
(73)
Duncan, an influential Scottish member.
Despite the predictions of a widespread Conservative revolt, the
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anti-marketeers only obtained the support of around 40 M.P.s, with
perhaps 12 last-ditchers. (74) Why did they fail to attract more
support? A major cause was the lack of a leader of stature.
Walker-Smith and Turton were respected ex-ministers but they were
never perceived as real heavy-weights. They were seen as men of
both moderate views and moderate stature.
	
Julian Critchley noted
the importance of the fact that they had no leader of real calibre. (75)
The second problem for the anti-marketeers was that they were labelled
(unfairly as this chapter has argued) as simply right-wingers, and not
particularly respectable ones either. (76) They were associated with
the xenophobic and hysterical language of a couple of M.P.s and the
Daily Express.	 Thirdly, they appeared old-fashioned and reactionary,
while the progressive, younger and 'forward-looking' parts of the
Party were identified with the European cause. 	 The presence of Peter
Walker failed to change that image. 	 Another problem was that many
M.P.s resented the suggestion that in supporting the Government they
were betraying the Commonwealth and the farmers. 	 Ted Leather M.P.
(an Australian) told a public meeting that "The British people should
know that the vast majority of Tory M.P.s are heartily sick of a tiny
minority who are apparently prepared to say anything in the cause of
self-publicity.	 What I find particularly galling is that they are
called the pro-Commonwealth group. 	 They ought to be called the
anti-Commonwealth group. Most of them know nothing of the Commonwealth's
(7?)history or the views of its members".	 A final problem was that
criticisms of Macmillan's European policy was often seen as an attack
on Macmillan as Party leader and his general policies which, in the
_speeches of a few such as Fell, they were.	 The danger that this
created for gaining the support of M.P.s was clearly seen by Walker-
Smith and Turton, and they stressed that their position in no way
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indicated opposition to Macmillan's leadership. 	 However, they were
unable to remove that impression.	 The anti-marketeers were
disunited and never looked anywhere like gaining the support of a
majority of Conservative M.P.s. (78)
Support for the Government in the Parliamentary Party remained
fairly firm throughout this period, despite considerable fluctuations
in morale.	 It seems likely that the vast majority, about 310, of
Conservative M.P.s would have supported membership terms also
acceptable to the Cabinet. (9)	 Despiteconstant Party and press
speculation that a major parliamentary revolt was imminent, such a
(80)
revolt never took place. 	 There were three potential occasions
for revolt.
The first was the Commonwealth Conference in September 1962,
described by the Economist as "potentially.. .the most explosive
internal situation since the repeal of the Corn Laws", (81)and
speculated that many Conservative M.P.s might follow that Commonwealth
opposition.
	 The Government were hoping for a passive acceptance at
the Commonwealth Conference, but considerable disquiet was expressed
by Commonwealth leaders. 	 In fact, there was 'Still No Revolt', (82)
and the Conference may have strengthened the Government as many M.P.s
resented both the demands and language of the Commonwealth leaders
(83)
which showed little concern for the interests of Britain.
Furthermore, M.P.s seemed to have received little evidence that the
Commonwealth was a major concern of their constituents. (84)
The second predicted revolt, as noted by Macmillan, was after the
Conservatives did badly in six by-elections in November 1962, and in
particular the loss of South Dorset to Labour due to the intervention
(85)
of an anti-market independent Conservative.
	
Naturally M.P.s
became very concerned at the potential loss of their seats as an
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election was expected in the next 18 months.
	 Particular concern was
expressed by agricultural M.P.s to the Whips. (86) The Government,
and the CRD, conducted a campaign to play down the role that Europe
played in the by-elections, argued that it was the result of a lack
of successes, and that in a successful entry lay the best hope for
re-election.	 CCO in their report on the by-elections claimed that
Europe was not a major factor, except perhaps in South Dorset where
there were also important local factors such as the popularity of the
independent Conservative, Sir Piers Debenham, a former chairman of
the local Association. (87) MacLeod argued that the difficulties
of the Government would disappear once the negotiations were over and
the Government could campaign vigorously for Europe. (88) The
Parliamentary Advisory Committee attributed the loss to the visible
drift of the Government, and the lack of progress in the
(89)
negotiations.
	
The defeated candidate in Derby North believed
that Europe was not an important factor in his defeat. (90) While
undoubtedly the by-elections rocked the Parliamentary Party, after
consideration Europe did not emerge as the major factor in the minds
of Conservative M.P.s and indeed the desire for any success
strengthened support for a successful outcome of the negotiations.
The third source was the long lingering concern, potentially the
most dangerous, over adequate safeguards for British agriculture and
horticulutre.	 Butt believed that 100 M.P.s had reservations primarily
over agriculture. (91) The NFU was very active in expressing their
concerns, and during the negotiations the EEC were developing their
own Common Agricultural Policy. 	 The South Dorset by-election shook
rural M.P.s and the Conservative Agricultural Committee expressed the
fear that in a general election the Conservatives could lose 80 rural
seats.	 The concern over an agricultural revolt was strengthened by
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the emergence of Sir Anthony Hurd as an anti-marketeer.	 The
negotiations broke down in January 1963 so it is difficult to predict
whether these fears would have translated into open revolt. 	 Ramsden
suggested that it would.	 "There is little doubt that the
(Agricultural) Committee and the Party in general welcomed the failure
of the negotiations, on the grounds that a serious source of friction
(92)
could thereby be avoided or postponed". 	 This, however,
exaggerates the degree of agricultural opposition. 	 There was
evidence that the NFU did not represent a consensus among farmers, as
Butler discovered in his agricultural tours. 	 "I began to see that
(93)the farmers thought.. .they would get just as good a deal".	 Sir
Richard Nugent, a former agricultural minister, pointed to the strength
(94)
of the agricultural lobby in the Six.	 British agriculture was
seen as being more efficient than its Continental competitors and
therefore would benefit from agricultural trade. 	 Camps argued in her
analysis of the August 1961 debate that among the concerns expressed
during the debate, agriculture was "a very poor third. 	 There was
general recognition that for the most part British farmers were as
efficient as, or more efficient than, continental farmers, that
continental farmers were more important numerically (and therefore
more powerful politically) than British farmers and could be counted
on to press for the protection of agricultural interests, and that
existing British agricultural support schemes were almost sure to be
changed in the relatively near future, whether or not Britain joined
(95)
the Common Market".
	
As far as the state of negotiations at the
time of breakdown are concerned, Camps argued that an acceptable
agreement could have been expected. (96) There was no agricultural
revolt as predicted and there is reason to believe that there would
not have been.
	
When the application collapsed, there were no major
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recriminations by M.P.s of the behaviour of the Government, but
considerable disappointment that an important success had been denied
them in the future forthcoming election. 	 "Tory M.P.s know that
triumphant entry into Europe offered the Party the best chance of
(9 7)recovery, and that hope has been dashed". 	 Neither did the
response of the Parliamentary Advisory Committee, with its call for
an information campaign on European trade, suggest an incipient
(98)
revolt.
The bulk of the Parliamentary Party supported the Government's
policy.	 The anti-marketeers were at a maximum 40, and only about
12 were last-ditchers.	 About 100 M.P.s may have had reservations
but would have been satisfied with terms that could reasonably be
expected to have been achieved.
	
All the predicted revolts came to
nothing.	 In other words, 1962 never looked like 1846.
National Union 
The Party Conferences in 1961 and 1962 received even greater
attention than usual as revolts from the rank and file were predicted.
For the 1961 Conference a large number of resolutions, 41, on the
Common Market and Commonwealth were received.
Yes:	 WITHOUT RESERVATIONS	 4
Yes if:	 EFTA/COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE
	 4
COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE	 3
AGRICULTURE	 1
No unless:
	
COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE	 3
COMMONWEALTH/SOVEREIGNTY 	 2
COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE/SOVEREIGNTY 	 2
SOVEREIGNTY	 1
AGRICULTURE	 1
COMMONWEALTH/EFTA 	 1
COMMONWEALTH/SOVEREIGNTY/EFTA revoked 	 1
COMMONWEALTH FIRST
	
13
No:	 WITHOUT CONDITIONS 	 3
UNCLEAR	 2
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Few of the resolutions took an unambiguous position for or
against the membership.	 Most resolutions took a position in favour
•and so urged that particular interests should be protected, or a
position against unless certain conditions were met.	 However, the
way the resolutions were phrased is a good indication of how they
were leaning.	 It should be noted that there was a clear attempt to
obtain 'Commonwealth firsV motions, several of which were presented by
Roger Moate, Peter Walker and Paul Williams. 	 Three of the nine
motions on agriculture also presented fears about membership. 	 The
resolutions sent in, therefore, while not completely hostile,
reflected widespread concerns, and led to predictions of great trouble
(99)
at the Conference.
The Agriculture debate, just before the Commonwealth one, was
fairly balanced in its attitude towards EEC. 	 The motion chosen for
debate asked that agricultural support should be made clear, especially
if Britain entered the EEC, and the proposer was pro-EEC and argued
that the level of support was more important than the method. 	 He was
supported by another speaker who believed that if it was in Britain's
interests to join, then agriculture would act responsibly. 	 The two
speakers against the EEC expressed the considerable apprehension of
many farmers.	 Soames, in his winding up speech, noted that the very
high cost of subsidies created a problem whether in or out of the EEC
but that would have to await negotiations.
The motion chosen for the Common Market and Commonwealth debate
urged that Britain should negotiate a closer association compatible
with the Commonwealth, EFTA responsibilities and pledges to British
agriculture, a motion with deliberately broad appeal. (100)
Surprisingly, perhaps because of the fear of charges of unfairness,
an amendment by Derek Walker-Smith was also chosen for debate. 	 This
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amendment urged no approval of membership if "surrender of sovereignty,
or inconsistent with pledges to British agriculture and horticulture,
or with the continuance by the U.K. of its traditional role in
Commonwealth and world affairs". 	 The Economist reported that
ministers expected the amendment to be passed, but considered it not
very important as the wording simply repeated the conditions of the
original motion. (101)
The proposer, Andrew Bowden, did not deliver a rallying cry for
British membership but a cautious and conditional acceptance.	 The
case for membership was based on the need for Western unity against
Communism and he argued that a limited amount of sovereignty should
be sacrificed in that cause.	 He also repeated the theme that if a
choice had to be made between Europe and the Commonwealth, then "all
here" would endorse the Commonwealth.
	 The seconder, David Lane, was
more positive, noting the benefits to the Commonwealth of British
membership.	 Walker-Smith, introducing his amendment, argued that
membership meant integration not association and eventual European
political union.
	 It was an argument against on principle.	 The long
debate was balanced except for a speech by a minister, Heath, in the
middle of the debate, who restated the political and economic case and
tried to calm specific concerns such as those over the monarchy.
Other speeches mentioned the declining value of Commonwealth trade;
Roger Moate of the Anti-Common Market League argued that the EEC
meant federation and that "free trade has not paid"; Nigel Birch, M.P.,
asked, "But are we to be the only country in the Commonwealth which
is not sovereign?"; an anti-marketeer complained that "Sometimes the
Government has been apt to look complacently upon the Conservative
Party as the patient oxen which draw the bandwagon, regardless of the
tunes the band is playing and the frequent changes of instrument".
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After Heath's speech, John Biffen welcomed the unusually vigorous debate
uncontrolled by the platform, said that Imperial Preference was not the
Clause IV of the Conservative Party and urged rejection of the amendment;
one anti-marketeer was heckled; Patrick Jenkin of the Bow Group argued
that influence was more important than sovereignty; Hinchingbrooke
predicted the Common Market would break up; and Legge-Bourke asked
Conference not to undermine Heath's position. 	 Sandys wound up the debate
with a strong speech with many references to the Commonwealth, and
sensing the mood of the Conference, urged rejection of the amendment. (102)
He sat down to a standing ovation.	 The amendment was overwhelmingly
rejected and the original motion overwhelmingly passed.
Macmillan then spoke to Conference, with an emphasis on the
East-West struggle after the building of the Berlin Wall.
	 "It is with
this in mind that we have approached the question of Europe and the
Common Market".
	
Bernard Levin in the Spectator argued that the vote
was an impressive display of political unity, that the speakers were
carefully chosen and that the anti-aarketeers were steaaroilered. (103)
Certainly the speakers were carefully chosen but it is not clear that
the anti-marketeers were unfairly treated.	 Their amendment was
called, when amendments are rarely called at Conservative Conferences
and when there was little difference in substance, if there was in tone,
with the motion.	 The speakers were balanced, except for the Heath
speech, and it was apparently only decided to ask for the amendment
to be rejected near the end of the debate.	 (Sandys could have urged
acceptance of the amendment without in any way creating new conditions
for the Government).	 The mood of the Conference was interpreted by
Sandys and the platform as more pro-European than they expected, as
was reflected in the vote on the amendment. 	 The vote could be
interpreted not as a massive sign of support for membership, but of a
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strong unwillingness to reject membership as a matter of principle,
as demanded by the anti-marketeers.
The 1962 Conference at Llandudno created even greater speculation
as to the likelihood of a revolt. There were a number of developments
which caused the party organisers considerable concern. There was the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference with what was perceived as the
considerable emotional attachment to the Commonwealth by the rank and
file.	 There was the claim by Lord Montgomery that Winston Churchill
had told him he was "entirely against the Common Market". 	 The
opinion polls showed declining support both for Europe and the
Conservative Party. The negotiations had been dragging on without
notable progress in the eyes of the public. 	 The anti-marketeers had
made most of the running in public, the Government had kept a low
profile during the negotiations and ministers feared that the antis
(104)
would be highly organised at the Conference. 	 The Party
leadership and Conservative Central Office conducted a vigorous
campaign to avert a defeat at Llandudno.	 Winston Churchill was
persuaded to write to Association Chairmen denying Montgomery's story.
"In my conception of a Unified Europe, I never contemplated the
dimunition of the Commonwealth". 	 As the Economist noted, "Radical
innovation is best sold to a Conservative audience by persuading them
(105)
that the change is rooted in the past". 	 Macmillan responded
to pleas from Macleod for strong leadership on this issue, with a
television broadcast and a pamphlet which put forward the case for
membership in a positive fashion. 	 Macmillan was concerned to influence
the Conference debate although he would not speak to Conference until
after the debate, and so he wrote a pamphlet published by the CCO
(106)
Britain, Commonwealth and Europe. 	 The pamphlet was well
received by the press and conference delegates, and was felt by the
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National Advisory Committee on Publicity and Speakers to have "received
outstanding publicity in the press and on T.V.". (107)
The Conference resolutions were far more favourable to Europe
(although fewer Europe motions were received, only 31 compared to
59 on taxation and rates).	 Butt's analysis was that "only 3...were
absolutely against joining, while 19 underwrote the Government's
policy - leaving the balance to voice varying degrees of anxiety". (108)
The Economist felt that half the motions were pro-European with lip
service to agriculture and the Commonwealth, 12 gave qualified support
while 4 were against. (109) Analysis based on the author's
examination of the resolutions is: (110)
Yes:	 WITHOUT CONDITIONS	 10
Yes, if: EFTA/COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE 	 5
EFTA/COMMONWEALTH	 1
COMMONWEALTH	 2
COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE 	 1
EFTA/COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE/SOVEREIGNTY 1
No unless:
	
EFTA/COMMONWEALTH/AGRICULTURE 	 1
COMMONWEALTH	 1
ECONOMY/PEACE/COMMONWEALTH	 1
No:	 5
Of interest are the reasons given for favouring membership: four
mention the free world; three prosperity; three peace; one industry;
and one the developing countries.
The Conference Chairman opened the debate with a reference to its
importance and the attempt by the National Union to present equal
sides. (111) The motion was again a broad one supporting membership
for the unity of the free world, and the prosperity of the U.K.,
Commonwealth and Europe. An amendment was proposed by Robin Turton
calling for firm pledges and opposing federalism. 	 He was heckled
with shouts of "no" when he claimed that the Commonwealth Conference
had rejected membership. 	 David Clarke, his seconder, was also heckled
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with similar shouts when he claimed that the majority of the young
were against membership. 	 John Selwyn Gummer said that Conservative
Students were six to one in favour.	 Several apeakers expressed
confidence in the Government. 	 Butler spoke in the middle of the
debate and gave a vigorous attack on Gaitskell and the Labour Party.
"For them a thousand years of history books, for us the future".
	 He
argued that the young "regard this as the greatest adventure of our
time" and that the amendment was unnecessary.	 Butler's speech was
enthusiastically received, and marked a decisive turn in the debate. (112)
Harmar Nicholls M.P. spoke for the amendment, saying "we are the
farmers' Party" and was received quietly.	 However, the speech of
John Paul, the ACML Chairman, was continuously interrupted by shouts
of 'rubbish', 'nonsense' and 'no'. 	 Walker-Smith summed up for the
anti-marketeers, with his familiar themes of the Commonwealth,
sovereignty and "Britain can have no part in federation". 	 Heath
concluded the debate with references to the open and frank debate,
argued the political and economic case for membership and said that
much had been gained for the Commonwealth in the negotiations. 	 The
debate was described by the Spectator as dull and serious, full of
(113)
sober earnestness.
The amendment was then defeated overwhelmingly. Macmillan
estimated "only 50 or so out of 4,000 voting for it". (114)The
short debate on Imperial Preference between Peter Walker and Sir
Robin Williams versus Patricia McLaughlin and Sandys also revealed
the belief in Europe-Commonwealth co-operation as not alternatives.
The agriculture motion urged a move to subsidies to increase production
and efficiency.
	 Stephen Hastings, a right-wing M.P., noted the
concerns of farmers but expressed confidence in their ability to
compete.	 Soames repeated the view that reconsideration of the
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agricultural support system was necessary in or out of the EEC. 	 In
the debate on Conservative principles, all references to Europe were
favourable, by Barney Hayhoe, Tom Stacey and Muriel Bowen. The
Conference was, therefore, a great endorsement of Britain's membership.
Once again the commentators were surprised. 	 One delegate was
quoted as saying, "If somebody had told me 3 months ago, or even 3
weeks ago, it would be like this, I would have said he was mad". (115)
Henry Fairlie argued that the result was not due to stage-management
but "to the process of education - which enabled a mass, democratic
Party to become a support of Government, instead of a hindrance to
Government as it is in the Labour Party - is a genuinely original
contribution which the Conservatives have made to the development of
political institutions". (116)He gave particular praise to Michael
Fraser and the work of CCO. 	 The Economist noted that the Conference
hurdle had been passed "with almost derisory ease", the antis had
. appeared "scattered, isolated and made to look absurd" while the
pro-Europeans were "larger, noisier" and heckled the opposition. (117)
Both politicians and press were amazed at the enthusiasm for Europe,
with many people wearing bold 'Yes' badges. (118)
A number of reasons can be suggested for the overwhelming success
for the Government's European policy, at the Llandudno Conference.
First the Government, and especially Macmillan in his broadcast and
pamphlet, at last came out strongly in favour of British membership
without all the cautious conditions.	 Membership was presented as
something to be welcomed and not merely an unfortunate necessity.
Second was Butler's speech which finally ended speculation that the
Cabinet was badly split with Butler as chief opponent.	 Thirdly, the
Labour Conference the previous week had come out against membership
with a well-publicised speech by Gaitskell.	 Membership thereupon
65
became a Party issue and strengthened partisan support for the
Government, especially as exploited by Butler. 	 Another factor was
that the Commonwealth Conference had in fact strengthened the
Turopeans i due to widespread resentment created at the attitudes
expressed, particularly by New Commonwealth leaders. 	 The'Europeane
also successfully associated Europe with the young, with frequent
references to youth's support for Europe, with several young pro-
European speeches, and the active support of Young Conservatives
expressed in badges and heckling.	 The Conservative Party is
concerned with its old fashioned image as a Party and is particularly
open to suitable ideas which they consider to be of appeal to the young.
Finally, as Fairlie pointed out, mention must be made of the immense
preparations for the Conference carried out by CCO to produce that
result, discussed later in more detail.
Two other major sources of information on constituency opinion
were a weekend Conference at Swinton Conservative College, 5-7th May
1961, and reports from Area Agents.
	 A full report on the Conference
was written by Stephen Abbot of the CRD. (119) The conference
divided into four groups (Trade, Commonwealth, Agriculture,
Institutions) and all groups agreed that Britain should not sign the
Treaty of Rome as it stands, but the balance of advantage lay in
membership if certain conditions could be met - Commonwealth, EFTA and
sovereignty.	 The Agricultural Group was confident that satisfactory
arrangements could be made.	 A clear majority were in favour of
membership, and felt that some sacrifice would be worthwhile.
	 The
arguments expressed for membership were Western unity, the danger of
exclusion, the benefits of a large unit, the fear that capital
investment would go to the Continent, and the advantages of increased
competition and efficiency and that decisions would be open to British
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influence.	 A large number of questions were raised during the
weekend, including political instability in the EEC, the strength of
socialism and trade unions, and the inward-looking nature of the EEC.
Abbott made three suggestions: that the uncertainty of the
negotiations increased fears, that the Party must consider the
alternatives, and the public must be given far more information.
In August 1962 the Area Agents were asked to provide an
assessment of public opinion on Europe in their areas. (120)
	
The
London Report, which they interpreted primarily as an assessment of
Party opinion, concluded that "the general public is confused and
ignorant", noting the influence of Beaverbrooke, the generation gap
on this issue, that Conservatives believe that competition will make
people work harder and the widespread feeling of a lack of information.
The Northern Area reported a hardening of opinion; that Conservatives
wanted more information before crystallising their own attitudes;
that some felt very strongly about sovereignty; the decline of
Commonwealth opposition; and the division within the agricultural
community.	 Yorkshire reported that "The Beaverbrooke Press Campaign
is making a substantial impact", a "hardening of opposition", the
demand for more information, and concluded that "provided necessary
safeguards are obtained much of the current opposition in the Party may
be fairly easily converted". 	 East Midlands estimated 60% for and 40%
against, repeated the complaints of lack of information, that opinion
was hardening, and that Conservatives believed membership would help
curb the trade unions. 	 The West Midlands Report thought there was a
slight pro-European majority, with the hardening of opposition mainly
because of the Commonwealth and sovereignty, the great demand for
information, and reported that Peter Walker was "over-playing his
hand" with his Association. 	 The North West showed a majority for,
167
but confused and doubtful.	 Sovereignty was of low importance, the
Commonwealth of interest to the right-wing and women, and agriculture
was divided.	 The East reported opposition hardening.	 The South
East reported the area very divided, with growing opposition due to
the Express, the ACML and the French.	 The pro-Europeans came
especially from the "thinking section of our Party" and the young,
while the antis were older and more rural. 	 If a Conservative M.P.
took a stand, like Kirk at Gravesend, he could have a considerable
influence.	 A majority were probably against but opinion could be
swung round if negotiations were a success, but that required a
campaign. Wessex reported that the antis were now stronger than
the pros, the West that the antis were mainly extreme right.
There was a remarkable consensus in their reports on a number of
points: opposition was hardening; the important role of the
Beaverbrooke press; the association of the ACML with the right wing;
the demand for information; the importance of the Commonwealth to a
few; agriculture was divided between the large and small farmers; the
old versus the young; elements of anti-Americanism and xenophobia;
and that the Party could be swayed into support with a vigorous
campaign.	 The Organisation Department concluded that supporters
were larger in number but less informed and vocal, that the uncertainty
was undermining support, and the need for the Government to provide
more information. 	 This report helped to persuade the Government of
the need for an active European campaign.
The Young Conservatives maintained their pro-European stance.
The 1961 Young Conservatives' Conference received six motions urging
European co-operation and seven for British membership. 	 The
Conference passed a motion urging the Government "to ensure Britain's
full and active support for the formation of an economically and
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politically integrated Europe" by a small majority, a debate to which
Heath replied. (121) There was an attempt, probably inspired by
Walker, to increase interest in the Commonwealth, with a Young
Conservative Policy Group, and the distribution of a discussion
document on "A Changing Partnership". (122) Europe, however, remained
the major theme, with a special course on the Common Market for Area
Officers at Swinton in Autumn 1962..
	
Area Agents consistently
reported support for Europe from the Young Conservatives.
	 The 1962
Conference did not debate Europe, but received twenty-five motions in
favour, and only eight against. 	 At the 1962 Party Conference the
Young Conservatives distributed "Yes" badges and helped to create the
feeling that the young were pro-European.	 After the breakdown of
negotiations, the Young Conservatives' Conference, with 1,400
representatives, passed by an overwhelming majority the motion
"realising that the breakdown of negotiations.. .presents a challenge
to Europe, the Atlantic Alliance and the free world as a whole, urges
H.M. Government to do all in its power further to develop European
co-operation in all fields".
The Conservative students were in a similar position.
	
At their
Conference in March 1961, they urged the Government "to take immediate
steps to join the EEC" by 51 votes to zero with 15 abstentions. 	 In
1961 they helped to form the International Union of Conservative and
Christian Democrat Students (ICCS) with Continental groups.
	
John
Selwyn Gummer told the 1962 Party Conference that FCS was six to one
in favour.
The women did not debate Europe at their conferences, although a
session on the Common Market was held at their Swinton course in
October 1962.
	 The North West Area Agent suggested that women were
more emotionally attached to the Commonwealth.	 Apart from this,
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here is little evidence to suggest that sex was an important variable
within the Party on this issue.
The Conservative Trade Unionists voted by a large majority at
their Conference in March 1962 "in favour of Britain's entry...so
long as the entry does not adversely effect the standard of living,
and the social welfare services and safeguard the interests of
(123)Commonwealth countries and British agriculture". 	 The West
Midlands Trade Union chairman resigned against membership but the Area
Agent reported that the majority of the Conservative Trade Unionists
(124)
were in favour.
The NUEC constantly discussed the problem of political education
on Europe, and criticised the Government for not keeping the Party and
the electorate better informed. 	 58,000 copies of a leaflet on the
Common Market were sold to 79 Associations, which was more Associations
(125)than for any other leaflet.	 The NUEC also came to the
conclusion that Europe was not a primary factor in the poor results of
spring 1962, a view endorsed by the defeated candidate for Derby
North. (126)At one NUEC meeting the need for a good team of speakers
on Europe was raised. (127)
	
Heath came to a meeting of the NUEC to
describe the negotiations and to answer their questions. 	 The National
Union Advisory Committee on Publicity "urged to give all possible
thought to methods of ensuring that the momentum of the Common Market
Campaign, which had been achieved at the Party Conference, should be
maintained in the near future". (128)
In conclusion the speculation that the Conservative rank and file
would be in revolt against the Government proved to be unsubstantiated.
The view that this was avoided simply due to deference towards the
leadership ignores the many other factors discussed here. 	 Opinion
in the Party was 'soft' on this issue, but when the Government made
its position clear and when Party information was distributed and
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considered, when the positive case for membership was presented, the
Party members quickly established a pro-European position. 	 Many
members were ahead of the Government-in their support for membership.
The observer must distinguish between a policy supported merely
because it is supported by the Party leadership, and a policy
supported after the Party leadership has presented its arguments
which members can consider against those of the Government's opponents.
That occurred in the summer and autumn of 1962 was the active campaign
urged by the Economist and some of the 'Europeans'. 	 However, it was
to be aborted after De Gaulle gave his infamous "Non!"
Central Office 
Soon after the 1959 election, the CRD began its preparations
for the next election, following the view of Michael Fraser, the
Director of the CRD, that they are won between elections and not
during the camuaign. (129) Two early conclusions from their
discussions were the establishment of a youth policy as "the most
urgent" of the long term policies that needed development, and the
renewal of confidence in Britain's position in the world to soften
the widespread feeling about Britain's post-war decline. (130)
Britain's membership of the EEC was felt to assist in both of these
strategic objectives.	 Most of the CRD officials became convinced
both of the political and electoral advantages of membership, and
helped to convince lain Macleod, the Party Chairman. 	 Throughout the
negotiations there was a committee of officials under Paul Dean to
evaluate the electoral impact of the negotiated terms and to plan
Party publications on various assumptions about the outcome of the
negotiations.
	 The CRD emphasised that electoral benefits required
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actual entry, and that only a commitment to enter or actual negotiations
would be damaging during an election. 	 "If entry had been successfully
negotiated on what could be presented as favourable terms, it might
well open new vistas for Britain in the public mind - to the credit
of the Conservative Party". (131) The CRD and Macleod were eager
for the negotiations to finish so that an offensive campaign could be
conducted, "preaching the cause with missionary fervour, and trying to
. rob the Liberals of every stitch of their more respectable clothes",
as the Economist reported. 
(132 )
This approach was illustrated by
Macleod's talk to the NUEC on the loss of the Orpington by-election.
"It was the fact that at a time when we were ceasing to be the
greatest imperial power in the world, the country as . a whole was not
sure where it was going as a country....A reappraisal of the position
was necessary and what mattered was to find out a way to give the
country a real sense of purpose again, which only the Conservative
Party can do, so that the country continued to play a part in the
world as it had always done... .The real task of the Conservative
Party was to convince the people.. .that they are still one of the
greatest Nations in the world". (133)
During the negotiations the CRD produced a vast number of
briefs and pamphlets aimed at ministers, M.P.s and Party members.
They had several functions including the provision of information on
the negotiations, the concern to keep attention on the strategic
objectives amidst the discussion of individual problems, to monitor
anti-market feeling and to reply to the many questions sent to
ministers and M.P.s
The regular series of publications published by the CRD gave
special attention to Europe. Weekend Talking Points were sent to
M.P.s and candidates as suggested topics for their weekend speeches,
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and eight of them during this period dealt with Europe, describing
the reasons for the applications, the developing state of the
negotiations, the 1962 Conference as an "overwhelming vote of
confidence" in the leadership on the Common Market, and the difficulties
Britain faced after the breakdown. (134) Notes on Current Politics
(NC?) was a series of pamphlets distributed to M.P.s and subscribers
dealing with topics in some detail, providing both detailed factual
information and Party policy on the topics. 	 Pamphlets were produced
on Britain and Europe, Agriculture, Questions, the negotiations, and
(135)the Commonwealth.	 A special series of seven briefs called
Common Market Topics were produced for M.P.s by Guy Hadley, dealing
with Agriculture, the cost of living and EFTA.	 One brief suggested
that M.P.s might include a reference to Europe in their New Year
messages to their constituency journals. 	 Another emphasised the
difference between Liberal and Conservative attitudes to Europe.
—
"Liberals would go charging into Europe with all the reckless
enthusiasm of the Light Brigade....Many Liberals are ready to pay
almost any price for joining the Common Market.	 Conservatives are
(
not". (136)
The full use of Party publications for the campaign was urged by
Peter Minoprio, who in a memorandum to Fraser emphasised the need to
sell the policy once a decision had been reached.	 He criticised the
language used in Party publications as remote from the ordinary man,
and requested punchy answers for speakers and workers in response to
(137)
the questions that were frequently raised. 	 In July 1962 he
surveyed the full range of publications on Europe produced by CCO and
noted the different role played by different publications - factual
information in the NCPs, the Foreign Affairs Survey aimed at foreign
affairs specialists and concentrating on the political aspects,
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leaflets by the CPC and the Publicity Department for members and
voters, the weekly newsletter to Party activists, and the Pocket
Politics and Talking Points to speakers. (138) Despite all this,
CRD continually received requests for more literature.
M.P.s were naturally a major target for the CRD.
	 Briefs were
produced as usual for the appropriate Parliamentary Committees, e.g.
on the European Assemblies for the Foreign Affairs Committee, and on
the Movement of Foreign Workers in the EEC for the Trade Committee.
In addition the Parliamentary Advisory Group was created, serviced by
Guy Hadley, and many briefs were 'produced in response to questions
received by M.P.s, much of which was incorporated into the regular
publications - on the Walker-Smith amendment in October 1961, on
sovereignty, on the Common Market and religion, and on the issue of
(140)
whether the Government had a mandate. 	 M.P.s were thus provided
with a mass of information designed both to strengthen their own
commitment and to enable them to reply to questions received from
constituents.
Another major activity was the monitoring of anti-market activity
within the Party.	 Copies of their publications were collected, and
briefs written to inform the Party leadership of anti-market
activity. (141) Minoprio monitored agricultural opposition, reporting
to Macleod the opposition of the Farming Express, wrote a special
article on agriculture for constituency journals, and a brief on
(142)
Questions Farmers Ask.	 A brief on questions to the Labour
(143)
Party on Europe was also produced.	 Much of this literature was
also directed at Party activists, in particular to gain a favourable
result at the Party Conferences.
	
Henry Fairlie in the Spectator 
attributed the success of the 1962 Conference to Fraser. (144)
The CPC also produced a collection of activities and publications.
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(146)
Butler told the CPC in August 1961 that "what is immediately needed
is the building up of an informed body of opinion in support of the
(145)Government's policy".	 The National Advisory Committee on
Publicity and Speakers complained about the lack of briefing of Party
workers, and in response a series of seminars was organised in 1962,
to which every Association could send six representatives, and
speakers included Soames,Maudling, Heath, Thorneycroft and Macmillan.
In May 1962 a Swinton weekend conference on the Commonwealth and the
Common Market was organised, and the theme of the regular Oxford
Summer School was 'The New Europe' in June 1962, which attracted a
record number of students. The CPC published a pamphlet in July 1962
The New Europe, based on the Summer School, and Britain in Europe for
the Bow Group in January 1962. The Swinton Journal published
articles on the Commonwealth by Richard Bailey and World Trade by
Robert Carr, arguing that the Commonwealth need not prevent membership
of the EEC and that Britain's influence in the world was more important
than sovereignty and depended on economic strength. (147)
	
Short
pamphlets aimed at CPC discussion groups included a special European
series on the Commonwealth, Agriculture, Sovereignty, Social Security
(148)
and European Political Unity.	 The discussion pamphlet on the
Commonwealth and the Common Market produced the largest number of
reports for some years. Throughout 1962 the CPC organised 1,300
meetings at schools, conferences and briefings, the main subject of
which was the Common Market, and the CPC had difficulty in responding
(149)to the demand for speakers on Europe.
	
The major emphasis of
CPC political education in 1962 was Europe.
The Publicity Department also produced literature aimed primarily
at the ordinary voter.	 They produced a series of 16 one-page
leaflets in Autumn 1962 called 'Common Market, Common Sense', for sale
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to Associations for door to door delivery. They also produced
literature based on important ministerial speeches and television
broadcasts, a short Question and Answer leaflet, a Progress Report,
and the views of Industrial Leaders. Undoubtedly their most
successful publication was Britain, Commonwealth and Europe by
Macmillan, published just before the Party Conference in October 1962.
The CCO produced the largest quantity and variety of literature
on one theme they had ever produced up to that time. This reflected
the fears of Party divisions, its perceived importance to electoral
success, and CCO commitment to that policy.
	 The need to campaign
was a continuous theme from the CRD.
The Organisation Department also monitored Party opinion.
	 A
major assessment of public opinion (usually interpreted as Party
opinion) was conducted by the Department through the Area Office
Agents in August 1962. (150)
	
They used their intelligence service
to monitor activity and feeling.
	
Macmillan even told local agents
at Llandudno, "You have great influence in the constituencies.
	 Make
sure that on this Market issue your local Party does not rock the
(151)boat".
	 The Department reported that Walker-Smith saw no
difficulties if his Association supported the Government, and it urged
the provision of speakers to the local CPC Conferences. (152)They
reported the success of the six special briefings held in September
1961 and on the local activities of the ACML. 	 Using their day-to-day
contact with the constituencies, the Organisation Department was able
to help provide the Party with information on constituency Party
feelings.
An entirely different role existed for the Overseas Bureau, which
began to be active in inter-Party relations, in response to the view
that "the Foreign Office favours special attention to the Continentals"
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and that the Christian Democratic Nouvelles Equipes Internationales
(NEI) was "a convenient, if at present inadequate, means of inter-
(153)party liaison among party-political friends".
	
The EUW held
its Assembly in London in July 1961, the ICCS held a Conference on
'One Europe' at Winchester in July 1962, the Party participated in a
preparatory Committee of the NEI with Nicholas Ridley, for the first
time made an effort to attract Continental guests to the Party
Conference, and the Young Conservatives attempted to join the
International Union of Young Christian Democrats. (154) 	 In September
1961 and 1962 study visits to Strasbourg were arranged for parliamentary
candidates, whose reports were highly pro-European. 	 The Study Group
in 1962 recommended "the pressing need for a fuller liaison with
comparable parties" on the Continent, and the Overseas Bureau
Chairman, Lady Emmett, requested a Committee on Links with Europe.
This met with opposition from R. Allan, Party Treasurer. 	 "Money is
given to us in order to get votes and win elections. 	 Evelyn Emmett's
efforts, admirable though they are, do not get a single vote for the
Tory Party at a general election".	 The Committee on Links was set
up on 10th December 1962 under Macleod, discussed papers on the role
of the groups in the European Assemblies by Ursula Branston and on the
NEI by R. Milne, and on the Party's Role After Brussels by Branston,
which argued there was a good case for the Party to present a European
image, but the Committee fizzled out without being formally disbanded,
meeting last on 4th March 1963. 	 However, the work of the Overseas
Bureau had changed in a significant way as formal inter-party links
were now encouraged by the Party leadership and the Bureau's response to
the breakdown was to urge the Party's full membership of the NEI. (155)
The CCO played a very important role in this period: by urging
the leadership to conduct a more positive campaign by monitoring the
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extent of anti-market feeling within the Party; by providing M.P.s
with arguments to respond to their constituents' questions; and by
providing basic information to Party workers. Much of the credit for
the limited opposition to the Government's policy in the Party must
go to the CCO.
The Informal Party 
A number of anti-market organisations were created soon after the
decision to apply.	 Keel, Britain Out was primarily free trade
Liberals, the Forward Britain Movement was mainly Labour and trade
unionists, while the Anti Common Market League (ACML) was
Conservative-oriented and the most active. 	 Other minor groups
existed such as 'The True Tories',under Major-General (Retired)
Richard Hilton, and the League of Empire Loyalists. 	 The only group
to which the Conservative Party gave considerable attention was the
ACML.
The ACML had its origins in a meeting held on June 26th 1962 by
Peter Walker, M.P., and former Young Conservative Chairman, of mainly
Young Conservatives interested in the Commonwealth. 	 It was followed
by further meetings on August 3rd and 15th, at which opinion was
divided on the nature of the organisation. 	 Walker was the spokesman
for the view that it should be a research and information organisation
designed to promote the Commonwealth and solely open to Conservatives,
while John Paul, a former Chairman of South Kensington Conservative
Association and a former parliamentary candidate, argued for opposition
on all grounds with no special emphasis on the Commonwealth, that it
should be a campaigning organisation, and that it should be willing to
fight the Conservative Party if necessary. (156)
The group supporting Paul's position decided to form the ACML with
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John Paul as Chairman, and YC's David Clarke and Michael Shay as
Treasurer and Secretary.	 The ACML declared itself "a Conservative
body dedicated to preventing the Government from plunging this country
into the EEC" and aimed "to influence public and parliamentary opinion
in every possible way to achieve a reversal of the disastrous decision
announced on August 2nd to negotiate British entry into the Common
Market". (157) Paul was the driving force, with his home as
headquarters and his wife, Diane, as secretary. 	 They were entirely
dependent on voluntary workers until May 1962 when they had a paid
secretary, and by January 1963 three paid staff. 	 Paul himself became
so involved with the campaign that he lost his position as research
director of Mobil Oil in Britain. 	 He reported that he was "offered
the choice of resigning or being sacked.	 It was put to me that my
anti-common market activities were incompatible with my position as a
director of an American-owned subsidiary". (158) There was some early
speculation that Mobil was funding the League, but the League had to
rely on individual donations, and was continually in debt.
	 The
appointment of Sir Jeffrey Reynolds as Treasurer eased the situation,
leading to substantial donations of £2,000 from Garfield Weston and
£250 from the Commonwealth Industries Association (CIA), but the_League was
never financially secure.	 The League recieved a special donation of
£35,000 for a Rally to the Commonwealth in September 1962. (159)
Considering their weak organisational basis, the ACML conducted
an impressive range of activities.	 They organised a large number of
meetings, starting with one at the Kensington Town Hall on 4th June
(160)1961, often attracting an audience of over 200.
	
Their main
speakers were M.P.s Walker-Smith, Turton, Fell and Biggs-Davison,
Lord Hinchingbrooke, Sir Arthur Bryant, the popular English historian,
who also contributed articles to the Illustrated London News and wrote
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(161)
an anti-market book.	 In 1962 they claimed to have organised
240 meetings, with 35 public, 35 educational, 34 Rotary and Business
Clubs, and 20 NFU meetings. (162) Some meetings were organised in
co-operation with the CIA and the Farming Express. 	 They advertised
in journals like the Rotarian offering to supply speakers. 	 One
meeting at the Central Hall Westminster attracted an audience of
2,000, and the South East Agent reported that their meetings were
well-attended. (163) They published and distributed a recruitment
leaflet, 1 million copies of a Common Market Quiz, 10,000 copies of
their pamphlet Britain not Europe, and 600,000 stickers 'Commonwealth not
Common Market'. (164) They also distributed the pamphlet, A Call to 
the Commonwealth by Peter Walker and Derek Walker-Smith which was
treated respectfully by 'Europeans' despite its attempt to present the
Commonwealth as a realistic alternative to the EEC. (165)Altogether
the ACML distributed around 2 million pieces of literature, which
almost matched the success of Central Office. (166) 	 It was active'
in promoting resolutions to Party Conferences and their leaders
contributed to several debates. 	 It actively supported independent
anti-market Conservative candidates in by-elections at Lincoln, Derby
North, Newcastle Central and, most notably, Dorset South, where they
claimed to have contributed 50 canvassers. (167) Membership was
advertised in the Times, Telegraph and Express.	 One advertisement
in the Express on 24th June 1962 attracted 735 replies. 	 By
the end of 1962 they claimed a membership of 30,000. (168)
The ACML made up in commitment what they lacked in numbers and
finance, and yet they failed to have the major impact that had been
predicted.	 The reasons are threefold.
	 Firstly, the leadership had
very limited political experience, except for Paul himself.
	 Most of
them were Young Conservatives, and the great bulk of the burden of
18(
running the organisation fell on Paul's shoulders. 	 While M.P.s were
active as speakers, they were not active as organisers and no M.P. was
on the Committee in this period.	 This was a deliberate decision to
(169)leave out M.P.s made in an early committee meeting. 	 They lacked
political experience, or as the CRD put it, they were individuals
(170)
without any big guns.	 Secondly, they became identified with
the lunatic right. Paul was quoted by the Spectator attacking
Merchant Bankers "who have only recently come to this country from the
Continent and cannot wait to get back" and describing Prince Philip
as "this German-born Prince" (which he later denied). 	 Hinchingbrooke
was quoted as referring to the city merchants' origins in Hamburg and
Frankfurt and saying that "those of us in Britain who oppose the
Common Market don't want to subject ourselves to a lot of frogs and
(171)huns."	 The xenophobic and hysterical tone of some ACML speeches
alienated those such as Peter Walker.
	
Thirdly, the ACML appeared to be
disloyal both to Macmillan as Party leader and the Conservative Party
as a whole.
	 While Walker-Smith and others sought to distinguish
between their principled opposition to the EEC and their support for
the Government and Macmillan as Prime Minister, the ACML attacked
Macmillan in quite personal terms.
	 From the very beginning the
League .threatened to run candidates against the official Conservative
Candidate.	 The Constitution adopted on 9th February 1962 authorised
the Committee to "select prospective parliamentary candidates where
desired to contest constituencies to fulfil the aims of the League and
(172)to take all possible action for the success of such candidates".
While the ACML itself never put up candidates in this period, it did
support unofficial anti-market candidates.	 The Conservative nature
of the organisation also became weakened.
	
Advertisements making a
direct appeal to Conservatives were dropped, membership was open to
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anyone and not just Conservatives, and their publicity material was
changed to broaden their appeal. "Initially the League was formed to
represent the views of dissatisfied Conservative voters. 	 Now,
however, a large proportion of the League's members no longer support
the Conservative Party as such". (173) This alienated many potential
supporters whose loyalty to the Conservative Party was more important
than their hostility to the Common Market. Thus the ACML failed
to provide a broad enough umbrella for anti-market feeling within the
Party.
The Monday Club was formed in 1961 as a right-wing ginger group
within the Conservative Party, but Europe was not one of the main
inspirations in its creation, and members, like the rest of the Right
were divided over the issue.	 O.K. Young, an active figure in the
Monday Club, saw the new Commonwealth as anti-European, sovereignty
as no guarantee of national survival, and a united Europe as an escape
from U.S. domination. 	 "Our good name has gone in Europe and we have
lost our power of independent action vis-a-vis the U.S., while the
Commonwealth has become a political liability rather than an asset". (174)
He urged that we swallow our pride and "after joining on whatever
terms the Six have been prepared to offer us to throw ourselves in
furthering its political and social aims". (175) These 'Europeans'
favoured Europe as a third force independent of the two super-powers
and based on a Europe of Nations. Hinchingbrooke, another prominent
Monday Clubber, was President of the ACML and represented a
substantial body of opposition. 	 At a vote in January 1963, there
was a majority against British membership, while the Club decided to
have no policy. 	 The significance of the Club at this time was that,
although it represented in many people's minds the sort of Conservative
who was anti-market, in fact it played no role in the inspiration of
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the formation of the Club and the Club's members themselves were
strongly divided.
The Bow Group by contrast was perceived as the forum for the
younger, more 'progressive' elements of the Party and was associated
with the pro-European cause.
	 Julian Critchley, a former Bow Group
Chairman, described the Group as convinced Europeans, although warned
that might not be to the policy's advantage because of its progressive
image. (176) This is not an entirely accurate depiction of the
Group, which included pro-European economic Liberals such as Russell
Lewis and Jock Bruce-Gardyne, and pro-Commonwealth 'progressives'
such as Sir Robin Williams, a former chairman.
	 The majority of the
Group leadership, however, were strongly pro-European. • An editorial
in their journal, Crossbow, endorsed membership, and another editorial
complained of the half-hearted nature of the Government. (177)Most
of the articles on Europe argued for membership on a wide variety of
grounds, and rebutted the case against membership, e.g. with a
detailed look at the impact on British law. (178) The Group also
published, under the aus pices of the CPC, the pamphlet, Britain in 
Europe.
	 The main theme of Bow Group
 writers during the negotiations
was to urge-a greater commitment to political and economic unity from
the Government.	 The importance of the association of the Bow Group
with Europe was that Groui) members represented the young, educated
middle class that were the electoral target of the next election, and
helped reinforce the feeling in the Party that entry was both
supported and in the interests of the young.
	 Contrary to Critchley's
fears, the Group played a reinforcing role in the intra-Party debate
on Europe.
The European Movement had established close relations with the
Government during the period when relations with Europe were a high
183
priority. Macmillan even instructed CCO to give the European
Movement a maximum of £30,000 on the argument of Lord Poole that
British entry would help the Conservative Party to win the next
election.	 Lord Aldington, Party Vice-Chairman, agreed to liaise
with the European Movement, but avoided any financial relationship.
Most unusually CCO provided names of local constituency officers who
might be willing to assist in setting up local European Movement
branches. (179) The European Movement, however, included elements
who were luke-warm towards membership, lacked flexibility in approach
and organisation, and was too close to the position of the Government.
Therefore, the Common Market Campaign was created in the summer of
1960 as a small all-party group aimed at informed opinion. (180)
The Directing Committee included Kirk as Secretary, and Martin
Maddan.	 The Campaign produced a Statement on Europe with 140
signatures, including a number of Conservative M.P.s and Conservative
opinion-formers. 
(181)
There was a separate Labour Common Market
Campaign so the Campaign concentrated on the Conservative Conferences
in 1961 and 1962, producing special Common Market Broadsheets.
	 The
impact of ihe European Movement and the Common Market Campaign was
limited but useful.
A brief mention should be made of the economic liberal Institute
of Economic Affairs, yet to have the major political influence of
more recent times, but important among economic liberals within the
Party.
	
Its position was that if membership increased free trade 	 then
it was welcome, but if not alternatives should be examined. 	 It
published The U.K., Commonwealth and Common Market by James Meade in
April 1962 which was lukewarmly in favour of membership, that Britain
"should join if liberal, outward, but not if a tight parochial
European bloc".
	 The pamphlet was well received as a thoughtful
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contribution to the debate but the Economist felt that it did not
recognise that outside Europe, Britain would be more protectionist. (182)
That same year the IEA published a second edition, which seemed even
more sceptical of the benefits of membership, which the Economist 
criticised as based on liberal nostalgia that a preferable alternative
(183)
could be found.	 The IEA pamphlet represented a scepticism
among some economic liberals, but nothing like outright opposition.
The FBI had been urgent proponents of EFTA, but were much more
cautious over the EEC. The FBI were internally very divided, with
mainly the larger industries in favour while the smaller industries
and trade associations were opposed. (184) The staff themselves
were opposed.	 The FBI were, therefore, unable to play a major role
in the discussions. 	 An early statement noted that any decision to
apply would be primarily political rather than economic. (185)On
15th July 1961, the FBI published a statement that "a large majority
of us are of the opinion that it is right not to become committed to
formal negotiations with the Six until existing differences over the
problems outlined above (i.e. in their aide memoire) have been so
far narrowed as to offer the prospect of a satisfactory conclusion". (186)
The Government applied for membership twelve days later.
Thus the FBI was not a primary factor in the Government's decision.
If the FBI had taken a firm position against membership, then the
Government's position would have been undermined, but no clear
position was possible. 	 However, when the negotiations failed, the
FBI were swift in placing an advertisement in the Financial Times 
(187)
saying that membership now had to be put behind it.
Other sources of information of industrial attitudes were more
positive.	 The Institute of Directors was in favour, with the
(188)
exception of the aged Chairman, Sir Edward Spears. 	 The Area
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Agents' assessments were that industry was largely in favour, with
some industries hostile due to particular circumstances. (189)A
Sunday Times poll of industrialists showed them strongly pro-European. (190)
(191)The Spectator reported that the City was firmly committed.
	
One
not unexpected source of industrial opposition was the Commonwealth
. Industries Association (CIA), based on political opposition over the
Commonwealth and sovereignty, which directed its attention towards
the Conservatives with 10 Conservative M.P.s on its executive council
and the distribution of leaflets to all Conservative M.P.s and
Constituency Associations. (192) However, broadly speaking, industry
played a supportive or neutral role during this period.
The protection of agriculture was a major issue in this period
and one of the conditions established by the Government for
participation in the EEC. 	 The monitoring of agricultural opinion was
constant.	 The NFU took an early position of suspicion towards
membership encouraged by a change in the NFU Presidency from a pro-
(193)to an anti-European.
	 The NFU was kept well informed on the
negotiations by the Government, while it actively sought to influence
M.P.s to ensure the Government's responsiveness to their concerns.
Numerous meetings were arranged with M.P.s and candidates in
agricultural constituencies.	 Butler and Sir Anthony Hurd acted as
spokesmen for agriculture in the Cabinet and the Parliamentary Party.
The NFU became increasingly hostile.
	 The journal, Farming Express,
came out against membership in April 1962, noted by the CRD,and
offered to organise meetings for the ACML. (194)	 Harmar Nicholls,
M.P. told the 1962 Conference that the NFU was against membership and
stated "We are the farmers' Party". The poor vote in rural
by-elections in winter 1962 increased the concern of agricultural
M.P.s.	 The NFU announced in late 1962 that unless the conditions
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were renegotiated, "the Union would have no alternative but to oppose
U.K. entry". (195)
The agricultural lobby was potentially the most serious source
of intra-party opposition. Why did it not have more influence over
the Government? Firstly, farmers were by no means united behind the
NFU's position.	 There were a number of farmers, especially in wheat
and barley, who would gain from the proposed C.A.P.
	 An opinion poll
in October 1961 showed 42% of farmers in favour with 39% against
membership.	 Agricultural opposition was no means monolithic.
Secondly, there was reason to believe that agriculture would be
stronger within the EEC considering the political strength of the
rural vote on the Continent compared to the U.K. 	 Thirdly, the Party
was well aware of the dangers and Peter Minoprio, at the CRD's
Argriculture Desk and a convinced European, was active in producing
information to calm the agriculture lobby. 	 He argued, in a
memorandum to Macleod, the case for the agricultural benefits of
membership, and those arguments were distributed in a series of Party
leaflets and pamphlets, and a special brief on "Questions Farmers
Ask". (196) Finally, the power of the agricultural lobby was much
exaggerated.	 Butler stated "that it wasn't so much that the Lobby
was powerful - because it's very small, isn't it - but I was powerful".
Self and Storing, in their study of the NFU, concluded that the
political importance of agriculture had been exaggerated and that it
was doubtful that its influence could have excluded Britain from
entry. (197) The Government was sensitive to the interests of
agriculture, but not convinced that the NFU correctly interpreted
those interests and sought to convince farmers that the Government's
interpretation was a better one.
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The Economist remained a vigorous supporter of membership, which
presented the intra-party debate as between the progressive left and
the reactionary right.	 They believed that Europe was a good political
move for the Conservatives but urged the necessity for a strong
campaign by the Government.	 They noted that "the truth is that
though the Conservative Party has genuinely accepted the idea of
European Union, the EEC has not had time to establish itself as an
(198)institution around which Tory emotions could constellate". 	 The
Economist provided an unswerving supporter of membership and a
proponent of the need for an active campaign.
. The Spectator was another firm support of entry, both in its
leader columns and in providing a forum for 'Europeans' such as Peter
Kirk, Lord Altrincham, Roy Jenkins, Anthony Hartley and Julian
Critchley.	 The leader column took a strong position for entry and
(199)
called for a "softening-up campaign ,, 	the Government.	 The
economic column by Nicholas Davenport presented the economic case for
membership and showed that there was considerable industrial and
financial support for membership. 	 There was plenty of critical
comment upon the anti-marketeers. (200) The Spectator urged a more
vigorous leadership, and even that the Government should take a lead
(201)
toward supranationalism.	 It took the view that only Europe
could provide an election win for the Conservatives, as the only issue
of sufficient size and significance to capture the imagination and
enthusiasm of the electorate, that would make "an appeal to the
country's imagination and a renewal of their own ideals". (202) 	 It
"could make the most successful - and rightly successful - appeal to
the electorate since the Labour Party in 1945, said simply that it was
time for a change". (203) The Spectator appeared as the voice of
progressive Toryism in favour of membership.
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(204)The Tory newspapers also remained in support of entry, 	 and
the Telegraph and the Times even produced special pamphlets on Europe,
presenting the EEC in a positive way.	 However, they also took a
strong line over the conditions, e.g. over Commonwealth temperate
(205)foodstuffs,	 and the Times even discussed the possibility that
the price of membership could be too high, (206)so their role was not
always helpful to the Government.
The 4.3 million circulation Express conducted a very strong
campaign against the EEC, under the personal direction of Lord
Beaverbrooke.	 He viewed the EEC as the political subjection of
Britain, and there was a strong anti-German and anti-American spirit
in the campaign.	 For a period the First and Second World Wars were
described as the First and Second German wars. 	 The Express argued
. in favour of Empire Free Trade, against the loss of sovereignty,
encouraged hostility towards foreigners, especially Germans, and
aroused fears over the standard of living.
	 It asked its readers,
"Do you want to be British? Or are you willing that you and your
(207)
children should belong to some British-French-German hotch-potch?".
The Express sought to demonstrate popular opposition, to act as a
mouthpiece for opponents and to influence the uncommitted.
The Express gave considerable, and almost wholely critical,
attention to the issue in its news and editorial columns.	 A
Fact-a-Day was printed with critical 'facts'. 	 Special leaflets were
produced, 'Questions and Answers on the Common Market' and 'You and the
Common Market', and a pamphlet by . Conservative M.P. Lord Lambton.
Advertisements were placed in other newspapers quoting prominent
opponents such as the industrialist Sir Jock Campbell, the historian
(208)Sir Arthur Bryant, Viscount Montgomery and Clement Attlee.
Publicity was given to the activities of the A.C.M.L.
	 A campaign
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(209)
was conducted to remove Macleod from the Party Chairmanship.
Beaverbrooke offered money and publicity to Eden if he would lead an
(210)
anti-European campaign, but Eden was in poor health. 	 He also
wrote to the South Norfolk Conservative Association offering a £1,000
contribution to "any good candidate" opposed to the Common Market in
(211)the by-election and made enquiries about North Somerset. 	 The
paper even threatened to oppose the Government at the next election. (212)
The Express played an important role as a rallying-point for
Conservative anti-marketeers, and the points that it made were
frequently raised in meetings and letters to M.P.s, especially its
demand for a new mandate either in an election or a referendum. 	 As
Windlesham noted, "no one likes to be alone with an unpopular opinion"
(213)
and the paper showed readers that they were not alone.
	
The Area
(214)
Agents reported the Express influence to be considerable, 	 and
opinion polls showed Express readers to be more anti-market than most
other newspapers. (215) The influence of the Express was significant
but should not be exaggerated. 	 Even after months of campaigning a
Gallup poll in early 1962 found that Express readers were 45% in
(216)favour of entry, 29% against with 26% don't knows.
	
The tone of
its campaign was strident and xenophobic and "the leading protagonists
of the cause do their best to dissociate it from the strident efforts
of Lord Beaverbrooke and his standard-bearers, Lords Montgomery and
(217)
Lambton".	 Furthermore, according to Macmillan, the paper came
(218)to fear that it might be boring its readers.	 The Express 
campaign was of concern to the Government and the Party but it never
caught the popular imagination as Beaverbrooke hoped and the
Government feared.
The attitude of the electorate was highly volatile during the
negotiations but usually favourable.	 Windlesham argued that the
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Government believed that the positive attitudes of most opinion-leaders
would eventually influence the views of opinion-holders.
	 The
Government's conditions were a response to specific interests rather
than the demands of public opinion.
	 "There is nothing to suggest
that the three main British reservations.. .were imposed by public
opinion....From July 1961 to January 1963 the role of public opinion
was no more than a residual check on any extravagant extensions of
(219)pro-Common Market policy".
	 Opinion polls charted the
fluctuations reflecting the state of negotiations.
Support was relatively stable while opposition was more volatile,
always with substantial numbers undecided.
	 Supporters tended to
provide general statements of support while opponents had very specific
concerns (the Commonwealth, unemployment, prices). (220)Attitudes
to the Government influenced attitudes on Europe as Conservatives were
more favourable, while opposition tended to rise with the unpopularity
of the Government. Support for membership was strongly influenced by
partisan support for the Conservative Government, while the Government
hoped that a pro-European position would improve attitudes towards the
Government.
Naturally the Government was concerned about the state of public
opinion, especially with regard to its effect on an election.
	 Macleod
produced a memorandum on public opinion for the Cabinet on 18th
(221)September 1962.
	 "He reported that the country was evenly
divided and that opinion on Europe was volatile, with swings of up to
10% occurring within a month or two".
	 The floating opinion was, on
balance, against "though this could easily be reversed...the country's
head was convinced, but its heart was not.
	 He thought that there was
a real need for an idealistic approach; that the support of the young
and of the opinion formers was the key and that the issue should be
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presented 'with trumpets', as the next great adventure in our
country's history.. .he argued strongly for an unequivocal lead by the
Government and by individual Members of Parliament". 	 The Cabinet
accepted this interpretation and believed that a Government campaign
after negotiations were completed would successfully turn people in
favour and result in electoral gains, so public opinion was not a
major constraint.
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the role of Harold Macmillan in
Britain's application to the European Community, while significant,
has been exaggerated.	 The opposition to that policy has been
over-estimated.	 Within the Cabinet there were many supporters, while
the sceptics never felt strongly enough to resign or attempt to lead
an intra-party opposition. 	 The parliamentary party was overwhelmingly
in favour, drawing support from all sections of opinion among M.P.s,
while the anti-marketeers failed to secure prominent backbench
leadership and became associated, if unfairly, with hostility to
Macmillan's leadership and extreme right-wing opinions. 	 The often
predicted revolt, in 1846 style, never occurred.
The Conference debates revealed even greater support than the
leadership expected, as indicated in the decision to reject Walker-Smith's
amendment in the 1962 Conference. 	 This is not to under-estimate
widespread concerns among constituency activists, but these concerns
were not translated into any principled opposition to membership.
Once the government and the party had clearly expressed the case for
membership, many of those concerns were calmed.
Central Office provided a significant role in a number of respects.
The CRD specialists provided intellectual support for the economic
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and political advantages of membership, and urged the need for a more
positive campaign to present those advantages to the Party and the
electorate.
	 Their belief that membership would provide great
electoral advantage to the Conservatives and support other aspects of
the electoral strategy influenced Macleod, the Party Chairman,
reinforced Macmillan's instincts and helped to strengthen pro-European
feeling and undermine opposition within the Cabinet and the parliamentary
party.
	 M.P.s were kept well informed by CRD publications, which
provided them with the means to answer constituents' queries.
The monitoring of anti-market opinion informed party leaders and
strategists both that anti-market feeling among certain groups was
exaggerated (the parliamentary party, the right, industry, agriculture)
and that the anti-market propaganda was influential on a significant
body of opinion but that opinion could easily be swayed by a vigorous
campaign.
	 The provision of basic information to constituency
associations helped theirnatural inclinations to support party policy.
To Central Office must be given considerable credit for translating
party sympathies and concerns into positive endorsement.
The Anti-Common Market League conducted a remarkable campaign
but due to the weaknesses identified earlier they failed to have any
significant impact upon government and party policy.
	 The Monday Club
was divided and the Bow Group was largely enthusiastic.
	 The economic
interest groups, such as the FBI and the NFU, expressed their concerns
but never exercised any veto power over government policy.
	 The
press and weekly journals were nearly all supportive except for the
somewhat hysterical Daily Express.
Electoral consequences are always of considerable significance
. to a rational-efficient party like the Conservatives.
	 Opinion polls
revealed considerable fluctuations, but party strategists predicted
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that successful negotiations would result in a major swing of opinion
towards entry. The polls also revealed that target groups, such as
the new middle classes and the young, were especially pro-European.
The evidence suggests that, had negotiations been successfully
concluded, there would have been no major intra-party opposition to
membership. Macmillan's cautious approach may have been useful in
handling the Cabinet and the parliamentary party but it may also have
failed to adequately convey to the Party and the electorate the case
for British membership, and thus the anti-marketeers made a greater
impact than otherwise would have been the case. 	 Even then,
Conservative support was firm and widespread. 	 Macmillan's decision
to apply for membership was a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of
Conservative support.	 There were many other factors, previously
under-estimated, which made the Conservative Party the Party to
decide to join Europe.
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Background 
The breakdown of the negotiations in January 1963 was a major
shock to Macmillan and the Conservatives, destroying both what
Macmillan had hoped would be his crowning glory, and what Party
strategists had seen as one of their best electoral assets. 	 By the
end of the year Macmillan had retired, and on 11th November 1963,
Lord Home surrendered his peerage to become Sir Alec Douglas-Home,
Prime Minister , and Party Leader.	 Despite a remarkable come-back
during the election by the Conservatives, Labour won the general
election on 15th October 1964, when the mention of Europe in the
Conservative Manifesto was "perfunctory". (1)
In early 1965 Conservative interest in Europe began to be renewed,
especially among 'Tory Gaullists'.	 They were interested in stronger
Anglo-French relations, especially when the Luxembourg compromise
had shown France to be a forceful opponent of supranationalism within
the EEC.
	
De Gaulle's concept of a 'Europe des Etats' was more
attractive to them than federalism.
	
This support contributed to the
election of Edward Heath as Leader on 2nd August 1965 rather than
Reginald Maudling.
	
The Labour Government was operating on a slim
majority, and so at a favourable opportunity, i.e. on 31st March 1966,
went to the country. 	 Membership of the EEC was one of the main
Conservative themes of the election campaign, during which Labour
Leader, Harold Wilson, attacked Heath for being too eager to enter.
Upon the re-election of the Labour Government, however, Wilson
concluded that membership was necessary, and he announced on 10th
November 1966 that the question of membership would be explored anew
with the Six.	 On 2nd May 1967 the Labour Government made the second
application, with Conservative endorsement, supported in the Commons
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by 488 votes to 62, with 26 Tory, 36 Labour and 2 others voting in the
No lobby. The second application received the same fate as the
first, a French veto.	 With the resignation of De Gaulle and an
expressed willingness by all Six governments to negotiate, the Labour
Government made the third application in December 1969, but before
the application had proceeded very far, the Labour Government was
removed from office by the election on 18th June 1970, whereupon
the Conservatives pursued vigorously the negotiations, as discussed
in the next chapter.
These years were marked by three elections, two changes in
government, three Party leaders and two applications for membership
of the Community. 	 Europe was an ever present issue, without being
at the forefront of British public debate.
The Leader 
The French veto was a bitter blow to Macmillan, who never
recovered from the destruction of his main electoral campaign theme
and what he perceived as the main legacy of his statesmanship.
Macmillan wrote
"in a moment of something like despairI recorded:
All our policies at home and abroad are in ruins.
Our defence plans have been radically changed
from air to sea.	 European unity is no more;
French domination of Europe is the new and
alarming feature; our popularity as'a Government
is rapidly declining.	 We have lost everything
except our courage and determination" (2)
His biographer, Anthony Sampson, reported that "Macmillan was dispirited,
tired and bewildered".	 During a visit to Rome, "he suddenly burst out,
with an emotion which astonished the Italians, to say he was not
interested in these details, that he only wanted to make one thing
clear - that for him the events of the past week had been a complete
. disaster, and he did not know what to do next". (3) As the Observer 
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commented, "Instead of seeming a far-sighted statesman, he suddenly
(4)
seemed a gambler who had miscalculated the odds". 	 Macmillan was
battered by defeat, scandal and illness, which led to his resignation
by the end of the year. 	 Europe played an important role in
destroying the image of Supermac, and in undermining public confidence
• in his leadership.
After a bitter public fight, Home emerged as the new Leader and
Prime Minister on 11th November 1963. (5) Home shared the general
disappointment over the veto, but he decided that membership was not
a possibility in the short term and Europe played no role in the
Conservative election campaign of 1964 when less than two years before
it was to have been the centrepiece.
	 The manifesto simply stated
that problems could best be solved in a partnership between America
and a united Europe, that there was no possibility of negotiations to
enter the EEC and that the Conservatives would work with EFTA, the
Council of Europe and the WEU, " for the closest possible relations
with the Six consistent with our Commonwealth ties". (6)Home
described membership, in a BBC interview, as a "dead duck". (7)He
was criticised by the 'Europeans' for this approach.	 The Economist 
accused the Conservatives of cowardice in having rebuffed their most
imaginative initiative.	 Home displayed little interest, yet in 1962
he had given "one of the most forceful and basic of all speeches on
the political reasons". (8)
In early 1965 renewed interest in Europe encouraged Home to
reaffirm the Party's commitment to the EEC in a speech to the Young
Conservatives on 13th February 1965.	 "If.. .the Europe of the future
will be one of the great installations of power - economic, military,
and political - then Britain must not shirk her role of helping to
shape its destiny". (9) Some Conservatives were beginning to
envisage a nuclear relationship between France and Britain, as a means
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of entry into the EEC, with Britain's nuclear relationship with the
USA seen as an important source of French hostility. (10)Home's
position was that an initiative would be premature at least for the
next couple of years, but that it remained a long term objective of
the Conservatives to develop closer relations with Europe.
With constant criticism of his style of leadership, Home decided
to resign and an election was held for the leadership under the new
rules by which the Parliamentary Party elected the Leader. 	 Heath
defeated his main opponent, Maudling, on 27th July 1965, by 150 votes
to Maudling's 133 and 15 for Powell.	 Heath attributed his victory
(11)in part to his identification with the European cause.
	 Camps
argued more cautiously that "the fact that Mr. Heath was chosen leader
of the Conservative Party in preference to Mr. Maudling showed that
his known sympathies for 'joining Europe' were no liability, and
probably an asset". 
(12)
The Spectator believed that "perhaps in
the end (Europe) was decisive", because Maudling was viewed as not a
passionate'European% (3)	 Heath's election as leader should not be
seen as a vote on Europe, but a vote for a policy of change rather
than caution, the desire to present the Conservatives as a reforming
party of progressive change to compete with Labour.
	
Vigorous
support for Europe was one of the policies which made Heath appear as
the more radical of the two main contenders. 	 No-one, therefore,
should have been surprised that Heath placed Europe high on his list
of priorities.	 Soon after his election, in September 1965, the Party
produced Putting Britain Right Ahead, which made a clear commitment
to eventual membership.
"In maintaining peace, in seeking disarmament, in
promoting economic development, in safeguarding
and expanding our commerce, in building up our
strength to exert political influence in the
world, we can best achieve our objectives in a
wider grouping.
It was on these grounds that Britain sought
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suitable conditions for membership of the EEC - a
prospect unwelcome to the Labour Party. 	 It is
on these grounds that when the present difficulties
and uncertainties in Europe are resolved, we
believe it would be right to tackle the first
favourable opportunity to join the Community and to
assist those who wish, in the Commonwealth and in
EFTA, to seek closer association with it. 	 Until
this becomes possible, a future Conservative
Government will co-operate with other European
countries in joint policies in the common
interest". (14)
In the 1966 election Heath made Europe the second of the five
main themes of the campaign, partly because it was an issue which
divided Labour, was endorsed by most of the press, and was supported
by those target voters who took a position. 	 The manifesto stated:
"Work energetically for entry into the European .
Common Market at the first favourable opportunity.
Prepare for entry by relating the development of
our policies to those of the Common Market,
whenever appropriate.	 Encourage co-operation
with other European countries in joint projects
which need not await our membership of the
Common Market: particularly where large-scale
scientific and technological resources are
called for". (15)
Heath spoke frequently on Europe during the campaign, attacked the
Labour Government's unwillingness to make the changes necessary to
enable British entry, and stated that it had "always been known that
Mx. Wilson has been anti-European".	 Wilson responded with a
description of Heath ."rolling around on his back like a spaniel at
any kind gesture from the French" and reiterated two conditions of
membership: full independence in respect of foreign and defence
policies, and the right to buy food in the cheapest markets. (16)
These conditions were viewed by the Conservatives as incompatible with
the Treaty of Rome.
Heath's commitment to Europe was clear, but what was the nature
of that commitment? He saw Europe as a new centre of power within
the Atlantic Alliance, based on economic union first, followed by
defence and foreign policies. 	 His vision was a confederalist rather
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than a federalist one.	 "In my judgement the unity of Europe will
in the end be achieved by European Governments forming the habits of
working together". (17)He was perceived as a quasi-Gaullist, as
his speeches reflected an anti-American and pro-French bias. (18)
In the Commons debate on 17th November 1966, he said:
"What Europe is about is the redressing of the
balance on the two sides of the Atlantic -
redressing the balance in trade, finance, defence
and in political influence. 	 What they ask
themselves is: Is Britain prepared to be a member
of the Community which is deliberately setting out
to do that, and to accept the changes in its own
relationship which are involved? That is the
question which they are asking and it is the
question to which the country has to give an
answer.	 That is the reason I believe in a
European policy, because it is desirable and it .
is for the good of the Western World as a whole
that Europe should be developed, should be
strengthened, should be more prosperous, and
should be a counter-balance to the other side of
the Atlantic.	 This cannot happen at once.	 But
Europe is thinking in those terms and, unless we
show that we are thinking in those terms, we shall
not be acceptable to the Europe which is
developing today". (19)
France was the main object of his strategy. 	 On 27th November
1965 he went to Paris to convince the French of the Conservative
commitment. (20) His response to France's departure from the
military wing of NATO was compliant.	 "What is required at the moment
is not to go around...condemning De Gaulle and the French" but to
"get down to the fundamental problems of working out the structure of
(21)NATO".	 He strongly attacked Government attempts to improve
relations with the Five, e.g. through the WEU. (22) "We would be
wrong to isolate France by creating new institutions without her.
Even if it were to succeed which I doubt, such a policy would only
repeat in different form, the same errors from which Britain has
suffered these last five years. 	 A Europe without France in the long
run makes as little sense as a Europe without Britain". (23)
One idea that Heath promoted was Anglo-French co-operation over
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nuclear weapons, that "the British and French nuclear forces should
be pooled to form a joint deterrent which would be held in trust
(24)for Europe".
	
In an interview in the Sunday Times Heath
repeated his two-pillars concept of the Atlantic Alliance, and the
concept of joint Franco-British weapons held in trust for the other
countries of the EEC if they wished. (25) This idea was not
developed in any great detail but was designed to strengthen the
impression that Britain was closer to De Gaulle's concept of Europe
than France might think, and served to demonstrate Britain's
willingness to establish her independence from the USA.
Heath ordered a detailed consideration of Conservative policies
that should be implemented upon gaining office. 	 Douglas litrd of the
CRD told Heath, "This is the first serious attempt by a political
party in Britain (?the world) to prepare itself not simply for winning
the election but for the real business of government". (26)A vast
array of committees met to consider and propose a large number of
reforms, and in Heath's eyes many of the reforms proposed would ease
membership of the EEC. (27) There was to be a shift from direct to
indirect taxation and the introduction of Value Added Tax, which was
a part of the Community's taxes, in place of Purchase Tax.
	
Agricultural
support was to be changed towards import levies and import protection
as in the Common Agricultural Policy.
	 Trade Union legislation was
to be reformed along Continental lines to allow competitive efficiency
to be achieved.	 Social services were to be moved towards selective
benefits and a greater insurance element.
When Labour applied for membership in 1967, this caused some
embarrassment to Heath, as Europe was one of the main themes for his
argument about the Great Divide between Conservative and Labour. (28)
Heath welcomed the Government's decision whilst expressing scepticism
as to its sincerity and the handicap of Labour's hostile record.
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Privately he was convinced that the application would fail and was
faced with the problem of how to support the application while
criticising the Government's methods.	 He made his position clear in a
speech at Harrogate that the Government should accept the Treaty of
Rome, negotiate transitional arrangements and seek areas of
(29)
co-operation outside the Treaty.
	
James Douglas of the CRD
recognised that if there were no criticisms of the conduct of the
negotiations, it would be difficult to blame the Government after
they failed.	 He recommended Heath to send a secret memorandum
acknowledging the pressure to criticise the negotiations but stating
that nothing should be done to prejudice a successful outcome. 	 The
memorandum could then be released after the failure. 	 Heath, however,
rejected this idea. (30) Hurd recommended that support should be
restrained and cautious but the criticism should come after the
breakdown.
After the second veto in December 1967 when the Labour Government
left the application on the table, Heath re-emphasised the need for
Anglo-French nuclear entente and to seek co-operation outside the
framework of the Treaties. 	 While membership remained the ultimate
objective, Heath pursued the search for alternative forms of
co-operation, in particular over defence.	 However, this did not
receive widespread support in the Party. 	 Hurd, in a memorandum to
Brendan Sewill, noted that "In putting forward these ideas he is well
ahead of opinion in the Party and in the Press, and I think that most
people have been advising him not to develop the theme any further. (31)
Thus the idea was not presented in any concrete form.
With evidence of increased hostility to Europe in opinion polls
and the Party, together with the ever-present fear of another failure,
Heath's position on Europe in the 1970 election was rather more
cautious than in 1966, or indeed in 1967.
	 The manifesto, while noting
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the long term advantages of membership, said "obviously there is a
price we would not be prepared to pay". 	 Only after negotiations will
we know if the price is fair.	 "Our sole commitment is to negotiate,
no more, no less".	 The Government would then report to Parliament
and the country, and listen to their constituents. (32) The tone was
hopeful but not enthusiastic.
The Nuffield election study reported that "all party leaders...
took a common line - in essence, 'we must look at the terms but we
should go in if the terms are right". (33) Heath emphasised more
than previously the importance of the terms than the need to
demonstrate Britain's commitment, which had been a frequent theme of
his in the years before the election. 	 Europe was not one of the
major themes of the campaign, in contrast to 1966. 	 A widely
distributed leaflet on Ten Reasons for Voting Conservative did not
mention the EEC.	 Thus by 1970 the Conservatives, including Heath,
did not see Europe as an election winner, and there was a deliberate
decision to play it down as an issue.
There can be no doubt that Heath kept the EEC as "the vital core
(34)
of Conservative strategy".	 What may be disputed is that Europe
was central because Heath was leader.	 There is evidence, considered
in this chapter, that Heath's position, while genuine, also reflected
attitudes widely found within the Conservative Party. 	 "Tory
Gaullism" was a widespread phenomenon in the Party in this period.
The Economist noted the existence of anti-American feelings within
the Party, among the right and businessmen afraid of U.S. competition,
so that the Tory Party is "palliated by their belief that going into
Europe will be, politically and industrially, an anti-American
action". (35) Policies on the reform of taxation, agriculture, trade
unions and social services emerged from the study groups without any
central guidance and conscious demand for coherence. 	 When Heath
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favoured, an option outside the consensus with the Party, over
Anglo-French nuclear entente, it remained a personal idea and not
Party policy.	 When public and Party opinion was seen as less
favourable to membership, Party policy became more cautious.
	 In
summary, Heath's European policy was not one simply imposed upon the
Party as his personal views.
The Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet 
After the veto, the Cabinet shared the view of both Macmillan
and Home that no new initiative should be made in the short term and
acquiesced in the brief reference to Europe in the 1964 manifesto.
In early 1965 Sandys and Heath made statements together with Home on
(36)
the importance of European Unity,
	 and there was clear recognition
that some form of political and defence union would be a necessary
element in that objective, including the possibility of Anglo-French
nuclear weapons.
	 After Heath's election, Europe played a central
role in Conservative policy, but this appears not to have caused any
great opposition within the Shadow Cabinet.
	 The conflicts that did
exist were not about the principle of membership but concerning its
importance in the Conservative profile in opposition, and the tactical
means of obtaining entry.
	 As part of the major programme of policy
development, the committee on foreign policy was set up, including
Sandys and Soames, one of whose concerns was to develop a clear
(37)
European policy.
	 In this period the emphasis shifted from the
economic advantages of membership to the political advantages and
especially the increased influence in the world it would provide
Britain.
	 This was significant in a decade when Britain became more
strongly aware of her decline as a world power.
Sandys was an advocate of a European nuclear force, although
he emphasised that it should be within the Atlantic Alliance. (38)
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Heath adopted this policy with some enthusiasm but it never achieved
widespread support within the Shadow Cabinet. 	 Home, the Shadow
Foreign Secretary, defended an independent nuclear deterrent, and
there is no evidence in his speeches, despite his frequent references
to the need to strengthen defence against the Soviet Union, that he
seriously considered an Anglo-French deterrent as a useful
contribution to that end. (39) Thelack of Shadow Cabinet support
prevented the adoption of that policy.
The issue that had provided the source of greatest difficulty
over Europe within Macmillan's Cabinet, agriculture, did not create
similar concern in the Shadow Cabinet. 	 Shadow spokesmen on
agriculture, first Soames and then Joseph Godber, were convinced
of the need to change the system of agricultural support due to its
heavy cost to the taxpayer, and an obvious alternative was that of
import duties as in the C.A.P.	 They argued the case for the change
on the basis of its merits, with the additional and valued bonus
that such a policy would make it easier to obtain membership.
	 Soon
after his appointment to Agriculture in 1960 Soames "decided then
that we were going to have to change our agricultural support policy
(40)
anyway, because we couldn't afford to go on".
	 In March 1966,
Soames argued that farmers ignored the positive benefits of the C.A.P.
and that farmers could join the Common Market "eagerly and with
confidence". (41) Godber, who succeeded Soames in 1966, was another
(42)
advocate of the benefits of the C.A.P. to farmers. 	 There
appears to have been no difficulty in gaining Shadow Cabinet support
for the new policy of import duties.
The Shadow Cabinet agreed to support the Labour Government's
application in 1967 and endorsed a three line Whip in the Commons
debate.
	 However, with the second veto, some members of the Shadow
Cabinet urged the consideration of alternatives to membership.
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(43)These included Maudling, Hogg and Lord Balniel.
	 Maudling in
particular expressed concern that the price of preventing another
veto would be at the expense of relations with the U.S.A. (44) 	 In
December 1967, the Shadow Cabinet considered a paper on the
alternatives prepared by Gordon Pears of the CRD, but no alternative
presented itself as sufficiently attractive to substitute for the
pursuit of membership. (45)
	
Thus, despite the expression of some
concern, no alternative policy was found satisfactory by the Shadow.
Cabinet.
This is an appropriate point to discuss the role of Enoch Powell.
As Minister of Health he had supported the bid for membership under
Macmillan.	 He emerged as the major critic of the Commonwealth, and
of Britain's defence role of East Suez, and a proponent of Britain
as a European military power.
	 In a series of articles in the Times 
in 1964, published under the pseudonym, 'A Conservative', he
described the Commonwealth as "a gigantic farce", felt that it
prevented "closer commercial relations with western Europe" and
argued that Western European defence rather than NATO would provide
"the possibility of independent action". (46) T.E. Utley argued
that Heath's appointment of Powell as Shadow Minister of Defence was
designed to carry out "one of the most crucial and pressing of
missions - the destruction of the Imperial Legend which was so
(47)important a part in the mythology of the Conservative Party".
Powell believed that "Britain's essential interest is to equip herself
to make a massive contribution to the defence of Western Europe in a
conventional war". (48)At the 1965 conference he said that "the
U.K. is a European Power" which required a European alliance and the
abandonment of a presence East of Suez.
	 This speech was only
(49)
approved by Home after several changes.
	
In a Times article,
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he attacked 'The Myth of the Commonwealth', and in his speeches
called for Britain's defence to concentrate on Western Europe. (50)
Thus Powell was a strong supporter of a European orientation in
Conservative policy.
On 20th April 1968 Powell made his famous 'rivers of blood'
speech on immigration and race relations which led to his dismissal
from the Shadow Cabinet and caused the expression of considerable
public support for him. 	 Powell emerged as a significant figure
within the Conservative Party.	 Roth claims that Powell was
approached by anti-marketeers as a speaker soon after his
dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet, but in fact the ACM, discussed
that possibility and concluded that "this was extremely' unlikely
as he seemed to have a deepseated dislike of the Commonwealth". (51)
Powell had become more sceptical about the EEC as the argument
shifted from the economic advantages, to which he was sympathetic,
to political union, to which he was opposed. 	 On 29th March 1969, he
gave his first public speech in opposition to membership. 	 He said,
"I am a European.. .1 supported Macmillan on balance.. .1 had doubts
in 1966.. .but now I feel the EEC has failed". (52)
	
He emerged as
the spokesman for the anti-marketeers in the Party which they had
lacked for so long.	 It was to considerable surprise that Powell
spoke on the economy rather than Europe at the 1969 Conference, but
that fear contributed to the Shadow Cabinet's decision to be more
cautious at that Conference.
	 At the 1970 election, his own election
address proclaimed, 	 "The Conservative Party is not yet committed to
Britain entering the Common Market.	 I shall do my utmost to make
sure that we never do", and he urged that all candidates should make
their position on Europe clear. (53)A clear distinction must be
made between Powell's role in Heath's Shadow Cabinet, which was
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broadly a supportive one, and that as a backbench dissident, when he
decided on grounds of parliamentary sovereignty to oppose membership.
Thus within the Shadow Cabinet there was no substantial
opposition to the policy of seeking membership, although some felt
that too much emphasis had been placed upon it during many of the
years in opposition.
Parliamentary Party 
There were few recriminations in the Parliamentary Party after
the 1963 veto as it was accepted the Government had done its best,
(54)
and "the Tory Party always closes ranks in adversity". 	 The
'Europeans', however, were concerned at the lack of a stronger
commitment.	 The Parliamentary Advisory Committee urged stronger
contacts with the Continent to enable future membership, and an
information campaign of which the essential purpose was to tell
people the basic facts of life on which "the Foreign Secretary has
to operate outside the Common Market" and preparations for a future
(55)
application.	 This committee was suspended in May 1963 until
Europe was again an active issue politically.
Kirk warned, in 1964, that another approach would not occur soon,
but that the discussion was shifting from an economic to a
(56)	
neo-
political one.	 Julian Critchley proposed a motion in the
summer of 1964 on a multi-lateral nuclear force as a bridge to Europe,
which received 15 signatures from the younger pro-Europeans, (57)
while Thorneycroft and Amery indicated support for a deal with France
over nuclear weapons. (58) All this represented concern that the
European issue should not be neglected. 	 In April 1965 the One
Nation group of M.P.s produced a pamphlet, One Europe, published by
CPC and edited by Nicholas Ridley. 	 This pamphlet argued that the
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first essential was to change those parts of British life in conflict
with continental conditions, followed by the need to demonstrate
enthusiasm.	 The pamphlet was signed by 18 M.P.s and was felt also
to reflect the views of those Group members in the Shadow Cabinet. (59)
With the commitment expressed in Putting Britain Right Ahead, the
'European' M.P.s were more satisfied with the Party's position.
	 A
number of Conservative M.P.s were active in the European Movement.
In 1966, 22 Conservative M.P.s sat on the Executive Committee of the
Movement, and in the late 1960's several M.P.s were mentioned by the
Movement for their active support - Christopher Chataway, Harry Hynd,
Robert Matthew, Geoffrey Rippon, Sandys, Julian Amery, Maurice
(60)Macmillan, Tufton Beamish and David Howell.
The anti-marketeers obtained only a very short term benefit from
the veto when they obtained 50 signatures for a motion calling for
(61)the strengthening of Commonwealth trade.
	 In 1965, however,
Conservative support for integration was stronger, so that in November
1965, 6 anti-marketeers claimed that they were not opposed to
membership in principle but only to rigid conditions in the Treaty of
(62)Rome.
	 Ronald Butt attributed the decline of the Conservative
anti-marketeers to the need for the greater protection of agriculture,
the decline of support for the Commonwealth, the demonstrated
independence of France within the EEC and thus evidence of the weakness
of the federalist aspects of the EEC. (63)
The vote on the 1967 application saw only 26 Conservative anti-
marketeers, despite the fact that the application was by a Labour
Government and without the stronger appeal of loyalty to a Conservative
Government decision.	 The Conservatives adopted a three line Whip
although they knew that would be defied by as many as 30 Conservative
M.P.s.	 In the Commons debate of 8-10th May 1967, Turton proposed an
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amendment regretting the application, but his supporters were the
familiar faithfuls such as Sir Ronald Russell, Ronald Bell and
Walker-Smith.	 The amendment was defeated by 487 to 62, with 26
(64)
"entirely right-wing Conservatives".	 Thus they failed to
broaden their base within the Parliamentary Party.
With the second veto, the anti-marketeers had another opportunity
with the promotion of the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) as
an alternative, and the appearance of Powell as a potential leader.
Apart from himself and his ally, John Biff en, he added no additional
supporters to the anti-market group.	 Biffen's position on Europe
was close to Powell's, that membership had made some sense in 1962
but that the EEC had since developed in the wrong direction towards
supranationalism and managed markets. (65) Their addition may have
added much to the intellectual quality of the anti-marketeers, but
little to their numbers and it further strengthened their image as a
narrowly right-wing group opposed to the leadership.
Among M.P.s support for Europe was steady.
	 In 1964 only 11% of
Conservative candidates mentioned Europe in their manifestos in line
with the low priority given by the leadership.
	 In 1966, 50% of
(66)
candidates mentioned Europe.
	 The discussion was largely
conducted in three forums: the Foreign Affairs Committee which was
concerned with general decisions and provided an opportunity to sound
out non-specialist opinion; the Committee on Europe (Policy Research)
which was concerned with details and tactics and involved more
specialists M.P.s; and the Co-ordinating Committee on Europe designed
to co-ordinate activity in Parliament and to keep the Shadow Cabinet
informed of parliamentary opinion. (67)
The Policy Committee of the Foreign Affairs Committee was one of
20 Policy Study Groups formed as part of Heath's policy-making exercise.
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This committee formed a sub-committee on Britain and Europe. (68)
Paul Williams, an anti-marketeer, demanded to know why there was not
also a Commonwealth group. (69) This sub-committee considered a
number of broad topics. 	 The debate on federalism was between those
who rejected federalism outright, (Peter Thomas, Paul Williams) and
those who argued that no specific position need be adopted (Norman
St. John Stevas, Beamish, Douglas Dodds-Parker). 	 Jock Bruce-Gardyne
argued that a commitment to the aim of political union was essential,
while Eldon Griffiths felt this was an issue for the future. 	 Bruce-
Gardyne also argued for Anglo-French nuclear co-operation and the
abandonment of a special relationship with the U.S.A., while St. John
Stevas and Thomas were sceptical of this approach. 	 The committee saw
the way forward through the promotion of co-operation in particular
fields such as agriculture, space and nuclear energy.
	 The Committee
finally adopted a paper, based on one produced by Sir Anthony Meyer
and Eldon Griffiths, which saw three main arguments in favour of
membership (economic, technological, political), urged a new
Conservative Government to review its application, and while recognising
that this was "a fundamental, not to say, a radical decision", the
British people would support it.
	
This paper was included in the final
report of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
The Committee on Europe (Policy Research) was formed in May 1966,
at Heath's request, under the chairmanship of Lord Balniel. 	 It was
made up of 20 M.P.s and 1 or 2 CRD members, and its "main function
has been studying various aspects of British entry to the Common
(70)
Market and producing papers on them". 	 This committee allocated
the study of particular areas between its members.
	
It decided to
form a tactics committee, independent of the front bench, led by
Sandys and Ridley, but it only lasted for four months. 	 A large
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number of papers were considered by the committee. 	 It was decided
that the Sterling Area was not really a problem, that for Meyer's
proposal of a European Technological Community "the time was not yet
ripe to put forward this idea as final Party policy", and that the
Party should attack the incompetence of the Labour Government's
application, disassociating itself from the execution but not the
intention of the policy. 	 Biffen argued that there was "a significant
amount of latent anti-Europeanism in the Party which would come out
into the open if we appeared too enthusiastically pro-European",
while Ridley feared that another failure would boost Tory anti-
European feeling.
The Committee therefore considered a paper by Gordon Pears of
the CRD on Other Ways Into Europe, if early entry was not an
available option. (71) Pears argued the need to avoid a policy
vacuum if the application was rejected and to avoid the accusation
that the Party was so tied to the Common Market that it could think
of no other way to advance Britain's interests.
	
The paper rejected
non-European alternatives because "Anything that runs the risk of
taking us away from Europe must be rejected, anything that could
take us close to Europe is worth considering". 	 Association under
article 238 deserved further study; an association between EFTA and
the EEC would be very complicated; the removal of non-tariff barriers
within EFTA would only provide very limited gains; the Western
European Union could be used to promote a European defence policy;
and ad hoc co-operation in specific fields could be encouraged. 	 The
paper concluded that the case for the EEC was the case for a united
Europe.
	
If the EEC was not available, then other means to achieve
the same objective should be examined. 	 This paper was adopted by
the committee.
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The reaction to the second veto was a search for other approaches.
Ridley argued that "you can make Europe without France", but Biffen
argued against this special dialogue with the Five, and against a
technological or defence community.	 He wanted the harmonisation of
legislation to enable a real European market. 	 Bruce-Gardyne and
Biggs-Davison argued for greater co-operation with France; a
Commonwealth and Europe Group argued for association under Article
238 as part of "an irrevocable commitment at the end of a specific
period", and Peter Blaker presented a paper on NAFTA as "an acceptable
alternative" but this was rejected by Biffen and Biggs-Davison. 	 In
summary, no coherent alternative emerged amongst the confused response.
In December 1967, Home appointed Richard Wood to as chairman
"to examine the present situation and recommend Party policy for the
period during which entry into the Common Market could be expected to
be denied us", to consider co-operation with the EEC, NAFTA, the
Commonwealth and EFTA.
	 The committee was to study the evidence and
pass judgements, but it also failed to find an alternative.
	 The
Committee on Europe (Policy Research) reflected the attitude among
M.P.s in its support for membership and a lack of an alternative
strategy.
The Common Market Co-ordinating Committee allocated
responsibilities between its members with chairman Balniel with general
responsibility, Anthony Buck for legal and constitutional affairs,
Patrick Jenkin for trade, taxation and sterling, Paul Dean for social
policy and Jim Prior for agriculture.	 The terms of reference were
not to seek detailed solutions, but to identify the issues and
become informed about them. 	 The Committee was to inform the Shadow
Cabinet, examine domestic legislation for their European implications,
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consider the possibilities for harmonisation, react to the
negotiations and prepare Parliamentary questions, Ten Minute Bills
and Adjournment Debates. 	 In practice this committee was not active
but it did develop well-informed individual M.P.s
These committees provided much opportunity for M.P.s to
discuss and develop their ideas on Europe, and reinforced the view
that membership was a necessity.	 However, the committees also
reflected a widespread feeling that the policy research programme
was not well considered and contributed little to the development of
Party policy, except as a reflection of backbench feeling to the
front bench.
(72)
The second veto created widespread unease. 	 M.P.s who
were not considered anti-marketeers believed that Britain would have
to adjust to life outside the EEC (Rippon, John Boyd-Carpenter,
Edward du Cann). (73) There existed the possibility of an
alternative in NAFTA. 	 In the summer of 1967 an all-party motion
received 100 signatures for a feasibility study on NAFTA. 	 Neil
Marten, M.P., wrote a paper on NAFTA and wanted it published by CPC,
but that was vetoed by Heath. (74)On 23rd January 1968, the Foreign
Affairs Committee listened to Sir Maurice Wright, Chairman of the
Atlantic Trade Study Group, who argued that NAFTA could eventually
include the EEC and that the U.S.A. would support the idea if Britain
favoured it.
	
Gordon Pears wrote that "NAFTA is a non-starter, but
there are quite a few people in the Parliamentary Party who still
(75)
want to pursue the idea".
	
Sir William Gorell-Barnes, the
influential Chairman of the Conservative Agriculture Committee,
favoured the idea.
	 Support for the idea disappeared when there was
no indication of interest from the U.S.A., but it represented a sign
of despair amongst M.P.s that membership would become a genuine
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possibility.	 This feeling of malaise continued until the 1970
election and influenced Heath and the Shadow Cabinet to adopt a more
(76)
cautious position, reflected in his speech in Paris. 	 The 1970
Commons debate on the application demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm
with the familiar arguments expressed by the familiar spokesmen,
Sandys and Walker-Smith. (77)An article in the Spectator speculated
that Powell would emerge as the leader of a powerful, politically
dangerous anti-European policy. (78)
	
The 'Europeans' were
disappointed at the lack of leadership on Europe and with Heath's
Gaullism, and Kirk rebuked Heath so sharply that Heath refused to
talk to him for six months, according to Roth. (79) Eldon Griffiths,
with Gordon Pears, organised an unofficial group of 'Europeans', but
this was greeted with hostility by Heath and the group decided to
proceed very catuiously to avoid antagonising the leadership. (80)
David Howell, M.P., felt that "the pro-European section of the Party
(81)is crumbling before our eyes". 	 The feeling among M.P.s in the
late 1960's was not one of hostility to the EEC but a scepticism that
membership was likely and the fear that too much of the Conservative
case depended on the idea of membership.
National Union 
At the 1963 Conference, the motions expressed regret at the
failure and hoped for eventual membership. (82)No debate was held
on Europe, but the Commonwealth debate suggested that the Commonwealth
was not seen as an alternative and in the Foreign Affairs debate most
speakers urged continuing interest in Europe. (83) There was no
conference in 1964 because of the expectation of an election.
In 1965, with a re-awakening of interest in Europe, 24 resolutions
were submitted supporting membership and there were no anti-European
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resolutions. (84)
	
The agricultural motion supported a move from
deficiency payments to import duties, and Godber insisted that they
"stand on their own as a coherent programme" and not just to enable
entry.	 The external affairs debate was on a three circles motion
and the proposers expressed their support for Europe, but an amendment
based on Putting Britain Right Ahead, and more explicitly 'European',
was proposed by Peter Fry and Peter Thomas. All the speakers placed
Europe as the first circle.	 The amendment was carried by an
overwhelming majority and the final motion unanimously. (85)The
Economist asked "Where now are the Commonwealth men who fought against
the European Common Market to the last ditch? Gone, one must record,
quite gone". (86) This was the first conference since the war without
a Commonwealth or Empire debate, and the defence debate was dominated
by Powell's assertion that Britain was now a European power. 	 As one
speaker said in the debate, the Tory party has returned to a strong
and full-blooded commitment to the Unity of Europe.
At the next Conference in 1966, 12 resolutions submitted were
pro-European, mainly emphasising the economic benefits with no anti
motions.	 10 resolutions on defence supported a presence East of Suez
but several emphasised that this was not in conflict with Europe.
Only 1 of the agricultural resolutions was opposed to import
controls. (87)
The agricultural debate again reaffirmed support for the new
policy of import duties. The motion on external affairs urged a
reappraisal of policy to give proper priority to a united Europe
equal to the U.S., proposed by Sir Anthony Meyer.	 Support was
expressed by most speakers for a whole-hearted commitment, several
mentioned Meyer's European Technological Community, but opposition
to the motion was expressed by David Lane because there was no
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mention of the Commonwealth although he supported European unity.
Home ended with a re-statement of the political reasons for European
unity.
"Britain and Europe today are forfeiting priceless
advantages in the accumulation of wealth, which
is the basis of all security, and in political
authority and influence by allowing EFTA and the
EEC to continue to be separate. 	 A unified
Europe would strengthen the economy of every
partner; it would make the defence budgets of
every country much less onerous; it would give...
scope for technical advantage, and industrial
co-operation on a hugely increased scale, a scale
sufficient to make the Continent of Europe an
equal partner with the U.S. and the Soviet Union".
The motion was adopted unanimously. 	 In the debate Jim Spicer said
that the Party was no longer divided on Europe. (88)
The 1967 Conference, however, was held in a different atmosphere
after the second veto. The resolutions were more mixed; 10 urged
the continued search for membership (3 asking for changes in domestic
policies); 3 had specific conditions on New Zealand, agriculture
and education; 2 supported NAFTA; and 2 wanted a search for
alternatives.	 The agricultural resolutions supported the new policy
as the removal of a major obstacle to membership. (89)
The motion for debate called for greater European unity. 	 Three
critical amendments were proposed, one by Fred Hardman of TUNAC, and
Gordon Pears advised Home that no amendment be called, but if so call
the most anti-European and defeat it. (90)
	
Home called no amendments.
The debate was almost consistently in favour of European unity even if
membership was not an immediate option.	 The motion was adopted
unanimously.
There was a concerted attempt by anti-marketeers to have a
debate on NAFTA at the 1968 conference. 	 12 pro-NAFTA resolutions
were submitted, proposed by traditional anti-marketeers like
(91)Walker-Smith, Roger Moate and Harmar Nicholls.	 No debate was
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held on the Common Market or NAFTA. According to the Spectator poll
of delegates, this caused some dissatisfaction as 14% wanted a debate,
the second highest issue after immigration. (92) Thus Conference
reflected the interest in an alternative found among M.P.s
The 1969 Conference took on a particular significance just before
an expected election in 1970.
	 The submitted resolutions reflected a
strong surge of opposition:
For:	 6
Against unless conditions:	 3 - Sterling 1
Agriculture 1
Monarchy/Commonwealth/
Agriculture/Cost of Living 1
Against:	 2
Withdraw Application:	 2
NAFTA:	 2
Alternatives:	 3
English-Speaking union: 	 2
Doubts:	 2
Referendum:	 3
More information: 	 4
Even the agricultural resolutions, which had been largely
favourable in earlier conferences, had 5 with reservations with 9 in
(93)favour of the new system.	 The Economist felt that opposition
now came from more moderate elements in the Party, and Powell had
now emerged as "the most natural leader of the emotional right-wing"
providing a grave new challenge. 	 The leadership, therefore,
approached the Conference with a more cautious endorsement of
(94)Europe.
The motion for debate stated that Conference was convinced of
the influence for good of Britain in world affairs, and that joining
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the EEC would be a major contribution to the security and prosperity
of Britain.	 The proposer, Eldon Griffiths, emphasised Britain's
influence through Europe, but noted that the price could be too high.
The opposition included Walker-Smith with his traditional concerns,
and Neil Marten, who stated that a vote against the motion was not
against Heath's leadership.	 To some surprise, Powell did not speak
in this debate.	 Support for the motion came from Sandys and two
enthusiastic speeches from Young Conservatives David Atkinson and
Eric Chalker noting the support of the young. 	 Home's response to
the debate was a deliberately cautious one, noting that no final
decision would be made before the negotiations had finished, and
without close consultation.	 The only decision was to negotiate. (95)
On the show of hands, the Chairman declared the motion carried by a
very large majority but Walker-Smith insisted on a ballot. 	 After
much confusion, as ballots are unusual at Conservative Conferences,
the result was declared accompanied by much applause and cheers.
It was 1,452 votes to 475. (96) The verdict was a more decisive
one than the leadership had expected.
The Spectator poll of delegates showed that they felt that the
Common Market debate was the best of the Conference, partly because
it was the first not dominated by the leadership. No one thought
the Common Market should be a major election issue, even though 73%
of the delegates polled were pro-European, and only 19% against with
(97)6% don't know.	 Heath ended the Conference on a more positive
note, with Europe as a major theme and a promise that the facts would
be put before the public. 	 Heath emerged with his leadership more
firmly established but concerned not to increase intra-party
(98)divisions before the election.
Other evidence of constituency feelings suggests the pattern of
"Ca
increased support in 1965, with more concern after the second veto.
Europe was never debated in this period at Central Council, but in
1967 it endorsed the movement to agricultural import levies. The
CPC discussion groups in 1965 came out strongly for membership with
an emphasis on the advantages of a large market. 	 Agricultural
opposition was in deep decline, while some fears still continued to
exist.	 Support was for a confederal structure and against direct
elections to the European Parliament.
	
There was little support for
an Atlantic Community and some anti-American feeling. 	 The report
ended with a demand for more information. (99) The NUEC also
received several resolutions welcoming the pursuit of entry by the
(100)leadership.	 In summer 1967 CPC discussed two briefs on
co-operation with Europe. Home, in his reply, saw three main points
in the reports: the demand for more information; the need to prepare
for entry; and the need to join, with the groups emphasising the
economic over the political advantages. 	 On another brief on Britain's
role in the world, constituency opinion was against a European nuclear
force. (101)	 In 1967 the NUEC received motions expressing
reservations, one from the South East region and adopted unanimously
said that "in view of public controversy, the Conservative Party should
now re-issue an up-to-date summary of the advantages and disadvantages
of joining the EEC", while another urged no commitment to join without
a referendum.	 Opposition even began to appear to the new
agricultural policy. (102)	 In February 1970 in a CPC discussion on
food and agriculture, 145 discussants were against the new policy
(103)
while 282 were in favour.
The Young Conservatives took a consistent and enthusiastic
position in favour of Europe despite the difficulties.
	
At their
February 1963 Conference, 14 resolutions were enthusiastically for a
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united Europe with only 3 against. 	 The motion, "realising that the
breakdown of negotiations presents a challenge to Europe, the Atlantic
Alliance and the free world as a whole, urges H.M. Government to do
all in its power further to develop co-operation in all fields", was
adopted by an overwhelming majority of the 1,400 delegates. (104)
Home used the opportunity of his speech to the Young Conservatives'
Conference on 15th February 1965 to reassert Conservative support for
Europe, as did Heath in his 1966 speech, when he committed the
Conservatives to join at the first favourable opportunity. (105)
	
The
Young Conservatives' National Advisory Committee supported withdrawal
from East of Suez in September 1966, and a European orientation in
(106)defence.	 The Greater London Young Conservatives (GLYC)
emerged at this time as an active 'progressive' force within the
Young Conservatives and the Party.	 At the 1966 Party Conference,
Eric Chalker GLYC Chairman, attacked the Commonwealth and claimed that
Young Conservatives were desperate for European Unity. At the GLYC
Conference in March 1967, Paul-Henri Spaak was the guest speaker and
his speech was published by CPC. (107) Gordon Pears attended the
(108)
Conference for the CRD and reported a majority of 4 to 1 in favour.
In June 1967, the Young Conservatives held a joint weekend with
Conservative Students on Europe at Swinton College; and Europe was a
major theme of their Action '67 campaign. 	 At the 1969 Party
Conference the platform called two Young Conservatives to speak on
Europe.
	
David Atkinson argued that the youth vote depended on Europe,
and Eric Chalker reported that a Party survey had found that 73% of
young people in Britain felt that they had more in common with other
young people than older people in Britain.	 The Young Conservatives
were also active in the Conservative youth international, the
Conservative and Christian Democrat Youth Community (COCDYC).
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Throughout this period the Young Conservatives were consistent and
enthusiastic champions of the European cause, and used by the
leadership in identification with that policy.
The Federation of University Conservative Associations, which
became the Federation of Conservative Students (FCS) in April 1967,
were also strong a supporter. In 1963 they submitted a resolution to
the Party Conference on the danger of Europe as a third force without
Britain, and so the need for maximum political, economic and military
links with Europe.	 The Party paid for them to organise a conference
for the International Conservative and Christian Democrat Students (ICCS)
in July 1963.	 In 1965, their annual Conference adopted, by an
overwhelming majority, the motion that "the Conservative Party should
make all possible efforts to see that Britain joins the Common Market
as quickly as possible" and submitted it to the Party Conference.
	
In
1967 the theme of their discussion groups, for which the CRD prepared
a special pamphlet, was Britain's Relations with Europe; they
participated in the Campaign for aluropean Political Community; and
Spencer Batiste, representing FCS, spoke at the Party Conference for
Europe.	 FCS was also active in ICCS, with Ian Taylor as Chairman in
(109)1969.	 FCS was another reliable source of youth support.
The women were less interested in Europe.
	
Their reaction to the
first veto was to congratulate Heath on his negotiating performance,
and urge the protection of British and Commonwealth interests. 	 In
1965 the 2,500'women's Conference endorsed Home's statement and urged
the opposition "to put before the people the advantages to be gained
by such co-operation" by a large majority. (110) The women shared the
same sense of unease in the late 1960s. 	 Kate Macmillan, the Vice-
Chairman for Women, and wife of Maurice Macmillan, wrote a calming
letter in November 1969 when she admitted that there was much confusion
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in the branches, rebutted the sovereignty argument and reassured
that "All the Conservative Party is committed to do is to start
negotiations if a favourable opportunity arises". (111)
The women thus reflected attitudes throughout the Party with the
exception of the consistently pro-European stance of the youth
sections: support for European co-operation in 1965, endorsement of
Heath's strong position in 1966, agreement to support the 1967 Labour
application but considerable disillusion after the second veto, and
an uneasy and fruitless search for an alternative.
	 This uneasiness
within the Party influenced the softer approach of the Party leadership
by the end of the decade.
Central Office 
The CRD was bitterly disappointed with the French veto in 1963,
both for short term electoral considerations and long term foreign
policy objectives.	 One senior official stated:
"Europe was to be our deus ex machina; it was to
create a new contemporary political argument
with insular Socialism; dish the Liberals by
stealing their clothes; give us something new
after 12-13 years; act as a catalyst of
modernisation; give us a new place in the
international sun. 	 It was Macmillan's ace,
and de Gaulle trumped it. 	 The Conservatives
never really recovered". (112)
The CRD emphasised that there was no easy alternative and that
the long term implications of the veto were very bad. (113)Ursula
Branston, in a paper on The Party's Role After Brussels, argued that
there was a good case for the Party to present a European image, (114)
but the CRD accepted the position of the leadership that membership
was not a practical option in the existing circumstances. (115)
The CRD naturally welcomed the emphasis on policy-making under
Heath and were actively involved in the policy study groups. 	 The
1
Economist saw the CRD as "the most influential" of the different grUs..'
influencing the Party in a liberal direction, (116) and their work
gave them a close relationship with Heath.	 Brandon Sewill, the new
Director, proposed that efficiency and Europe should be the main
themes, which eventually were merged to become the theme of the 1966
(117)
manifesto.	 Sewill was concerned that the Labour Party would
pinch Conservative policies, "for example Europe", (118) and so the
CRD emphasised the lack of trustworthiness and commitment to Europe
of Wilson and the Labour Party as evidenced by the import surcharges,
the cancellation of the European Launcher Development Organisation
(ELDO), and the lack of support for Concorde. (119)
Gordon Pears, at the European desk, was a passionate 'European'.
In a memorandum to Sewell on 26th April 1966, he urged the need for
proselytising on Europe, not policy-making, "with the aim of
consolidating a large and growing body of informed support within the
Party....We should recognise that while there is widespread acceptance
within the Party for our current policy on Europe, there are as yet
comparatively few informed and committed enthusiasts for it...
(support) needs developing until it is proof against shocks of any
kind".	 He urged the creation of a Foreign Affairs Forum, Parliamentary
European co-operation, greater participation in the European Movement,
better representation at European Assemblies, and a European Section
at the CRD. (120) Pears was the secretary, and wrote a number of
briefs, for the Common Market Co-ordinating Committee, the Committee
on Europe (Policy Research) and the European Policy Group of the
Foreign Affairs Committee. 	 Sewill told Pears on 1st June 1966 that
one of the jobs of the Committee on Europe (Policy Research) was to
mark antis.	 "You as a member of the CRD must have nothing to do
with activities against - or even attempting to influence - other
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members of the Conservative Party. The Research Department must
serve the Party as a whole and never get involved in arguments
between different sections of the Party - even when these involve
(121)
official Party policy".	 In this work he was assisted by
other European enthusiasts, Guy Hadley and Douglas Hurd. 	 One of
Pears' continual complaints was the lack of information to the
constituencies.
•	 Sewill's fears came to fruition with the Labour application and
the CRD tried to criticise Labour for the suddenness of their
conversion and their lack of preparations, without damaging the
application, (122) especially as they shared Heath's view that the
application would fail.	 Heath met with Pears, Hadley and Hurd on
20th December 1966 and 5th June 1967 to discuss European policy. 	 At
the December 1966 meeting it was agreed that a veto was likely.
Heath restated the basic policy: to accept the Treaty, to make
transitional arrangements and to discuss other issues outside the
Treaty.
	
He supported Anglo- French defence co-operation but not a
European defence community, rejected the idea of a European
Technological Community and asked Hadley to examine legislation for
their European implications.
	 Hurd recommended that Heath emphasise
the long-term nature of the European policy which required
preparation at home and would not be affected by any veto, a position
adopted by Heath.	 "It sounds obvious but it is a point which an
amazing number of people particularly in the Party do not grasp". (123)
In a memo from Douglas to Heath on the tactics if/when the
engotiations fail, he wanted criticism on the grounds that a divided
Labour government made a full commitment difficult but this was
vetoed by Heath (presumably because he feared it would undermine the
application), so he recommended that Heath write a secret memorandum
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to the Shadow Cabinet, CCO and CRD acknowledging the pressure to
criticise the negotiations but nothing should be done to prejudice
them. This memorandum could then be leaked when they failed. 	 A
memorandum was prepared by Hurd and Pears but Heath rejected the
(124)idea.	 Hurd's recommendation was that a second veto should
be treated as "a temporary setback" and Heath's support should be
tempered and cautious but critical afterwards. (125) Pears urged
that Heath speak on Europe at the Party Conference or it would imply
lukewarm support, but he must establish a boundary between support
and criticism of the Government. (126)
After the veto CRD advice was generally to study the alternatives
to the EEC to pacify dissatisfaction and to demonstrate their
inadequacies.	 Pears warned that Conservative support was already
subject to considerable strain in the country and the Parliamentary
Party, so tactically alternatives should be examined, the leadership
should mute its support and discussions should be conducted to
(127)
strengthen Conservative commitment.	 Sewill, in April 1967, had
requested Hadley to prepare a study of alternatives even if to say
(128)
there is no alternative.	 Sewill suggested to Heath that he
should make a striking initiative in the European nuclear approach. (129)
There was much confusion as to the correct response to the second veto.
Pears was highly concerned about the Party's response.
	
In
private correspondence with David Howell, he described the Wood
Committee as "One can say that it is expected to be as pro-European
as official Party policy is at the moment.	 And who can say how much
that is... .The leadership seems very unlikely to do anything whatever
over the next few months to stimulate pro-European feeling in the
Party so those individuals who feel this to be necessary - as I do
(130)
and as I am sure you do - will have to do it".
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Their fears were justified.	 The Party took a much more cautious
position, with little reference to Europe in the mid-term manifesto of
October 1968, Make Life Better, a commitment only to negotiate,
statements that entry would occur only after full debate and even,
according to Ramsden, the consideration of the inclusion of a
reference to a referendum or a free vote in the 1970 manifesto.
	 "It
was also decided, late in the day, to stick to the original commitment
to leave a decision on the Common Market to Parliament, rather than
throwing in the idea of a referendum, on the argument that Parliament
would not act directly against public opinion on such a vital issue:
the question whether or not to allow a free vote was considered and
deferred". (131)
The CRD were deeply involved in policy-making in the Heath
opposition, and they were unanimously in favour of membership - Sewill
the Director, Pears, Hadley and Hurd on international affairs, Tim
Boswell on agriculture and Brian Griffiths on economics.
The CPC published a series of pamphlets and organised many
activities on Europe throughout this period. 	 The CPC participated in
the re-emergence of interest in Europe in 1965 with the publication of
two pamphlets.	 One Europe was produced by the One Nation group of
M.P.s, edited by Nicholas Ridley and signed by all the group members
except those in the Shadow Cabinet. (132) The pamphlet argued the
economic, defence and political cases, urged that the first essential
was to alter those parts of British life in conflict with continental
conditions, and the need for an enthusaistic approach.
	
The One Nation
Group was no longer as influential as in the immediate post-war period
and was now primarily a dining club, but it did express support from
the backbenches.	 Later in 1965 the CPC published A Europe of Nations 
by the Cambridge University Monday Club. 	 Meyer's ideas
 of a European
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Technological Community was promoted in a 1966 pamphlet. The case
for the introduction of the Value Added Tax both on its merits and
to ease future membership was argued by Stephen Sherbourne of the CRD.
Most unusually it published a speech by a non-Briton and a socialist,
Paul-Henri Spaak, to the Greater London Young Conservatives, while
Europe and Technology by Manfred Macioti, and Europe and the Law, by
the Society of Conservative Lawyers dealt with specific areas. Eldon
Griffiths, M.P., and Michael Niblock of the CRD tried to promote
Anglo-French nuclear entente in an early 1970 pamphlet. (173)
' Europe was a major theme of CPC activity in 1967-68. 	 It was
the theme of the regular Oxford Summer School in 1967, an important
feature of three discussion group topics, and a visit to NATO and the
EEC was organised in Spring 1968. 	 The master briefs introducing the
discussion groups were written by Ben Paterson, CPC Deputy Director,
and later Member of the European Parliament. (134) Thechange in
agricultural policy was the subject of several CPC publications and
discussion groups, but while it was mentioned that the new system would
make membership easier the virtues of the system itself were
emphasised. (135)	 TheCPC thus fulfilled a role of promoting
information and discussion on Europe and floated ideas to gauge Party
reaction without any official commitment, such as the European
Technological Community, and Anglo-French Nuclear Entente. 	 Swinton
Conservative College also contributed to political education with the
publication of several articles and the organisation of several
conferences on Europe. (136)
The Overseas Bureau was uncertain how to respond to the 1963 veto.
The Committee on Links fizzled out without . being formally disbanded,
and the Bureau repeated its position that there was no question of
alliances with parties in other countries, with no favourite parties. (137)
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With the election of Heath as Leader, there was a greater emphasis on
inter-party relations and a greater willingness to seek a formal
relationship.	 In November 1965, the NEI, with whom the Conservatives
were loosely associated, became the European Union of Christian
Democrats (UECD) which prompted discussion of forming their own
organisation. Heath himself went to Rome to urge Conservative
membership of the UEDC, and in a letter hoped for a favourable
decision within the next few weeks, but membership was obstructed by
the opposition of the Italian and Dutch Christian Democrats. (138)
In 1966 the Bureau agreed to give urgent attention to multilateral
links with like-minded Continental parties and Heath gave his support
to the idea of an alternative organisation with the CDU and
Scandinavian Conservatives. (139)	 In 1967, the first Conservative
and Christian Democrat conference was held at Kalsruhe under the
auspices of the CDU and against the strong opposition of the Italian
.Christian Democrats (DCI).	 The Conservative position was that the
"missing friends" would be drawn into any organisation by
demonstrating its success, so regular meetings were held known as the
Inter-Party Meetings. 	 The importance of these relations led to the
translation of the Party publication, Make Life Better, into French
and German.	 The Bureau continued to organise visits to Strasbourg
for prospective parliamentary candidates which increased the strength
of their support.	 An example was the report of the group in October
1966 which urged the need to include European integration in Party
publicity. (140)
There were also several organisations associated with the Bureau.
The Conservative Commonwealth and Overseas Council was primarily
interested in Commonwealth affairs but it set up a Commonwealth and
European Group under Sir William Gorell Barnes, which could have
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emerged as a focus of anti-market feeling. The Group produced five
detailed papers on agriculture, institutions, social policy, economics
and Britain's economic policy. 	 With the second veto, the Group set
up an alternatives sub-committee which heard evidence in December
1967 from Sir Michael Wright, Chairman of the Atlantic Study Committee,
the main proponent of NAFTA. 	 The idea of Association status was
promoted but only as part of the transition period with an
"irrevocable commitment at the end of a specified period (5 years?)"
The Alternatives sub-committee under J. Harvey rejected NAFTA because
it would divide the free world.	 In May 1968, the Council organised
a conference on Commonwealth-Common Market Alternatives, which however
found no satisfactory alternative to the European Community. (141)
Thus the most Commonwealth-oriented element in the Party did not
oppose Britain's entry, even after the second veto.
Another body was the Foreign Affairs Forum designed to encourage
the discussion of foreign affairs in the Party especially among
parliamentary candidates. 	 According to Gordon Pears there had been
opposition to the creation of the Forum as foreign affairs spokesmen
feared that their relative freedom of action would be constrained by
rank and file discussion.	 He felt that "it tends to attract anti-
Europeans" but with Meyer as Chairman it did not act as an anti-
European force. (142)
Thus CCO was strongly committed to the European policy and
through publications, briefs, conferences and informal contacts promoted
the view that membership was the only realistic policy option.
The Informal Party 
The Bow Group had been strongly identified with Europe, and so
the publication of an anti-European pamphlet soon after the first
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veto caused considerable interest and claims of intellectual
somersaults.	 It had been decided by only 21 votes to 17 that it
(143)
should be published.	 No Tame or Minor Role was written by
anti-European Bow Groupers led by Leonard Beaton, Timothy Raison and
Sir Robin Williams, which argued the case for the Commonwealth as
the centre of Britain's international relations and against European
Community membership. (144) Raison in his 1964 Penguin special
(145)Why Conservative? saw Europe as only the third of the three circles.
This, however, was a reflection of the pluralism within the Bow
Group rather than any change in the attitude of most Bow Groupers,
evidenced in the critical review of the pamphlet published in the
Bow Group magazine. (146) TheGroup published in December 1965 a
pamphlet placing Europe at the centre of Britain's role in the world,
and rejecting the Commonwealth as too large and complex to provide
sufficient cohesion.	 The method of joining was to be a declaration
of interest accepting political unity, the pre-membership alignment
of policies and a Technological Association. 	 It was highly critical
of the Gaullist ideas then current in the Party and urged support for
the Atlantic Nuclear Force.
	 This pamphlet, edited by Leon Brittan,
was more representative of feeling in the Bow Group. (147)
Crossbow continued to provide a forum for Conservatives critical
of the anti-marketeers, of the lack of enthusiasm within the Party,
of Tory Gaullism and in support of a clear commitment to a defence
and technological role in Europe and political union. (148)Laurence
Reed, a prominent Bow Grouper, actively promoted the idea of European
(149)
Technology, in a book and a Bow Group pamphlet.
	 During the
height of Conservative scepticism during this period and a weaker
commitment by the leadership, the Bow Group published in February 1970
a pamphlet emphasising the long-term case for membership, implicitly
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critical of the emphasis on the terms that the leadership was then
making. (150)	 It was one of the best-selling pamphlets of the Bow
Group since its foundation.
Throughout this period the Bow Group leadership was firmly
pro-European, on political and defence grounds as much if not more
than economic ones, and all the chairmen were in favour of entry.
The editor of Crossbow was always a 'European' except for Simon
Jenkins.	 The Group provided substantial intellectual and political
support for that policy.
The Monday Club was a strong critic of Heath's leadership but on
Europe never provided an effective challenge, because many of its
leaders were convinced 'Europeans': Julian Amery, Duncan Sandys,
John Biggs-Davison and Geoffrey Rippon. The anti-marketeers were
probably stronger among the rank and file membership but their only
leaders were Victor Montagu, the former . Viscount Hinchingbrooke, and
Teddy Taylor.	 The Monday Club 'Europeans' were supporters of De
Gaulle's concept of Europe des patries. 	 The Cambridge University
Monday Club published A Europe of Nations explicitly confederalist,
anti-American and in favour of Anglo-French nuclear entente. 	 Stephen
Hastings M.P. saw the need to choose between the three circles,
rejected the USA as a loss of independence and the Commonwealth as
weak and against British interests, and saw Europe as a potentially
mighty state. Amery urged an Anglo-French concord in the Daily 
Telegraph, while Biggs-Davison noted that both Britain and France
rejected federalism.	 George Pole, an active Monday Club member,
believed that with States in a wider federation, the freedom of the
individual might be more secure. 	 The 'Europeans' in the Club were
intellectually and politically dominant even if not in terms of
numbers. (151)
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There was anti-market activity within the Club but it was
handicapped by a lack of an alternative. 	 After the second veto a
sub-committee on alternatives was created by Patrick Wall as Chairman
of the External Affairs Committee and a proponent of Atlantic Union.
The Study Group on NAFTA, however, was keen to emphasise that it was
merely a feasibility study implying no commitment. The NAFTA
approach received little support because it conflicted with a
widespread feeling within the Monday Club that the USA was not to be
trusted.	 The division of opinion within the Club was expressed in
a pamphlet in which Meyer and Montagu discussed the virtues and evils
of the European Community, and in a lively meeting where no majority
view emerged.	 The Executive took the view that the Club should
have no policy on membership.	 The 'Europeans' were dissatisfied
with several aspects of the European Community and through a Group
on British-European Relations under Biggs-Davison sought to find
additional means of co-operation, but ultimately they recognised
that European co-operation required membership and were optimistic
about changing the European Community from within in alliance with
the French.	 Thus the Monday Club, a major source of opposition to
the leadership generally, did not provide opposition on Europe. (152)
The Society of Conservative Lawyers (formerly the Inns of
Court Conservative Society) was another informal Conservative body
which examined the issue of Europe, with particular reference to the
legal implications of membership. 	 Their Common Market Committee,
under Lionel Heald, was set up in 1967 and carried out a series of
detailed studies of twelve specific areas of the implications of
membership.
	 Some of the best of them were published by the CPC as
Europe and the Law.	 The significance of their work was that it
undermined the legal opposition to the European Community which was
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so important to Walker-Smith and Turton.
The Anti-Common Market League was unsure how to respond to the
first veto.	 Options considered were the formation of a new political
party, a merger with other organisations such as Leo Russell's
Commonwealth Association, and a change of name. 	 It was decided to
keep the League in existence as the issue was expected to come to
(153)the fore after the general election.	 The ACML supported three
independent candidates in the 1964 election but they received less
than 3% of the vote. Paul was keen that Heath should be opposed.
"Heath must be unseated, otherwise there was a very real danger of
his being selected as a future leader of the Conservative Party",
but he acknowledged that "the last effort had clearly established
that independents at general elections were a waste of time and
effort". (154)By 1964 it declared that "The League is non-Party"
(155)
although "it began by catering primarily for Conservatives".
The League continued at a very low level of activity, although
there was an attempt to revive it with a petition and the creation of
a Petition Council of prominent anti-marketeers.
	 The Council took
a long time to be formed because of the difficulty of obtaining the
membership of a prominent member of the Labour Party. While the
petition eventually attracted 764,107 signatures, this was over a
(156)period of 5 years and it was not formally submitted until May 1972.
The League rarely met during this period and never again played the
central role as the focus of Conservative anti-market feeling that
it had played in 1962.
The best hope for the anti-marketeers after the second veto was
the ability to present an alternative, the North Atlantic Free Trade Area
(NAFTA), which would lihk EFTA with the USA and Canada. 'Hurd reported
that the antis had rallied around the idea, promoted by the Atlantic
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Trade Study Group. The Group was formed in 1967 by Hugh Corbet, a
Times journalist, Professor Harry Johnson, and Leonard Beaton, former
Director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies. 	 Maxwell
Stamp Associates produced a report for the Group, which concluded that
"The direct effects of joining EEC would not be as advantageous as
joining the North Atlantic Free Trade Area". (157) They also
produced other reports supporting the NAFTA case.
Neil Marten wrote a paper on NAFTA for the Committee on Europe
(Policy Research) which he wanted published as a CPC pamphlet but this
was vetoed by Heath.	 The NAFTA campaigners organised several
conferences, including one in February 1968 in London, and a two day
event at Sussex University in July 1968. 	 This idea attracted the
support of some economic liberals, such as Roy Harrod and Edward
Holloway, who were concerned with the inward-looking nature of the
European Community, and the interest of Lord Watkinson, a former
Minister of Defence, Lord Boyd, former Colonial Secretary, and Hugh
Fraser M.P.
	 The NAFTA idea, however, foundered on the lack of U.S.
interest, (Bruce-Gardyne wrote that in America it only existed in the
mind of Jacob Javits) and the anti-Americanism of the Right.
	
Thus
the anti-marketeers were unsuccessful in replying to the question posed
to them frequently by the 'Europeans', "what is your alternative?". (158)
The Commonwealth appeared less and less as an alternative.
Several organisations were created to promote relations with the
Commonwealth, such as the Commonwealth League for Economic Co-operation
and the British Commonwealth Union, but their leaders, Rippon and
Biggs-Davison respectively, were 'Europeans'. 	 The failure of many
Commonwealth countries to retain democracy, the assertive nature of
many Commonwealth leaders, and fears over coloured immigration weakened
commitment to the Commonwealth. 	 Montagu had even urged that the
Commonwealth be wound up after the 1969 Commonwealth conference, and
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Powell had explicitly rejected the Commonwealth and Empire as central
to Britain's role in the world. Thus there was no popular Commonwealth
organisation as a focus for anti-market opposition. (159)
However, neither did the European Movement provide a satisfactory
home for Conservative pro-marketeers. The European Movement was a
mixture of businessmen, who provided the finances and the audiences,
and federalist intellectuals, who provided the ideas and the policies.
There was the familiar complaint from Conservatives about their lack
of influence. Pears complained about the lack of Tories in the
European Movement, apart from Howell, and the need to encourage
Conservative participation, not to take it over but to curb its
federalism. The Campaign for European Political Unity was launched
in July 1966 and attracted the support of 150 M.P.s, and yet still in
September 1968 Martin Madden felt there was a need to get a hard core
of 'Europeans' together.	 The need for an explicitly Conservative
group led to the creation of the European Forum on 20th May 1969 of
"Conservatives who wish to further the Party's European policy",
with Heath, Macmillan and Home as honorary officers. 	 The aim was to
have only a small membership, about 150, of opinion-leaders, 50 M.P.s
and 100 prospective parliamentary candidates and activists. 	 The
Forum held several briefing conferences, one in conjunction with the
Bow Group; encouraged parliamentary questions through David Howell;
provided speakers for local party meetings; organised an Anglo-French
conference; and published a pamphlet by Nicholas Ridley, Towards a 
Federal Europe. (160) This organisation was to come into prominence
under the Heath Government as the Conservative Group for Europe.
The Confederation of British Industry was formed in 1965 from an
amalgamation of the Federation of British Industries, the British
Employers' Federation and the National Association of British
2/!g
Manufacturers.	 Its first appraisal of the EEC in 1966 concluded
that there would be "a clear and progressive balance of advantage to
Britishindustry" in membership.	 The C.B.I. urged an application by
the Labour Government. 	 The CBI's position was reaffirmed in January
1970 with the report 'Britain in Europe - A Second Industrial
Appraisal'.	 The CBI played a very limited role on Europe in this
period, which was based on a policy of cautious support, with emphasis
on the terms and necessary preparations. (161) TheCommonwealth
Industries Association continued its hostility to the EEC, provided
a forum for Conservative anti-marketeers in its journal, Britain and
Overseas, edited by Edward Holloway and published an anti-market
(162)leaflet.	 The NFU, on the contrary, played an active role on
Europe, even while its own position changed. 	 Its initial position
was continued hostility to membership and the C.A.P. 	 A. Winegarten,
NFU's Chief Economist, stated that "none of the conditions which the
Union regarded as essential in 1961-63 would be met if the U.K. were
to enter the Common Market unconditionally" and the NFU published a
letter, during the 1966 election, criticising the Conservative position.
"The Conservative Party have thus apparently withdrawn from their
earlier position and seem to be prepared to go into the Community on
the basis of the CAP".	 The NFU prepared a study of the implications
of the CAP, a summary of which was widely distributed to M.P.s on the
eve of a Common Market debate in November 1966. 	 The study claimed
that the CAP would increase the cost of living, mean a sharp change in
the method of agricultural support, and would increase the cost of
foodstuffs.	 However, opinion among farmers was not so hostile, as
some farmers such as large cereal growers would benefit. 	 The Guardian 
reported in January 1967 that farmers were divided almost equally.
The arguments of the Conservative spokesmen that the system of deficiency
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payments was too expensive and that import levies would increase
domestic agricultural productions won much support. 	 In 1967 the
NFU published British Agriculture and the Common Market which accepted
the principle of levies and the CAP provided that the system was the
same for everyone and that certain changes in the application of the
CAP were made.	 The NFU President in 1969, G.T. Williams, attacked
the levy system, but with increasing dissatisfaction with the farm
price reviews under the Labour Government and declining farm incomes
the moderate pro-European position reasserted itself in 1970. 	 During
the 1960's the NFU changed its position from opposition to the CAP to
critical support combined with protection for the most vulnerable
elements of the agricultural interests. (163)
The Economist remained a consistent champion of Europe. 	 After
the first breakdown it urged a number of bridge-building exercises to
pave the way to future membership, such as the reduction of tariffs and
(164)
the creation of multinational defence institutions. 	 It was
strongly critical of the Conservatives for their failure to continue
to promote Europe, especially during the 1964 election campaign which
(165)it attributed to cowardice. 	 It warmly welcomed the strong
position taken by Heath and Putting Britain Right Ahead, which "loudly
says the right things on the Common Market", but was very suspicious
of his overtures to the French and the anti-American tone of some of
his remarks. (166)	 It was also severely critical of the way that the
Conservative leadership tried to avoid Europe, or at least downplay
its importance in the run up to the 1970 election. (167) 	 The
Economist, thus was a critic from a more 'European' position.
The Spectator throughout this period was another staunch
supporter on Europe.	 It believed that there was no alternative to
membership and it was the job of leaders to make the electorate
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understand why this was so. 	 In 1966, it said that "Europe is the
supreme issue in this election". 	 It was a supporter of a multilateral
nuclear force "put.. .in trust for Europe". (168)
The Conservative press continued to support entry, and expressed
considerable scepticism towards the sincerity of the Labour
application in 1967.	 The Daily Telegraph, for example, stated that
"no sensible person" was against joining Europe. (169)	 Thepress
provided a forum for the neo-Gaullist ideas of some Conservatives,
such as Nigel Lawson in the Financial Times and John Grigg in the
Guardian. (170) The influential commentator, Peregrine Worsethome,
wrote in the Sunday Telegraph, "The principal new reason why it is
necessary today to reopen the question of Britain moving closer to
the Six is that the U.S., seen from London, is beginning to look
much less satisfactory as an ally than any time since the alliance
began.. .the only chance Britain and Western Europe have of protecting
their own interests is to act in concert". (171) When the commitment
was under a cloud, the Telegraph published a series of articles in
November 1969 reiterating the importance of membership over a wide
range of policies, which was then published as a pamphlet". (172)
The Express maintained its opposition. 	 "Anyone who thought
that the Express's attitude would change after the death of Lord
(173)Beaverbrooke was mistaken". 	 The Express reaffirmed its
opposition in the 1964 and 1966 elections. 	 "The Daily Express must
register anew its determined opposition to the Market, whether it comes
stealthily through Mr. Wilson or bluntly through Mr. Heath". (174)
Sir Max Aitken, Beaverbrooke's son, confirmed to the ACML that "the
Express remained definitely anti-market" and he promised them his full
support. (175) However, Europe did become a less central issue in
the newspaper and received less coverage.	 The ACML complained that
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it could no longer get letters printed and that "whilst Sir Max Aitken
appeared to promise a lot when they last met him, nothing had come out
of it". (176) Thepaper's problems over attacking a central plank of
Conservative policy were eased by Labour's application and a lower
profile on the issue by the Conservatives. 	 In 1970 it described the
Common Market as "the most momentous issue of all", but without any
commitment to a referendum there was no difference between the parties
and therefore they were able to endorse the Conservatives. (177)
The electorate remained unstable throughout this period,
reflecting the changing position of the parties and the degree of
confidence about membership. 	 In 1964 Europe was not an issue as
neither party considered membership a possibility in the short term.
In 1966 Europe appeared not to have been an issue which directly
affected the decision of many voters, and there is no evidence to
suggest that the Conservative position actually lost votes. 	 CCO
commissioned a survey poll by ORC in spring 1967 which showed a
substantial decline in support, together with a sharp rise in antis
and don't knows, although the pro-Europeans remained in a majority of
51% to 33%.	 Conservative supporters, however, now had considerable
doubts.	 78% believed that food prices would rise as a result of
membership, including a majority of supporters. 	 Conservative support
was soft and based on support for the Party. 	 The issue was one of
low salience for all but a few. 	 However, opposition was based on
particular concerns, such as the cost of living, not general hostility
to the idea of Europe. (178)
However, with the Labour application in 1967 opinion swung very
rapidly in favour of membership. 	 Jowell and Hoinville attribute this
to the agreement of all three main parties, the continuing balance of
payments crises, the declining support for the Commonwealth and the
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endorsement of Wilson. (179)
	
By February 1970 opinion had swung yet
again with only 22% in favour, because of the feeling that they had
been rejected twice, that Britain would not lead within the European
Community, prices, and the feeling that Britain needed protection from
outside competition.
Not surprisingly, the Conservatives did not emphasise the issue
in the campaign.	 The Nuffield Election Study suggested that it was
the second most important doorstep issue, but that there was in
practice no difference in the swing for pro or anti Conservative
candidates. (180)	 It was an issue of some concern to the voters but
not of sufficient salience to them nor was the difference between the
parties so clear as to affect voting behaviour.
Conclusion 
This period was marked by great shifting moods within the
Conservative party in response to events outside their control. 	 The
first veto was a shock to its electoral strategy and long term
foreign policy.	 The low profile on Europe presented by Home concerned
many 'Europeans'.	 In 1965 there was a revival of Conservative
interest, due to a number of factors.	 There was increasing
recognition of the high cost of supporting agriculture and a search
for a cheaper alternative, and import levies, as in the CAP, appeared
to provide that alternative. 	 The Commonwealth was a declining symbol
for Conservatives as member countries became more assertive and
independent, even aggressive in some eyes, and the sense of family
ties was looser as black nations became a more prominent part of the
Commonwealth.
	
The decline in Commonwealth trade also served to
weaken the existence of pro-Commonwealth interests. Another factor
was the view that Britain's future lay with advanced technology, and
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that technology required both the considerable investment and large
markets that Europe could provide. The independent position of the
French towards the Community, endorsed in the Luxembourg Compromise,
strengthened the Tory Gaullists who desired a united Europe but a
Europe of Nations and not a federalist unity. 	 Their arguments that
entry would not damage Britain's independence was more plausible with
France as an example. Anti-American feeling and a desire to avoid
dependence on the U.S.A. also found expression in Tory Gaullism.
The election of Heath as party leader was a significant event in
confirming that the Conservatives would remain the party of Europe.
Heath ensured that in Putting Britain Right Ahead, the 1966 manifesto,
and in his speeches that Europe was a consistent theme of Conservative
policy.	 In this he was supported by most of the Cabinet, the
parliamentary party, the constituency associations, Central Office,
the party ginger groups and the Tory press.
	 There was little
opposition, outside of the traditional anti-marketeers, to support
for the principle of membership.
However, there was concern over the ability to translate that
policy into an electoral asset. Between 1963 and 1967 membership
appeared as a remote possibility and therefore without any immediate
benefit electorally. The Labour Government's application in 1967
threatened to remove an issue that was meant to divide the parties.
The second veto intensified these concerns, and encouraged the search
for an alternative.
	 That search proved to be fruitless, but weak
support for membership in the opinion polls sustained opposition to
the European policy as a central element in party strategy.
Recognition of this led to the more cautious stance of Home at the
1969 conference and of the manifesto in the 1970 election, with its
commitment to negotiate, "no more, no less".
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The case for membership became stronger during this period, in
the eyes of many Conservatives, just as the possibility of achieving
membership became more remote. 	 A series of arguments, political,
defence, agricultural, international, technological, were strengthened
by the events of the 1960's, and thus confirmed the view that Britain's
membership of the European Community was in the country's long term
interest. However, two important conditions that would enable
membership, the attitude of the French Government and public opinion,
either remained or became even greater obstacles to the fulfilment of
that policy.	 Belief in the wisdom of British membership remained
widespread within the party, but due to those obstacles, many in the
Party sought alternatives which might eventually lead to membership
without alienating potential voters. It was the perception of
membership as a long term objective which led to the diminished
enthusiasm and interest in the late 1960s.
Heath followed as much as led over European policy. 	 When the
intra-party climate was good, as in 1966, Heath was able to take a
vigorous pro-European position.	 When optimism over the likelihood of
early membership was low, he adopted a more cautious approach, as in
the run up to the 1970 election. 	 Rather than the leader of a
pro-European faction within the Party, he was frequently criticised by
Tory 'Europeans' for failing to give a stronger lead. 	 As noted in
this chapter, Kirk was critical of Heath's lack of leadership.
Heath opposed the creation of an unofficial group of 'Europeans' under
Eldon Griffiths; David Howell, M.P., felt that the pro-Europeans were
crumbling; and Gordon Pears of the CRD felt that the leadership could
not be relied upon to stimulate pro-European feeling. 	 Thus during the
1960's, under Heath's leadership, the Party was not dragged into a
policy it did not support, but remained committed to membership as a
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long-term objective.
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Introduction 
The Conservatives won a surprising victory in the 1970 election
and the new Government immediately pursued the application to the
Community as a major priority.
	 The negotiations were conducted first
by Heath's close friend Anthony Barber, who became Chancellor upon the
death of Macleod, and then by Geoffrey Rippon.
	 The negotiations
were marked, as previously, by the conflict between seeking to negotiate
with the Community the best possible terms from a position of strength,
and the need to convince public opinion of the necessity of British
entry.	 'European' critics felt that the former was the Government's
strategy to the neglect of the latter, which was a major contribution
to the swing against entry among public opinion that occurred during
the negotiations.
The negotiations were successfully completed in May 1971, and the
Cabinet unanimously recommended in the White Paper acceptance of the
terms, but there was a considerable difference of opinion within the
Cabinet as to when Parliament should vote on the principle of entry on
the terms obtained, as soon as possible in July or in the Autumn 	 The
negative state of public opinion led to considerable pressure from M.P.s
to delay the vote until the Government had been able to conduct a
strong campaign.
	 During the summer a vigorous campaign by the
Government, the Conservative Party and the European Movement to turn
public opinion in favour of entry met with considerable success.
The vote on the principle of membership was taken in the Commons
on 28th October 1971, which achieved a majority of 112, with 39
Conservatives voting against and 2 abstentions.
	 The large majority
was due to the support of Labour 'Europeans', who were, however, unable
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to commit their votes for the passage of the detailed legislation.
The actual legislation, the European Communities Bill, was a long and
detailed bill which occupied much discussion and 104 divisions, with the
ever present danger of a defeat for the Government. The Second Reading
was taken on 17th December 1971. 	 The Third and final Reading, on 13th
July 1972, received a majority of 17, with only 16 Conservative
opponents and 4 abstentions. Many then felt that at last the debate
on membership, which had occupied much political time and energy for
over a decade, had come to a conclusion, and attention could be turned
to other issues.
The Leader 
Much of the praise for the Conservative victory of 1970 was given
to Heath, as the one person who seemed to have been convinced that
victory was likely, and for his pursuit of a consistent campaign
strategy, despite the expression of apprehension by some Conservatives
during the election.	 "The Conservative success gives Mr. Reath a
unique authority which is wholely new to him". 	 Europe quickly emerged
as the major priority of the new Prime Minister, although as the
Economist noted, "Europe has not been in the forefront of Mr. Heath's
campaign". (1)	 Heath became personally very identified, and very
pre-occupied, with the pursuit of membership, to an excessive degree
in the minds of some within the Government. He followed the negotiations
very closely, and the good relations he established with the French
President Pompidou at the Paris summit in May 1971 were felt to be a
significant factor in the success of the negotiations. 	 Heath was
closely identified with the pursuit of membership.
Heath was particularly criticised by anti-marketeers for pursuing
a policy which, according to the opinion polls, lacked public support.
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During the election campaign on 27th May on BBC television, Heath had
stated that "No British Government could possibly take this country
(2)into the Common Market against the wishes of the British people".
After this was picked up by anti-marketeers, Heath responded on 2nd June
that "I always said that you couldn't possibly take this country into
the Common Market if the majority of people were against it. 	 But
this is handled through the Parliamentary system". (3)
	
Anti-marketeers
however insisted that this was a commitment to obtain public endorsement
before membership.
	
Heath was thus portrayed as 'Dictator Heath'
dragging the British people into the European Community against their
will, and using all his legitimate and some illegitimate powers to 	 •••
obtain entry.	 One critic described Heath as a Latter Day Charlemagne,
(4)imposing European unity by force.	 Another critic commented on
Heath's "degree of insensitivity to the British parliamentary tradition,
never mind the popular will". (5) The Spectator, under the editorship
of George Gale, took a highly populist and anti-Heath position.
There was a widespread feeling, not only among anti-marketeers,
that Britain was being 'bounced' into Europe without adequate discussion
and thought.	 Heath wanted to have an early parliamentary vote in July,
but was persuaded in the Cabinet to postpone the vote until October.
During the summer the Government and Party conducted a massive campaign
to change public opinion to ensure a large majority in the Commons, and
a remarkable shift of opinion in favour of membership did occur.
Heath saw Europe as a central element in the policy of the
Government, and therefore viewed the issue as a vote of confidence in
the Government as a whole.	 He wanted membership to be achieved with
Conservative votes and not to have to depend on Labour support.
However, there were many who felt that the issue was of such importance
that M.P.s should be allowed to express their views in a free vote.
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During the election Macleod embarrassed Heath by appearing to endorse
a free vote, and Neil Marten claimed that Heath "had accepted the
(6)principle of a free vote".
	 Heath frequently reaffirmed his
belief in a three line whip.	 On 12th July 1971 at a press conference
he declared, "it does seem to be a strange approach...that you ask
your party for support on a whole variety of issues, but when you come
to a major issue such as this you say, 'Well, of course, we will
withdraw all the normal means of organised government and sit back and
do nothing'.	 We as a government are absolutely entitled to ask our
supporters to support us in the lobby". (7) Only at the last minute
and with great reluctance, when it was clear that Conservative votes
would be insufficient, and that a free vote would make it much easier
to obtain Labour votes, did Heath agree to a free vote.
The discussion on Heath and Europe was part of a more widespread
feeling that Heath was insensitive to alternative opinions to his own,
surrounded himself with those who shared his views, excluded from the
government any potential dissenters, and ignored parliamentary and
party opinion.	 Ramsden commented that Heath "had an understandable
wish to be remembered as a statesman-like Prime Minister rather than
merely as a political partisan, no doubt in part an over-reaction to
his predecessor, and this made him more open to advice from the civil
service than from his Party". (8) Hurd also cautiously told Heath,
"there is a general impression at all levels within the Party that this
administration is in fact less politically conscious than its
Conservative predecessor". (9) Norton attributed to Heath a major
responsibility for the rise in dissident votes during the Heath
(10)
administration.
	 In other words, Heath was accused of prime
ministerial government, which strengthened the determination of the
anti-marketeers and caused considerable irritation amongst pro-marketeers.
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The role of Heath was seen as crucial in obtaining British
membership. Kitzinger claimed that, "The Conservative Party took its
most decisive step towards British entry into the EEC 8 years before
1973" when it elected him as Leader. (11) Douglas Evans felt that
"The character and personality of Edward Heath were crucial ingredients
in the attitude of the Conservative Party towards the EEC". (12)
Richard Rose put it most bluntly that Heath "knew what he wanted;
British entry into the Common Market.
	 Britain joined". (13)Thus
Heath was seen as in a similar role to Macmillan during the first
application as the sine qua non of British membership.
Cabinet 
Heath's Cabinet was made up almost exclusively of either committed
'Europeans' or deeply loyal friends.
	 Home as Foreign Secretary, Macleod
as Chancellor, and Rippon at Defence were old-established'Europeane,
and John Davies, at Trade and Industry, had demonstrated his commitment
as Director-General of the CBI. Anthony Barber as chief European
negotiator, Jim Prior at Agriculture, Peter Carrington at Defence,
Francis Pym as Chief Whip, Willie Whitelaw as Leader of the House of
Commons, were personally loyal.
	 Peter Walker was now a supporter of
membership and a Heath loyalist.
	 Two potential opponents, Maudling at
the Home Office and Hogg as Lord Chancellor, were placed into offices
which were not much concerned with Europe and contributed little to
these discussions. (14) Decision on Europe were taken by an Inner
Group of loyalists consisting of Heath, Home, Rippon, Barber, Carrington,
Pym and Whitelaw. (15)
It was a frequent accusation that Heath had deliberately excluded
all anti-marketeers from the Government. (16) This was said to include
junior ministers. 	 The support for Europe among junior ministers
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"is not surprising for it recognises that any anti-market ministers
are likely to find life extremely uncomfortable" (Economist) (17) 	 The
Government wished to avoid any embarrassing resignations over Community
membership.
	
Neil Marten was offered a post provided he made a
commitment not to resign if the Government did agree to join. Marten
refused to give that promise and so the offer was withdrawn. (18)One
exception was Teddy Taylor at the Scottish Office, but this was
attributed to the small number and poor quality of Conservative M.P.s
from Scotland. (19) His later resignation was predictable.	 There
were two significant exclusions from the Government, which were
sometimes attributed to Europe.	 The first was Enoch Powell, who had
emerged as a major political figure with substantial popular support,
and it was argued that the Conservative victory was attributable to
Powell's influence. (20) Europe, however, was certainly only a minor
aspect of his exclusion from office.	 His remarks on race were a
sufficient factor. 	 A less dramatic exclusion was Edward du Cann, a
noted sceptic on Europe. 	 The cause here was probably due to the bad
personal relations between them that developed during du Cann's period
as Party Chairman in 1965-1967 rather than to any political diff3rences
over Europe.
Macleod died in July 1970 soon after the formation of the
Government.	 This was a great loss to the Government, especially over
Europe, as the Government needed a rousing speaker to inspire support
for the policy, in contrast to the well-informed but rather mechanistic
image of most of the Government, including Heath. 	 The Economist 
commented that, after negotiations, "then his real moment of destiny,
the time when all his political skill would have been called into play,
would have arrived.	 Mr. Heath has acquired authority; Sir Alec has
always had respect; Mr. Maudling has always been intelligent. 	 But when
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the day comes for this Government to stand up and declare itself, the
European case will be put the worse to the party and to the country
(21)because Macleod will not be putting it". 	 His biographer felt
that "we should certainly have joined the European Community with
greater public enthusiasm and excitement if Macleod had lived to put
(22)the case for doing it".
Barber replaced Macleod and Rippon was his successor as European
negotiator.	 Rippon had been active in European affairs for a long
time, as the Mayor of Surbiton in the Council of European Municipalities
and as a backbencher, and had an additional advantage of having been
a member of the Monday Club and with some influence on the right of
the party.
	 Rippon was a highly successful negotiator with the
European Community, even if he acted as if all problems could be
solved over coffee and cognac. 	 However, he appeared insensitive to
the fears and doubts of the anti-marketeers and sceptics, and was
criticised for his high-handed treatment of the Commons when he reported
back on the negotiations.	 The Times reported that his reports to the
Commons "have been unhappy occasions.. .his manner brusque, bordering
on the contemptuous.. .he gives the impression of feeling that all this
talk in the House is a waste of time, that most M.Ps are fools anyway
and the only thing to do is get the unpleasant and distasteful task
over as quickly as possible". (23) However, he later adapted to these
criticisms.	 "He has toned down his earlier over-exuberance to show a
courteous and sympathetic face to those in doubt and ansiety", (24)
and his 'new empire' approach, with Britain as the leader of Europe in
the world, was attractive to many Conservatives, especially on the
right.
The negotiated terms were generally perceived as good, and in
response to Labour criticisms, several prominent Labour ex-ministers
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claimed that they would have been acceptable to the previous Labour
Government.	 The Spectator, now anti-market, claimed that several
senior ministers were sceptical (although no names were suggested) and
the Cabinet uncommitted. (25) The Cabinet, however, agreed
unanimously to endorse the terms.
	 The only resignations were those of
Teddy Taylor, as expected, and Jasper More, a junior Whip.
	 The terms.
however, do not appear to have been a major factor in Cabinet acceptance,
although Carrington did claim that "until recently" his agreement
depended on the terms. (26) Most of the negotiations were over the
terms of the transition period while the Treaty of Rome was accepted
without change. The manifesto commitment has been "to negotiate; no
more, no less", but the prestige of the Government, and particularly
that of Heath, had become so closely associated with Europe that the
rejection of the terms would have been extremely difficult.
The critical feelings expressed concerned the over-emphasis on
Europe in the Government's strategy to the neglect of other issues
rather than over the policy.	 All Cabinet members belong to the
Conservative Group for Europe (C.G.E.) (except the Lord Chancellor for
constitutional reasons) and supported the acceptance of membership.
There was, however, a large difference of opinion over the tactics.
Heath and Rippon wanted a parliamentary decision as soon as possible
after the completion of the negotiations, in June 1971.	 They argued
that a quick vote would benefit from the successful conclusion of
negotiations and avoid anti-marketeers criticising specific details of
the agreement. Pym and Whitelaw, however, argued for a three months
delay to enable M.P.s to consult with their constituents.
	
The M.P.s
were said to be in "a nervous state" over recent losses in by-elections
and local elections, and were fearful of the criticism from voters of
being bounced into Europe without full public discussion.
	
After
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considerable debate within the Cabinet, Heath reluctantly accepted the
delay. (27)
A second dispute was over whether the vote should be considered a
vote of confidence or left to a free vote. 	 Heath made clear his own
position in response to a question at the Conservative Central Council
on 14th July 1971, that the Government had a right to expect the
support of Conservative M.P.s on an issue central to the Government's
policies and reaffirmed his position as late as 11th October in a
Panorama interview. (28) However, opinion in the Cabinet favoured a
free vote.	 On 18th October 1971 Pym recommended a free vote.	 The
arguments presented were that only an additional ten Conservative
anti-marketeers would vote against, that public opinion* favoured a free
vote, and that the vote would be won due to the support of an additional
30 Labour votes. (29) Cabinet members were concerned that Europe
should not leave any permanent divisions within the Party, and so at a
meeting of the Inner Cabinet Heath reluctantly accepted the Cabinet
position.
The Cabinet was thus united on the policy of European membership,
and only if the terms had been completely disastrous would the Cabinet
have rejected membership.	 However, there were Cabinet members
critical of the priority placed on Europe to the neglect of other
aspects of Government policy, and there was strong opposition to a July
vote and a three-line Whip in October. 	 Thus the Cabinet was not
simply the rubber-stamp that it was often portrayed.
Parliamentary Party.
Soon after the formation of the Government, there began
speculation as to the degree of Parliamentary support and opposition,
and this speculation continued until the third Reading in July 1972.
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The enthusiastic 'Europeans', about 50 backbenchers, were concerned
that during the negotiations the European case would go by default,
with the ground left to the anti-marketeers, as many felt had
occurred in the 1962 debate. 	 These M.P.s were organised in the
Conservative Group for Europe (formerly the European Forum) under the
chairmanship of Sir Tufton Beamish, and they conducted a campaign to
maximise support, in close co-operation with the party whips and Central
Office.	 Norman St. John Stevas, Secretary, wrote a memorandum,
distributed to Party Chairman Peter Thomas, Rippon, Pym and Whitelaw. (30)
He argued that the Party's position during the election, of a
commitment only to negotiate, was tactically understandable but
politically dnagerous and the positive case went by default.
	
The
European Community was unpopular because of the decline of the European
idea and the domination of the debate by the antis. 	 He recommended
1). an accurate assessment of Conservative Parliamentary opinion,
in which he could use his experience during the Abortion Act
of 1967;
2). an attempt to win waverers;
3). tabling pro-European motions in the House of Commons;
4). the use of Parliamentary Questions as a top priority; and
5). the presence of 'Europeans' at Party meetings, especially the
1922, Foreign Affairs and Agriculture Committees.
The programme of activities was carried out by the CGE. 	 St. John
Stevas surveyed the Parliamentary Party on the issue and provided useful
information to the Whips.	 Four half day seminars were organised in
May 1971, aimed at doubters, which attracted an average attendance of
30 M.P.s with experts and ministers Home, Prior, Davies and Soames.
An Anglo-French Parliamentary Conference was organised in Paris on 30th
April-lst May 1971, with 20 doubters, and a visit to Brussels.
	
Intense
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informal lobbying also took place.
	 By the First Reading over half
the Conservative M.P.s were members of the CGE.
	 The work of the CGE
was highly significant because it provided reliable intelligence to
the Whips, and informal pressures on doubters from colleagues rather
than from the top.
The anti-marketeers were the traditional ones, such as Walker-Smith
and Turton, but with the addition of three Powellites (Powell, Biffen,
Body) and the loss of Walker and Biggs-Davison. 	 30 anti-marketeers
had retired at the 1970 election and only 20 newcomers joined them. (31)
An addition was Nicholas Winterton who won the Macclesfield by-election
in 1971.	 He had been selected largely for his anti-market views, had
spoken against Europe at the 1970 Conference and these views were
vocally expressed during the campaign, much to the embarrassment of the
Government.	 After his election his opposition was modified. 	 The
Economist reported that he was prepared to "think again if the terms
for entry turn out to be considerably better than they appear to be".
He wrote to the Spectator that "I am in fact a strong anti-marketeer
personally but no doubt you will appreciate that I cannot speak as yet
on behalf of the Macclesfield constituency". (32) Eventually he voted
in the Government lobby. The Powell group was not always appreciated
by some of the other antis because it appeared to make them more of an
anti-Heath rebellion, while they were concerned not to split the party
permanently on the issue.	 They met informally in the 1970 Group,
known as Derek's Diner, which was registered with the Whips and met
about three times a year with a membership of a maximum of 56.
Speakers included Heath and Maudling. 	 In practice this group was
	 very
loose, and so there was an informal working group which tried to
co-ordinate anti-market activity, which included Walker-Smith, Turton
and Powell.	 This group encouraged critical Early Day Motions and
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Parliamentary Questions. Early Day Motions received 40 signatures
(23rd July 1970 including 18 new M.P. ․) and 19 (22nd June 1971). (33)
Their strategy was to seek a very small 'European' majority on the
principle so that faced with public opposition and the prospect of
defeat on the detailed legislation, the Government would withdraw the
bill. While their numbers fluctuated, mainly downwards, they were
never large enough to be a dominant influence within the Parliamentary
Party.
There were also a number of clearly identifiable doubters. 	 Sir
Harry Legge-Bourke, chairman of the 1922 Committee, was highly
sceptical, and even discussed with his Association the possibility of
organising a postal ballot of his constituents.	 He was also suspected
of writing an anonymous article in the Spectator urging Heath's removal,
(34)
which he denied.	 William Clarke wrote to the Party Chairmen
saying that his decision would depend upon the terms and noting the
strong opposition of his constituency. 
(35)
Ray Mawby was a doubter
who held four public meetings in his Totnes constituency to help him
decide.. Du Cann was another doubter, together with some with specific
concerns over New Zealand and sugar. 	 The most interesting doubter was
Philip Goodhart, who was a prominent and articulate spokesman for a
referendum.	 His views were considered "mildly favourable" and his
(36)
book of 1964 suggested support for Western Europe. 	 However, he
was concerned over the lack of public endorsement of this major
constitutional issue.	 He wanted a CPC pamphlet together with St. John
Stevas arguing the pros and cons of a referendum but it was vetoed by
(37)
Heath.
	 He urged a national referendum, and decided to hold a
local referendum in his own constituency of Beckenham and to abide by
the result if there was a 30-40% turnout. 	 This was highly sensitive to
the Government as it was accused of action without a mandate. 	 Pym met
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personally with Goodhart to persuade him to change his mind, but to
no avail.	 The vote was: Yes 3,737 to No 3,587, a favourable majority
of 170.	 It was the only local referendum in which the European
Movement conducted a strong campaign because the vote of an M.P. was
committed to the result. 	 Goodhart voted with the Government. (38)
The assessment of Parliamentary opinion began early with a CRD
survey of election addresses.	 Of the 329 studied, 154 had mentioned
Europe, 123 had supported the manifesto position, 24 were anti-market
(
and 6 more had asked for a referendum. 39)	 In December 1970 the CGE
conducted their first survey with 195 for, 22 against, 45 doubtful and
60 uncanvassed.	 In January 1971 a more complete study found 218 for,
33 against, with 75 doubtfuls (half leaning for and half against).
The Whips' assessment found more antis: 194 for, 62 against and 70
doubters.
	 Further estimates were made in April, July and August.
The July estimate of 42 antis proved to be the most accurate prediction. (40)
The pressure from M.P.s was in favour of delay in the vote to the
Autumn	 Legge-Bourke argued that M.P.s needed a reasonable chance
to discuss with their constituents, and many backbenchers wrote to
Heath and Whitelaw calling for time to consult with their constituents
and convince them. (41) Typical were the two new M.P.s for Bolton,
Laurence Reed and Richard Richmond, who sought a six weeks delay to
talk to their constituents. 	 Many of these M.P.s, like Reed, were
convinced 'Europeans' but wanted to be able to present their arguments
to their constituents and appear open to questions and fears. Strong
backbench pressure helped to convince Heath of the wisdom of delay.
There was also backbench pressure for a free vote.
	
The 1922
Committee recommended a free vote in July 1971, and the anti-marketeers
also requested it.
	
The Economist claimed that the anti-marketeers were
against a free vote because they would gain only 5-6 votes and lose the
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(42)
propaganda value of a forced decision.	 This interpretation,
however, ignored their belief that they would obtain much more support
than that, and their concern not to split the Party any more than
necessary.	 Walker-Smith said that the free vote was "welcome but
tardy". (43)A decisive role was played by the CGE assessment that a
free vote would at most increase the overall No votes by two.
The six day debate, 21st-22nd, 25th-28th October 1971, on the
principle of membership was opened by Home. 	 Most of the contributions
were predictable.	 Conservative anti-market speakers were Turton,
Nabarro, Russell, Bullus, Taylor, Maude, Harmar Nicholls, Walker-Smith
and Powell.	 Two surprises were William Clarke who described entry as
a gamble and, therefore, was reluctantly voting against, and du Cann
who said that there was little economic advantage and abstained in the
vote.	 The final vote was 356 to 244, with 69 Labour M.P.s voting with
the Government and 20 abstentions, disobeying their Party's three line
Whip.	 The Conservative votes were 284 for, 39 against and 2
abstentions, du Cann and Patrick Wolridge-Gordon.	 The Government
majority of 112 was greater than anyone in the Government had
(44)
expected.
The Government's problems, however, were not yet over. 	 The Whips
were faced with getting majorities on all the detailed legislation in
committee and on the floor of the House, and the Labour 'Europeans'
said that the Government could not rely on them to save it on the
future votes.	 14 Conservative M.P.s stated that they would now
accept the majority decision and support the Government on the
(45)
legislation, e.g. Clarke, Jessel, More and Wolridge-Gordon. 	 The
Times claimed that "the Conservative anti-market group collapsed" but
this was an exaggeration.	 The Conservative anti-market vote was
unpredictable, but ever-present, and the pressure on them by Whips,
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colleagues and Associations continued.	 Heath even requested a meeting
with them, of which 9 saw him, 4 changed their votes and 2 refused to
see him. (46)On the Second Reading there were 309 Conservative votes
for, 15 against and 5 abstentions.	 There was a small tactical group
of Powell, Biffen and Marten, with Biffen as unofficial Whip, which
tried for a series'of wrecking amendments rather than defeat on the
2nd and 3rd Readings.	 They were known as the R (for Resistance) Group.
A new strategy for them was their support for a referendum.
	
On 14th
March 1972 Neil Marten and 5 others put down an amendment calling for
a consultative advisory referendum, and welcomed the decision of
President Pompidou to hold a referendum on British entry in France.
Marten wrote to the Times that "The Government should welcome a
consultative referendum as a means of convincing our future partners in
the Common Market that the people of this country are not being dragged
in against their will and instinct, but that we are joining with the
(47)full-hearted consent and enthusiasm of the people". 	 Their
(48)
support fluctuated widely from 1 to 15 on the guillotine motion.
On the 3rd Reading on 13th July 1972 there were 16 negative votes and
4 abstentions.	 Norton described this as the "most persistent
Conservative intra-party dissent in post-war history". (49)
A most controversial issue was whether some of the pressures
brought upon the antis and the doubters were illegitimate. 	 The
Government certainly used a wide range of instruments at their disposal
to obtain a maximum vote: the Whips, fellow M.P.s, the use of promotion
prospects, personal meetings with Heath and other ministers, committee
assignments, foreign trips, etc.
went beyond the normal practices
Associations against their M.P.s
(50)
"utterly immoral".	 "Over
The antis claimed that the Government
by trying to mobilise local
Powell described these attempts as
there an honourable member, who has
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stood by his cause for years, is explaining to his friends that his
heart is with them still and he wishes them success, but he has no
means of support apart from his parliamentary salary, and his family
must come first.	 With him goes, to vote for what he detests, a man
who declared from a score of platforms to applauding audiences that
he for one would be no party to it; but lately, it appears, he
discovered that he had 'difficulties in his constituency', and the
mighty voice is hushed. 	 There goes another, a second and a third, who
know the sorrowful secret written in their election addresses but who
also know that there is a big redistribution of parliamentary boundaries
and the main thing (is it not?) is to be sure of a seat in the next
(51)
House".
Norton has documented in detail the difficulties of Conservative
(52)
anti-marketeers with their Associations.	 21 of the 33 M.P.s who
voted against entry were known to have had problems with their
associations.	 Most of the problems took the form of criticism of the
M.P.'s actions and a statement of support for the Government's policy
and not of threats to deselect them.	 The Association officers were
usually satisfied by an undertaking not to bring down the Government,
given by several M.P.s.
	
The most serious problems concerned Neil
Marten and Ronald Bell.
The relations between Marten and the Banbury Conservative Association
were extremely serious. 	 On the morning before the Central Council
meeting on 14th July 1971, the Association officers met with the Party
Chairman, Peter Thomas.
	 This has been presented as a deliberate
attempt by Central Office to influence the Association to bring pressure
to bear. (53)	 Themeeting, however, was called at the initiative of
the Association Chairman, who wrote to Thomas on 1st July reporting
that there was considerable hostility towards the M.P. and that the
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Association had received many letters of complaint and cancellations
of subscription.	 The Association letter requested a pro-European
article from Thomas for the constituency journal to balance Marten, and
the Chairman later requested speakers for all meetings to speak against
(54)
Marten.	 On 12th August 1971 the Association executive passed a
motion, by 49 votes to 10, expressing confidence in the Government's
policy and calling for a three-line Whip.
Marten believed that this had been instigated by CCO and wrote to
complain.
	 Thomas replied that "I can assure you, however, that Central
Office would not give any encouragement to any attempt to embarrass or
undermine a Conservative Member of Parliament". (55)
Relations between M.P. and Association remained strained throughout
the voting on the Bill, and there was thought to have teen an attempt to
deny re-nomination. However, Marten was re-adopted without challenge
in 1973.
Ronald Bell was faced with re-adoption due to the redistribution of
his constituency.
	
A general meeting of the Association voted by 654
votes to 525 against his automatic re-adoption as candidate. 	 Another
meeting voted on the nomination between Bell and Frederick Sylvester,
eventually giving 781 votes to Bell to 514 for his opponent. 	 Norton
suggested that this had a restraining effect on Bell's opposition in the
House.
Despite the belief of the anti-marketeers themselves, there was no
concerted attempt centrally to encourage Associations to remove their
M.P.	 The Organisation Department did discover that 22 of the anti
M.P.s would face major redistribution of their constituencies and
therefore re-selection, but there is no evidence that this was used in
any deliberate way. (56) CCO certainly did concentrate speakers and
literature distribution in their constituencies, and Association motions
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in support of the Government were encouraged, but there was never any
attempt to unseat M.P.s.
	 This was because Pym and Michael Faaser
were both determined not to leave the Party permanently damaged,
because Associations themselves are highly concerned to protect their
autonomy against CCO interference and because the Associations on their
own initiative applied tremendous pressure.
	
There may have been
individual actions of formenting opposition but there was no planned or
determined attempt to underseat M.P.s.	 The impetus for local party
discipline came from the local Associations themselves as they feared
that the Government itself was in danger, but Norton's conclusion is
that constituency party pressure had only a marginal effect on voting. (57)
National Union 
The 1970 Conference was the first held after the general election,
and thus was much of a victory rally.	 There were 22 favourable
resolutions, 8 unambiguously, 10 if the terms were right and 3 if
Britain and the Commonwealth were protected and 1 if pensions were
protected.
	 There were only 5 hostile motions, which were against
unless certain specific interests were protected, the cost of living/
commonwealth/sovereignty 1, horticulture 1, monarchy and democracy 1,
and agriculture 1, with 1 pro-NAFTA.
	 Seven resolutions called for
full information, 3 for and 1 against a referendum, and one for direct
elections to the European Parliament.
	
The pro-European resolutions
gave a diverse series of reasons (security 1, economic growth 2,
defence 1, voice in the world 2, sense of purpose 1, peace 1,
technology 1).	 In the agriculture resolutions, all four mentioning
Europe were favourable. (58)
The motion chosen for debate was that it was in Britain's long term
interests to join if satisfactory terms could be obtained, proposed by
280
Leon Brittan from the Bow Group and Norman St. John Stevas from the
CGE. The anti-marketeers were unknowns (including Winterton before
his selection for Macclesfield) with the usual Young Conservative
and FCS speakers on the'European'side. 	 Rippon ended the debate with
a reminder that the EEC was about more than economics. The motion
was declared passed overwhelmingly. 	 A ballot was requested but that
was ruled out of order. Europe was a major aspect of Heath's closing
speech. (59)
The Spectator poll of representatives reported 57% for Europe,
41% against and 2% don't know; that 10% wanted a referendum and that
included both pro and anti-marketeers; and that 90% of anti-Heath
representatives were anti-Common Market. (60) This report should be
treated with some suspicion as this degree of opposition was not
demonstrated in the vote on the motion, and this poll showed a dramatic
swing against Europe from earlier polls at the same time as the
Spectator itself had turned against.
Concern was expressed within the Committee on Europe that
opposition might be organised for the Central Council in spring 1971,
and therefore special efforts were made to ensure 'European' resolutions
and speakers were presented.	 Russell Lewis, CPC Director, wrote to
CPC Regional Chairmen requesting European resolutions, as did Kate
(61)
Macmillan and Sara Morrison through the Women. 	 The result was a
series of 15 resolutions, some of which were positive subject to the
terms, some expressing particular concerns such as agriculture and
others with the traditional demand for more information. 	 The debate
was held on the most positive resolution, to which Rippon replied.
One unusual development was the calling of a special Central
Council meeting of 14th July 1971.
	
This meeting was, decided the NUEC,
held "for the specific purpose of enabling the Prime Minister 'to accept
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the invitation of the National Union to address the Central Council at
the earliest possible opportunity after the publication of the
Government White Paper on the terms negotiated". (62)
	
Many resolutions
had been received from Associations requesting an opportunity for a
discussion on the feelings of Party members.
The meeting, chaired by active 'European' Dame Unity Lister,
consisted of a 40 minute speech by Heath followed by one hour of
questions.	 About 2,000 representatives were present, and they gave
strong support to Heath's position with frequent applause throughout
his speech.	 The questions reflected mainly concerns and fears rather
than outright opposition, on the size of lorries, the licencing of
insurance, and people on fixed incomes.	 The loudest applause came
for Heath's defence of Parliamentary democracy and the Party Whip as the
appropriate method of deciding the issue.	 The NUEC felt that it had
been "a great success" and were especially delighted with the media
coverage, and the Economist concluded from it that "It is a party
which has confidence and trust in Mr. Heath to lead Britain into the
Market". (63)	 Themeeting thus satisfied demands that Associations
should be allowed to discuss the terms, while at the same time
demonstrating rank and file support for Heath and his policy.
The 1971 conference was amost significant conference as it was
held after the terms had been negotiated, was more representative than
the Central Council meeting and was held before the vote in Parliament,
and was expected to have some influence on the size of the Conservative
rebellion.
	
The resolutions were overwhelmingly 'European'. 53 were
unequivocably pro-European, 16 mentioning the excellent terms, while 7
expressed concerns over particular areas (horticulture 1, fishing 3,
fixed incomes 3).
	 Only 7 resolutions expressed their clear opposition,
but 3 urged membership only with the full hearted support of the British
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people and 4 urged a free vote.	 The reasons given for entry were
again varied: influence in the world 12, prosperity 13, a united
Europe 9, peace 4, economic growth 3, security 3, large market 2,
defence 1, less developed countries 1 and our children's future 1.
These resolutions reflected the shift from economic to political
arguments within the Conservative Party. (64)
•	 The debate was conducted on a Young Conservative motion, welcoming
entry, and noting the pooling of sovereignty and the political
opportunities.	 The debate was dominated by the 'Europeans', including
both the young and the established as Sandys and St. John Stevas.
Opposition was led by Powell and Walker-Smith. 	 The mood of the
Conference was decidedly 'European', with the jokes of St. John Stevas
well received, and Walker-Smith's speech interrupted by a cry of 'cheer-
up' and much laughter.
	 The 'Europeans' were clearly in control and
Rippon provided an unnecessarily long speech in reply.
	 The vote was
overwhelmingly in favour of the motion, but Heath insisted on a card
vote.	 After the usual confusion while the vote was taken, the result
was 2,474 votes to 324, a vote of 8 to 1.
	 The vote was a strong
endorsement of entry and helped to relieve some of the pressure on some
(65)
of the more cautious M.P.s.
The anti-marketeers believed that until spring 1971 the local
Associations were strongly against entry but were swung by the summer
(66)
campaign.	 Even the Economist in April 1971 wrote that Association
Chairmen "are mostly insular men who, if no compelling reason of party
loyalty or local opinion exists to persuade otherwise, are more likely
than not to discourage their M.P.s from supporting entry". (67)
	
The
situation was, however, more complex than that. 	 Chairmen were naturally
wary over issues which offended some members and even activists were
sensitive to the concerns of important constituency groups such as
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farmers and many shared the widespread feeling that there had been
inadequate information and discussion. 	 However, this should not be
interpreted as hostility.	 When motions were discussed by Associations,
the decision was normally in favour of entry, e.g. the Isle of Wight
by 33 to 1, North Devon 62 to 2 and Putney 80 to 20. (68) Even the
Scottish conference, which had hitherto been seen as cool due to the
fears of the fishing and hill-farming interests, endorsed the policy
by 600 votes to 50 on 18th May 1971. (69)
What is undisputed is that the Associations were overwhelmingly
for entry by Autumn 1971.	 The CPC discussion groups in October 1971
expressed their strong support.	 The main arguments were seen as
benefiting the economy and the influence of Britain in the world. 	 A
number of problems were raised: over fishing, agriculture, the legal
situation, sovereignty, the veto, Communism in EEC countries, the free
movement of labour and old age pensions.	 The groups urged that in
order to convince public opinion, the facts must be simplified. (70)
Conservative strategists were well aware of the value of the
Young Conservatives for their campaign. 	 St. John Stevas, in his
confidential memorandum, argued that special use should be made of the
Young Conservatives because they contributed both idealism and
enthusiasm which was frequently lacking from the 'European' side. (71)
At the 1970 Conference, David Atkinson, Young Conservative Vice-
Chairman, was one of the speakers, and there was noisy and active
support for Europe from Young Conservatives led by Greater London.
The 1971 Conference was held on a Young Conservative motion, and the
vote was greeted by a Young Conservative demonstration including
balloons and Euro-dollies in the national costumes of the EEC countries,
which the Express described as "more like an American Convention than
(72)
any momentous act of history".
	 The Young Conservatives were firm
284
and enthusiastic, as were the FCS.
	 At the 1970 conference FCS held
a joint meeting with the CGE and Chairman Roger Mountford spoke in
the debate.	 At their 1971 Conference a motion opposing membership
on any terms was overwhelmingly defeated.
	 Many Conservative students
participated in minibus tours in summer resorts distributing literature
organised by the European Movement in summer 1971, and their Swinton
course in September 1971 was on Europe and the Third World.	 The FCS
Conference in March 1972 found substantial majorities for a European
Defence Community, and reaffirmed support for a united Europe based on
direct elections and control of the Commission by the European
Parliament. (73)
The Women were quieter on Europe, although their leaders Kate
Macmillan and SaraMorrison were active in encouraging pro-European
resolutions.	 The discussion on the EEC at their 1971 Conference
found all pro-European speakers. (74)
TUNAC was of concern to the CCO.
	
"Anti-Market feeling is
particularly strong in this section of the Party, where there is a
substantial feeling that entry could have an adverse effect on living
standards as well as employment prospects". (75) There was a danger
that a European motion could be defeated, especially as the vote was
taken before the ministerial speech.	 Special effort was called for.
Eventually a motion was passed by a substantial majority expressing
the fullest confidence in the Government but urging that it should
explain to the old that their standard of living will increase at the
same rate as the average worker. (76)
The claim that grass roots Conservatives were anti-market is
unsubstantiated.	 Concern was expressed over particular interests,
Association Chairmen were naturally concerned about any divisions within
their local Associations, and there was sensitivity to any electoral
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damage from the issue.	 However, there is much evidence of support
even before the summer campaign: the motions to the 1970 Conference,
the Central Council, the enthusiasm expressed at the special Central
Council meeting, the Y.C.s and FCS. 	 The summer campaign was a success
in calming fears, providing answers to specific concerns and in
generating some enthusiasm, but was neither designed nor conducted as
a conversion campaign.
Central Office 
The importance of Europe to the Party was easily understood in
CCO and recognised by the creation of two committees on Europe (merged
in July 1971).	 The Committee on Europe was chaired by Michael Fraser.
They recognised that a major campaign was necessary to turn the Party
from doubters to enthusiasts.
	
Russell Lewis, CPC Director, presented
a paper on Educating the Party, which argued that the pros had been
outclassed by the antis and urged the need for factual information,
produced by the Central Office of Information and the Foreign Office;
a team of regional information officers; the training of the right kind
of speakers; and the production of briefing material for speakers. (77)
The Committee on Europe decided that the issue should be debated at all
kinds of Party meetings, preferably by Ministers, and Rippon was
requested to speak to the NUEC as an example, which he did in January
1971; that local activity should be stimulated through Association
officers, agents and Young Conservatives, simple leaflets should be
produced; an opinion poll carried out by Opinion Research Centre; and
the publication of Ministerial speeches. (78) The Committee acted as
the co-ordinator of the various activities of the Party and the
assessor of opinion within the Parliamentary Party and the Associations.
Their first step was to try to assess opinion. 	 M.P.s were
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tested through an examination of election addresses, and a CGE survey.
An ORC poll was commissioned, which confirmed that public opinion was
hostile, including 48% of Conservatives, mainly because of the cost
of living.	 The poll suggested that peace and prosperity were the
most favourable arguments to use, and that the public remained very
ill-informed.	 Douglas reported the poll to the Committee emphasising
that the overwhelming obstacle was prices, but that "public opinion is
not implacably opposed.. .There is confused, not hostile opinion....
Much better public relations is needed to convince people that Europe
is a good idea.	 But I believe that there is a large number waiting
to be convinced". (79)
The campaign, therefore, was directed at converting doubters into
supporters, by providing factual information, by dealing with the fears
raised by anti-marketeers and presenting the positive arguments for
membership.	 Michael Fraser was very concerned to keep intra-party
divisions to a minimum, and so strong action against the antis was
avoided seeking not to damage relations permanently and they made an
attempt to make Party members feel involved in the decision. (80)
The Committee also discussed how to handle by-elections, and local
referendums.	 There was the possibility that Labour would propose a
referendum on Europe so CCO was sensitive to the potential importance
of local referenda.
	
There was some evidence of support for the idea
(81)
of a national referendum among local Conservatives, 	 and a number
of local referendums were organised, mainly, but not only, by antis.
The problem was how to handle them.
	 Niblock recommended that Party
material should be available in bulk, and backbench M.P.s should be
encouraged to debate, but otherwise the Party should avoid giving them
publicity. (82) Rippon requested that the referendum in his own
constituency of Hexham should be ignored.
	
Geoffrey Block produced a
287
paper arguing strongly against a referendum and supporting a commitment
to the 1970 manifesto. (83) 	 TheCommittee decided that each referendum
should be handled locally with no special central involvement.
	 The
local referenda were surveyed by Donald Harker who reported that only
the Beckenham one organised by Philip Goodhart could be taken seriously.
The turnouts had been low, and M.P.s, like Prior, had dismissed them as
(84)
a farce.
	 CCO was satisfied that they did not demonstrate massive
opposition, influence parliamentary opinion, or provide encouragement
to the idea of a national referendum.
CRD produced considerable coverage on Europe in their publications,
concentrating on factual information and ministerial statements, with
titles like Common Market Facts, British and Europe, Interim Report on
the negotiations, Common Market Prospects for Britain, and European
Community Bill, a detailed study of the bill.
	 A number of information
sheets were produced by Tim Boswell, Stephen Sherbourne, Robin Turner
and Michael Niblock, aimed primarily at M.P.s, dealing with topics
such as a critique of the National Institute of Economic and Social
Research (NIESR) report, the Werner Report, European Monetary Union (EMU),
the Vedel Report, EEC Court of Justice and the Community's Treaty-Making
Powers.
	 Griffiths and Niblock, in April 1970, and Forman in December
1971, visited Brussels and conducted high level negotiations to keep
(85)the CRD well-informed on recent developments within the Community.
Their most popular publication was Europe: Words to Remember, which
provided a large number of quotations by Conservative, Labour, Liberal
politicians and non-party influentials, which provided useful quotations
of Wilson and other Labour politicians in their more pro-European moods.
The CRD also manned a Common Market Answering Service to deal with
queries from M.P.s and candidates, which answered over 100 questions
between 2nd August 1971 and 7th September 1971. (86)
	
In pursuing
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Fraser's policy to minimise permanent divisions, CRD publications on
the general activities of the Government did not provide a major
emphasis on Europe, in presenting the Government programme or
(87)
achievements.
The CPC, under the vigorous leadership of Russell Lewis,
concentrated on the publication of pamphlets aimed directly at the
anti-market arguments, and the provision of local trained speakers.
The pamphlets dealt with prices written by Diana Elles, sovereignty
by Beamish and St. John Stevas, and the regions by George Gardiner.. (88)
A number of pamphlets were produced on defence, all of which noted the
(89)
need for European co-operation.	 A CPC Contact brief on the
Common Market, written by Ben Paterson, argued the economic case, which
provided the basis for the CPC discussion groups. 
(90)
There was a
discussion over whether to produce a pamphlet arguing the case for and
against a referendum, between Goodhart and St. John Stevas, but this
was vetoed after a critical article by David Wood in the Times argued
that it would suggest an indecisive attitude towards the idea. (91)
The veto was bitterly criticised by Goodhart, and also by the pro-
European Greater London Young Conservatives.
The CPC recruited speakers and organised a voluntary speakers
conference on 30th January 1971; invited Home to give the CPC lecture
at the 1971 Conference which linked Britain's foreign policy to the
EEC; and encouraged CPC Chairmen to sponsor Association resolutions for
the Conferences and Central Councils. 
(92)
Lewis independently wrote
Between Rome or Brussels? for the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA),
aimed at the economic liberals, which argued for the liberal, free
market nature of the Treaty of Rome and attributed alternative
developments within the Community to the lack of fidelity to the
(93)
Treaty.
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The Swinton Journal published articles on 'Political Aspects of the
Common Market' by Lewis, 'Britain in Europe' by Beamish which dealt
with anti-market critics in a tone of disappointment rather than anger,
and 'Developing European Institutions' by Barney Hayhoe. (94)
The Organisation Department organised a series of seminars in
summer 1971 at Manchester, York, Cambridge, Bristol and London with
big speakers like John Davies, Keith Joseph, Prior, Thomas and Rippon,
although it was criticised for being too business oriented with too
many non-Party speakers. (95)
The Publicity Department produced a series of 17 leaflets under
the title of Europe and You, dealing with a wide range of issues.	 All
of these were sent to Rippon for checking by the Foreign Office.	 They
were distributed to local Association Chairmen in April 1971, designed
for general distribution and to satisfy their demands for simple
material.	 They proved extremely popular, with sales of over 200,000
despite demands for even simpler leaflets. 	 Also distributed were 2
million copies of the short white paper through the Party, or through
the European Movement if the Association was hostile. (96)An idea
for a Party Political Broadcast on Europe was vetoed by Rippon. (97)
Two issues that arose for CCO were the question of balance, and of
timing.	 Several anti M.P.s, Neil Marten, William Clarke, John Wells
and Richard Body, complained that CCO publications were one sided.
Marten wrote to the Party Chairman that M.P.s attacked Conservative
literature because of "the general principle of putting out pamphlets
which are bound to be attacked by Conservatives and, therefore,
creating divisiveness, while others thought that such pamphlets would
discredit C.O. 'objectivity' and that they would irritate Party
subscribers".	 In another letter he wanted anti-market literature
distributed through CCO. (98)
	
This raised the sensitive point of
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intra-party conflict and the role of CCO in such conflicts. 	 Thomas'
reply was clear that it was the job of CCO to support the Government
even if some M.P.s were opposed.
Another issue '
 was the timing of the Conservative campaign. 	 Some,
such as Lewis, were concerned that, during the negotiations, the
initiative was left to the anti-marketeers and attention was concentrated
on the details of the terms rather than the broad case for entry, and
they wanted Party activity to begin as early as possible.
	 However,
Douglas told Hurd on 19th February 1971 that "there does appear to be
general agreement amongst Ministers that pulling out too many stops
before the negotiations are safely past the crucial stage would damage
(99)the outcome".
	
Douglas felt that the negotiations were the key
factor in swinging public opinion, that the climax should be in July,
but that after the holidays "it seems to me to be pretty hopeless".
However, CCO opinion was generally that a longer campaign would increase
and consolidate Party support and avoid the anti-market criticisms of
'bouncing', and this was the recommendation of the influential Michael
Fraser.
The Informal Party 
The attitude of the Bow Group towards Europe was discussed in a
special European issue of Crossbow in July 1971.
	
After repeating the
traditional disclaimer of no corporate viewpoint, it acknowledged that
"The Group has always contained many passionate Europeans, including
the last 5 or 6 Chairmen, and is probably broadly in favour of entry",
even while there had been strong antis such as Simon Jenkins, a former
(100)
Crossbow editor".	 "The majority of Bow Group M.P.s will vote
with the Government - even Tim Raison, who has always been lukewarm,
has recently prepared himself and his constituents, in an Evening 
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Standard article, for are-examination of issues that look likely to
end in a European decision.	 Only John Biffen...and possibly Toby
Jessel, are likely to vote against the Government".
The same issue had a strong editorial, noting that "Although it
has been the economy, not Europe, that has lost by-elections for the
Government, it has been generally accepted that a favourable attitude
to Europe should be prudently played down on the hustings.
	
It is	 up
to Mr. Heath to ensure that the European case is put well and
realistically, so that the success of Britain's application not only
ceases to be thought a liability in by-elections, but becomes a major
plank in the Conservative Party's eventual platform".	 The issue also
included pro-European articles on defence by Leon Brittan, Industry by
Campbell Adamson of the CBI, Institutions by Bruce-Gardyne and
Agriculture by Scott-Hopkins, and reassuring articles on the Commonwealth
by Arnold Smith, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, and New Zealand
by Sir Denis Blundell.
Two Bow Group pamphlets were Rich Man's Club? by Leon Brittan et
al in January 1971 which argued the benefit to developing countries of
membership, and Peace Has Its Price, published by CPC, which argued
for Anglo-French nuclear entente and a European Defence Force within
NATO.	 The Bow Group therefore remained a strong source of support
among young and ambitious Conservatives.
The Monday Club was very severely divided over Europe with most of
the leadership favourable while the membership was more generally
hostile.	 David Levy, the Deputy Editor of their quarterly magazine,
Monday World, argued that "whether we like it or not our future is
intimately involved with that of our European neighbours", that
"co-operation with our European equals is surely closer to self
government than is our present slide into the economic slavery of
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American domination....A Europe of Nations shall be the framework for
a truly conservative revolution". (101) Biggs-Davison produced a
eulogy on De Gaulle and his belief in a European confederation of
nations. Rippon, a Monday Club member, was the guest speaker at the
Annual Dinner in January 1971.
	 Most Monday Club 'Europeans' were
concerned to reject federalism, with a critical editorial on the
special Central Council meeting for its denigration of national
differences, and Jonathan Guinness complained that the real case for
Europe was ignored by the One Wonders, who dominated the debate. (102)
However, this did not reflect opinion among the membership.	 The
Newsletter was filled by largely anti-market letters and Monday World 
with anti-market advertisements.
	
The Young Members held a conference
on Europe on 7th January 1970 with Body versus Amery as speakers which
reflected hostile opinion in the audience. 	 At the Annual General
Meeting on 28th April 1971 a motion that the Monday Club is against
Britain signing the Treaty of Rome was carried. 	 At a conference on
2nd October 1971 members voted by 66 to 47 against membership. (103)
Feelings ran so high that the Executive decided that the Monday
Club should take .a neutral attitude and barred pro and anti groups
inside the Monday Club.	 This, however, was seen as an attempt by the
leadership to ignore the anti-market'feelings of the membership. 	 Tim
Stroud, Chairman of the Young Members, proposed a compromise that the
antis would not work within the Monday Club to leave the European
Community while the pros would not work for federalism. 	 This, however,
produced little support as few Monday Clubbers were federalists.
Eventually a . compromise was reached at a policy conference on 1st July
1972, where G.K. Young, Chairman of the EEC Study Group, reported
that the majority were against membership and the Government had no
mandate.
	
A motion was proposed by anti-marketeers Harvey Proctor and
293
Gordon Middleton that the Monday Club notes the lack of support and so
is unable to ratify the decision to enter. 	 This was accepted by 25
votes to 3.	 The Monday Club was so concerned with its internal
(104)divisions that it was unable to influence the debate.
After the 1970 election, the European Forum renamed itself the
Conservative Group for Europe to make its party character clear, and
David Baker stepped down as chairman to enable an M.P., Sir Tuf ton
Beamish, to lead the CGE.	 The CGE divided itself into three functional
groups, on Parliament and Government, Party and Country, and relations
with the Continent.	 The first group was the main field of activity,
as discussed earlier, and was the main reason for the presence of
Beamish on the Committee on Europe. 	 The other areas, though, were not
neglected.	 At the 1970 conference they held a joint meeting with FCS;
in January 1971 they formed three advisory committees on Young
Conservatives, women and agriculture; produced speakers' notes;
organised a chemical industries conference; and published three pamphlets,
with speeches by Rippon and Home and on the industrial advantages by
(105)Tom Boardman, M.P.
	
On 16th November 1971, the CGE decided that
its role for 1972 should reflect this 3-pronged approach - to encourage
the antis to support the legislation, to maintain public support and
(106)to help create a centre-right alliance in Europe.	 The CGE's main
contribution was in strengthening backbench supporters and influencing
informally the uncertain backbenchers.
The CGE, as an integral part of the European Movement, tried to
ensure that balance was achieved in European Movement activities, and
supported European Movement publications and activities.
	
Lord Harlech,
a former Tory Minister, became European Movement Chairman on 30th
January 1971, and Donald Harker of the Organisation Department joined
the Campaign Committee of the European Movement to achieve a high level
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of contact with the Party. Whitelaw became chairman of the information
programme to ensure publications were acceptable to the Conservatives,
and in return Conservatives were encouraged not to overpraise Labour
'Europeans' and thus embarrassthem.
	
The European Movement was active
in the local referendums, especially in Beckenham, and distributed
literature from CCO when the local Associations were hostile.
	 The
European Movement was thus able to fulfil certain functions which would
have been difficult for the Government or Party officially. (107)
The Anti-Common Market League, now under the chairmanship of Sir
Robin Williams, maintained its existence but acted primarily as a
support group for the Common Market Safeguards Campaign, to which it
handed over its funds.	 It distributed 50,000 copies of an election
leaflet, organised a debate under the auspices of the Monday Club at
the 1970 Party Conference, and continued to collect signatures for the
petition, but primarily it simply supported the activities of other
organisations.
One group of free traders were based around the Open Seas Forum,
which took its name from a quote from Winston Churchill. "Each time
we must choose between Europe and the Open Seas, we shall always choose
the Open Seas". 	 While an all-party group, it was dominated by
Conservative anti-market M.P.s with Richard Body M.P. as Chairman, and
Michael Clark Hutchinson, Edward Du Cann, Toby Jessel, Roger Moate
and Robin Turton on the Council. 	 The Forum favoured "the idea of a
wider free trade area based upon the principles of EFTA", and its main
concern was attacking Community membership. 	 It published a series of
pamphlets by economists on the economic case against membership, with
Harry Johnson, James Meade and Peter Oppenheimer as authors, and during
the negotiations another series highlighting the negative impact on
specific industries such as the banana, fishing and tobacco industries. (108)
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Body demanded for the Forum equal space at Conservative conferences
but Peter Thomas replied that it was not the job of Central Office to
distribute anti-government literature. (109) TheForum was the
inspiration for the book, Destiny and Disillusion, with articles on
agriculture by Body, industry by Sir John Hunter chairman of Swan
Hunters, monetary union by Brian Griffiths, World Trade by Harry
Johnson and the strategic implications by Leonard Beaton. (110)
Another group was the Conservative Anti-Common Market Information
Service (CACMIS), formed at the inspiration of the leading anti-market
M.P.s, who felt the need to demonstrate grass root Conservative support
for their position.	 The President was Turton, the Vice-Presidents
Walker-Smith and Marten, with Roger Moate as Chairman, a new M.P. who
had been active as a Young Conservative in the creation of the ACML, and
an unpaid Director, Jim Bourlet.	 The refusal of Central Office to
distribute anti-market literature provided the reason for creating
CACMIS, which was limited to providing information and guidance.
CACMIS published 6 well-produced leaflets called 'The Common Market and
You' on Australia, Key Questions, the economy, sovereignty, prices and
the regions, which were cleverly very similar in design to the official
Party leaflets.	 Packages of literature, including a copy of Powell's
The Common Market: the Case Against were sent to every Conservative
agent to distribute to the 1971 Conference delegates. 	 A bookshop was
set up at the 1971 and 1972 Party Conferences and leaflets, an article
by Teddy Taylor and other anti-market literature were distributed to
all on their mailing list.	 CACMIS was not a membership organisation
but a distribution network to anti-market Conservatives. 	 After the
vote on the principle of membership, CACMIS tried to strengthen the
resolve of anti-market M.P.s to vote against the details of the bill.
Heath and Pym were quoted that "the vote on principle was not a vote of
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confidence in the government, so how could the details be?".	 Their
(111)
activity caused considerable concern at CCO
	
but on 19th December
1972 CACMIS was ended as a separate organisation.
The Common Market Safeguards Campaign distributed a pamphlet to
all Conservative Associations; British Intelligence Publications
published anti-market pamphlets; the weekly magazine Time and Tide was
anti-market and anti-Dictator Heath; Donald Johnson a former M.P. wrote
and published the vitriolic Ted Heath: A Latter Day Charlemagne: Europe 
Slave or Free?; and some Conservatives supported Keep Britain Out,
including Body and Sir lain McTaggart, and 5 Conservative candidates
from safe Labour seats.
	 At a Keep Britain Out rally Tim Keigwin, the
parliamentary candidate for North Devon, claimed that over the past 7
years pro-Europeans had been infiltrated into marginal seats.
	 KBO
organised several of the local referendums in the view that popular
opinion was intensely anti-market.
	 However, by the autumn the antis
have "seen what they believed was grass root opposition to the market
drift away". (112) Conservative antis felt support for Europe had
been bought, that they had been overwhelmed by the sheer size and money
of the pro-market campaign and that if the debate had been balanced
then public opinion would have been on their side.
The C.B.I. had come to adopt a strongly 'European' position under
John Davies and Campbell Adamson as Director-General and Sir John
Partridge and Sir Arthur Norman as President.
	 They co-operated
closely with the Government during the negotiations, while strongly
endorsing the principle of membership. 	 Between 1970-1972 they
conducted a campaign amongst their members to explain the economic
advantages of membership.
	 This position was endorsed by the over-
whelming majority of their members and by all the Regional Councils.
There was some little opposition led by Sir John Hunter, of Swan Hunters
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the shipbuilders, and a number of small firms expressed fears as to
the effects upon them.	 The CBI, however, was a firm ally and
co-operated closely with the broad campaign effort. 	 It had close
links through John Davies to the Government; Campbell Adamson addressed
a CGE seminar on the Industrial Advantages on 19th May 1971 and
contributed an article to Crossbow in July 1971; and the CBI were
always willing to provide business spokesman as speakers.
The NFU stated that it "wisely refrained from taking up a pro and
anti-position on the general principle of Common Market membership". (113)
The Union was much more apprehensive about the future of British
agriculture outside the Community and aware that agricultural support
depended on the general health of the economy. 	 It concentrated on
obtaining the best possible terms during the negotiations without any
commitment on the principle.	 After considerable discussion among the
agricultural community, the NFU's Council concluded that "There is no
doubt that among producers generally the response to the terms as
negotiated by the Government is a positive one. 	 British agriculture
for its part is confident of its ability to respond to the challenge
presented by membership of an enlarged community". 
.(114)
Farmers
therefore did not provide a major source of Conservative anti-market
feeling as in the early 1960s.
The Economist maintained its pro-European position. 	 It was highly
critical of the lack of leadership during the negotiations, and felt
that the pro-Europeans "were found largely silent, inert and generally
wanting". (115)On the debate over a quick bill versus the Autumn,
they acknowledged the arguments on both sides but urged July, as they
felt that movement was toward the antis, but they remained optimistic
because they believed that public opinion was "more lethargic and
(116)
sceptical than deeply hostile". 	 The Economist was important in
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maintaining confidence among businessmen and the Party that membership
remained both in the interests of Britain and that it was a policy that
would become popular with the British people.
The Spectator became highly critical of membership under the
editorship of George Gale and took a populist, Anglo-Saxon position,
calling for a community of white English-speaking nations, because
"Australia, Canada and New Zealand are familial and Africa is not". (117)
It published articles by Harry Johnson on the economic case against,
by Legge-Bourke in favour of a unilateral decision to reconsider
Britain's trading preferences, and 'A Senior Conservative' which viewed
entry as "a form of abdication". (118) Editorials argued that
membership was "folly and treachery", supported anti-market Conservatives
who risked their political futures and felt that this issue overrided
partisan loyalty. (119)	 TheSpectator thus provided a forum for
anti-market Conservatives, although it probably suffered from a rather
hysterical tone on its editorial page.
The Conservative press (except, of course, for the Express)
remained consistently pro-European, while allowing some space to critics.
The Financial Times provided extensive coverage on the Common Market,
while its columnist, C. Gordon Tether, took a strongly hostile position.
The editor of the Times, William Rees-Mogg, provided a highly favourable,
sometimes even enthusiastic, support in the editorial columns, while
Peter Jay, the economics editor and son of leading Labour anti-marketeer
Douglas Jay, argued the case against on the economic pages. 	 Peregrine
Worsethorne, an influential columnist, was highly sceptical of the
pro-European arguments, but the Daily Telegraph emphasised that "We
have supported entry in principle from the start and consider the
present terms acceptable". (120) 	 It opposed the idea of a free vote,
published a successful guide to the Common Market, and was confident
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(121)
that the public would accept the decision of Parliament. 	 The
Daily Mail, while moderately favourable, expressed much more concern
over the failure to convince public opinion. (122) Thepro-Market
press (both Tory and Labour), were well catered for by the media
breakfasts, organised by Geoffrey Tucker, former publicity director
for the Conservatives on behalf of the European Movement, which
provided them with useful pro-market information and opinion.
The Express continued its campaign against British entry, and
presented itself as the true voice of the British people. 	 However,
after the Parliamentary vote on principle, it accepted the decision.
"A mistake - a great mistake has been made.	 But it has been made by
the House of Commons, and the Daily Express accepts the verdict of the
freely elected British Parliament". (123) Much to the disappointment
of many anti-marketeers, it did not support the campaign to fight the
bill on every occasion.
Public opinion on Europe was highly volatile in this period, with
substantial opposition in 1970 and early 1971 changing ta suggart by
autumn 1971.	 Public opinion was extremely important because of its
effect on the voting of M.P.s and because of Heath's declaration that
Britain would not enter without the wholehearted support of the British
people. While he claimed that this support was expressed through
Parliament there was a widely held feeling that public opinion was
being ignored by the Government and the fear of the effect this would
have on the Conservative vote at the next election. 	 So opinion polls
were studied with interest even more intense than normal.
The ORC conducted three polls on Europe for CCO, in April 1967,
August 1970 and July 1971.	 The second poll 5-9th August 1970 showed
33% for with 53% against, which however showed improvement from a poll in
February 1970 which was 16% to 70%.
	 The poll showed that only 10%
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were very strongly for with 26% very strongly against; that men were
more for than women; that Conservative voters were only marginally
more 'European' than Labour voters with Liberal voters very anti; that a
majority, including 25% of the antis, supported negotiations; that the
primary anti issue was the cost of living mentioned by 38%, while
issues such as the Commonwealth or British identity received only 3%;
that the main pro arguments were trade, long term benefits and anti-
isolation; 62% supported a referendum including a majority of pro-
marketeers: that competition, prosperity and peace were the best issues
in favour of Europe. and that most people were poorly informed. (123)
The interpretation of Douglas of the CRD was that opinion was not fixed
and could be swung in favour with a proper campaign.
The third poll showed that 60% of Conservatives thought that the
agreement was reasonable; 56% were still against and only 30% for
but this revealed a significant shift in favour; the cost of living
remained the main issue, although sovereignty was now raised by 9%;
50% felt that we were entering too quickly; 90% felt that Britain would
join; and most significantly that if there was Party polarisation there
would be little change in voting, with 2% of Labour going to the
Conservatives, 1% of Conservatives to Labour, and 7% Liberals to
Labour. (124)
James Douglas was the opinion poll expert in the CRD and his
assessment was that opinion was volatile becasue they think they are
expressing views about something different.	 They were in favour in
1960 because they felt British industry needed a kick, now they were
against because of the price of butter. (125) .Opinion  therefore was
sceptical but not hostile. By the time of the Parliamentary vote,
opinion had shifted enough in favour that the claim that Parliament
was acting against the will of the people had lost much of its force.
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The advice that the Government received from the opinion polls,
most of the press, and from Central Office was that opposition was
volatile and could easily be swung by a strong campaign emphasising
the merits of membership.	 As the summer of 1971 demonstrated, this
assessment proved correct.
However,signficantly,this was not due to a simple appeal to party
loyalty.	 While support for entry rose from 30% to 45% between April
and June 1971, support for the Government slumped from 48% to 39%.
Kitzinger points out that while there was a remarkable 30% shift among
Conservative voters between May and July 1971, there was another
remarkable shift among Labour voters of 14% in the same direction,
despite the clear opposition of the Labour leadership. (126)
	
Thus
there were other significant influences, other than the party, on the
swift change in public opinion.
Conclusion 
The role of Edward Heath in obtaining British membership has been
seen as crucial with the powers of Prime Minister and Party Leader
providing him with the necessary instruments to achieve his goal.
	 This
is a view presented both by pro-marketeers such as Kitzinger and
anti-marketeers like Evans.	 However, as with the assessment of the
role of Macmillan earlier, this view underestimates the existence of
forces within the Conservative Party (and outside) which showed that
same objective.
The Cabinet was unanimous in recommending entry, even if some were
not enthusiastic.	 Others, however, were just as committed as Heath.
While attitudes to the Common Market was a factor in the selection of
government ministers, it was not the decisive factor, for example with
regard to Powell or Du Cann.
	 Among junior ministers, Neil Marten was
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the only anti-marketeer approached to give a commitment not to resign
over the issue, although there were other M.P.s less publicly
associated with that position. 	 There is little evidence to suggest
that the make-up of the government would have been much different if
the issue of Europe had not existed.
In the parliamentary party the earliest study by the CGE in
December 1970 found overwhelming support for the policy, with 195 in
favour and 22 against out of 322 M.P.s.
	 The CGE backbenchers were
active in using friendship and personal relations in the campaign.
The Whips, the official representatives of the party leadership, had
little influence on the final outcome for a number of reasons.	 The
instruments available to them were very limited and the potentially
most useful, ministerial appointments and honours, were undermined by
Heath's policy of low ministerial turnover and restricted patronage,
while the rest has been described by Norton as the "Small change of
political life 	 unlikely in itself to influence particular votes
and was not apparently employed". (127)
Secondly, the Whips made little attempt to influence the strong
anti-marketeers because of their publicly established position.
Thirdly, the Whips wanted backbench co-operation on other issues before
the House about which M.P.s might not have felt so strongly. 	 Finally,
the Chief Whip, Francis Pym, was highly concerned to minimise the long
term damage to party cohesion.
The support for entry amongst constituency activists has been
underestimated.	 Kitzinger claimed that "In early 1971 there can be
little doubt that the majority of associations was rather opposed to
entry" but provides no evidence for this view. (128) Norton claimed
that "One may infer from the shift in opinion reflected in the party
that many local activists supported entry because it was Conservative
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Government policy - hence an issue of loyalty to the party - and not
primarily on the merits of the case for entry". (129) Here Norton
confuses Conservative voters represented in opinion polls with the
much smaller number and more politically informed Conservative
activists.	 These activists had for a number of years listened to
speakers, read party literature and discussed at CPC or Association
meetings the issue, and thus were far more aware of the reasons that
led the party leadership to believe in British membership.	 Surveys
show that the more informed people were the most pro-European and
party activists could be expected to be amongst the better informed.
Evidence from constituency resolutions to the 1970 and 1971
Party Conferences and 1971 Central Council, from the votes on the motions
at those Conferences, the feedback from the October 1971 CPC discussion
groups, the attendance and enthusiasm at the special Central Council
meeting do not suggest a hostile party reluctantly endorsing a policy
purely out of party loyalty.
	 This is not to deny the existence of
much confusion among party activists due to the complexity of the
issue, concern over the potential, electoral impact or the role of party
loyalty in tipping the balance of those who were uncertain. 	 However,
the claims that most associations were hostile in early 1971 or that a
change of opinion occurred among activists during the summer due to
party loyalty is unsubstantiated.	 The majority of party activists
could probably be described as moderately or mildly pro-European, but
more concerned about the continuation of the Government than any
specific issue.
Central Office was committed to the European policy on substantive
grounds and believed that, after an effective campaign, it would not
be electorally damaging, indeed could be presented as a major
achievement of the Government.
	 Central Office worked extremely hard
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producing and distributing a massive amount of literature. 	 Sir Michael
Fraser was committed to conducting a successful campaign without any
permanent split in the party, and so was very careful not to appear to
be pressing the local Associations of rebel M.P.s.
	 Literature was
provided but more extensive campaigning was left to the CGE or the
European Movement. The professionals would have preferred an earlier
campaign but they were restrained by ministerial considerations over
the negotiations.	 Central Office was enthusiastic and eager to
conduct the campaign on Europe.
The informal elements of the party remained broadly pro-European.
The Bow Group was critical of the early lack of leadership. 	 The
•
Conservative Group for Europe were active on a number of fronts but
especially in Parliament. 	 The CBI conducted their own intense
campaign, the NFU eventually supported entry, while the Economist and
the press vigorously supported entry.	 The Monday Club was led by
pro-marketeers but prevented from activity by grass roots opposition.
The Anti-Common Market League was virtually defunct; the Open Seas
Forum only reached a fairly limited audience; CACMIS was successful but
only formed in June 1971; while Conservative anti-market activity was
spread amongst a number of organisations.
	 The Express continued its
fight, now joined by the Spectator. The Tory anti-marketeers lacked
an adequate focus for their activities that was provided on the other
side by the CGE.
The shift in public opinion during the summer of 1971 was due to
a number of factors, of which party loyalty was only one.
	 The
perception of the negotiated terms as satisfactory, the attraction of a
strong Government with a clear policy, distrust of what appeared as
unprincipled opposition by the Labour Party and confused signals to
Labour voters, the massive information and propaganda campaign, and
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that many voters only then gave serious consideration to the issue
with the clear possibility of membership, all contributed to public
endorsement of entry by October 1971.
There is no attempt to deny the importance of the role played by
Edward Heath in this period, but to emphasise that much of the
Conservative Party had the same goal as himself, entry to the European
Community, and on tactics, over an October vote and a free vote, won
over the opposition of the Party Leader.
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CHAPTER 7	 STILL THE PARTY OF EUROPE 1972-1975
Introduction 
Britain became a member of the European Community on 1st January
1973.	 However hopes that the issue of membership was now settled
were not met, as an active element in the Labour Party called for
withdrawal.	 At the February 1974 election, Labour made Europe an
issue with a statement in the manifesto that they wanted a total
renegotiation and that they would give an opportunity to the people
to decide on the issue, although whether this would be through an
election or a referendum was kept vague. 	 Heath declared, "It's not
an issue. We are in the Common Market and we stay in the Common
Market", but Wilson responded that "Try as he can, Mr. Heath cannot
dodge the question of the Common Market". (1)
	
Powell also made
Europe an issue by not standing as a Conservative candidate, by
speaking at two Get Britain Out rallies, and by his declaration that
he had voted Labour by postal ballot before the election day
explicitly on this issue.
The Conservative manifesto presented a cautious but clear
endorsement of British entry, emphasising the advantages for the
economy and British influence in the world.
"We have now been a member of the Community for a
little over a year.	 While it is, therefore, far
too soon to attempt a complete assessment of the
implications for Britain of this historical step
forward, it is already clear that we are better
able to secure our national interests both
economic and political within the Community than
would have been possible had we remained outside...
We have made it clear that we are not satisfied
with every aspect of Community arrangements, and
have sought - and will comtinue to seek - changes
when these are desirable... .Renegotiation of the
Community in the sense of reforming its practice
and redefining Britain's place in it, is a
continuous process, which can only be conducted
from within, and in which we are already playing
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a full part". (2)
The Conservatives lost the election, although with more votes
than Labour.	 Europe was later presented as one of the major
achievements of the Heath administration, but it was not one of the
major Conservative themes of the campaign. 	 There was some
speculation that Powell and Europe had led to the Conservative defeat,
but there is little evidence that intensity on this issue was sufficient
to change many votes.
The Labour Government began renegotiations of the terms of
membership,which a major section hoped would eventually lead to
withdrawal.	 In the October 1974 election, Europe was described in
the Conservative manifesto as "by far the most historic achievement
of the last Conservative Administration", (3) but again received little
attention as a campaign theme.	 Labour meanwhile repeated its promise
that the British people would be consulted on the results of the
renegotiations "through the ballot box". 	 On 23rd January 1975 Wilson
finally confirmed that the consultation would be through a referendum.
Due to the very strong divisions within the Government, a referendum
was seen as the best way to resolve these divisions. (4)
During the renegotiations the Conservatives were preoccupied with
the question of the Party Leader.	 Faced with considerable criticism,
Heath presented himself for re-election. 	 On 4th February 1975, to
considerable surprise, Margaret Thatcher received 130 votes to 119 for
Heath; Heath withdrew from the contest, and Mrs. Thatcher easily beat
Whitelaw in the second round on 11th February 1975.
In March 1975 Wilson announced that the renegotiations had been
successful and that the Government would recommend the British people
to vote in favour of staying in the Community. 	 The Conservatives
were placed in a difficult situation of wishing to welcome improvements
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in the conditions achieved in the renegotiations without repudiating
their own set of negotiations.	 The position adopted was to welcome
the improvements but to emphasise that they could have been achieved
in the normal process of Community discussion. 	 Whitelaw stated that
"the undoubted improvements in Community arrangements from the United
Kingdom's point of view could have been obtained in the course of the
Community's normal development and without the whole business of
renegotiation under threat of withdrawal". (5)
Mrs. Thatcher took the opportunity in the debate to reiterate
the Conservative commitment to the Community under her leadership,
and gave as her three principal reasons peace and security, guaranteed
food supplies and a future world role for Britain. 	 On the vote to
accept the new terms on 9th April 1975, only 8 Conservatives joined
the No Lobby, while a majority of Labour M.P.s voted against the •
recoimendation of their own Government.
On the legislation for the referendum, the Conservatives opposed
the referendum on the grounds that it was an attempt to break Treaty
obligations, that it was intended to be binding on Parliament, that
it would undermine Parliamentary democracy, that it was an unrealiable
method of political decision, and that it created a precedence for
future referenda.	 Mrs. Thatcher led the opposition in the Commons
debate on March 9th, and only 5 Conservatives voted in favour of the
referendum.	 The Conservatives maintained their principled opposition
through the Second and Third Readings of the Bill, but assisted its
speedy passage.
With the vote in March to hold a referendum, the Conservative
Party put its full support behind the Yes Campaign, with both its own
campaign and full participation in the umbrella organisation, Britain
in Europe.
	 The vote on 5th June 1975 was:
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Yes
	 17,378,581	 67.2%
No	 8,470,073	 32.8%.
The policy thus had the popular endorsement, at least on 5th June 1975,
that the Conservatives had feared would be lacking.
	
Although most
anti-marketeers declared that they would accept the decision, the
issue refused to remain dead, and at the time of writing remains on
the political agenda.	 That, however, is beyond the bounds of this
study.
Leader 
After Britain's entry, Heath turned his attentions elsewhere,
partly in response to the feeling that Europe had already taken too
much of the Government's energy to the neglect of other pressing
problems, partly due to the continuing unpopularity of Europe in the
opinion polls and partly as a deliberate policy in the hope that a
lack of attention would lead to a passive acceptance. 	 Sir Christopher
Soames was appointed a Commissioner, Sir Peter Kirk was made leader
of the Conservative delegation to the European Parliament and Heath
made some references to Europe in the 1973 Conference speech, with a
call for the participation of the Commonwealth in the Community, a
common policy towards the USA, reform of the CAP and a new regional
policy.	 However, these policies were not vigorously pursued and other
initiatives, such as direct elections to the European Parliament, were
firmly opposed by Heath.
This approach came in for considerable criticism from Conservative
'Europeans'.	 Norman St. John Stevas expressed grave concern at a CGE
meeting at the failure of the Government to put over the European case
and asked that this concern should be expressed to the Prime Minister. (6)
This was taken up by the Overseas Committee who expressed intense
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dissatisfaction with the Government's low profile due to its feared
electoral impact.
	 Kenneth Clarke, representing the Prime Minister,
claimed that there had been "a conscious change of mind in the
Government and a recognition that the policy of deliberately playing
down Europe had been a mistake", (7) but there is little evidence of
any change in the Government's tactics. 	 Soames was also felt to
have made an oblique attack on Heath's nationalism. (8)
The Economist claimed that it was "Time for Ted to Stop the Rot',
and that many businessmen and Conservatives felt there had been much
loss of goodwill over Britain's response to the oil crisis. 	 "It is
felt by the CBI...that Mr. Heath has been particularly to blame in
starting the scramble towards petty nationalism in Europe" and quotes
one businessman about Heath that "He rightly got the credit for bringing
us in, but when he was really needed last year, he abandoned ship and
let it sink". (9)	 It also criticised that "His Government, and
notably his senior members, have not said as much about the EEC as
(10)
they might have, either in public or in Parliament", 	 although
it believed in September 1973 that "the great man in Number 10 is now
stirring from his long Eurosleep". (11) However, Heath gave Europe
little attention during the 1974 elections on the grounds that it was
no longer an issue, but he did not even take up the question of what
a Conservative Government would do inside the Community.
During the leadership election, Europe was not an issue which
divided the candidates, but it was reflected amongst their supporters.
The most fervent marketeers tended to support Heath as the man of
Europe, while anti-marketeers had their own natural reasons for
supporting the alternative candidate.	 One Conservative anti-marketeer,
who was also close to Mrs. Thatcher, stated that "almost certainly all
(12)
of them voted for Margaret Thatcher".
	
It was a protest against
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the way that Heath had treated them, a hope that under a new
leadership there would be more opportunities for opponents or lukewarm
supporters of the Community, and an underestimation of Thatcher's
commitment to membership. However she could never have been elected
without the support of many of the marketeers.
There was much discussion as to Thatcher's views on Europe.
Anti-marketeers liked to feel that she shared much of their position.
Powell said, "She was never a committed Marketeer, though she accepted,
as a condition of leadership, the European commitment; she left the
referendum campaign largely and thankfully to Heath (when it began
there was no certainty that Heath would have a triumph)....There is
no point in the new Conservative leadership spiking itself on the
commitments of the former discredited leadership". (13)Cosgrave
felt that "All in all, she was certain to find herself more at home
with the Tory members of the National Referendum Campaign than with
their opponents, among whose ranks were to be found those most
critical of her leadership". (14)
Evidence for this view was found in her changes in the Shadow
Cabinet with the dismissal of six members, all 'Europeans' and
including Rippon, and their replacement by people who were at least
not prominent enthusiasts.
	 She asked John Biffen to join but he
declined until after the referendum. Particular concern was
expressed at the selection of Reginald Maudling as Foreign Secretary.
The CGE wanted her to play a more active role in the referendum
campaign, to make more European speeches and to send a letter to all
Association Chairmen. (15) There was a widely held scepticism
among Conservative 'Europeans' about her perceived lack of commitment
to Europe and the Yes Campaign.
However this underestimates her own position.
	
Thatcher was a
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convinced marketeer, but lacked Heath's emotional involvement. 	 She
was a pragmatic 'European' who saw clear advantages to Britain in the
field of peace and security, a bigger market and a world role for
Britain.	 She took an early opportunity, in the Commons debate on
the renegotiated terms, to vigorously reassert her support for the
(16)Community.
The selection of her Shadow Cabinet was a reflection of the
existence of the few anti-market M.P.s and the larger number of
lukewarm ones amongst her supporters. None of her appointments had
difficulties in endorsing the Conservative position in the campaign.
Her choice of Maudling was taken only after great consultation, and
(17)
with the support of Home.
Soon after her election she told the Conservative campaign
committee that she was keen to make a major speech on Europe at the
(18)
appropriate time, which the committee felt would be May. 	 She
decided that she would only speak from Conservative platforms and not
for Britain in Europe, but this was in response to Wilson's decision
to speak only on Labour platforms, and she feared that to do otherwise
(19)
would weaken her position as Party leader. 	 She launched the
CGE campaign on 16th April, under the watchful eye of its President
Edward Heath, with a strong speech claiming that Conservatives have
pursued the "European vision for almost as long as we have existed
as a Party... .Conservatives must give a clear lead and play a
vigorous part in the campaign to keep Britain in Europe....We must
play our full part in ensuring that Conservative supporters say 'Yes
(20)to Europe'".	 The content of her speech was lost as attention
was directed to her presence on the same platform as Heath.
She gave another strong speech on 28th April to Area Agents
urging them to use all their influence to encourage local Conservative
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activity; wrote a letter to all Conservative M.P.s urging their
active support; mentioned Europe in all her speeches and ensured that
they were always included in press handouts. (21) TheFederalist,
a journal published by young federalists and normally very quick to
criticise any deviation from fervent Europeanism, stated that "Mrs.
Thatcher.. .has stirred herself mightily and delivered some excellent
speeches on Europe which makes her position quite clear, and firmly
slapped down those in the Party who wanted the referendum for
(22)Conservative advantage".
There were suggestions that she begrudged Heath's role in the
campaign.	 However, she indirectly offered the Conservative leadership
(23)
of the campaign to him which he rejected; 	 she did not exclude
him from the Britain in Europe launch on 26th May as claimed in some
of the press; (24) and after the campaign publicly congratulated him
in the House of Commons in a question to Wilson, "Is the Prime
Minister aware that all of us on this side of the House and many of
(252that side would wish to give the campaign honours to(Mr. Heath)?".
In different circumstances, she might have been expected to play
a bigger role, but there were a number of specific factors which
prevented that.	 She was aware that Conservative anti-marketeers
were amongst her supporters; she was eager to heal the wounds of the
past and to reunite all in the Party after the referendum; she was
reluctant to help Wilson in his intra-party difficulties; she was
still settling into her new leadership, without strong self-confidence;
she was relatively inexperienced in foreign affairs; and she was
unwilling to appear to be competing with Heath.
	 Her support for
Britain in Europe was clear and unequivocable, but her priorities
lay elsewhere.	 The attention that the Conservative Party gave to
the referendum, and the resources that were contributed to it, was a
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result of the forces within the Conservative Party and not due to her
own political priorities.
Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet 
The Heath Cabinet had been united in favour of membership but it
supported the redirection of energies away from Europe and towards
other matters.	 John Davies was the Minister for Europe, but the
Economist attacked him for merely being a co-ordinator between the
various departments rather than an initiator of European policy. (26)
The European Co-ordinating Committee expressed the view that the
Cabinet had decided to give Europe a low profile because of a possible
general election. (27)
The election of Mrs. Thatcher as Leader led to a number of
changes in the Shadow Cabinet, with the departure of Rippon, Walker,
Carr, Paul Channon, Nicholas Scott and Peter Thomas, and the entry
of Airey Neave, Timothy Raison (who had been a lukewarm supporter of
Europe), Sally Oppehheim and George Younger. 	 The replacement of
Rippon by Maudling as Shadow Foreign Secretary caused some speculation
that it was an indication of a less 'European' approach. but it was
motivated primarily by a desire to have an experienced politician in
that position, and a 'progressive' in a field which would not involve
him extensively in economic policy questions.	 The new Party Chairman,
Lord Thorneycroft, was a long established 'European'.
The Shadow Cabinet was united in opposition to the principle of
the referendum, as undermining parliamentary democracy, but considered
a paper from the European Co-ordinating Committee which noted that 80%
in opinion polls favoured a referendum and that an attempt to wreck
the referendum bill could prove to be highly unpopular.
	
There was
also the fear that a delay on the referendum could irritate voters
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into a more hostile stance. 	 The Shadow Cabinet therefore decided to
oppose the bill on the Second and Third Readings, but otherwise not to
cause delay.	 The easy passage of the bill was contribution to the
opposition by John Peyton, the Shadow Leader of the House. "I must
remind the Government of how much they are indebted to the Opposition
for the exceedingly reasonable, restrained and sensible way in which
they received a Bill which was based on a rather unwelcome dodge and
device adopted by the Prime Mininster in a moment of difficulty for
himself". (28)
There was no dissent in the Shadow Cabinet that the Conservative
Party should campaign for a Yes vote. 	 William Whitelaw, Deputy
Leader, was given responsibility for the Conservative role in the
campaign.	 He was chosen partly for his acceptability to the pro-
marketeers in the other parties, and partly as a symbolic gesture to
him and his supporters as the defeated candidate for the leadership.
Whitelaw acted as Deputy President of Britain in Europe, and kept an
eye on its activities for the Party.	 During the campaign, the main
Conservative spokesmen were, apart from Mrs. Thatcher, Whitelaw,
Maudling, Heath, Carrington, Rippon and Home.
	 Maudling, was one of
the Conservative spokesmen at the launch of Britain in Europe on
26th March 1975, and contributed to several press conferences, debates
and newspapers. 	 As Shadow Foreign Secretary, he could have been
expected to play a more active role, but his failure to do so was
attributed more to his general lack of activity rather than any doubts
about the policy.
The Shadow Cabinet, during this period, therefore provided no
opposition or criticism of the Party's pro-European stance.
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Parliamentary Conservative Party 
One of the early decisions following membership was the selection
of the Conservative delegation to the European Parliament, which before
direct elections in 1979 were nominated from M.P.s and peers by the
Whips.	 It was decided by Heath to select as Leader of the delegation
a junior minister with a political future rather than a retired
minister, and the choice fell on Peter Kirk, Minister for the Navy,
"because of my long experience of Council of Europe affairs.. .as well
as my support for the European idea going back long before I first
(29)
entered Parliament in 1955". 	 There was some confusion over the
delegation, with leaks to the Times and promises of a selection
committee of backbenchers. 	 The final delegation was chosen by the
Whips and included mainly committed 'Europeans', chosen for their
specialist knowledge including the anti-market lawyer, Sir Derek
Walker-Smith.	 The Economist, however, complained that "British
Conservative M.P.s in Strasbourg are, with a few exceptions such as
(30)
Mr. Peter Kirk, lightweights".
The Group had to decide whether to join one of the political
Groups already in the European Parliament or to create one of their
own.	 Eventually they formed the European Conservative Group together
with two Danes.	 This was a topic of some controversy as there was a
lobby concerned with developing a centre-right alliance in the
European Parliament and favoured membership of the Christian Democrat
Group.	 Negotiations were conducted on joining the Christian
Democrats, and it was believed by Egon Klepsch, Christian Democrat
Group Leader, that an agreement to join had been made, despite the
known opposition of some within his Group. 	 However, a spearate group
was formed, partly because, as Kirk claimed, "there was a strong
feeling that our supporters would take only just so much, and that if
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the first thing we did was to change our name and apparently bring
religion into politics, this would cause uproar", (31)partly
because it was felt the Conservatives could have greater influence as
a separate Group, and partly, according to his critics, because Kirk
wanted the status of a Group Leader.
On the first day of the new Parliament, Kirk gave a speech
calling for changes in the procedures of the European Parliament,
which had a great impact, and was well covered in both the British and
Continental press. (32)
	
The British Conservatives had a considerable
influence on the method of working of the European Parliament,
especially through the introduction of Question Time, and helped to
invigorate it.	 However, its impact in the European Parliament was
not reflected in the attention that the Group received in Britain,
either in the Parliament or the media.	 There was a group of
backbenchers led by Nick Scott who tried to bring Europe to Parliament's
attention but it had no official recognition.	 This was the subject
of considerable concern among Conservative 'Europeans'. (33)
As a response to these problems, a European Policy Committee of
M.P.s was created, and met for the first time on 18th June 1974. 	 The
Chairman was Sir Anthony Royle, Secretary Hugh Dykes, and
responsibilities were devolved to a number of M.P.s. 	 A group of M.P.s,
led by Peter Blaker, wrote a paper on the renegotiations; and another,
led by Hurd, wrote a paper on the referendum.	 Other responsibilities
were the European Parliament (Dodds-Parker); alternatives if the
renegotiations failed (led by Marten); the long term political
development of the EEC (Ridley et al); Liaison (St. John-Stevas); the
link with the Nick Scott Group (Dykes and Robin Turner); Links with
the European Movement (Forman); the Media Group (Geoffrey Tucker,
ex-Director of Publicity); and links with Labour 'Europeans' (Royle
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and Tucker).
The papers were requested to be completed in a short period of
time, and by 26th July 1974 papers on renegotiations and the referendum
were presented. Blaker reported that a CPC pamphlet signed by
Rippon would comment on the renegotiations; Home would have an article
published in the Telegraph; and his own views would be published in
(34)
World Today.	 The Hurd paper reported on the arrangements made
by the various European groups in preparation for a referendum. 	 This
paper was submitted to the Shadow Cabinet. Backbenchers, however,
followed their leadership in giving little attention to Europe in their
election addresses in the two 1974 elections, only 22% mentioned it in
(35)
the February election and 27% in the October election.
Hurd held an informal meeting on 27th November 1974 with
backbenchers on the Conservative approach to a referendum. 	 He
reported to Michael Wolff, the Director of CCO, that there was strong
opposition to counting the vote by constituency as this could be
embarrassing.	 There were "strong feelings, much stronger than I had
supposed, that the Party's own efforts should not be on a constituency
basis.	 It was felt that if we used our own constituency organisations
we would create a lot of local problems and reduce the number of
(36)
Labour and Liberal voters for Europe". 	 The backbench recommendation
was for a campaign conducted at the national level and through the
media.
The Parliamentary Party was virtually unanimous against the
principle of the referendum, and all but 5 Conservatives went into the
opposition lobby on 11th March 1975. There were some comments on how
M.P.s so concerned with parliamentary sovereignty could favour
referendums.	 The details of the bill were much discussed within the
party's Legal and European Affairs Committees, and there were a number
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of M.P.s who wished to do everything possible to stop the bill.
	 The
Whips office had some difficulty in persuading M.P.s and peers to
(37)follow the Shadow Cabinet's policy of allowing its passage.
On April 9th the Commons voted by 398 votes to 172 to endorse
Britain's continued membership of the Community. 	 The Labour Party
divided equally on the issue, with 137 supporting the Labour
Government's recommendation to stay in, and 145 voting against,
including 7 Cabinet Ministers and half the junior ministers. 	 By
contrast the overwhelming majority of Conservatives voted in the
(38)government lobby, with only 8 votes against with 18 who did not vote.
There had been speculation that some Conservatives might try to
embarrass or even defeat the Labour Government by refusing to support
it in the lobbies. 	 The Economist declared that "The monolithic Tory
vote in support of the government had not really been anticipated....
Any hope of mobilising a viable Tory campaign against the market must
(39)
seem immensely forelorn". 	 One reason for the small anti-market
vote was that several anti-marketeers now accepted that Britain was
in, and it should make the most of it. Derek Walker-Smith stated
that
"In 12 years, through 4 Parliaments, I have spelt
out both inside and outside the House two basic
propositions.	 First, entry to the EEC would
entail a material surrender or transfer of
sovereignty....The second was that membership of
the Community once entered into would in
principle and in practice be irrevocable... .We
cannot break our treaty obligation without a
breach of international law and good faith.
Therefore, if we are to be true to ourselves and
our tradition, we have no option in the matter". (40)
A similar position was taken by Hugh Fraser.
A second factor was that any hope that the new Leader would take
a more ambivalent approach to Community membership was squashed by a
firm and vigorous speech during the debate by Mrs. Thatcher.
	 "It
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has been suggested in some quarters that my Party might fight it
tempting to withdraw support in order to embarrass the Prime Minister.
But we have voted consistently for Britain in Europe by a large
majority and would not think of performing U-turns on this issue". (41)
Initially Tory backbenchers were not encouraged to play an
active role in the campaign, partly because of fears that this would
alienate anti-market Conservatives, and partly in case they alienated
vitally important Labour voters. (42) However, as the lack of
Conservative opposition became clear and the campaign developed
strong anti-Left themes, M.P.s were encouraged to play an active role,
some even being requested to set up local Britain in Europe groups. (43)
Indeed many were swept into the enthusiasm of the campaign. 	 Goodhart
quoted one M.P. "who had been far from enthusiastic about the
European cause in its early days, saying 'I never thought that I
(44)
would care so much17.
The anti-market M.P.s found themselves much depleted. 	 Only 8
Conservative M.P.s and one peer (Turton, now Lord Tranmire) actively
campaigned for a No vote. Neil Marten was their leader, and became
Chairman of the National Referendum Campaign (NRC), the anti-market
co-ordinating body.	 He was a widely respected figure, with ministerial
experience and considered a moderate, but not a strong enough
personality to create a real impression amongst the public. (45)
	
Sir
Ronald Bell, chairman of Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome
(CATOR), was viewed as an extremist; John Biffen and Richard Body were
closely associated with Powell; Teddy Taylor was active mainly in
Scotland; Roger Moate was a young and inexperienced M.P. 	 There was
no Conservative anti-marketeer of real political weight, and the media
had great difficulties in finding one to balance a Labour pro-marketeer.
As well as Walker-Smith and Fraser, they had lost Enoch Powell.
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In May 1973 he refused to campaign for the Conservative candidate in
a by-election because of his views on Europe, and in June 1973 at
Stockport called for principles before Party, and in response to a
question stated that he would prefer Labour rule if they would return
sovereignty. (46)He was faced with increased opposition within the
Wolverhampton South West Conservative Association, especially from
Tettenhall ward, and the Association was bitterly divided. Powell
announced that he would not stand as a candidate in the February 1974
election, and his replacement Nicholas Budgen was pro-EEC.
	 During
the election campaign he spoke at several Get Britain Out rallies,
and at Birmingham urged a vote for Labour on the EEC issue, and later
he stated that he had voted Labour by postal ballot. Whether his
intervention had any influence is disputed. (47)
With his own decision not to stand as a Conservative due to the
Party's commitment to Europe, he became very critical of Conservative
antis who remained in the Party, accusing them of corruption. (48)
Powell returned to the House as an Ulster Unionist in October 1974.
He made 6 major speeches during the referendum and received some media
coverage.	 However, in one opinion poll only 46% correctly identified
(49)his position.	 Some antis felt that he would be a negative
reference point for some voters and others were embarrassed to share
a platform with him.
	
The general conclusion was that he had very
little impact on the referendum result.. (50) His presence in the
Conservative Party could have provided the prominent leadership the
Tory anti-marketeers required.
	
Instead his recommendations to vote
Labour in the 1974 elections had undermined him as a serious influence
on Conservative voters.
One anti-marketeer might have played a significant role if his
stand had not been taken so late. 	 Edward Du Cann was chairman of the
1922 Committee, and had abstained in 1971 and in April, but had told
(51)
the House that now Britain was in, we should make a success of it.
It was with considerable surprise, and much embarrassment to the Party,
that Du Cann told his constituency on 3rd June that half the
Conservatives were anti-market.
"...the Conservative Party is divided too.	 The
divisions may show much less than the split in
the Labour Party.. .but it is none the less real.
It is muted for one good reason. 	 The
Conservative Party is naturally loyal to its
leaders, past and present, and wishes to support
them, or at least not to be seen to oppose them,
wherever possible.
Were this not so, I have no doubt that at least
as many Conservative Party members would be
publicly seen to be against our remaining members
of the EEC as are in favour. 	 Perhaps there
might even be a majority for withdrawal...
There is always a higher loyalty than Party
loyalty - loyalty to one's country, and what one
honestly believes to be her best interests". (52)
The speech received considerable publicity (after widespread
distribution of a press release by Du Cann), and Conservative
strategists feared that it might influence Conservative voters at the
last minute.	 However, Mrs. Thatcher's response at the next morning's
Central Office press conference that the Party showed an unprecedented
degree of unity on this issue seemed more plausible than Du Cann's
exaggerated claims.	 The speech was met with strong criticism from
other Conservative M.P.s. 	 David Crouch stated that "Mr. Du Cann is
obviously completely out of touch with Conservative thinking. 	 One
thing that is certain to come out of this referendum...is that we shall
(53)have to elect a new Chairman of the 1922 Committee". 	 In November
Du Cann was re-elected unopposed due to a desire not to cause any
permanent divisions in the Party.
The situation in the parliamentary party was very different in
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1975 from 1971.	 Tory M.P.s were even more united in favour of
membership; the Conservative inclination to accept membership once
Britain was in had depleted the anti-market ranks; the focus of
opposition to Heath as Leader was replaced by a desire to support a
new Leader who, whilst not changing the policy, was more sympathetic
in its espousal; and there was no prominent anti-market leader
amongst the Tory ranks.	 1975 was neither 1962 nor 1971.
National Union 
After entry, Associations remained in support of membership, even
if most Associations preferred to concentrate on other issues.
'Europeans' urged more action by the Party, particularly concentrating
on direct elections to the European Parliament and the creation of a
centre-right alliance.	 In 1972, 27 resolutions on Europe were
received for the Party Conference, only 2 negative. 	 6 referred to
the need for centre-right co-operation and 3 to direct elections to
(54)the European Parliament. 	 The 1972 debate was held on a motion
urging the Government "to take positive initiatives in the Common
Market".	 There was a determined effort to debate direct elections
with the proposal of 7 amendments, and intense lobbying for them to be
called which, however, they were not.	 The debate was mainly
concerned with new EEC policies such as EMU and regional policy,
although Marten continued his campaign for a referendum, and talked
about 'If' Britain entered, 11 weeks before entry. 	 Tom Spencer of
FCS launched their campaign for a European Democrat Party of centre-
right parties.	 Home wound up by saying that the public mood was to
stop talking and get on with the job, opposed the referendum as
unconstitutional, and mentioned several policies that could be developed.
(55)
The motion was passed by an overwhelming majority.
The traditional Spectator poll of conference representives found
263 in favour of entry and and 77 against.	 It found even higher
figures believing that membership would benefit Britain, with 278 to
(56)68.
In 1973 12 resolutions called for direct elections, together
with 28 other European resolutions mostly positive. (57) Therewas
no debate on Europe but a discussion on overseas affairs, where those
who wanted to speak on direct elections wer not called. Home in his
speech placed EEC membership within the context of Britain's position
in the world.	 Heath in his speech closing the conference devoted
much time to discussing Europe, and several European policies, but
with no mention of direct elections, which he opposed. (58) -
Motions received by the NUEC reaffirmed support for membership
and attacked the idea of a referendum.	 As the referendum approached,
several Associations sent motions of support to the NUEC with no or
(59)insignificant votes against. 	 The Central Council in March 1975
again overwhelmingly endorsed membership.
Within the NUEC_the leadership came under some criticism for not
providing a lead over Europe and the referendum. 	 In August 1974 the
Chairman of the National Society of Conservative Agents requested
guidance for Associations, which the Party Chairman, Whitelaw, promised
in the future. (60)
	
In January 1975 Frances Chambers attacked the
"lack of action by the Party in this matter.	 She suggested that there
had been no encouragement to do anything and commented upon the
difficulty she had experienced in trying to find out who, within the
Party, was responsible for action that should be taken". 	 Whitelaw
responded that, "our Party is absolutely committed to the policy of
staying in Europe", and that "we would be doing everything possible to
enlist maximum amount of support for this objective... .However, it is
difficult to conduct a campaign until it is known when and tow the
referendum will operate" and promised more information as soon as
possible. (61)
Early surveys revealed that only 30 Associations had at least
one of the Chairman, Agent or candidate anti-market, and in the end
only 2 Associations, .both in rock solid Labour seats, voted against
Europe. The Party Chairman wrote to Association Chairmen in
February 1975 urging activity everywhere, with the "utmost energy
though in a manner which is as non-partisan as possible", and
co-operation with allies.
	 Some Associations refused to co-operate
with other Parties, but Whitelaw believed that apart from the letter
not "much more guidance could be given from the centre". (62)
Associations demanded to know what assistance, especially financial,
could be expected for the referendum campaign. (63) Therewas much
talk among constituency associations that a great deal of money would
be available for them to spend. 	 They were to be disappointed.
In response Guidelines for Constituencies was produced by Miles
Hudson, CGE Director. 	 This envisaged 3 stages: a preliminary stage
to inform activists; maximum information during the renegotiations;
and the campaign itself of 3-4 weeks when literature should reach
every voter.	 Hudson presented 4 alternatives: the Association could
conduct its own campaign; it could co-operate with Liberals and the
Labour Committee for Europe within the Local BiE; there could be a
campaign just by Conservatives but not officially by. the Association;
or individual Conservatives could operate within the local BiE without
the involvement of the Association.	 "If it is possible to co-ordinate
the efforts of all those who are active, from whatever Party or
organisation, this would clearly be an advantage. 	 But this should
not be done if the result would be a serious split in the Association".
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The Association should appoint a leader responsible for the campaign,
distribute literature, provide speakers, raise finance mainly locally,
write letters and participate in phone-ins, in other words "as much
political activity as possible on Europe". (64)
	
Much concern was
expressed that the Associations would sit out the campaign, and leave
activity to the local Britain in Europe groups, which individual
Conservatives could join if they wished.	 The Economist, for example,
doubted that they would get out the Conservative vote. 	 "At the local
level the Tory referendum campaign will seldom be more than lukewarm". (65)
CCO however was surprised at the positive response from the
grass roots.	 The CPC discussion groups on Europe: Yes or No? in
April 1975 found 94% Yes, 4% No and li% Don't Know. 	 It proved
difficult to get an exact assessment on meetings held, but by 10th
March 1975 350 meetings had already been held by Associations and there
were probably over 500 by the end. (66) Therewas a heavy sale of
Party materials, while several million were distributed free. 	 Agents
and Associations were continually demanding more money and literature
for distribution.	 Most Associations in fact co-operated well with
other parties within the BiE, despite some friction. 	 Christopher
Soames, the Conservative EEC Commissioner, who spoke extensively at
Conservative meetings reported that "He found more than expected local
activity generally, less division in the Party than anticipated, and
wide variation in the forms of local activity". (67)
	
One Conservative
organiser from the East Midlands wrote that, "Towards the end of the
campaign, where no groups existed, we persuaded the Party organisations
to reform themselves into official committees". 	 By the end of May
88% of the BiE local groups claimed to have the official support of
(68)the local Conservatives.	 The Economist reported that "co-operation
between Labour pro-marketeers and Tory activists has gone surprisingly
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well at constituency level". (69)
	
Thus the campaign produced
greater enthusiasm and less intra-party division than CCO expected.
The youth sections were very critical of the lack of European .
activity by the Party.	 At the 1972 Conference the Y.C.'s presented
2 motions, urging direct elections and democratic control by the
European Parliament, and Conservative membership of the European
Union of Christian Democrats , and they issued a leaflet complaining
about the suppression by the Party managers of a debate on direct
(70)
elections.	 Lynda Chalker, Vice-Chairman, spoke in the debate in
support of direct elections. 	 The 1973 Y.C. Conference passed a
motion in support of a United Europe and democratic control. 	 By the
end of the year the Young Conservative N.A.C. adopted a policy, by 23
to 13, in favour of a European Federation or a United States of
(71)Europe.
FCS adopted motions at their Annual Conferences in favour of a
European Defence Community, and direct elections in 1972 and
unilateral direct elections at the same time as the next general
election in 1973. 	 They were particularly active in the Campaign
for the European Democrat Party (EDP).
	 In July 1972, anEDP Charter
was adopted at a conference in London by student and youth
representatives from 8 countries. 	 At the 1972 Party Conference, Tom
Spencer, the new ECCS Chairman, spoke on the EDP unveiling a.Vote EDP
poster, and a leaflet was distributed. 	 FCS instigated an all-party
seminar organised by Students for a United Europe (SUE) on "European
Political Parties - is the time ripe?" at Cambridge 12-16th April 1973;
a research programme comparing European centre-right parties, which
led to the publication by CPC of Foundations for Alignment by Scott
Hamilton; and an EDP Campaign Conference in Edinburgh, 3rd-6th January
1975.
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The Young Conservatives and FCS, concerned on the low level of
European activity, formed Young European Democrats (YED) in January
1974, whose aims included "to work for a more federal Europe". 	 The
YED National Council "was dismayed at evidence of continuing emphasis
on the part of Conservative Elders on the alleged need to pursue a
low profile on Europe. Young Conservatives, FCS and YED were
absolutely agreed that this was a certain recipe for disaster and
reeked of a lack of self-confidence over the issue of Europe.. .the
Young Conservatives had for some time been pressing for political
organisation and direction on the European Front within the
Conservative Party as there was a complete lack of co-ordination". (72)
YED organised briefing seminars and conferences, and encouraged
European activity among the youth sections.
Soames launched the Young Conservative referendum campaign at the
Young Conservative Conference in February 1975, with their own
literature, badges and stickers.	 FCS also conducted its own campaign,
urged "the Party to use all its resources to endorse an affirmative
result", campaigned within the National Union of Students, organised
a Campaign Committee, and produced its own leaflets, stickers, badges
and beer mats with the slogan "We've got to get in to get on". 	 The
Young Conservatives and FCS also provided the backbone of Youth for
Europe and Students for a United Europe, providing most of the personnel
and resources, which led to some conflict with the Young European Left
and the Young Liberals.
Tom Spencer of FCS was Chairman of Britain in Europe Youth
Steering Committee; Michael Fallon, formerly of FCS, was the Youth
Officer; FCS controlled Students for a United Europe; and the magazine,
the Federalist, was written mainly by young Conservatives, edited by former
FCS chairman Andrew Neil.
	 Tom Spencer also became personal assistant
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to Sir Con O'Neill, BiE President. 	 Greater London Y.C.s organised
the massive Youth for Europe rally in Trafalgar Square, which was
described by Roy Jenkins as receiving the best publicity for any
BiE event. (72)	 TheY.C.s predicted that 90% of their members would
vote Yes. Britain in Europe were eager to promote the impression
that youth was in enthusiastic support of membership, and thus
persuade voters that it was in the interests of their children and
grand-children.	 It was primarily through the work of the Young
Conservatives and Conservative students that this image was successfully
conveyed to the public.
The Women organised a European Union of Women (EUW) conference
at Oxford in September 1973, debated Europe at their 1974 conference
with Baroness Elles replying, and decided that the Chairman of the
British section of EUW would automatically be Vice-Chairman (Europe)
of the Women's Advisory Committee.	 Even the TUNAC conference,
traditionally less enthusiastic about Europe than other parts of the
Party, in March 1975 urged, by an overwhelming majority, moderate trade
unionists to vote Yes. (73)
Central Office 
The CRD was considering the difficulties for the Party of activity
in the European Parliament even before the third reading of the
membership Bill.	 Michael Niblock produced a memorandum on 'The Role
of the CRD in the Context of the European Parliament', which was to
provide a link between MEP's and the Government, MEP's and the
Parliamentary Party, and MEP's and the Party. There would be
considerable problems in communications on Europe between the
different elements of the Party, which would require the appointment
of a small European group. (74) Niblock reported to Prior on the
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preparations for the European Parliament, which included the need for
information to be given to the Westminster M.P.s and the creation of
(75)
an ad hoc group of backbenchers (the Nick Scott group). 	 Niblock
also produced a report on "Thinking European", and how the Government
should handle the Party, by making clear at an early stage upon what
issues they would take a hard-line. (76)
During 1974 the CRD was naturally taken up with the two election
campaigns, and followed the leaderhip's decision to give Europe a low
profile.
In response to 'European' pressure on the lack of activity, in
November 1974 Whitelaw asked Lord Fraser to set up a European
Co-ordination Committee (ECC) "to co-ordinate activity within the
Party in regard to European developments over the next year, and to
keep in touch with other bodies and individuals in the same field".
It was a small group with Fraser as Chairman, Michael Wolff Director-
General, Richard Webster Director of Organisation, Alex Todd Director
of Publicity, WilliamWald-egraverepresenting Heath, Chris Patten
Director of the CRD, and Nigel Forman of CRD as Secretary.
	
It was
this group of people which organised and co-ordinated the Conservative
contribution to the referendum, meeting every Monday. 	 Their terms of
reference were to co-ordinate Conservative Party activity at all levels
in preparation for a likely referendum, and to contact other bodies
outside the Party with similar objectives, and to make proposals for
action to safeguard membership. (77)
In November 1974 Forman presented a paper on how the Party should
handle the question of the referendum, with 4 options: to accept the
inevitability of a referendum and offer no parliamentary opposition, but
this would be unpopular with M.P.s and many Conservatives; to oppose
the referendum on the 2nd Reading only, which was a sign of weakness;
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try and wreck it which would be consistentbut unpopular with 80% of
the public in favour of a referendum; or fight it in the Lords, which
would delay it but raise other constitutional issues. Forman
recommended a free vote. (78) Thepaper was adopted by the ECC and
sent to the Shadow Cabinet.
Fcirman presented another paper on the campaign which recommended
full co-operation with Britain in Europe; nothing should be done to
undermine Labour or Trade Union 'Europeans'; the campaign should begin
immediately and be given the highest priority. He presented detailed
proposals for Parliament, the Party organisation, the CRD and the
media.	 The campaign themes should be the advantages of membership
and the dangers of withdrawal, with minor themes of jobs, the
children's future, the EEC cares, special interests and "Who Wants
Out". (79) The ECC decided not to have a particular Conservative
slogan but to adopt the general one of Britain in Europe.
The first activity was to organise 12 regional conferences in the
first three months of 1975 with Soames as the main speaker.
	 They
were a great success, with a high acceptance rate, an average of 300
participants per conference, and 80% of the Associations expressed an
interest in following up the conferences (80) There were selzeral
difficulties.	 Wolff had to convince Soames to allow the press, while
he would have preferred to speak more freely without them; (81)
Soames offended some with his response to a question that "I believe
going into Europe is based essentially on the capitalist system", (82)
which should show people the wisdom of having "a government which
believes in free enterprise and the capitalist system"; and Forman
temporarily vetoed the distribution of "some of the more suspect
publications" of the European Movement at the seminars. (83)
An ORC poll was conducted for the.Party, and Forman reported
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that the strongest argument for the antis was the price of food; there
was the need for some idealism for the young; the EEC must be seen to
help the poor; Government information would have a considerable
influence; and the Conservatives must avoid a Party battle, by
excluding arguments such as it weakens the trade unions, and
Conservative speakers should always consult with Labour 'Europeans'
when entering Labour areas.	 A high poll would probably be good, but
it might bring out Labour voters. (84)
The ECC decided against a canvass and for a literature drop; for
a special campaign budget; against a separate Conservative campaign in
case that alienated Labour voters; formed a publicity group to prepare
Conservative literature; agreed to monitor the media for Britain in
Europe; and created an Information Unit under David Knapp which
received few inquiries. (85)A detailed campaign guide was produced
after instructions from Mrs. Thatcher, but it was late and there was
some confusion as to whether Mrs. Thatcher should write a foreword.
Eventually it was published without a foreword. (86)
Six Conservative leaflets were produced, including a controversial
anti-Left one, and altogether CCO distributed 10 million leaflets
(3i million Conservative, 6i million Britain in Europe), more than in
(87)
any general election.
The CPC remained active on Europe even before the likelihood of
the referendum, with the publication of several pamphlets on Europe,
on industry, agriculture, the centre-right, the views of Soames, Kirk
and Davies, and 'Our Future in Europe' by Rippon which re-stated the case
for membership and against withdrawal, and Europe was also included in
(88)
pamphlets nn VAT, energy and Western civilisation.
	
Two CPC discussion
briefs on Europe were produced in November 1972 and April 1975. 	 The
first found two-thirds of participants in favour of direct elections
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even if that meant a federal Parliament. There was some support for
a European Parliament, half nominated and half elected; concern over
the turnout; and support for monetary union and a Regional Policy.
The second report found 94% support for membership and almost total
(89)
• opposition to a referendum. 	 The CPC organised a special
conference in Belgium on "Britain's Prospects in the European Community",
24-26th November 1972; a weekend Conference in June 1973 and a one
day symposium in London on 25th January 1974, which attracted 400
participants.
The Swinton Journal published a number of articles on Europe.
Kai-Uwe von Hassel gave the annual Swinton Lecture on Conservatism and
Christian Democracy in Europe, Bessborough wrote on a technological
Europe, Paterson on A European Welfare State?, Michael Berendt of the
EEC Information Office on agriculture, and Robin Turner and Derek Prag
(90)
on the internal problems of the EEC.
The Overseas Committee, under Lady Elles, provided a forum for
Conservative 'Europeans', and it discussed three main aims: the
development of centre-right co-operation, a stronger influence on
European activities, and the encouragement of greater European activity
by the Party.	 The Committee discussed a change of name for the
European Conservative Group and suggestions included Democratic Centre,
European Centre and Centre Democrat, and these ideas were discussed
with Party Chairman Lord Carrington, but this made no progress. (91)
The Inter-Party Meeting between centre-right parties became more
established, and an International Office under Sir John Peele was set
up to deal with external Party contacts. 	 The Committee also discussed
the lack of Conservative influence in the European Movement and the
European Community Information Office. Beamish argued for the
"importance of such an appointment" of a Conservative in the European
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Community Information Office, and a similar point was made by Niblock.
The CGE agreed to try to exercise more influence on the European
Movement.
Lady Elles wrote to Carrington in October 1973 that "Considerable
concern was expressed about the increasing anti-market feeling in the
country and the apparent lack of publicity and stimulus to our
European activities and justification for Government policies in
Europe.
	 There was strong feeling that an energetic publicity
campaign was required to counteract the increasing socialist anti-
market propaganda and to explain and report on our policies and
achievements". (92) She urged the appointment of a senior Cabinet
minister as responsible for the campaign. 	 Carrington responded that
Vice-Chairman Geoffrey Johnson-Smith was responsible for publicity.
Eventually the protest of the Committee and other 'Europeans' led to
the response that "Number 10 now recognised that it had been a mistake
to play Europe in low profile" and that there was "a conscious change
of mind in the Government and a recognition that the policy of
deliberately playing down Europe had been an error". (95)Lady
Elles immediately presented a series of proposals, and met with Rippon
to discuss whether, and if so how actively, to press the case for
Community membership; Wolff called a CCO meeting on 17th August 1974
to examine the function of the Party machine in this regard, which
eventually led to the creation of the ECC; and the European Policy
Committee of M.P.s was formed on 18th June 1974.
Central Office had followed the decision of the Government.to
give Europe a low profile, but once it had been decided, with the
creation of the European Co-ordinating Committee, that Europe was to
become a major priority for the Party, Central Office gave it their
full attention.	 There were a few, such as the Director of
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Organisation Richard Webster, who doubted the value of the campaign,
but that view was not widely shared.
The Informal Party 
The Bow Group produced a detailed memorandum on Europe in
October 1972 by David Baker CGE Deputy Chairman, Peter Ratzer and
Bernard Brooke-Patridge, which called for institutional reforms
implying a federalist direction, and detailed proposals for direct
elections. (94) However, Europe featured less and more critically
in Bow Group publications. 	 An Alternative Manifesto in October 1973
re-affirmed support for membership but added "We shall not hesitate
to make Britain's interests clear to the rest of the Community. 	 We
are not prepared to pay a high price for entry into the EEC without
the guarantee of concrete benefits now and in the future", (95)and
presented a confederalist conception of the EEC. 	 Crossbow published
a critical article on Peter Shore and Europe in January 1974, but at
the same time a Group pamphlet on The First Year in Europe was not a
ringing endorsement, describing the most fundamental impact as the
destruction of national sovereignty. ( 96) During the debate from
late 1974 to the referendum day, the only contribution was a debate on
sovereignty in Crossbow, and two pamphlets arguing for and against a
(97)
referendum.	 The Group had gradually moved to the right, and in
1975 elected Patricia Hodgeson as chairman, who was outspokenly
right-wing.	 "She is out of tune with her members only in being
(98)lukewarm about, if not actively against the Common Market".
The move to the right had not changed the Group's basically
favourable position, but it had developed a more confederalist and
less idealistic approach.	 There was none of the great enthusiasm
that had come from Bow Group members and publications of the past.
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The Monday Club had continued to be disrupted by internal
disputes.	 There was a bitter fight for the chairmanship in July 1972
which Jonathan Guinness won by 676 votes to 228 for Richard Body, 48
to Tim Stroud.	 The battle was repeated in May 1973 with 625 votes
to Guinnemsand 455 to G.K. Young. 	 Many members resigned, rebels
were expelled, some branches banned and a rival TUesday Club formed.
The division was between a leadership which pursued a responsible
opposition within the Conservative Party, and the rebels who were
willing to support candidates against the official Conservative and
some even flirted with the National Front.	 Attitudes to Powell were
an important element in this division.	 The editor of Monday World,
supporting the leadership, wrote that "we are an elitist group bent on
rationalising right-wing policy and selling it to those in power.
The temptation to be drawn by frustration or emotion into anti-
Establishment and anti-hierarchical populism, which is totally alien
to the Tory tradition, must be resisted". (99)
Europe was one of the issues which divided the Club. 	 Guinness
was identified with Europe while Body was a prominent anti. 	 The Club
newsletter was filled with letters between those who supported or at
least accepted membership, and those who urged withdrawal and cited
(100)
hostile public opinion.	 The former view won. A Monday Club
Policy Document stated "The Monday Club will back the Government in
the assertion of British rights and sovereignty within the Community,
in drastic amendment of the CAP and in the curbing of bureaucracy in
Brussels.	 We hold that the nation remains the greatest European
(101)
political reality".	 Even Biffen in a speech to the Monday Club
argued that "the talk is Community, the action is national" and that
membership could be accepted if national co-operation was the way
(102)forward.	 The Monday Club published a series of speeches by
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Julian Amery which included his European speech to the 1974 Party
Conference, and a pamphlet against a referendum because "voters may be
led by appeals to prejudice, parochialism, jingoism and anti red
herrings". (103)	 During the referendum the Monday Club did not take
a position.
The Conservative Group for Europe was uncertain of its role
after entry, which led to a big debate based on proposals presented
by David Baker and E.G. Thompson.
	
It organised supper meetings, one
day conferences, a Swinton weekend conferences, organised a stand and
a reception at the Party Conferences, a European Evening, briefly a
journal 'Tory European', and had attracted 1,000 members by January
1974.
The CGE had three main concerns.	 Firstly, "the CGE fulfilled an
admirable function in preventing the European Movement being dominated
(104)
by the Socialists" (Beamish). 	 One of its aims was "to ensure
that Conservatives were given full representation both within the
Movement itself and in delegations and groups sent to meetings and
Conferences in the Community". (105)	 TheCGE was an integrated part
of the European Movement and the source of much of its membership, but
there was a widespread feeling that power lay in the hands of the
Director, formerc Labour candidate Ernest Wistrich. 	 Douglas Dodds-Parker
M.P. complained-that "The Socialists had the European Movement behind
(106)them".
	
There were frequent complaints about the content of
Movement publications and it was agreed that "unless formal representation
of some sort were arranged, then the Group would not distribute future
issues of these publications". (107) The Economist reported that many
Tories "believed that the European Movement is a socialist-ridden
organisation living off capitalist money. They want the CGE to take a
more active line, for instance, by using its majority to demand more than
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parity in the decision-taking committees.	 Some are even going so far as
threatening to replace the present Chairman, Lord Harlech with Sir
Tufton Beamish". (108)No coup was attempted but relations remained
difficult.
The second concern was the lack of both government and party
support to the European Conservative Group in the European Parliament.
The Group even had to add to Peter Kirk's salary as Group Leader to
make it up to that of a junior minister that had surrendered upon
taking up the post with the Group. This arrangement ended with the
February 1974 election and the move to opposition. 	 The Group
believed that it was the responsibility of the Government to support
the ECG.	 In that absence they set up a European Representation Fund
and Lord Carrington spoke to a private dinner on 3rd December 1973 to
help raise funds for the CGE and the Fund. 	 It was not, however, a
great success, as the businessmen present also felt that it was a
governmental responsibility.
Their greatest concern was over the lack of Party activity on
Europe.	 The Chairman, Sir Gilbert Longden, felt that the Party had
much to gain or lose on Europe at the next election and that it was
of "vital importance that we should communicate the urgency of putting
this across at all levels of the Party". (109) However, "the CGE was
not equipped with the money or the organisation to spread the gospel
to the grass roots.	 This could only be done through the Party, and,
its organisation". (110) St. John Stevas expressed "grave concern
at the failure of the Government to put over the European case.. .it
was vital that there should be a strong lead from the centre" and urged
that the Chairman should "approach the Prime Minister - as the President
of the Group - and explain to him our concern about the situation and
ask that a strong lead be given". (111)
	
This remained a constant
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theme of CGE meetings and the Chairman felt it necessary to stress
"that however much the Committee felt that the Government had been
ineffectual in influencing public opinion on Europe, the Government
(112)
remained fully in favour of Europe".
After a meeting with Michael Wolff, the new Party Secretary-
General, the Chairman reported that "the need was recognised to abandon
the low profile that the Party had taken in the past over Europe". (113)
Wolff discussed the matter with Heath, which resulted in several
speeches on Europe.	 The CGE Director, Jim Spicer, reported that he
was confident that action would be taken and that Europe would be a
definite priority for the Party in 1975. (114)A speech by Wolff
to the CGE Council on the Party's European Campaign was met with comments
that it was "too little and too late", and that "the essential orders
(
have not yet been issued to the potential troops by the High Command".
115)
Even after the referendum Miles Hudson, the Director, reported that "the
Conservative Party could have done more than it did". (116)
With the likelihood of a referendum Miles Hudson was
appointed CGE Director in November 1974 and co-opted onto the ECC.
Hudson had worked at the CRD and as an adviser to Home at the Foreign
Office, and became fully integrated into the Central Office Campaign.
The CGE became more active through the recruitment of more prominent
members, the organisation of Association meetings, visits to the
European institutions, the re-establishment of links with Labour and
Liberal M.P.s, a rally at Central Hall and a conference in Scotland.
Its referendum campaign was launched by Mrs. Thatcher. 	 The CGE
continued its criticism of the Party's performance, wanting a meeting
of Association Chairmen and a more vigorous involvement of Mrs.
Thatcher.
	
Hudson stated that in Associations "he found a great deal
of goodwill towards the European cause and few misgivings about
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internal Party dissension on the matter". (117)
	
The CGE did not
play the Parliamentary role of 1971-72, but it was a useful source of
contact with Labour and Liberal 'Europeans', and it provided a source
of local activists who provided the enthusiasm within the local
Associations.
The European Movement was marked by extreme suspicion by many
Conservatives, but it did provide the forum for co-operation with
other parties, and by autumn 1974 a liaison group for a possible
referendum campaign was formed with Chairman Lord Harlech, Treasurer
Timothy Sainbury, Royle, Alistair McAlpine, representing the
Conservatives.	 The European League for Economic Co-operation (ELEC)
was another forum aimed primarily at industry and the trade unions,
with Hurd as Director, Rippon as Chairman and McAlpine as Treasurer. (118)
It was a meeting between the Movement and ELEC which led to the
creation of Britain in Europe.
The European Movement was viewed as an unacceptable vehicle for
the pro-European campaign, partly because of the considerable
Conservative hostility, partly because of doubts as to its efficiency,
and partly because of its "extreme" federalist image.
	
Relations between
Britain in Europe and the European Movement proved difficult, and the
operations were separate with Britain in Europe at Old Park Lane and
the European Movement remaining at Whitehall Place. Preparations for
the creation of Britain in Europe began in late 1974 with Fraser as a
member of the Steering Group.	 The ex-civil servant, Sir Con O'Neill,
was appointed chairman, and a number of important positions were given
to Labour men, President , publicity director, research director and
press officer, but most of the lower profile positions went to
Conservatives mainly because of their greater experience, e.g. Roger
Boaden was seconded from CCO to organise the mass rallies, McAlpine
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and Bruce-Gardyne on finance, and Tucker on publicity. Whitelaw
was only one of the Britain in Europe Vice-Presidents but in practice
he acted as Deputy President and co-operated closely with Jenkins.
As Butler and Kitzinger noted, "the Conservative Party was providing
much of the administrative backbone of the Britain in Europe
campaign", (119) However, the Conservatives were very sensitive to
the need for a good Labour vote. 	 The Conservatives and the European
Movement wanted the Britain in Europe launch in January 1975, but due
to the problems of the Labour Committee for Europe the official
launch was not until 26th March 1975.	 At the launch, because of the
lack of a third prominent Labour spokesman, there were only two
spokesmen from each party. (120) Therewas always a balance between
the parties on Britain in Europe platforms despite frequent
difficulties in obtaining Labour speakers. 	 The Conservatives were
always careful to avoid friction, but there were some suspicions that
some Labour people were abusing their position to avoid too much
criticism by their own Party. Fears were expressed about the
suitability of some Britain in Europe literature and broadcasts, and
Hoyle was asked to monitor Britain in Europe broadcasts from the
Conservative point of view. (121)3i million Britain in Europe
leaflets were distributed through the CCO. 	 The Conservatives were
willing to submerge their Conservative identity in order to obtain a
maximum Yes vote. Lord Fraser reported to the ECC that "Co-operation
at the top of the BiE all-Party effort was on the whole extremely good
and better than could have been conceivably anticipated". (122)
The activities of Conservative anti-marketeers were spread
amongst a number of organisations.	 The biggest anti-market
organisation was the Common Market Safeguards Campaign but it was
dominated by trade unionists and Labour Party members, so with the
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exception of Neil Marten, it was generally avoided by Conservatives.
Get Britain Out (GBO) was run by Christopher Frere-Smith, a former
Liberal candidate, but it attracted the support of most Conservative
anti-marketeers, and provided a platform for Powell.
	
Richard Body
and Sir lain McTaggart were active in GBO, and Marten, Bell and Moate
spoke at GBO meetings. The Anti-Common Market League, under the
chairmanship of Sir Robin Williams, was forced to share offices with
the Safeguards Campaign, and was able toconduct little activity.
	 In
1973 and 1974 it manned anti-market bookshops at the Conservative
Conferences.	 Despite frequent appeals, Powell refused to become a
Vice President of the League. (123)	 In October 1974 they attempted
to distribute material to all Conservative Associations. 	 The Trident
Group was an explicitly Conservative anti-market group under Victor
Montagu, but, apart from a letter to local Associations and the
distribution of some car stickers, it was an obscure organisation.
British Business for World Markets was free trade oriented, started
by Anthony Fisher, one of the founders of the Insitute of Economic
Affairs, and run by Wilf Proudfoot, a former Conservative candidate,
attracting little support outside of a few Yorkshire businessmen.
Tory anti-market activity failed to find a coherent focus
Despite considerable suspicions between the different groups, they
agreed to form the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) on January 7th
1975, with Neil Marten as chairman.	 Friction between the groups
continued, and the NRC operated primarily as a co-ordinating body.
The NRC was largely dependent on the trade unions for finance, staff
and organisation on the ground, but this was disliked by some
Conservatives.
	
Butler and Kitzinger quoted one Twickenham lady. 	 "I
found myself driven to consort with Communists, international
socialists, left-wing Labour Party members and Marxists on the issue.
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Only a most passionate love of this country gave me the stomach to do
so". (124)
The need for an explicitly Conservative anti-market appeal led
to the creation of Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome (CATOR)
by Ronald Bell M.P. and Hugh Simmonds from Bell's Beaconsfield
constituency. CATOR spent £600 on 140,000 leaflets and wrote to
every Association.	 It claimed that 4 out of 5 Associations had
replied that they were taking no part in the campaign. 	 These claims
were dismissed by Central Office. 	 CATOR failed to have any impact,
partly because it was organised at a very late stage in the campaign,
and partly because of its populist tone.	 It expressed no faith in
the judgement of the Establishment, "when we remember that the
conventional wisdom has been wrong about nearly every major political
issue this century".	 This style was not welcome to those like Marten
who wanted to return to a full role in the Party in the future.
Above all, CATOR and the Tory anti-marketeers in general failed to
influence many voters because of the identification of the anti-market
cause with the Left.	 CATOR complained that "A myth has grown up
that those of us who are opposed to the EEC are a motley crew of
Marxist extremists out to destroy Britain...the existence of CATOR (is)
itself a repudiation of this charge". (125) CATOR indeed was explicitly
created to dispel that image, but it failed to do so. 	 Tory anti-
marketeers, such as the Anti-Common Market League, recognised that
throughout the campaign there had been a "slippage of right-wing anti-
common market voters" and attributed the lack of a Conservative anti-
market vote to the Red Smear and Benn. (126)
The CBI remained committed to Community membership, and conducted
its own campaign under the slogan, "Think It Over", with briefing
kits, leaflets and posters, spending £50,000.
	 A Special Operations
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Unit under Richard Dixon was created, John Whitehorn became the CBI
representative to BiE, and Liaison Officers were appointed throughout
the regions.	 The CBI lost no opportunity to restate its position.
One example was a statement on 22nd March 1975. 	 "The CBI has long
asserted that the chief benefits of membership would be slow to
materialise; today it must stress that the disadvantages of withdrawal
would come swiftly. 	 It is more than ever convinced of its original
view that membership carries a long term balance of advantage; it is
increasingly conscious of the fearful dangers of withdrawal". (127)
The CBI's position that industry was overwhelmingly in favour of the
Community was confirmed in surveys by the European Representation
Fund under Lord Selsdon, which found 91% of the 200 biggest companies
in favour (128) and an Economist/ORC poll which found 95% Yes, 2% No
and 3% Don't Know. (129)
The National Farmers Union also called for a Yes vote. 	 The NFU
Council stated in March "that it will be in the long term interests of
British agriculture for the U.K. to remain a member of the European
Community". (130)
	
The NFU Chairman, Sir Henry Plumb, was an active
campaigner.
The Conservative press remained consistently pro-market. 	 The
Telegraph repeated its commitment, stating that there was "an
(131)intellectual, moral and spiritual value" in the Common Market.
It did, however, create concern among Tory strategists when it published
an article by the respected Tory journalist, Peregrine Worsethorne,
urging a No vote as a way to bring down the Wilson government. (132)
This was quickly repudiated by Mrs. Thatcher and certainly did not
represent the paper's editorial viewpoint.	 "The Times is a committed
European newspaper" summed up its position. (133). 	 The Financial Times,
Mail and Sun all urged a Yes vote.	 Even the Express, under
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the editorship of the pro-market Alistair Burnet, presented a balance
of viewpoints, although the large number of anti-market advertisements
suggested that it was still seen as a paper with many anti-market
readers.
The Economist retained its position of over 25 years of support
for entry, and provided substantial sympathetic coverage to the
pro-market cause, as well as its own series of briefings.
	 The
Spectator meanwhile was an important centre of Conservative anti-
market activity under its proprietor Harry Creighton and journalists
Patrick Cosgrave and George Gale.	 It endorsed Powell's position
that one must vote for the one major party that offers independence,
although at the February 1974 election it advised a Conservative vote
as Wilson could not be trusted, while George Gale, its former editor,
openly declared his vote for Labour. (134) Cosgrave declared that
"the Tory Party is in its heart against i
	
(135)t".	 The Spectator 
ran a regular feature, the Sovereign State, a column for anti-market
writers, mainly Conservative.
	
The journal also played an active
role in the NRC, providing a Party home for its research team,
Creighton and Cosgrave on its executive, Gale as the co-author of the
NRC pamphlet with Marten, and Cosgrave as the co-presenter, with
Paul Johnson of the New Statesman, of the NRC's political broadcast.
The Spectator was an important source of journalistic talent for the
anti-market cause, but with its low circulation influenced few people.
The referendum vote provided a two to one majority to stay in.
Opinion polls had consistently shown that Conservatives were over-
whelmingly pro-market, and that trend was strengthened throughout the
campaign.
	 Gallup, in January 1975, found that among Conservatives 52%
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were pro-European, 29% anti-European, 9% wouldn't vote and 10% didn't
(136)know.	 ORC reported in March that Conservatives split 61% for,
24% against, 15% don't know. (137)By just before the referendum day,
Gallup reported a 65% Yes vote among Conservatives, 12% No and 23%
who did not intend to vote. (138) Michael Steed in his analysis in
the Economist estimated that 85% of Conservatives who voted in the
(139)
referendum had voted Yes.	 Anthony King, in his analysis, shows
that "Conservative parts of the country produced larger 'Yes'
(140)
majorities than Labour parts". 	 What is certain is that the
Conservative vote was crucial to the final result.
Conclusion 
The 1975 referendum confirmed that whatever the situation in the
past, the Conservative Party was almost totally united in favour of
British membership of the European Community. The concern of Heath
to play Europe cool because of electoral considerations may have been
a less accurate assessment than that of the Conservative 'Europeans'
who argued that the lack of leadership only played into the hands of
the Labour Party, while a firm attempt to persuade the electorate of •
the virtues of membership would have met with success. While Mrs.
Thatcher's position was certainly pro-European, it is not clear that
she would have chosen to commit so much of the Party's resources to
the campaign, if there had not been a strong consensus within the
Party on the need to win a Yes vote. 	 The Cabinet, and later the
Shadow Cabinet, appears to have shared the position of the Leader.
Support for Europe became stronger in the parliamentary party,
as a new generation of M.P.s entered Parliament throughout whose
political history the Party had been pro-European, while the anti-market
M.P.s were retiring or dying and were not replaced by a new generation.
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Others simply respected the status quo and while lukewarm supporters,
or even former opponents, they accepted the case against withdrawal.
The National Union continued to reflect pro-market opinion from
the constituencies, and were even critical of the lack of commitment
by the leadership.	 Surveys by the Organisation Department, the CPC
discussion groups, motions to Party conferences and the NUEC, feedback
from the regional offices, and reports from speakers like Christopher
Soames or organisers like Miles Hudson all found far more willingness
to campaign than had been expected.	 Fears of divisiveness expressed
by Whitelaw and Fraser proved to be largely groundless.
The Y.C.s and Conservative students found themselves wanting to
push ahead much faster than the Party. 	 In particular their campaign
for direct elections to the European Parliament met with little
sympathy with the leadership.	 Similarly their support for federalism
was seen as an embarrassment which might frighten others, and
especially during the referendum they felt their views suppressed.
The Research Department was concerned with the adoption of the
Party to membership, particularly with regard to the European Parliament,
but this concern was not expressed by the Government. With the creation
of the European Co-ordinating Committee, Central Office threw itself
wholeheartedly into the campaign and managed to organise an impressive
range of meetings and to distribute a massive amount of literature,
while at the same time supporting Britain in Europe through the
secondment of staff, the monitoring of the media and the distribution
of BiE literature.
The informal elements of the Party too were more strongly
'European' than ever before.	 The Conservative Group for Europe, the
Tories in Britain in Europe, the CBI, the NFU, the Tory press and the
Economist all campaigned strongly for a Yes vote. The Bow Group and
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the Monday Club failed to play a significant role, while the Tory
anti-marketeers were badly organised, and lacked a coherent structure.
The Anti-Common Market League, the Trident Group, British Business
for World Markets, CATOR and the Spectator all reached relatively few
people, while the Express was no longer the mass organ of the
Conservative anti-marketeers.
The Conservative Party was united to keep Britain in Europe even
without strong leadership from the top.
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CHAPTER 8:	 THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER WITHIN THE CONSERVATIVE
PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN ISSUE.
The thesis of this dissertation is that the study of Conservative
Party and the issue of European integration supports the pluralist
view of the distribution of power within the Conservative Party,
contrary to most studies of this issue. 	 This chapter will explain
why power is dispersed within the party, despite the arguments
presented by McKenzie, Beer et al discussed in the introduction and
Chapter One, and survey the evidence presented in Chapters 2 - 7 in
support of this thesis.
The Conservative Party has long been recognised as a party
oriented to electoral success. 	 Gamble claimed that "electoral
(1)perspectives are the ideology of the leadership". 	 The Party has
always prided itself on its pragmatism and refusal to be tied to any
ideology. (2) This view of the role of party is close to the
(3)
'catch-all'	 or rational-efficient model. (4)	 "The rational-
efficient party has exclusively electoral functions and is
pragmatically occupied with winning elections rather than with
defining policy.	 The party democracy type is more policy-oriented,
ideological and concerned with defining policy in an internally
democratic manner involving rank and file membership participation". (5)
In contrast to the party democracy model, with its emphasis on
participation within the party as the determinant of party policy,
the rational-efficient model sees the concentration of power and
authority in the hands of the leader.	 The leader must be given a
high degree of autonomy to respond to political events in the most
successful way.
However, the assessment of the pragmatic, catch-all nature of
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the Conservative Party has ignored the considerable constraints that
this places upon the Leader.
	 The constraints are primarily of two
forms: the first is the need to maintain an effective party
organisation, which can campaign during an election, bring out the
supporters on the election day, provide a source of attractive
candidates and act as grass-roots supporters spreading the Party's
message through personal contract; and the second is the need to
successfully appeal to a diverse and differentiated electorate and
to create a majority from a coalition of minorities for electoral
purposes.	 Both these necessities create considerable constraints
on the autonomy of the leader.
The Conservative Party is a voluntary organisation, to which
people are free to belong or leave and even when they are members,
they may move between degrees of activity.
	 A successful party not
only requires a large membership but also a considerable number of
activists.
	 Clark and Wilson have identified three types of
incentives as necessary for the maintenance of an organisation:
material or monetary; solidarity, deriving from a sense of community
or belonging; and purposive, a concern with the achievement of
organisational goals. (6)
	
Discussion oi incentives lor activists
in American parties has concentration on the first incentive, material
incentives as exemplified in the urban machines such as that of
Chicago's Mayor Daley; and on the third incentive, purposive or
ideological, of those who participate with a concern for issues.
. This approach was described in a classic study by James Q. Wilson of
the 'amateurs' with ideological incentives, and the 'professionals',
with monetary or career incentives. (7)
The Conservative Party has a shortage of material incentives.
The Party can offer few jobs, with very few political appointments
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when in government, a small number of jobs in the Party headquarters
but often with low pay and a lack of job security, and several
hundred jobs as local agents, with unattractive hours and not
particularly good salaries.	 There may be some M.P.s who sought a
parliamentary seat for the material benefits such as company
directorships.	 Businessmen, lawyers and estate agents may find
that the contacts made at the local Conservative Association may be
beneficial to their work, but more contacts may be made at the
Chamber of Commerce or the Rotary Club.	 The limited material
benefits that exist are unsufficient to maintain a major party
organisation.
Studies of Conservative activists suggest that ideology or
issues are not a primary explanation of their activity. 	 Rose
discovered in his study of conference resolutions that they did not
reflect extremist or ideoligical positions among activists. (8)
Bochel's study of ward secretaries of both parties in Manchester
found that half the Conservatives mentioned ideological commitment as
the cause of their Party work, but this was expressed in very general
terms such as patriotism. (9) Constituency parties tend to spend
very little time on political discussion or campaigning, but
concentrate on fund-raising and social activities.
	 A visit to
virtually any Association would confirm the low level of activity.
There are, of course, some activists who are ideologically or issue
motivated, and they may be growing in number. 	 They may hold a
special significance for the Party organisation as opinion-leaders,
as speakers and as potential candidates.
	 The existence and role of
groups such as the Bow Group, the Monday Club and the Tory Reform
Group, suggest that such people do exist, and may play an important
role in Party debate out of all proportion to their numbers.
	 They
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are essential to the party but they are not the major source of
activists and their concern with policies could positively
discourage potential members who are less concerned with issues.
The second incentive,
the key to understanding Conservative party membership and activity.
Bochel found that 41% mentioned the non-political influence of family
and friends for their participation in the party.	 The principal
satisfactions of political activity were given as personal and
social satisfactions, rather than ideology or issues.
	 34% mentioned
working for a cause; 42% helping people; 17% doing a job for the
people; 4% serving the country or community; 24% influence and
prestige; 24% organising and campaigning; and 28% social relations
and friendship.
	
(Answers total to more than 100% because many
activists mentioned more than one satisfaction). (10)No conclusive
evidence exists, but with the weakness of clear material and
ideological incentives except for a few,
the most plausible primary explanation.
This approach has to explain why people seek these social
satisfactions through party activity rather than through one of the
host of other clubs and organisations that exist.
	
Part of the
explanation may be through family and friends, as suggested in Bochel's
study.	 A more comprehensive explanation may be that the Party
represents certain basic values or symbols.	 These values or symbols
are of such a general nature, such as patriotism, stability, authority,
property, that they have little ideological contact for most members.
If this approach is correct, then it becomes essential that party
policy be viewed as compatible with these values, and that intra-party
discussion should not be so divisive as to remove or reduce the sense
of community and shared values.	 This would explain the particularly
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strong emphasis on party unity and the conduct of party debate in a
restrained form.
The lack of social satisfactions will be reflected in 'exit'
rather than 'voice' at least in terms of activity. (11)
The maintenance of party organisation primarily on solidery
incentives, together with some ideological and a few material ones,
would explain the degree of attention given within the party on the
monitoring of party opinion, not as a determinant of policy, but as
a measure of acceptability within the light of party values and the
reaction of the ideologically oriented who could, through divisiveness,
weaken these solidery incentives. 	 This acts as a major constraint
on the party leader.
The other major constraint arises from the need to provide
policies which will be electorally successful.	 The electorate is
not viewed as an undifferentiated mass, but as a collection of groups
and interests, with overlapping membership, some of which are
traditional supporters whose loyalty and turnout must be ensured,
some of which are traditional opponents amongst whom some minority
support can be expected but at least they should not be encouraged
to vote negatively, and a third group, target voters, to which the
party is especially keen to appeal, such as young people, housewives
or the upwardly mobile middle classes.
Communication with the voters can be conducted directly, through
leaflets, publications, press advertising, billboards, and radio and
television broadcasts. The impersonal nature of these contacts means
that their value is primarily of a reinforcing nature.	 A second
channel of communication is through the party organisation. 	 This
may be formalised as through the existence of organisations such as
the Women's Organisation, the Young Conservatives, the Conservative
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students, the Conservative Trade Unionists and the Small Business
Bureau.	 These organisations play a two-way role, as the spokesmen
for the party within that section of the electorate, and as a
spokesman for that section to the party.	 Much of this contact
through the party is informal, through those members who are
businessmen or farmers expressing their particular grievances. 	 The
membership becomes an important source of information on opinions and
concerns amongst the various sections of the electorate.
The informal party is another major channel of communication
with the electorate.	 The 'ginger groups' play an organisational
role in producing a home within the party for the purposive member,
but they also play an electoral role in demonstrating that the party
is open to the opinions expressed by the more issue-oriented voter.
The Bow Group plays this role "in helping to project an image of the
Conservative party as a party of thoughtful, well-educated, and
successfully young people". (Rose) (12) The Monday Club indicates to
voters concerned with immigration or law and order that the party is
responsive to their concerns, the Tory Reform Group similarly to
voters concerned with race relations and 'liberal' on penal issues.
These groups provide a voice for these opinions within the party and
help to make the party electorally acceptable to voters with those
opinions.
The functional interest groups such as the CBI and the NFU are
a measure of opinion within that sector of the electorate, and a
channel to communicate the party's views to that sector. 	 The party
gives considerable attention to these organisations, not to discover
what their party ought to do and carry it out, but to gain an
understanding of the state of the opinion within that sector as to
what would be electorally beneficial or damaging. 	 The organisations
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are not always reliable reflections of opinions within their
membership, so the party does not rely upon them exclusively.
The press is naturally another major channel between the
electorate and the party. 	 The party will try to use the press to
put across their messages to the voters, and are concerned that other
sources of reference points within the newspapers should differ from
the party's message as little as possible.
	
Attention is thus given
to leader columns in the Times, Peregrine Worsethorne in the Telegraph 
or the editorials in the Sun in case they should provide conflicting
cues to that of the party.
	
It also sees the press as a reflection
of opinion, that the press contact with some sectors of the electorate
may reflect their opinions.	 The Economist is viewed as a significant
reflection of business opinion, and the Financial Times is examined
for City opinion.
The electorate, en masse, is a difficult body both to reach and
to understand.	 Opinion polls can provide useful information on the
state of opinion in general, but provides little information on
intensity, saliency and stability of opinion. 	 None of these channels
provide reliable means to understanding the electorate, nor means to
influence them.	 All together they provide a strong, if always
imperfect, picture of the electorate to which the leader must be
sensitive.
With this picture of the party, we can return to the Conservative
Party and the European issue and assess the power of the Leader.
Party Symbols 
Part of the argument for the power of the leader on the European
issue has been based on the view that traditional party symbols and
instincts were against Europe, and yet the party was made to betray
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its symbols for this new policy. 	 Gamble argued that "The translation
of the Conservative Party from the party of Empire to the party of
Europe was one of the greatest changes in its short modern history.
It required a major reorientation of the electoral perspective of the
leadership and of the electoral ideologies of the party for it
involved a fundamental change in the conception of the Conservative
Nation and in the role of the British State". (13) Lindsay and
Harrington believed that "the whole enterprise stood in flat
contradiction to all the traditional instincts of the party", and
Butt that the application "flew in the face of most of the instincts
(14)
supporting" the party.
It was certainly the view of the anti-marketeers that three
important Conservative symbols, sovereignty, agriculture and the
Commonwealth, were to be abandoned in pursuit of Community membership.
This was well expressed in their proposed amendment to the motion at
the 1961 conference that the Government "declare its clear resolve
not to approve any proposals which involved the surrender of British
sovereignty, or are inconsistent with pledges to British agriculture
and horticulture or with the continuance by the United Kingdom of
its traditional role in the Commonwealth and world affairs". (15)
Roger Moate asked in the debate, "Surely any Amendment so fundamentally
Conservative, so essentially founded in true Tory principles, will
be accepted by the Government?". 	 The amendment was overwhelmingly
rejected.
These symbols failed to motivate widespread anti-market feeling
mainly because the pro-marketeers were able to reduce their saliency.
The 'European' response to the sovereignty issue is summed up by the
title of a pamphlet by Beamish and St. John Stevas, Sovereignty: 
(16)
substance or shadow?.
	 They argued that outside the Community,
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Britain would have the impression of sovereignty but in practice
would be dependent on decisions taken elsewhere, and that it would
be absurd to say "that we should leave NATO to regain our military
sovereignty.
	 By co-operating with allies in defence we do not
weaken, but strengthen, ourselves".	 Suez demonstrated to many that
Britain was no longer able to act independently.	 Home argued that
"outside our freedom will be less, not more.
	 It is as sovereign
members of the Community that we shall be in a position to safeguard
the future of British - all of Britain - in the years to come". (17)
Sovereignty, in terms of the ability of Britain to determine
her own future, was presented as being greater within the Community.
The argument that sovereignty would be surrendered to a
supranationalist organisation was denied by the 'Europeans'. 	 Heath
reported after a meeting with President Pompidou that "We agreed in
particular that the identity of national states should be maintained
in the framework of the developing Community...that decisions should
in practice be taken by unanimous agreement... .It provides clear
evidence that joining the Community does not entail a loss of national
identity or an erosion of essential national sovereignty". (18)The
federalist implications of membership were undermined by the
Luxembourg Compromise in 1965, reflected in the Tory Gaullism that
saw Britain as the leader of a united Europe.
	 The sovereignty symbol
was successfully defused by the 'Europeans'.
The agriculture symbol proved less potent than expected because
the indications from the spokesmen for the agricultural interest became
more ambivalent.	 In the late 1950's during the negotiations for the
Free Trade Area and EFTA, there was the appearance of unanimity
against the participation of agriculture in any European agreement.
In the early 1960's the position of agriculture was less clear cut,
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as some farmers believed that they would benefit from membership,
there was recognition of the strength of the agricultural lobby within
the Community, and a strong case was presented that agriculture
would benefit.
	 None of these things removed the fears about
agriculture, especially as the NFU took a position against membership,
but neither was the agricultural case against entry conclusive.
During the rest of the 1960's, the view that the existing system of
agricultural support would have to be replaced due to the expense,
and that import levies would be the most appropriate system, became
widely excepted in the agricultural industry, reinforced by a series
of poor Farm Price Reviews under the Labour Government. 	 In the
negotiations in the early 1970's the N.F.U. did not take a position,
as it was internally divided, and sought the best terms available,
in particular to protect those sections most likely to be damaged
like horticulture. 	 By the 1975 referendum the NFU was an enthusiastic
supporter of membership.	 Agriculture was a negative symbol for the
European cause at the beginning, remained so but less clearly in the
1961 negotiations, rapidly declined in the late sixties, appeared
neutral in 1971 and was a positive symbol in 1975.
The Commonwealth was the third negative symbol of the anti-
marketeers.	 Highly potent in the aftermath of the Empire's
contribution to the second world war, Churchill and other Empire men
such as Sandys and Leo Amery saw no contradiction between an Empire
and a European role.	 With the Schuman Plan and other experiments
with supranationalism, the Empire was a barrier to deeper European
entanglements.	 By the end of the 1950's, the Empire had become the
Commonwealth, and had lost some of its emotional appeal.	 The
Commonwealth became more identified with independent black nations
and reduced feelings of a family or community among Conservatives.
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The emotional appeal was to individual countries such as Australia
or New Zealand, but it was recognised that they were insufficient
trading partners.	 Home stated, "I could not see how the Commonwealth
could compensate us in the future or lead to an increase in our
wealth and strength, simply because all the Commonwealth countries
were bent on becoming more independent and were fast industrialising
themselves". (20) The Commonwealth declined as an emotional symbol
of family, and disappeared as a realistic alternaitve of an economic
association.
The appeal that the Commonwealth still had was not clearly
directed towards an anti-European direction, as many identified with
the Empire and Commonwealth declared that entry was also in the
interests of the Commonwealth countries. 	 Duncan Sandys, Leo Amery,
Julian Amery, John Biggs-Davison, Lord Salisbury and Geoffrey Rippon
were both Commonwealth and European men. Many of the younger men
who identified with the developing Commonwealth were pro-European,
such as David Lane at the 1961 Conference, and the Bow Group published
Rich Man's Club? arguing the benefits of membership to the developing
countries.	 The Commonwealth was a declining symbol during these
years, and was not entirely associated with an anti-market position.
The contrast between the number and strength of references to the
Commonwealth in the Tory anti-Market publications of 1961-62 and
those of 1975 is considerable.
There were several Conservative symbols which were successively
associated with Europe: peace, prosperity, anti-Communism and Britain
as a power in the world. 	 Rippon told the House of Commons, "Had
the Community existed sixty years ago with Britain as a member, who
can doubt that the tragedy of two world wars could have been
(21)
averted?".
	 Central Office polls showed that peace was a
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(22)
. powerful argument for membership amongst the electorate. 	 The
case for prosperity through membership was a major theme from the
first application, to be achieved through increased trade within
the large market that the Community would provide. 	 The need for
European unity as a balance to the power of the Soviet Union was
first presented by Churchill, and was constantly reiterated,
particularly by Home. The emergence of the European Community as
a major world power, and the influence that Britain would have
through it, was a theme of great appeal to Conservatives, stated by
Heath and Rippon in his "new empire" approach.
These Conservative symbols were successfully associated with
Europe, and the potential negative symbols were either weaker or
more ambiguous.	 The symbols and values which bind many Conservatives
to the party, as activists, members or voters, were not the obstacle
to the European case that they have been presented. Now we can turn
directly to the role played by the various elements of the party.
The Leader 
The significant role played by the Leader within the Conservative
Party is recognised, but together with its limits. 	 The security of
tenure was not as secure as frequently believed, with all the changes
in the leadership in this period at least partly due to party pressure,
and in the cases of Home and Heath largely so.	 The main significance
is that tenure does not by itself lead to the ability to make decisions
independently of the party.
The power of appointments remains a limited instrument of power.
Despite major differences between Churchill and Eden, of which their
attitudes to Europe were but an example, Churchill was unable to
remove him from his Cabinet, give him a responsibility outside of
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foreign policy, or prevent him from succeeding as Leader. Eden was
able to remove Macmillan as Foreign Secretary and replace him by the
more pliant Selwyn Lloyd, but Macmillan had to be given the major
responsibility of Chancellor, which involved a concern with trade
relations with Europe. Macmillan felt unable to carry out a major
Cabinet reshuffle until July 1960, after 3i years as Prime Minister.
This strengthened the 'Europeans' but the scepticism of Butler, Maudling
and Hailsham remained a major force and many of the new appointments
were made in order to bring in a new generation, which was also more
'European'.	 Macmillan's second major reshuffle, in July 1962, "the
Night of the Long Knives", involved the dismissal of an older
generation, including not only sceptics but also pro-marketeers such
as Lord Kilmuir, Sir David Eccles and Selwyn Lloyd. 	 Heath's
appointments to the 1970 Government have been criticised for their
exclusion of anti-marketeers, but apart from Neil Marten there is
little evidence of a deliberate exclusion policy. 	 Powell and du Cann
were excluded for reasons only marginally related to Europe. 	 The
dismissal of six spokesmen from the Shadow Cabinet by Margaret
Thatcher in 1975 did nothing to prevent unanimous support for a "yes"
campaign by the new Shadow Cabinet.	 Europe may have been a factor
in the selection of Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet appointments, but it was
negligible compared to the need to find capable and responsible people
and to satisfy the various elements within the party.
Central Office appointments were not determined by attitudes to
Europe.	 The Chairmen of the Party Organisation were appointed for
their organisational abilities rather than their policy positions.
lain Macleod played a significant role in convincing the Cabinet and
most of the party that, despite the by-election defeats, Europe was
a positive electoral asset, but his appointment was due to his
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oratorical skills. Du Cann remained Chairman after Heath's
election until September 1967 when the personality clash had become
too great.	 The Chairman of the Research Department was R.A.Butler
from 1945-1964, a period in which the Foreign Desk staff became
more and more committed to the necessity of British participation in
European co-operation. 	 Sir Michael (now Lord) Fraser was a major
figure throughout this whole period, and once he had become convinced
both of the national benefit and electoral advantage of Community
membership, he was a firm advocate of a strong Conservative pro-
European position.
The formal policy-making power of the Leader was restricted by
the need to obtain party acceptance. 	 While Churchill was personally
identified with a united Europe, he was careful not to suggest that
this was party policy and tried, if unsuccessfully, to distinguish
between his role as a spokesman for the European Movement and as
. Conservative Leader.	 While Macmillan became convinced that Britain's
best interests would lie inside the Community in early 1960, he felt
constrained to act until the spring of 1961 when the Cabinet discussed
the possibility of an application. 	 Opposition within the Party was
an important factor in the delay and, while he recognised growing
support for such a move, he still feared a split.
	 His error was in
underestimating the substantial support that already existed in the
party.	 It is this factor, rather than Macmillan's leadership skills
(valuable though they were), which explains the ease with which the
application was accepted.
The election of Heath as Leader was a sign of the desire for a
more radical, adventurous and change-oriented party profile, and
Europe was a reflection of that attitude.	 The reaffirmation of
Conservative support for entry had already occurred in the early part
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of 1965 even before Heath's election, reflected in speeches by Home
whilst still Leader. 	 Heath was no 'Eurofanatic' and his
confederalist, quasi-Gaullist views were widely shared, while he
was frequently criticised by the more committed 'Europeans' such as
Peter Kirk, for example, for his lack of emphasis on Europe in the
period running up to the 1970 election- 	 'European' policies emerged
from the working groups in opposition without any central direction,
policies on VAT, agriculture, trade union reform and social security.
When Heath did believe in a policy outside the party consensus, the
Anglo-French nuclear deterrent, despite his efforts to promote the
idea, he was completely unsuccessful in making it party policy. 	 The
problem with Heath over Europe was not that he tried to promote the
policy against the wishes of the party, but that his single-mindedness
appeared to make him neglect other interests of the party and made
him insensitive to his opponents or even the difficulties of his
supporters.
	
In the area of tactics, Heath was forced to climb down
on two questions to which he was strongly committed, an early
parliamentary vote in 1971 and the three line whip.
None of the Leaders therefore imposed a European policy against
the wishes of most of the party.	 That policy was as much a
reflection of widespread attitudes as of the personal position of the
Leader.
Cabinet/Shadow Cabinet 
All the Conservative Cabinets and Shadow Cabinets during this
period believed in Western unity as essential to counteract Communism,
and European unity was perceived as a valuable contribution to that
aim.	 Differences existed over the exact relationship of Britain to
that movement.	 During the debates on the Schuman proposals, Churchill
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acted as a chairman of the discussion rather than a leader imposing
his will.	 The eventual approach, of participation in the discussions
but without a final commitment, was a compromise. On the European
Army Eden as Foreign Affairs Spokesman was decisive in British
rejection of participation, with Churchill sympathetic to the concept
if not the specific proposals.	 The failure of the more 'European'
members of the Cabinet to promote a more active policy under Churchill
and Eden was due to their belief that European developments were
moving in a direction unacceptable to Britain, towards more
supranationalism,a customs union and agricultural free trade. 	 The
active pursuit of the Free Trade Area and the European Free Trade
Area reflected a Cabinet consensus on the need to avoid a divided
Europe.
The scepticism of some members of the Cabinet, Butler, Maudling
and Hailsham, was a significant factor in the delay in making an
application for membership.	 Their scepticism was weakened as
Butler realised that agriculture was not in unanimous opposition,
Maudling that the Economic Community was not as protectionist as he
feared, and Hailsham that the EEC still operated largely through
national governments. 	 The decision to apply by the Cabinet on 27th
July 1961 was taken unanimously with no resignations. 	 The support
of the great majority of the Cabinet, and the easing of their
concerns,was a more significant factor than pressure applied by
Macmillan in explaining the weakness of opposition within the Cabinet.
There was complete support for British entry in Heath's Shadow
Cabinet, including Powell.	 It agreed that there should be a three
line whip in support of the Labour application in 1967. 	 With the
second veto there was discussion of alternatives in December 1967, but
they accepted the recommendation from the Research Department that
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none of them was acceptable.	 Led by Home, the Shadow Cabinet would
not endorse Heath's policy of Anglo-French nuclear entente. 	 In
government, the Cabinet unanimously recommended the terms, with only
the resignation of junior ministers, Teddy Taylor and Jasper More,
and all of them were members of the Conservative Group for Europe
(except Hailsham for constitutional reasons). 	 On the tactics of a
later vote and a free vote, the Chief Whip Pym was supported by
most of the Cabinet against Heath and Rippon.
Despite a less enthusiastic 'European' as Leader, Mrs. Thatcher's
Shadow Cabinet was unanimously in favour of campaigning for a 'Yes'
vote in the 1975 referendum, and most of them played an active role.
While the exact relationship between the Leader and his senior
colleagues is difficult to establish, it is clear that major
decisions on Europe were not taken without considerable discussion,
and that the Leader was not able to establish a policy without the
support of most of his colleagues and at least the acquiescence of
the rest.
Parliamentary Party 
There was alwaysthroughout the period of this study a substantial
body of 'Europeans' within the parliamentary party. 	 In the immediate
post-war period Bob Boothby was the most well-known but by no means
the most representative of around 60 M.P.s active in the Hague
Congress, the European Movement, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, and Westminster. 	 In the 1950s they brought
attention to European developments and the need for a positive
British response, and by 1961 they had established a broad base in
the parliamentary party.	 During the years of opposition under
Heath they actively participated in the various committees on Europe,
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were critical of Heath and formed themselves into an unofficial
group under Eldon Griffiths. Through the Conservative Group for
Europe, and led by Sir Tuf ton Beamish and Norman St. John Stevas,
they played an active role during the 1971 legislation in organising
supporters, reinforcing the less Committed and influencing the
undecided. During the referendum they campaigned hard for a
favourable vote. There was nearly always a group of around 50
M.P.s promoting the European cause, not in response to the leadership
but ahead of it, evidenced in the Early Day Motion calling for
participation in the Spaak proposals in 1956, their expression of
concern in the late 1960s and their pressure for a more positive
lead in 1974.	 These M.P.s, not always the same ones, of course,
-
were in the 'vanguard' of the party on Europe.
By contrast the anti-'Europeans' were never a substantial body.
On the Schuman Plan only a couple of M.P.s spoke against participation
in the talks and only 6 abstained in the vote. 	 They were able to
obtain many signatures for pro-Empire motions but there was no clear
conflict between that and Europe. 	 Almost half of those identified
as Empire stalwarts by Finer et al also signed a pro-European motion,
and only 9 M.P.s signed the most explicitly anti-European motions. (23)
In the July 1961 vote on the application, only 1 Tory M.P. voted
against with 25 abstentions.
	 40 M.P.s were thought to be against
membership with only 12 last ditchers.
	 Despite the frustrations of
the second veto in 1967, they were unable to strengthen their numbers.
By the Third Reading of the European Communities Bill they were able
to get only 16 M.P.s in the No lobby, plus 2 abstentions.
	
In the
referendum campaign only 8 M.P.s campaigned for a No vote.
The factors leading to such a relatively weak opposition (in
numbers though not in strength of conviction) are many.
	
One group
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of factors, said to arise from the power of the Leader as discussed
in Chapter One, played only a . limited role in the prevention of more
backbench dissent.
	
The threat of dissolution was never used, and
the whip was never withdrawn or threatened from any M.P. 	 Career
aspirations may have been a factor in limiting dissent, especially
under Heath who was considered to only appoint 'Yes-men', but
Norton suggested that Heath actually encouraged dissent by this
'attitude, because "having dissented (or expressed their intention to
dissent) on an important issue, (they) perceived that their chances of
promotion were very slight indeed". (24) There is no evidence to
suggest that any M.P. was excluded from office because of his
attitude to Europe except for Neil Marten in 1970.	 Du Cann and
Powell's exclusion can be explained by other factors. 	 Patronage was
not withheld from the anti-market rebels. Harry Legge-Bourke,
Nabarro, Walker-Smith and Turton were all knighted, and Turton became
Lord Tranmire.
	 The appeal to group identity can be potent, but it
was most effective when expressed by fellow backbenchers rather than
by the whips, as in the work of the CGE in 1971. 	 Group identity
also depends on the actions of the Leader, who must demonstrate a
reciprocal concern.
	 Heath's failure to appear open to backbenchers
weakened group identity and enabled the creation of a group identity
amongst the anti-marketeers.	 The successful use of group loyalty to
achieve cohesion requires restraint by the Leader.
	
The threat of
deselection only appeared in the period of the European Communities
Bill and was initiated by the associations themselves and not by the
Leader.
Other factors limiting dissent were outside the control of the
Leader.	 The first was the lack of a leader of stature.
Hinchingbrooke and Legge-Bourke failed to provide it in the 1950s
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and Turton and Walker-Smith in the 1960s. Powell could have been
this figure after 1969, but he refused to be a group leader as a
restriction on his own independence; he was treated with suspicion
for his anti-Commonwealth views,and he was associated with other
issues, particularly race, which some anti-market M.P.s wished to
avoid. Du Cann could have played this role if his opposition had
not been so rarely articulated and so frequently expressed by an
abstention.	 By the referendum, Mel]. Marten was the only anti-market
M.P. with any claim to leadership.
	
No major figure within the
party ever emerged to lead the Tory anti-marketeers.
A second factor was their identification as extremely right-wing.
Gerald Nabarro, Anthony Fell and Ronald Bell presented a negative
image for most M.P.s.
	
This right-wing image was strengthened by the
emergence of Powell as anti-market, so that a position against
Europe was associated with a number of other issue positions. 	 The
best time to have presented a broader profile was in 1961 when there
were elements from the 'left' in Peter Walker, the 'right' in
Anthony Fell and the 'centre' in Robin Turton opposed to entry, but
they proved to be incapable of working together.
A third factor was the populist, chauvinist and reactionary
flavour of some of the anti-marketeers. 	 Expressions of hostility to
foreigners caused embarassment among many M.P.s, as did appeals to
a white Anglo-Saxon empire.	 The populist anti-parliamentary tone,
expressed by some anti-marketeers, offended and the anti-market call
for a referendum was rejected by the great majority of Tory M.P.s
An additional factor was the division of opinion within the
anti-market ranks.
	 This can be seen between those who looked to
the old Empire and those who looked to the new Commonwealth, as in
Hinchingbrooke against Walker.
	
The latter became largely alienated
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from the cause. Another source of division was over the best
alternative to Europe, whether it was to be a reformed Empire
Preference or an Atlantic Free Trade Area. A European free trade
area was attractive to many economic liberals like Powell and Biffen
who rejected an economic association based on the old Empire.
	 It
was amongst these anti-marketeers that support for a North Atlantic
tree Trade Area (NAFTA) was greatest, but the idea was disliked by
many , of the Commonwealth men, coupled with a degree of anti-
Americanism.
Finally the arguments went against them.
	 The Commonwealth
developed in a way which reduced identity with it and the possibility
of its emergence as a replacement for the Community as an economic
association.	 Sovereignty was too abstract a concept to have great
appeal, and the reality of sovereignty appeared illusory as the
effect of outside events on Britain were clearly demonstrated.
Agriculture proved not to be such an obstacle as first thought, and
indeed by 1975 the agricultural community were staunch champions of
membership.
Amongst the many factors to explain the limited nature of
dissent, some of them identified with the power of the Leader played
no significant role, while other factors beyond leadership control
were significant.
There exist many opportunities for backbenchers to express their
views on party policy, but these were exercised by' only a few to
express anti-market views. 	 Meetings of the 1922 Committee expressed
broad support for a more European policy in 1950, in 1962 and in 1971.
None of the backbench committees revolted against the policy, and
indeed some members of them wanted a more vigorous approach, with
the Parliamentary Advisory Committee in 1962, and the Committee on
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Europe (Policy Research) of 1966-68.
	 These activities provide an
opportunity in relative privacy to express opposition to the party's
European policy.	 They were not extensively used by M.P.s.
It is not suggested here that M.P.s make party policy.	 M.P.s
however do play a significant role in the determination of policy.
First they can place and keep an issue on the party's agenda as a
message must be frequently repeated before it reaches consciousness
in an environment where there are so many messages. The 'European'
M.P.s played this role during the 1950s ahead of the leadership.
Secondly, they can create a favourable environment for a policy
amongst the less committed M.P.s. 	 The 'European' M.P.s helped to
create a favourable climate amongst backbenchers that enabled
support for a free trade area, then EFTA, and finally the EEC. 	 It
was a 'softening-up' process, which created an opportunity for
Macmillan to pursue an application.	 Thirdly, personal contacts are
the most effective means of obtaining party cohesion, and the
existence of supportive backbenchers is of great value, as demonstrated
by the CGE in 1971. Finally, the backbenchers are an imperfect
reflection of attitudes throughout the party.
	 Their values,
attitudes and assessments are strongly related to their contacts
with the rest of the party, and thus can provide a useful guide to
the acceptability or otherwise of. policies throughout the party.
Backbenchers are a significant restraint on the power of the Leader.
National Union 
The National Union accepts that it is not a policy-making body,
but its concern with organisational maintenance and electoral success
means that it must be concerned with the effect of policy upon
activists, members and voters.
	
For the Leader, the National Union is
383
a major source of demonstration of party support for his policies.
While their functions are explicitly different, they cannot ignore
the activities of each other.
The Annual Party Conference is often dismissed as a controlled
event designed to ensure an image of unity, but there is considerable
evidence to show that the leadership is highly sensitive to Conference,
not so much with the actual votes on the motions but with the
resolutions submitted, the tone of the debates and the reactions of
the audiences.	 The resolutions submitted are carefully analysed for
evidence of grass root feeling, as in the Research Department report
to Party Chairman Lord Hailsham - on the 1957 Conference.
	 The motions
selected for debate are a reflection of the assessment of the
National Union Executive Committee as to what the leadership would
like to see passed, but also with regard to the fact that dull debates
attract little publicity. 	 The normal practice has been not to call
amendments, but several anti-European amendments were called. 	 The
bland nature of many of the motions cannot hide the existence of
disagreements, sometimes conducted clearly for and against the motion,
and sometimes in the interpretations placed upon a motion, so that
the spirit of the motion is debated rather than its exact phraseology.
For example, the 1960 motion called for bridge-building in Europe
but the speeches of the proposers were such that it became a debate
on EEC membership,	 The usual procedure is to call speakers
alternatively on both sides of the motion, so there is plenty of
opportunity for those opposed to party policy to express themselves.
The concern to ensure a successful outcome was well expressed
in the preparations for the 1962 conference, when a pamphlet on
Europe by Macmillan was published before the conference, much
literature was distributed before and during the conferences, and a
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letter by Winston Churchill sent to all constituency associations.
These immense efforts do not suggest that the leadership feels
totally secure that the Conference will simply endorse their
position.
All the long series of pro-European motions presented to
Conservative Conferences were passed overwhelmingly, in 1949, 1954,
1957, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1972.
Anti-European amendments were defeated in 1957, 1961 and 1962 and a
pro-European one passed in 1965.
	 The 1961 amendment reiterated
conditions already accepted by the Government, and so could have
been supported without imposing additional constraints but because
its spirit was identified as anti-'European' it was overwhelmingly
rejected.
	 The tone of the debates suggested that the pro-European
speakers were more enthusiastic than the leadership, as in the
proposers of the 1960 motion and the Y.C. contributions to the 1969
debate.
	 The audience response is difficult to assess without being
present, but personal experience of the conferences between 1971 to
1975, press reports and interventions during the speeches all
suggest strongly pro-European audiences.
The party leadership seek other ways of assessing party opinion.
The Central Council resolutions to the National Union Executive
Committee, reports by Area Agents, attendance at party conferences
and meetings, and the CPC contact reports were all used to assess
party opinion on Europe.
	 The inability to exert complete control
over party conferences is reflected in the concern expressed that
there would be few 'European' resolutions to the 1971 Central Council
and that the 1971 Scottish and Trade Union Conferences would reject
membershi p .	 In fact all these conferences voted by substantial
majorities for membership. 	 The resolutions submitted to the NUEC
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were intermittent on Europe, but almost always favourable. 	 Area
Agents were frequently requested to give an assessment of party
opinion within their area, suggesting broad but 'soft' support in
contrast to minority but 'harder' opposition.	 CPC Conferences and
Swinton College seminars were reported as overwhelmingly pro-.
European. The most extensive exercise to measure constituency
party opinion is through the CPC contact programme	 These reports,
in 1959, 1965, 1967, 1971 and 1975 all found strong support for
membership, and reflected better than other methods the opinions of
the more politically conscious members in the constituencies.
The local selection of candidates provides an opportunity for
the expression of political positions by the adoption of candidates
with the appropriate views.	 In practice, as all studies have
suggested, political views are a minor consideration in the
selection of candidates at local level. 	 (The selection of Nicholas
Winterton at Macclesfield in 1971 partially for his anti-market
views is an exception, and one that disproves the rule that dissent
leads to automatic exclusion).	 Another opportunity would be the
deselection,or threat of deselection, of the M.P. 	 The only time
this was threatened over the European issue was in 1971, and was a
reflection of personal differences between the member and the
Association.
	
All anti-market M.P.s were successfully readopted
before the 1974 election.	 The usual situation was that the
Association would make its position clear to the M.P., but respect
the Burkean notion that the M.P. should make the final decision.
The Young Conservatives are viewed as significant within the
party because they contribute a younger image for the party, provide
many workers during campaigns, are the source of future parliamentary
and local government candidates, provide a partial reflection of
386
youth opinion, and are the party's main channel to young people. The
• Y.C.s have their own well organised structure of national, area and
local conferences and committees, produce their own publications,
organise their own campaigns and are well represented on party
committees and at Conferences. When they are able to present a
coherent political position, they can be a formidable force on the
voluntary side of the party. 	 On Europe they were such a force.
• Y.C. Annual Conferences overwhelmingly approved of membership
from 1961 onwards. Many of their Swinton Seminars and area
conferences revolved around Europe. 	 Y.C. National Officers were
active on European issues, in the European Youth Campaign and Youth
for Europe, in international youth organisations such as the NEI
youth and COCDYC, and as speakers at the party Conference. 	 The
Y.C. National Advisory Committee frequently passed motions on Europe
including calls for direct elections to the European Parliament in
1972 and for a United States of Europe in 1973, and sent them as
resolutions to the Party Conference.	 They provided enthusiastic
support at the Party Conference, with 'Yes' badges in 1962, Eurodollies
in 1971 and frequent heckling of-anti-market speakers. 	 They were
active campaigners on Europe from the 1952 European Youth Campaign
to the 1975 referendum. With their own organisational structure
and decision-making process, and the latitude given'to the youth, the
Y.C.s are able to adopt policies not totally in line with party
policy.	 On Europe it was always as more 'European' than the party.
The position of the Conservative Students (formerly F.U.C.U.A. and
now F.C.S.) is very similar, with their own conferences, officers
and activities.	 They, too, were active on Europe.	 FCS conferences
in 1948, 1961, 1963, 1965 and 1971 voted overwhelmingly for entry and
later for direct elections, a European Defence Community, a European
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Democrat Party and federalism.	 The leaders were active in the
European Youth Campaign, European Democrat Students, Students for
a United Europe, Youth for Europe, the Federalist magazine and,
together with the Y.C.s, Young European Democrats. 	 They, too, spoke
for the European case at the Party Conference and conducted their
• own -campaigns.
The Women's N.A.C. was active mainly through the European Union
of Women, whose British section Chairman was automatically a
Vice-Chairman of the Women's MAC. 	 The women tend to be less
politically conscious than the youth but when they did debate Europe,
in 1956, 1958, 1965, 1969 and 1971, they voted for pro-European
resolutions.	 Europe was a constant theme of their seminars and
conferences.
The Conservative Trade Unionists (formerly TUNAC, now CTU)
mainly concern themselves with industrial issues. 	 Fears were
expressed inside the party that they might prove a source of
opposition to membership but they voted overwhelmingly for membership
at their 1962, 1971 and 1975 conferences.
The role of the National Union in policy-making is to provide
an accurate assessment of party opinion on policies so that their
impact upon the party organisation and the electorate can be assessed.
It has no role as an initiator of policy, but the leadership does
give considerable attention to party opinion.	 Much of the concern
expressed on Europe from the constituencies was based on a lack of
information to provide to supporters to ensure their future vote
and the fear that valued activists might be lost over the issue.
Most party members do not expect a major say in policy-making but
the leadership does not take their support for granted.
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Central Office 
Europe was a major theme of the work of Central Office in 1961-62,
1970-72 and 1975, and a continuous minor theme during the rest of the
period. The Research Department was almost consistently more
sympathetic to British participation in European developments than
official party policy, from the appointment of Ursula Branston to the
foreign affairs desk in 1949. 	 In a series of briefs through the
1950s, the CRD supported association with the ECSC, the EDC, the
Spaak discussions, the PTA, EFTA and, by June 1960, membership of
the EEC. Michael Fraser led the CRD to argue that entry would have
major political and electoral advantages. 	 Even after the 1963 veto,
it urged the need to keep Europe as a Conservative theme, and with
the second veto in 1967 emphasised the importance to present
membership as a long term objective. 	 The Department was eager to
conduct a public campaign as early as possible in 1971 and 1975. 	 On
policy they emphasised the long term benefits for Britain of
participation in European unity. In its briefs on short term policy,
the CRD noted the electoral benefits of successful entry and steadied
nerves in difficult periods as in the 1962 by-election defeats and
the poor opinion polls in 1971. 	 In terms of information to M.P.s,
candidates and officials, it produced more material on Europe than on
any other single issue, with a massive number of pamphlets and
publications.	 The Department was a constant promoter of the
European cause, frequently ahead of the Leader.
The Conservative Political Centre was another active promoter of
Europe, starting with the discussion brief on European unity in 1949.
The CPC published numerous pamphlets, stimulated discussion through
contact briefs and organised many conferences and seminars. 	 Swinton
College organised many weekend seminars and published articles in the
Swinton Journal on Europe. 	 The CPC staff were active 'Europeans',
including Richard Bailey, editor of the CPC newsletter in the 1950s,
Ben Paterson, Deputy Director 1965-1974, and especially Russell Lewis,
Director.
The Publicity Department produced and distributed successively
the largest quantity of leaflets on an issue ever, firstly in the
1962 campaign, then more in 1971 and finally in 1975 more than in the
general election.	 The Organisation Department was concerned with
the Maintenance of a strong electoral organisation, but also
organised a number of seminars - on Europe and provided an assessment
of party and public opinion through the Area Offices.
The Overseas Committee, concerned with foreign affairs and
party contacts with the rest of the world, has grown into the
International Office, with the status of a full Central Office
department.	 The Committee was a stronghold of the Commonwealth
influence but became more European oriented as the result of the
activities of the youth and women's sections.	 By the early 1970s
it had become a force for a more positive European approach and was
critical of the lack of leadership by Heath.
The picture that emerges is not of the CCO as simply the obedient
servant of the Leader.	 The policy-oriented parts (the CRD and the
CPC) were more positive towards Europe than the Leader and were one
element in creating and maintaining leadership support for British
membership.
The claim of the Leader's use of the CCO to impose his policy
is not supported by this study. 	 The power of appointments was
considered earlier in this chapter.	 There was little evidence that
candidates were denied a place on the Candidates List for their
anti-market views, although a couple of anti-market candidates were
removed because of their National Front or Ulster para-military
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connections.	 As discussed in Chapter 1, political considerations
are rarely a major factor in the selection of candidates. 	 The third
claim was that CCO actively worked against rebel M.P.s.
	 CCO did not
withdraw the usual services to M.P.s, the organisation of speaking
tours and the distribution of press releases. The Party Chairman
rejected complaints that the party did not distribute anti-market
literature because it was against party policy. 	 Association
opposition to anti-market M.P.s were initiated locally.
	 The meeting
between the Banbury Chairman and the Party Chairman on 14th July 1971,
to which anti-marketeers have referred, was in response to the
Association's request.
	
Central Office did welcome declarations of
support for the party's policy by the Associations of anti-market
M.P.s but did not support moves for deselection.
The explanation for the lack of Central Office activity against
rebels was the desire to minimise the damage to party unity, so that
the party organisation would be well maintained to fight an election.
Brendan Sewill, CRD Director, warned Gordon Pears that "You as a
member of the CRD must have nothing to do with activities against - or
even attempting to influence - other members of the Conservative Party.
The Research Department must serve the Party as a whole and never
get involved in arguments between different sections of the Party -
even when these involve official Party policy". (25) Kitzinger noted,
with reference to Michael Fraser the chief party manager, that "The
party organisation had to think beyond any particular issue, however
important, and beyond any one party leader, however successful. 	 It
had to steer a path between strong action against the anti-market
Conservative M.P.s and tolerance of anti-market arguments being
propagated at the expense of party funds; between bringing pressure
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to bear on M.P.s through their local Associations, and not damaging
relationships between Conservatives at the constituency level". (26)
Central Office concern with organisational maintenance ultimately
outweighed the desire to achieve maximum success on the European
issue.
Central Office is neither so firmly controlled by the Leader nor
its power over the voluntary party so great as has been suggested.
It is the shared objective of electoral success which binds the
Leader, Central Office and the constituency associations together,
and prevents greater conflict, not the hierarchical nature of the
Party.
The Informal Party 
The gfnger groups can play a useful function for the party.
They can float ideas and policies, to which the Leader is sympathetic
but not committed, and party and public response can be evaluated.
Secondly, they can organise support for the Leader's policies.
Thirdly, they can stimulate political education amongst party members
so that members are better informed about party policy.
	 Fourthly,
they provide a source of politically experienced candidates and
speakers.
	 Fifthly, they maintain contact with opinion-formers,
through their meetings, conferences and publications.
	 Finally, they
help the party to appeal to certain sectors of the electorate.
	 The
danger for the Leader is that the groups may develop into factions
which challenge the policies of the Leader rather than support them
and create an image of disunity.
	 The European debate encouraged
both the positive and negative developments.
The Bow Group, as an early supporter of British membership of the
EEC, was able to test reaction to that idea and demonstrate that there
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was considerable support within the party. The Conservative Group
for Europe organised support for membership both among backbenchers
and in the constituencies.	 The groups' conferences and publications
helped to educate party members on Europe. Members of the CGE and
the Bow Group were frequent speakers in conference debates and
constituency meetings on Europe. 	 Opinion-formers not directly
related to the party helped to strengthen the European case, for
example, Crossbow published articles by the CBI and Commonwealth
spokesmen in favour of British membership. 	 The Monday Club helped
to sustain right-wing support for the EEC and prevent the
organisation of an explicitly Powellite anti-market group. 	 Although
not controlled by the Leader, the groups acted primarily in'a
supportive role.
However, the functions that they perform by their nature
require them to be autonomous from the party, so that their ideas and
actions can be clearly distinguished from those of the party. 	 The
groups may float ideas beyond or against those of the Leader. 	 The
Bow Group and the CGE published pamphlets and articles and invited
speakers in favour of direct elections to the European Parliament and
a federal Europe, when it was known that Heath was firmly opposed to
both.	 The Anti-Common Market League, the Conservative Anti-Common
Market Information Service and Conservatives Against the Treaty of
Rome organised against party policy. Improved political education
can lead to greater questioning of party policy, as with the efforts
to raise the question of the Conservative mandate for membership in
1961 and 1971, and also by the 'Europeans' in their campaign for a
more active policy in 1974.	 The candidates and speakers from the
groups are likely to be more issue-oriented than those not involved
with the groups.	 Outside opinion-formers can influence the group
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towards more radical policies, as occurred with the growth of
federalist ideas amongst Conservatives associated with the European
Movement.	 The desire to integrate sectors of the electorate may
lead to activity within the party by people whose loyalty is primarily
to the issues and not the party, and thus reduce the sense of social
solidarity.
The ginger groups have both an integrative and disintegrative
potential, as demonstrated on the EEC issue. 	 Is Seyd correct when
he claims that the EEC is the main explanation for the factional
upsurge within the Conservative party? (27) Theevidence would
suggest that he exaggerates its role, because support for the EEC
was so broad based within the party. 	 Support for the EEC united
both the 'progressive' left and the economic right within the Bow
Group. The Monday Club was divided on Europe and it could be claimed
that the issue helped to prevent a strong explicitly Powellite group
within the party. 	 While the Tory Reform Group and its predecessors
have been firmly pro-European this issue has not served to distinguish
them from other elements of the party. The European Movement and
the Conservative Group for Europe included both left and right-wing
Conservatives, with Peter Kirk and Duncan Sandys, Norman St. John
Stevas and Julian Amery.	 There is a stronger case that the anti-
market organisations encouraged the creation of a right-wing faction,
but Norton has shown that "although a number of identifiable Members
tended to dissent persistently on a number of issues, they were often
supported by different colleagues on different occasions" and gives
(28)
the EEC as an example.	 As this study has shown, neither the
authoritarian right nor the neo-liberal right were united on the
EEC and it remains an issue which divides the right rather than
sustains it.	 The departure of Powell, with his views on race, the
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EEC and the integration of Ulster, from the party may actually have
helped the various elements of the right to co-operate together.
This study found little direct relationship between the CBI and
the NFU, and the Conservative Party. The party's interest in these
organisations arises from the degree to which they reflect business
and agricultural opinion and their reaction to party policies. The
Research Department carefully monitored their opinions on Europe, but
their role was reactive rather than initiatory. They were concerned
with the details of the negotiations, but the direction of policy was
determined by the party, whether in or out of government.
Conservative support for the Free Trade Area, EFTA and the EEC was
established when the Federation of British Industry lacked a' clear
view on these issues.	 Agricultural policy in favour of import
levies rather than Exchequer support was adopted against the wishes
of the NFU.	 While the party is interested in the views of these
organisations, it recognises that they may not accurately reflect
the views of industry and agriculture.
	
Research Department surveys
found support for the European policy was stronger in industry and
agriculture than presented by these organisations. 	 The adoption
later of enthusiastic support for the EEC by both the CBI and the
NFU would suggest that the CRD's assessment was correct.
From the point of the CBI and the NFU, contacts with the
Conservative Party are indirect.	 They are usually with Conservatives
as Government Ministers, backbenchers from constituencies with special
interests, through their local or regional organisations, through
their members who belong to the party and finally through personal
contacts.
	
Their direct influence on the party is very limited.
The Conservative-inclined press is important to the Leader as a
channel of communication to explain his policies to party activists,
395
members and voters. Nearly all of them came out in favour of the
EEC before Macmillan, and remained supporters.
	 The press was closely
monitored by the Research Department, especially the Times as a
reflection of opinion-formers, the Telegraph of party activists and
the Financial Times and Economist of business opinion. All of them
were critical of the leadership on some questions, with the Telegraph 
critical of the conditions for Commonwealth temperate foodstuffs in
1962 and the Economist of the lack of European leadership by Heath in
1974.
The exceptions were the Express and, after 1970, the Spectator.
With an extensive readership among Conservative activists and voters,
the opposition of the Express was of considerable concern. 	 The paper
first raised the issue of a mandate for membership, which was not
resolved until the 1975 referendum, and was viewed by Tory anti-
marketeers as their main means of communication with the Conservative
grass-roots.	 The party feared that Europe might prevent the paper's
endorsement in a general election, although that never happened. 	 The
CRD and the Area Agents reported the impact of the Express's campaign
in 1962, and Heath requested a response to one of their pamphlets.
The campaign demonstrated that the Leader cannot rely on the support
of a paper even as partisan as the Express.
Europe was seen by anti-marketeers as an example of how the
Leader can totally ignore public opinion, which they saw as strongly
hostile to EEC membership. 	 In an electorally-oriented party like
the Conservatives, no Leader can afford to ignore public opinion, but
public opinion is rarely clear, consistent and stable. 	 Public opinion
polls require careful interpretation.	 The polls in 1948 and 1950
showed high support for European unity, but also a lack of understanding
and a low saliency.
	 Polls in the 1950s showed support for greater
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co-operation with Europe together with a suspicion of institutional
involvement and low saliency. Evidence of high salient support
for entry amongst the target groups of the young middle class helped
to convince the CRD, lain Macleod and the Cabinet of the electoral
benefits of an application.	 Through the great volatility of public
opinion, between 1962 and 1973, support reached a high point of 62%
and a low point of 22%, James Douglas, the poll expert of the CRD,
and the Opinion Research Centre, the party's poll-taker, emphasised
that a strong campaign would swing opinion in favour of membership,
as confirmed in 1971 and 1975. Public opinion was not ignored but
carefully measured and interpreted, so that 'public opinion', in the
sense of opinion after the careful consideration of the issue, was
not seen as hostile.
Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated that, contrary to most of the
literature on Britain and Europe, the role of the Conservative Party
in the issue of European integration supports a pluralistic
interpretation of the distribution of power within the party rather
than a monolithic one. The explanation for this dispersal of power
arises from the electoral orientation of the party, which leads to
the necessity of organisational maintenance and the existence of
channels of communication between the party leadership and various
sections of the electorate. 	 This again is contrary to the view
that the catch-all nature of the party gives the Leader strong powers.
The dependence on solidary incentives to maintain the party
organisation requires a leadership sensitive to the symbols and style
that creates the sense of community within the party. 	 The need to
reach numerous sections of society creates a dependence by the Leader
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on the various means of communication with those sections, such as
the national advisory committees or the sympathetic press. A
pluralistic party is required to successfully appeal to the various
groups within the electorate. 	 Supporting evidence has been found
in the study of the Conservative Party and European integration
between 1945 and 1975.
No study of one specific issues could conclusively determine
which of the two competing models of the Conservative party is
correct. The European issue was chosen as it appeared to provide
evidence for the monolithic view. 	 This study has been able to
refute that claim. 	 Further studies of the Conservative party and
other issues would help to test the validity of the competing models.
It may be argued that a foreign policy issue such as Europe is not
representative of political issues, but normally it has been argued
that foreign policy provides more autonomy for the leadership than
domestic policy, and therefore further domestic issue studies might
be expected to support the thesis presented here.
	 An additional
useful avenue of research would be a study of the motivations of
those who join the Conservative party and those who enter or leave
party activity.	 This study hopes that it will encourage further
examination of the nature of the Conservative party.
Following Sir Karl Popper's view that it is not scientifically
possible to prove the truth but it is possible to falsify, the
conclusion of this study of the Conservative Party and European
integration 1945-1975 is that the monolithic model of the Conservative
party has been falsified with regard to the European issue, and that
the pluralist model deserves more serious attention from students of
the Conservative Party.
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